The last unknown in D-113(a2) edge provisioning. The API path was proven (read AND write), but
every new edge still needed a MANUAL GUI CLICK to mint its key -- which would have put a human in
the middle of building DC1's and DC2's edges in Stage 3. Closed.

  scripts/opnsense-mint-apikey.php         runs ON the edge; calls OPNsense's OWN model
                                           (Auth\User -> apikeys->add()) -- the exact code path
                                           the GUI's ticket button invokes
  scripts/opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh     ships it over SSH, runs it, retrieves the key, wipes
                                           the remote copies
  tests/opnsense-bootstrap-apikey/         offline harness, 8 PASS (ssh/scp stubbed)

Gauntlet ALL GREEN (54 harnesses, was 53); repo-lint 0 fail.

VERIFIED END TO END on the live Office1 edge: minted a SECOND key via the vendor model ->
GET core/firmware/status returned HTTP 200 (the vendor-minted key AUTHENTICATES) ->
POST auth/user/del_api_key/<id> -> {"result":"deleted"} -> search_api_key shows 1 row remaining
(the operator's original key, untouched throughout) -> the retired key is now REJECTED (a real
negative test, not just an absence of errors). Temp creds shredded from the jumphost. The edge is
back to its prior state.

THE DESIGN DECISION, and why the alternative was rejected: OPNsense stores API secrets as
crypt(secret,'$6$') -- SHA-512 with an EMPTY salt (verified on the live 26.1 box: the stored hash
is "$6$$" + 86 chars). We COULD mint keys offline and seed them into a bootstrap config.xml. We
deliberately DO NOT. That would couple our provisioning to a vendor hash format we would have to
keep byte-compatible forever, and a mismatch FAILS SILENTLY -- keys that simply never
authenticate, with no error at generation time. Calling the vendor's own generator has no format
to keep in sync. Same principle as D-113(a2) itself: call the interface, do not re-implement the
internals -- which is exactly what DOCFIX-191/192/193 cost us. (An offline-hash attempt was
blocked by the permission classifier mid-session; the block was correct and produced this better
design.)

GUARD CLAUSE WORTH KEEPING (harness T5): the script REFUSES to overwrite an existing creds file.
An existing file means a LIVE key on the edge; overwriting the local copy would strand it there
PERMANENTLY, because the secret is hashed on save and can never be read back. That is
unrecoverable credential loss. T5 asserts both the refusal and that the existing file is left
byte-intact. The secret is never printed -- creation is the only moment it exists in cleartext.

WHAT THIS UNBLOCKS: edge provisioning is now automatable with no human in the loop --
  boot factory nano -> D-112(c) console bootstrap (SSH + key) -> opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh
  -> opnsense-api.sh for DHCP/firewall/interfaces.
There is NO config.xml anywhere in that chain.

STILL OPEN: the template reduction itself. And the chain above raises the real question -- the
template may not need REDUCING so much as DELETING, since the console bootstrap plus the key
minter cover first contact. NOT ruled; not done unilaterally. (Note the opnsense-edge module's
config_seed volume is INSTANTIATED -- it is in tfstate -- so removing the ISO wiring is a LIVE
change, not a docs change.)

Revert: git rm the two scripts + tests/opnsense-bootstrap-apikey/ (nothing live depends on them --
the live edge's key was minted via the GUI and is unaffected).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B6Fzre1CxCY8tzwFCudu57