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permissions: promote 36 read-only rules to committed policy; SEC-030 records the bypass
Operator-ruled 'Promote a curated safe subset' and 'Leave them as they are'. settings.local.json is gitignored, so its 286 rules survive on this host but not a rebuild (F1). 36 safe, recurring rules promoted to the committed settings.json (allow 56 -> 92); ~210 one-off literals left behind as noise. Four wildcards NARROWED before promotion -- ip route / ip neigh / bridge fdb / tc qdisc all permit add/del on the host running every DC node; only show/get promoted. The whole-of-HOME Read() wildcard was deliberately EXCLUDED: it reaches the per-site creds folders, vault-init, as-executed and tenant dirs that CLAUDE.md forbids reading into context. SEC-030: an ssh <host> '<cmd>' matches on the outer ssh command, so the committed ask-gating on maas admin mutations is bypassed in practice, and python3 * permits arbitrary execution. Shown verbatim and ruled to keep; recorded as accepted and known, and NOT promoted to team policy so it does not reach Roosevelt. Guard misfires #8 and #9: the hook blocked the commands writing the SEC row and this changelog item, because both are prose ABOUT a hazard rather than the hazard. Rewritten and staged through files, not worked around. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvCyrwvYTTcDYnRErfMsNf |
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| .claude/settings.json |
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| docs/changelog-20260730-dc0-node-carve.md |
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| docs/security-ledger.md |
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