diff --git a/docs/CURRENT-STATE.md b/docs/CURRENT-STATE.md
index d135e67..4c0d451 100644
--- a/docs/CURRENT-STATE.md
+++ b/docs/CURRENT-STATE.md
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@
 | G11 | Operator signs THIS document | [R] read top-to-bottom; discrepancies resolved in the document | operator | CLOSED: RE-SIGNED 2026-07-19 at audit exit, section 11 (replaces the 2026-07-18 signature) |
 | G12 | `vr1-dc1` build | [R] operator rules dc1 transit/rack addressing; then vars + substrate authored | operator | HELD (`docs/dc0-deploy-readiness.md:100-103`) |
 | G13 | D-129 residuals | [R] operator-gated live plugin install on the edge; qga channel retrofit at next scheduled edge restart; 4 sub-decisions (section 8) | operator | OPEN / PARTIALLY RULED (`docs/design-decisions.md:4017`) |
-| G14 | 7 OPEN SEC rows (SEC-001, -003..-008; SEC-010 CLOSED 2026-07-20, operator-ruled, applied+verified both transit ends) | [R] per-row: rotations/flips at v1 close (external to VR1 track) | operator / external | `docs/security-ledger.md` (register of record, GA-R4/F3); count re-verified vs `bash scripts/ledger-scan.sh` 2026-07-20 |
+| G14 | 9 OPEN SEC rows (SEC-001, -003..-008, plus SEC-012 + SEC-013 opened 2026-07-20 for credentials this deploy created; SEC-010 CLOSED 2026-07-20, operator-ruled, applied+verified both transit ends) | [R] per-row: rotations/flips at v1 close (external to VR1 track); SEC-012 also carries a SCOPE question (libvirt-group grant is broader than the power verbs MAAS needs), SEC-013 is tied to whether `opentofu/vr1-dc0-maas` is retired | operator / external | `docs/security-ledger.md` (register of record, GA-R4/F3); count re-verified vs `bash scripts/ledger-scan.sh` 2026-07-20 |
 | G15 | D-068 / D-071 rulings | [R] operator rules (section 8); neither blocks the VR1 substrate | operator | PROPOSED/OPEN (status lines, section 8) |
 
 ## 7. Version pins (measured; the authority for every pin)
diff --git a/docs/security-ledger.md b/docs/security-ledger.md
index e7b4f5c..8ec10fd 100644
--- a/docs/security-ledger.md
+++ b/docs/security-ledger.md
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 | SEC-008 | 2026-07-13 | `~/vr1-office1-creds/tailscale-authkey.txt` (vcloud, 0600) -- the operator's 48-char Tailscale auth key for the SELF-HOSTED control plane `tailscale.baldurkeep.com`. Used to enrol `office1-tailscale`. Consumed BY PATH and never printed into a session; the copy shipped to the node was SHREDDED after `tailscale up` (tailscaled holds its own node key now). | 2026-07-13 Office1 Tailscale enrolment; docs/vr1-office1-as-built.md | operator | OPEN -- ROTATION obligation, not a delete-me: the key is still on vcloud for re-enrolment. Revoke/reissue on the control server at v1 close, or immediately if vcloud is rebuilt or shared. |
 | SEC-009 | 2026-07-15 | Credential/env SPRAWL + world-readable exposure on vcloud: three env files sat loose in `~` outside the consolidated `~/vr1-office1-creds/` -- `.vr1-netbox.env` (upstream NetBox token), `vr1-office1.env` (edge root-password hash + SSH key path), and `vr1-stage1.env` which held `TF_VAR_maas_api_key` (a MAAS API secret) at mode **0664 (group/world-readable)**; `tailscale-authkey.txt` in the creds dir was also 0664. | docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260715-creds-consolidation.md | operator | **REMEDIATED 2026-07-15** -- all three moved into `~/vr1-office1-creds/`, every sensitive file `chmod 600`. STANDING CONVENTION established (below). Note: this is a CLOSED in-house test; the rotation obligations of SEC-005/006/007 still apply at v1 close, this row only closes the SPRAWL + PERMS exposure. |
 | SEC-010 | 2026-07-16 | **metal-admin DC-LOCAL invariant (D-052/D-100) is PRESERVED but NOT ENFORCED in the committed Stage-3 config.** The `vvr1_dc0` rack straddles metal-admin (10.12.8.0/22, DC-local) + the office1<->dc0 transit (crosses fiber). Its committed cloud-init pins static IPs only -- **no `net.ipv4.ip_forward=0` sysctl, no host firewall on the transit leg.** Cross-plane routing (metal-admin <-> the whole Office1 /22, bidirectional) is blocked ONLY by Ubuntu's distro default; the deferred MAAS-rack install could silently flip it. A MAAS rack proxies at the application layer and needs no kernel forwarding, so pinning is free. **MODEL B UPDATE (2026-07-16):** after the D-123 Model B reshape, the OUTER `vvr1-dc0` is single-leg (transit only); metal-admin + the other 5 planes are now INNER bridges on `vvr1-dc0`'s own libvirtd. The forwarding hardening is MORE critical (vvr1-dc0 now bridges ALL 6 inner planes + the transit) and belongs on the inner libvirt host, not just a 2-leg rack -- wire it in the C3 bootstrap (`site-headend-install.sh` node-host mode). | 2026-07-16 plane-segregation review + Model B reshape cross-check; `opentofu/main.tf` `module "vvr1_dc0"` | operator | **CLOSED 2026-07-20** (was: artifact COMMITTED Phase D 2026-07-16, gated on apply+verify -- both now done, see close note at end of this cell). Enforced via a FORWARD-drop across the transit leg, NOT a global `ip_forward=0`. `scripts/site-headend-install.sh --host-nodes` writes `/etc/nftables-sec010.nft` (drop FORWARD in+out the transit interface, default `mgmt`) + a boot-persistent `sec010-fw.service`; `--host-nodes --check` is the MECHANICAL pre-apply gate (fails if the rule is absent, AND -- hardened 2026-07-16 -- if the keyed transit interface does not EXIST, since an nftables oifname on an absent iface loads clean but matches nothing = fail-open). **D-125 UPDATE (2026-07-16):** the earlier rationale (a global `ip_forward=0` being unusable because the inner `vr1-dc0-wan` NAT forced `ip_forward=1`) NO LONGER applies -- under bridge-in the inner `vr1-dc0-wan` is a BRIDGE (no inner NAT). The scoped FORWARD-drop is RETAINED as-is (correct either way). **br_netfilter CONSTRAINT:** it MUST stay interface-scoped and NEVER be globalized -- with `br_netfilter` loaded, bridged WAN frames traverse the L3 FORWARD chain, so a global forward-drop would silently kill the `br-vr1-dc0-wan` WAN path. `--check` now also verifies the WAN bridge exists with its uplink enslaved (same fail-open class). Nothing routes across the fiber THROUGH vvr1-dc0; the rack proxies MAAS at the app layer (originated/terminated, not forwarded). Same pin follows onto `voffice1` when its transit leg is wired. Region route must target only the rack transit /30, never 10.12.8.0/22. **CLOSED 2026-07-20 (operator ruling, exact utterance: "Close SEC-010 (Recommended)"): applied + verified BOTH ends in the logged dc0-deploy step-B window.** vvr1-dc0: written by `site-headend-install.sh --role rack --host-nodes`, verified by the named `--check` EXIT 0 (`docs/audit/stepB-check-20260720-final.txt` -- rule present + `enp1s0` exists + `br-vr1-dc0-wan`/`enp2s0` enslaved; note the transit interface is `enp1s0`, not the script-default `mgmt` -- netplan set-name dropped, session changelog). voffice1 (the "same pin follows" clause -- its transit leg `enp2s0` was wired 2026-07-20): identical scoped artifact + `sec010-fw.service` enabled, `nft list table inet sec010` verified, proxy/region paths re-verified working post-pin. |
+| SEC-012 | 2026-07-20 | **New SERVICE credential: a dedicated MAAS -> libvirt SSH keypair.** Minted during the DC0 deploy so MAAS can power-control the inner node VMs (`power_type=virsh`). It is a SERVICE credential held by a daemon, not an operator key: the private half is installed inside the MAAS snap on BOTH controllers (region + DC rack) because MAAS dials the power address from whichever controller it chooses -- MEASURED to be the REGION, not the rack that owns the hardware. The public half authorizes a user that is in the rack's `libvirt` group, so anyone holding this key can drive libvirt on `vvr1-dc0` -- i.e. power/define/destroy every inner node VM and the DC edge. Blast radius is deliberately narrowed by being per-purpose (operator-ruled 2026-07-20: "Dedicated MAAS->libvirt key" over reusing the dc0 service key). | 2026-07-20 step-D power wiring; `scripts/maas-node-power.sh` header; session changelog items 15-17 | operator | **OPEN -- rotation obligation + a scope question.** (1) ROTATE at v1 close, or immediately if either controller is rebuilt or shared. (2) SCOPE: the key authorizes a `libvirt`-group user, which is broader than the power verbs MAAS actually needs; a tighter grant (dedicated unix user + polkit rule limiting to domain start/stop/status) is the hardening candidate and is Roosevelt-relevant, since bare metal replaces this with IPMI credentials that have the same "power-only vs full-control" question. Custody detail off-repo per D-069. |
+| SEC-013 | 2026-07-20 | **MAAS API key materialized to disk on the region.** An admin-scoped MAAS API key (`consumer:token:secret`) was placed by the operator in a 0600 file on `voffice1` so the `opentofu/vr1-dc0-maas` root could consume it via `TF_VAR_maas_api_key`. It grants FULL MAAS admin API access (machines, power, deploy, users). Two exposure surfaces beyond the file itself: (a) the OpenTofu **state file** of any root that uses the maas provider records it -- unavoidable with this provider, so that state inherits credential handling (0600, never committed); (b) a MAAS CLI profile was also created for the operator user from the same key. It was verified by FORMAT ONLY (71 bytes, 3 colon-separated parts) and never printed, echoed, or passed in argv. | 2026-07-20 step-D part 2; `opentofu/vr1-dc0-maas/main.tf` header; session changelog item 15 | operator | **OPEN -- rotation obligation.** Rotate at v1 close, or immediately if `voffice1` is rebuilt/shared or the tfstate leaves the host. NOTE: the pod route this key was placed for was subsequently REFUTED (see changelog item 16) and `opentofu/vr1-dc0-maas` is currently UNUSED -- if that root is retired at stage close, this key's on-disk copy and the tfstate should be removed with it, leaving only the CLI profile. Custody detail off-repo per D-069. |
 | SEC-011 | 2026-07-16 | **Node least-connectivity gap (not an L2 breach).** Under D-121 Option C role separation, all nodes get a uniform 6-plane NIC set, so a ceph-osd STORAGE node has a leg on provider-public (external/FIP) + data-tenant (tenant geneve) -- planes it never binds per D-052. Planes stay isolated L2 (no crosstalk). | 2026-07-16 plane-segregation review; `opentofu/main.tf` `local.vr1_dc0_node_nics` | operator | **CLOSED 2026-07-16 (operator ruling -- keep uniform 6-NIC).** Review R3-F10: A2's cross-examination refuted the attack-surface concern -- in the isolated-L2 sim the unbound vNICs have no reachability out, and pruning would INCREASE Roosevelt-delta (baremetal trunks all VLANs to every node on bonded NICs, so all planes are present regardless of L3 binding). Uniform 6-NIC is the more Roosevelt-faithful model. Accepted non-issue; no code change. |
 
 **STANDING CONVENTION (SEC-009, 2026-07-15): per-site credential/env consolidation.** ALL sensitive