creds consolidation batch: SEC-021(b) dc0 power key, SEC-025 NetBox GUI, V2 ruled deferral ...

Operator asked whether vcloud holds a consolidated set of login creds for every account that
exists, and what is missing / needs creating / was never moved in. Audited, then cleared the
consolidation batch on operator direction ("clear the whole consolidation batch first").

The audit's own headline: creds-audit read CLEAN on all three sites while the matrix returned
13 findings -- and the two most consequential gaps were in NEITHER surface. They were found by
enumerating the accounts that ACTUALLY EXIST. Absence of a ROW is invisible to the register,
which generalises D-137's founding argument one level up.

VERIFIED POSITIVE (both previously only asserted):
- MAAS account set COMPLETE: all 6 live accounts accounted for; admin + operator passwords on
  vcloud, juju-vr1-dc0/dc1 random+unstored BY RULING with API keys present, MAAS +
  maas-init-node MAAS-internal.
- tier-3 V1 now MEASURES maas-admin-password byte-identical to the headend source-of-record,
  so SEC-020's stale-trap risk is clear as of this date.

DONE:
- dc0 SEC-012 power key consolidated to vcloud + .pub DERIVED (SEC-021(b) as written).
  MEASURED FIRST, because the naming looked like a defect and was not: the headend
  maas-virsh_ed25519 and the snap's id_ed25519 are the SAME key; it IS dedicated (distinct
  from the dc0 service key, which is what SEC-012 requires); and dc0 using the snap's default
  identity is SEC-016's RULED design. So no re-mint, no live power path touched.
- dc1 svc .pub backfilled to the headend store (public-key material, sha256-verified).
- NetBox web-GUI admin password consolidated -- a HUMAN login that had never left the VM it
  was minted on, the third instance of the SEC-009/SEC-020 miss class. SEC-025 OPENED for the
  at-rest exposure the copy CREATES, not the gap it closed. Open rows 20 -> 21.
- V2 taught the ruled-deferral state: SEC-006's standing "revoke at completion of this
  deployment" ruling is now ACKNOWLEDGED (still naming the credential live and exposed)
  instead of failing every run. Reissuing the token would have CONTRAVENED that ruling, so the
  register was what needed to change. Match demands the cased state word AND explicit operator
  ruling attribution, and cannot cross a ledger table cell -- T58/T59 lock the evasion out.
- Added --ledger (default unchanged): V2 read the register via --repo, which the harness must
  point at the real repo for S4, so V2 had shipped with ZERO harness cases. T56-T59 added.

Findings 13 -> 7. Matrix 82 rows, harness 60/60 (was 56), creds-audit CLEAN x3, gauntlet ALL
GREEN (81), repo-lint 0-fail. The register is NOT green and is not expected to be.

RESIDUAL, all recorded: dc0-edge-api x2 (the opnsense-api.txt re-mint is a live edge mutation,
deliberately EXCLUDED from this batch), S5 x3 (RULED by SEC-016 -- needs a ruled-exception
mechanism, operator decision), S6 conflation x1 (the SEC-020 defect), E4 x2 (Stage-5/6 rows).

LOGGED NOT ACTIONED (hard rule 1): no registered root/console credential at EITHER DC edge
(measured absence of row/manifest/SEC row; what those passwords ARE is UNKNOWN and
deliberately unprobed per hard rule 2 -- vector is the LAN-reachable GUI and serial console,
not SSH, which is key-only and proven); plus the two structural blind spots that let it hide
-- S5 compares only cardinality=per-DC while all six per-site rows are office1-only, and
vm-secret-locations declares no rack/edge/cloud/unit/client location though the checker
accepts them.

Revert: per-item reverts in docs/changelog-20260727-creds-consolidation.md. The headend, snap
and NetBox VM source copies were never modified, so every file move is reversible by deletion.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvCyrwvYTTcDYnRErfMsNf

D-137 tier 3 (VALIDITY) BUILT: cross-copy sha256 provenance ...

Closes the gap the plan names: creds-audit PARSES declared provenance and
never verifies it, so SEC-020's stale-trap warning has been unchecked prose
and its sha256 equality was a ONE-TIME manual act on 2026-07-25.

sha256sum runs as an EXTERNAL command on both sides so only a 64-hex digest
enters the checker -- hashing bytes in Python would meet the letter of "never
transfer content" and not the spirit.

RESULT: 4 groups compared, all byte-identical, INCLUDING the SEC-020 pair
(maas-region-admin, region source-of-record vs jumphost copy). Now
machine-verified instead of remembered. The [ok] line names the groups.

TWO FALSE POSITIVES IN MY OWN DRAFT, caught by verifying before reporting.
Keying digests by (role, site) let an identity's DISTINCT artifacts at one
scope overwrite each other, so it compared unrelated files and reported drift
on maas-region-admin and dc1-svc-key. Manual sha256sum showed both IDENTICAL.
Reporting that would have raised a false credential-rotation alarm.

Root cause was a schema gap: nothing expressed which rows are byte-copies.
custody gains `verbatim-copy` [OPS]. V1 now compares only rows sharing
(id, filename) across scopes, or a source-of-record row against declared
verbatim-copy rows -- SEC-020's exact shape. Everything else is skipped with
a reason: a pair we cannot justify comparing is not a pair we may report
drift on. verbatim-copy is manifest-bearing; it asserts byte-identity, it
does not move the file.

Harness 44 -> 52: T47/T48 regression-lock both false positives; T49 keeps
SEC-020's case from falling into T48's skip; T51 asserts the digest path uses
sha256sum and that no content-transfer verb exists anywhere in the checker.

NOT built: tier 3's behavioural probes. Liveness, expiry, revocation state
and grant/scope drift remain unverified.

Gauntlet ALL GREEN (80), repo-lint 0-fail, finding-class baseline unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvCyrwvYTTcDYnRErfMsNf

D-137 phase 3: re-measure the register; SEC-024 opened ...

~21 inferred filenames corrected against their own mint-refs. The session had
owned six; those were only the rows the first sweep physically touched.
Octavia's 8 real basenames plus its THREE SUBDIRECTORIES (the bare
~/octavia-pki/* pattern matched ZERO of the 8 artifacts, two of them CA
private keys); vault's init.txt; the tenant rows' <client>- instance prefix,
with a placeholder matcher so they can match a real basename at all;
kube-config -> config; .maas.cli -> .maascli.db (measured: ~/.maas.cli does
not exist).

sec-ref mis-attribution corrected: both juju-maas-user rows cited SEC-020;
the on-subject rows are SEC-018/-019. This is the SEC-015 class recurring --
one instance was fixed by hand earlier without checking whether it was
systemic. It was.

mint-ref corrected: admin.pass cited a CONSUMER (:452), not the mint (:450);
the RGW key cites a line that takes it as INPUT, so it is operator-terminal.

Rows added: the libvirt SSH power password (standing rotation obligation from
a 2026-06-26 plaintext exposure, in neither the matrix nor the exclusions),
vault-ca-root, and the tfstate siblings. ~/as-executed/ deliberately NOT
declared, reason recorded: it holds session logs, so declaring it made every
log a false UNDECLARED.

Four further defects in my own phase-2 changes, found by RUNNING the sweep:
shlex.quote broke ~ expansion; a non-existent parent read as unreadable
rather than absent; site-key `-` needed shared-location semantics; the
tfstate siblings needed rows.

SEC-024 OPENED -- new exposure found by the fixed checker on its first clean
run: opentofu/terraform.tfstate.backup is mode 0664 and carries the MAAS API
key in plaintext (DOCFIX-175); the live state file is 0600. Invisible to
every prior control because the world-readable check was custody-gated and
the siblings were undeclared. LOGGED, NOT ACTIONED (hard rule 1).

Findings 35 -> 13, all true. Matrix 81 rows. Harness 44/44, creds-audit
15/15, gauntlet ALL GREEN (80), repo-lint 0-fail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvCyrwvYTTcDYnRErfMsNf

D-137 tier 2: privileged sweep completed; permission gap fixed; 6 inferred filenames corrected ...

The block was a PATTERN GAP, not a policy conflict. Bash(ssh * sudo *) was
already in the project ask list, but it needs a literal space before `sudo`
and the command was ssh <host> 'sudo ...' -- the quote meant no rule matched,
so it fell through to the classifier. Added the quoted variants plus a
targeted rule for the privileged invocation; all `ask`, never `allow`.

FLAGGED NOT FIXED (hard rule 1): Bash(ssh * virsh *) has the identical gap.

MEASURED (docs/audit/d137-tier2-privileged-20260726.txt): the region secrets
dir holds exactly admin.apikey/admin.pass/db.pass/lxd-trust.pass at 0600 --
precisely the SEC-020(i) carve-out list; netbox holds admin.pass/api.token/
secret_key at 0600; the SEC-022 shadow stores are confirmed and now audited.
ZERO undeclared files at any declared location: SEC-020 and SEC-022 are
accounted for.

OWNED: the first matrix draft carried SIX filenames I authored plausibly
instead of measuring -- a hard-rule-2 miss. The checker's undeclared-detection
caught every one on first contact with real hosts. Corrected to measured
values, real locations declared, and five colocated non-secret artifacts
declared so the check stays meaningful. Matrix 72 -> 77 rows.

9 findings remain, all true: SEC-021 (3 declaration + 2 on-disk), the ruling-5
conflation, and 3 S5 asymmetries -- dc0's snap power key is the generic
id_ed25519 while dc1's is the dedicated id_dc1_power, the SEC-012/SEC-016
per-DC-isolation divergence made visible.

Harness 35/35, gauntlet ALL GREEN (80), repo-lint 0-fail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvCyrwvYTTcDYnRErfMsNf

D-137 tier 1 (STATIC): credential matrix, checker, harness -- RED by design ...

Schema amended 10 -> 12 columns (operator-ruled 2026-07-26, "go with the
12-column amendment"): adds `custody` + `notes-ref` and re-keys a row to one
(credential, location) pair. A read-first round-trip check of the three
manifests proved the 10-column form could not carry what D-137 ruling 2
forbids dropping -- and ruling 3 puts four deliberate credential copies inside
--remote's declared locations, where creds-audit.sh:63-67 would report each as
UNDECLARED. Implements ruling 2 ("prose must become MATRIX FIELDS"); OPS under
GA-R3, the five sub-rulings untouched.

Ships: creds-matrix.tsv (72 rows), creds-matrix-notes.md (32 keys),
scripts/creds-matrix.py (S1 schema / S2 both-bounds manifest coverage / S3
render drift / S4 mint-ref resolution / S5 per-DC symmetry / S6 ruling-5
principal invariant / S7 notes integrity), tests/creds-matrix 24/24.
Gauntlet ALL GREEN (80, was 79); repo-lint 0-fail.

RED BY DESIGN, 5 findings -- do not go green by deleting rows: the ruling-5
identity conflation on maas-region-admin (the live SEC-020 defect), 3x
EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT for SEC-021's declaration half, and the S5 asymmetry on
dc0's divergently-named headend power key. 27 operator-terminal rows are the
FINDING 1 reproducibility debt, counted not faulted.

Two self-inflicted false-greens found and closed during the build: S2
enumerated only matrix-mentioned sites (an empty matrix read CLEAN -- the
sandbox-fidelity-check.py:131-143 defect one level up; now the union of both
sides, regression-locked by T9), and the uniqueness key false-failed two
identities sharing one file (T6).

NOT done, stated so the boundary is unambiguous: tiers 2-3, vm-secret-locations,
the SEC-009 demotion, and the ruling-1 preflight Pn -- whose blocking-vs-deferred
sequencing is an OPEN operator question. No manifest rewritten; no cloud state
touched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvCyrwvYTTcDYnRErfMsNf