creds consolidation batch: SEC-021(b) dc0 power key, SEC-025 NetBox GUI, V2 ruled deferral ...

Operator asked whether vcloud holds a consolidated set of login creds for every account that
exists, and what is missing / needs creating / was never moved in. Audited, then cleared the
consolidation batch on operator direction ("clear the whole consolidation batch first").

The audit's own headline: creds-audit read CLEAN on all three sites while the matrix returned
13 findings -- and the two most consequential gaps were in NEITHER surface. They were found by
enumerating the accounts that ACTUALLY EXIST. Absence of a ROW is invisible to the register,
which generalises D-137's founding argument one level up.

VERIFIED POSITIVE (both previously only asserted):
- MAAS account set COMPLETE: all 6 live accounts accounted for; admin + operator passwords on
  vcloud, juju-vr1-dc0/dc1 random+unstored BY RULING with API keys present, MAAS +
  maas-init-node MAAS-internal.
- tier-3 V1 now MEASURES maas-admin-password byte-identical to the headend source-of-record,
  so SEC-020's stale-trap risk is clear as of this date.

DONE:
- dc0 SEC-012 power key consolidated to vcloud + .pub DERIVED (SEC-021(b) as written).
  MEASURED FIRST, because the naming looked like a defect and was not: the headend
  maas-virsh_ed25519 and the snap's id_ed25519 are the SAME key; it IS dedicated (distinct
  from the dc0 service key, which is what SEC-012 requires); and dc0 using the snap's default
  identity is SEC-016's RULED design. So no re-mint, no live power path touched.
- dc1 svc .pub backfilled to the headend store (public-key material, sha256-verified).
- NetBox web-GUI admin password consolidated -- a HUMAN login that had never left the VM it
  was minted on, the third instance of the SEC-009/SEC-020 miss class. SEC-025 OPENED for the
  at-rest exposure the copy CREATES, not the gap it closed. Open rows 20 -> 21.
- V2 taught the ruled-deferral state: SEC-006's standing "revoke at completion of this
  deployment" ruling is now ACKNOWLEDGED (still naming the credential live and exposed)
  instead of failing every run. Reissuing the token would have CONTRAVENED that ruling, so the
  register was what needed to change. Match demands the cased state word AND explicit operator
  ruling attribution, and cannot cross a ledger table cell -- T58/T59 lock the evasion out.
- Added --ledger (default unchanged): V2 read the register via --repo, which the harness must
  point at the real repo for S4, so V2 had shipped with ZERO harness cases. T56-T59 added.

Findings 13 -> 7. Matrix 82 rows, harness 60/60 (was 56), creds-audit CLEAN x3, gauntlet ALL
GREEN (81), repo-lint 0-fail. The register is NOT green and is not expected to be.

RESIDUAL, all recorded: dc0-edge-api x2 (the opnsense-api.txt re-mint is a live edge mutation,
deliberately EXCLUDED from this batch), S5 x3 (RULED by SEC-016 -- needs a ruled-exception
mechanism, operator decision), S6 conflation x1 (the SEC-020 defect), E4 x2 (Stage-5/6 rows).

LOGGED NOT ACTIONED (hard rule 1): no registered root/console credential at EITHER DC edge
(measured absence of row/manifest/SEC row; what those passwords ARE is UNKNOWN and
deliberately unprobed per hard rule 2 -- vector is the LAN-reachable GUI and serial console,
not SSH, which is key-only and proven); plus the two structural blind spots that let it hide
-- S5 compares only cardinality=per-DC while all six per-site rows are office1-only, and
vm-secret-locations declares no rack/edge/cloud/unit/client location though the checker
accepts them.

Revert: per-item reverts in docs/changelog-20260727-creds-consolidation.md. The headend, snap
and NetBox VM source copies were never modified, so every file move is reversible by deletion.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvCyrwvYTTcDYnRErfMsNf

D-137 tier 2: local half blocking in P5; --pending-stage -> coupled projection ...

Two operator decisions, both taking the recommendation.

GATE SHAPE: local-only blocking, remote operator-run. preflight P5 now runs
creds-matrix.py --tier2 -- tier 1 STATIC plus tier 2 LOCAL, hermetic (no ssh,
no sudo). It already catches SEC-021's three dc0 on-disk absences without
leaving the jumphost. The remote half stays an operator-run check at
DC-standup close and stage close.

Wiring --remote --privileged into the deploy gate would let a host outage, a
NOPASSWD change, or a MAAS snap refresh turn the gate red for reasons that
are not about credentials, and a gate that fails environmentally is one
people learn to bypass. The repo already made this call once
(run-tests-all.sh:7-8, "different cadence"), and preflight already shows the
failure mode: P4 reads "MAAS unreachable" because it runs on vcloud while
MAAS lives on the headend.

STAGE INPUT: --pending-stage replaced by creds-manifests/stages-reached, a
machine-readable projection of CURRENT-STATE, coupled by new repo-lint L12
(the L10 pattern). A hand-typed gate parameter can be widened silently, and
GA-R1 puts status in CURRENT-STATE alone. A drifted projection would make the
gate defer REAL absences -- a false green.

Exhaustive both ways: an unclassified mint-stage is a hard FAIL, a
classified-but-unused one is a stale-declaration FAIL. That caught `stage4`
immediately -- Stage 4 is open and executing but mints no credential.

Self-inflicted break caught by the existing harness: I first renamed L10's
message to "L10/L12", breaking five cases that grep the established L10 id.
Reverted -- new rules get their own message id, they do not rebrand old ones.

Harnesses: creds-matrix 52 -> 56, repo-lint 45 -> 47, preflight 10.
Gauntlet ALL GREEN (80), repo-lint 0-fail, baseline unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvCyrwvYTTcDYnRErfMsNf

D-137 tier 3 (VALIDITY) BUILT: cross-copy sha256 provenance ...

Closes the gap the plan names: creds-audit PARSES declared provenance and
never verifies it, so SEC-020's stale-trap warning has been unchecked prose
and its sha256 equality was a ONE-TIME manual act on 2026-07-25.

sha256sum runs as an EXTERNAL command on both sides so only a 64-hex digest
enters the checker -- hashing bytes in Python would meet the letter of "never
transfer content" and not the spirit.

RESULT: 4 groups compared, all byte-identical, INCLUDING the SEC-020 pair
(maas-region-admin, region source-of-record vs jumphost copy). Now
machine-verified instead of remembered. The [ok] line names the groups.

TWO FALSE POSITIVES IN MY OWN DRAFT, caught by verifying before reporting.
Keying digests by (role, site) let an identity's DISTINCT artifacts at one
scope overwrite each other, so it compared unrelated files and reported drift
on maas-region-admin and dc1-svc-key. Manual sha256sum showed both IDENTICAL.
Reporting that would have raised a false credential-rotation alarm.

Root cause was a schema gap: nothing expressed which rows are byte-copies.
custody gains `verbatim-copy` [OPS]. V1 now compares only rows sharing
(id, filename) across scopes, or a source-of-record row against declared
verbatim-copy rows -- SEC-020's exact shape. Everything else is skipped with
a reason: a pair we cannot justify comparing is not a pair we may report
drift on. verbatim-copy is manifest-bearing; it asserts byte-identity, it
does not move the file.

Harness 44 -> 52: T47/T48 regression-lock both false positives; T49 keeps
SEC-020's case from falling into T48's skip; T51 asserts the digest path uses
sha256sum and that no content-transfer verb exists anywhere in the checker.

NOT built: tier 3's behavioural probes. Liveness, expiry, revocation state
and grant/scope drift remain unverified.

Gauntlet ALL GREEN (80), repo-lint 0-fail, finding-class baseline unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvCyrwvYTTcDYnRErfMsNf

D-137 phase 3: re-measure the register; SEC-024 opened ...

~21 inferred filenames corrected against their own mint-refs. The session had
owned six; those were only the rows the first sweep physically touched.
Octavia's 8 real basenames plus its THREE SUBDIRECTORIES (the bare
~/octavia-pki/* pattern matched ZERO of the 8 artifacts, two of them CA
private keys); vault's init.txt; the tenant rows' <client>- instance prefix,
with a placeholder matcher so they can match a real basename at all;
kube-config -> config; .maas.cli -> .maascli.db (measured: ~/.maas.cli does
not exist).

sec-ref mis-attribution corrected: both juju-maas-user rows cited SEC-020;
the on-subject rows are SEC-018/-019. This is the SEC-015 class recurring --
one instance was fixed by hand earlier without checking whether it was
systemic. It was.

mint-ref corrected: admin.pass cited a CONSUMER (:452), not the mint (:450);
the RGW key cites a line that takes it as INPUT, so it is operator-terminal.

Rows added: the libvirt SSH power password (standing rotation obligation from
a 2026-06-26 plaintext exposure, in neither the matrix nor the exclusions),
vault-ca-root, and the tfstate siblings. ~/as-executed/ deliberately NOT
declared, reason recorded: it holds session logs, so declaring it made every
log a false UNDECLARED.

Four further defects in my own phase-2 changes, found by RUNNING the sweep:
shlex.quote broke ~ expansion; a non-existent parent read as unreadable
rather than absent; site-key `-` needed shared-location semantics; the
tfstate siblings needed rows.

SEC-024 OPENED -- new exposure found by the fixed checker on its first clean
run: opentofu/terraform.tfstate.backup is mode 0664 and carries the MAAS API
key in plaintext (DOCFIX-175); the live state file is 0600. Invisible to
every prior control because the world-readable check was custody-gated and
the siblings were undeclared. LOGGED, NOT ACTIONED (hard rule 1).

Findings 35 -> 13, all true. Matrix 81 rows. Harness 44/44, creds-audit
15/15, gauntlet ALL GREEN (80), repo-lint 0-fail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvCyrwvYTTcDYnRErfMsNf

D-137 phase 2: fix the eight confirmed false-greens, regression-lock each ...

Tier 2 is now scoped by (host-role, SITE-KEY). Keying on role alone merged
all three jumphost creds folders into one basename namespace, so a credential
present at ANY site satisfied the row for EVERY site -- how SEC-021's dc0
opnsense-api.txt absence passed a green sweep while tier 1 flagged it. Four
committee lenses converged on this. vm-secret-locations gains a site column.

Also fixed, each reproduced by the committee and each now regression-locked:
- probe_remote called a successfully-read location UNREACHABLE when its glob
  matched nothing, gating the role and turning every absence FAIL there into
  an [ok]; a __DONE__ liveness marker now separates "ran, found nothing" from
  "could not reach".
- literal-file locations skipped absent/unreadable detection entirely (the
  T33 false green surviving in the other path form).
- an EMPTY locations list bypassed ruling 3's refusal.
- a zero-row matrix reported clean over the empty set.
- a mint-ref pointing at a directory crashed with exit 1 -- indistinguishable
  from findings -- and skipped S5/S6/S7, silently dropping the conflation and
  asymmetry findings.
- mode enforcement was custody-gated, leaving 43 of 77 rows unchecked
  including the SEC-020 and SEC-022 stores; a world-readable check now
  applies at any custody.
- S5's dc1->dc0 direction was untested; deleting it left the harness green.
- rows with no declared location for their scope are disclosed, not skipped.
- declared paths/targets are charset-validated and shell-quoted: an
  unvalidated `;` reached a remote shell, under sudo when --privileged.
- creds-audit sprawl globs now cover dotfiles; the prior widening could not
  see .admin.pass, the dotfile sibling of its own motivating secret.

T24 replaced with a checked-in finding-CLASS baseline. The old form grepped
for the literal "IDENTITY CONFLATION", so REMEDIATING that defect would have
turned the gauntlet red for whoever did the right thing -- making "edit the
test" the cheapest response exactly when the guard mattered.

Harness 35 -> 43, creds-audit 13 -> 15, gauntlet ALL GREEN (80), lint 0-fail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvCyrwvYTTcDYnRErfMsNf

D-137 tier 2: live read-only sweep + two probe false-greens it exposed ...

SEC-021's ON-DISK half REPRODUCED: vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519{,.pub} are
genuinely absent from the dc0 jumphost creds folder, not merely undeclared.
Capture: docs/audit/d137-tier2-sweep-20260726.txt (read-only, no sudo,
stat-over-ssh metadata only; jumphost + voffice1 + office1-netbox).

Running it against real hosts exposed two false-greens in the probe:

1. "absent" vs "could not look". /root/maas-secrets and /root/netbox-secrets
   reported "does not exist" -- they exist; SEC-020 is precisely about
   admin.pass living in the first. An unprivileged [ -d ] on a root-owned
   parent is indistinguishable from a missing directory. The probe now tests
   parent traversability and reports UNREADABLE as a FAIL, not a skip.

2. Role-level aggregation manufactured false absences: skipping one location
   let a role's other locations cover it, so credentials in the unprobed
   location reported EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT. Absence is now asserted only over
   fully-probed roles (14 rows report NOT JUDGED). Refinement: "absent" is a
   conclusive observation and does not gate a role; only unreadable and
   unreachable do.

Harness 33 -> 35 (T33 unreadable location, T34 absent location).
Gauntlet ALL GREEN (80), repo-lint 0-fail.

OUTSTANDING: the two root-owned dirs need a privileged read, so SEC-022's
shadow-store contents and the SEC-020 region secrets stay UNCONFIRMED. That
is a remote-sudo shape and was not run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvCyrwvYTTcDYnRErfMsNf

D-137 tier 2 (EXISTENCE): declared-location bound, existence checks, widened globs ...

Tooling only -- the LIVE three-site sweep has NOT run, so SEC-021's on-disk
half, SEC-022 and SEC-023 are not yet reproduced as live findings.

creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations (ruling 3): the absolute bound on
discovery. Covers the jumphost creds folders, the SEC-022 headend shadow
stores, the SEC-020 region secrets dir, the three dirs outside the SEC-009
convention, plus two the ruling's note did not name -- the in-clone PKI
overlay and the DOCFIX-175 plaintext tfstate. Tenant dirs are LOCAL-only:
no tenant VM/project/host is reachable from this file, so D-069 holds by
construction rather than by good behaviour. `<repo>` is substituted at
runtime (D-110: the repo name is never hardcoded).

creds-matrix.py --tier2 [--remote]: E1 expected-but-absent, E2 mode, E3
undeclared-at-a-declared-location. Probes are `stat` over ssh -- metadata
only, never content. An unreachable host SKIPS with an explicit [ok],
because "could not look" must never read as "nothing there".
--pending-stage is supplied by the CALLER so a not-yet-reached mint stage
defers instead of failing; encoding which stages have run would put a
status claim in code, and GA-R1 puts status in CURRENT-STATE only.

creds-audit.sh sprawl globs widened for the SEC-023 blind spots
(admin.pass, *.apikey, *.key, *.pem, *_ed25519, *_rsa, *openrc*). The old
six patterns could not have matched the SEC-020 secret that sat undetected
12 days, any bare SSH key or PEM, or the predicted Stage-5 ~/admin-openrc.

Harnesses: creds-matrix 33/33 (8 new tier-2 cases), creds-audit 13/13
(was 7; five blind-spot fixtures plus T13 asserting the widening did NOT
become trigger-happy). Gauntlet ALL GREEN (80), repo-lint 0-fail.

FLAGGED DIVERGENCE from the plan's Files list: --remote is implemented in
creds-matrix.py, not creds-audit.sh. Tier 2 IS the preflight Pn and the
matrix plus locations list both live there; splitting it would mean two
implementations of one bounded walk. Ruling 3 names a bound, not a script.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvCyrwvYTTcDYnRErfMsNf

D-137 tier 1 (STATIC): credential matrix, checker, harness -- RED by design ...

Schema amended 10 -> 12 columns (operator-ruled 2026-07-26, "go with the
12-column amendment"): adds `custody` + `notes-ref` and re-keys a row to one
(credential, location) pair. A read-first round-trip check of the three
manifests proved the 10-column form could not carry what D-137 ruling 2
forbids dropping -- and ruling 3 puts four deliberate credential copies inside
--remote's declared locations, where creds-audit.sh:63-67 would report each as
UNDECLARED. Implements ruling 2 ("prose must become MATRIX FIELDS"); OPS under
GA-R3, the five sub-rulings untouched.

Ships: creds-matrix.tsv (72 rows), creds-matrix-notes.md (32 keys),
scripts/creds-matrix.py (S1 schema / S2 both-bounds manifest coverage / S3
render drift / S4 mint-ref resolution / S5 per-DC symmetry / S6 ruling-5
principal invariant / S7 notes integrity), tests/creds-matrix 24/24.
Gauntlet ALL GREEN (80, was 79); repo-lint 0-fail.

RED BY DESIGN, 5 findings -- do not go green by deleting rows: the ruling-5
identity conflation on maas-region-admin (the live SEC-020 defect), 3x
EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT for SEC-021's declaration half, and the S5 asymmetry on
dc0's divergently-named headend power key. 27 operator-terminal rows are the
FINDING 1 reproducibility debt, counted not faulted.

Two self-inflicted false-greens found and closed during the build: S2
enumerated only matrix-mentioned sites (an empty matrix read CLEAN -- the
sandbox-fidelity-check.py:131-143 defect one level up; now the union of both
sides, regression-locked by T9), and the uniqueness key false-failed two
identities sharing one file (T6).

NOT done, stated so the boundary is unambiguous: tiers 2-3, vm-secret-locations,
the SEC-009 demotion, and the ruling-1 preflight Pn -- whose blocking-vs-deferred
sequencing is an OPEN operator question. No manifest rewritten; no cloud state
touched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvCyrwvYTTcDYnRErfMsNf