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dc0 MAAS region LIVE; three creds minted, consolidated and REGISTERED (SEC-027)
Region: noble + MAAS 3.7.2 + PostgreSQL 16.14 snaps, byte-identical versions to the Office1 region (checked, not assumed). regiond/rackd/apiserver ACTIVE, dhcpd INACTIVE so there is no DHCP conflict with the Office1 rack still serving that VLAN. API answers 200 on 10.12.8.6:5240 -- the address jujud could not reach at Office1, which is the whole point of D-132's amendment. Carve verified BOTH legs (the lesson of today): metal-admin 10.12.8.6 + v6 ::6, provider-public 10.12.4.6 with gw 10.12.4.1. Credentials, per operator direction: DB password, region admin password and admin API key minted ON the VM, never printed, consolidated to ~/vr1-dc0-creds/ at 0600 with sha256 digests compared to prove the copies are identical, API key format-verified parts=3. SEC-027 opened (open SEC 22->23), recording the residual argv exposure honestly -- `maas init` has no stdin or file option for --database-uri. The creds MATRIX now expects them at BOTH DCs: 5 rows per DC, a new `region` host-role token in the enum, 4 vm-secret-locations rows (definition-of-done for a new mint site), dc0's manifest declares its three. dc1's three now FAIL S2 BY DESIGN -- the forward register making dc1's absence detectable, which is what D-137 exists for. Harness 65/65 PASS, repo-lint 0 fail. Also: durable ssh aliases for DC nodes. Deployed nodes carry the MAAS-registered vr1-office1-svc key, not the rack service key, so each hop needs its own identity -- a bare `ssh -i <key> -J voffice1,<rack>` fails because -i forces one key on every hop. No credential was copied anywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvCyrwvYTTcDYnRErfMsNf |
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| creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations |
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| creds-manifests/vr1-dc0.manifest |
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| creds-matrix.tsv |
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| docs/CURRENT-STATE.md |
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| docs/security-ledger.md |
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| scripts/creds-matrix.py |
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