diff --git a/docs/CURRENT-STATE.md b/docs/CURRENT-STATE.md
index a31aae4..1103f9c 100644
--- a/docs/CURRENT-STATE.md
+++ b/docs/CURRENT-STATE.md
@@ -2236,6 +2236,46 @@
   NOWHERE (B5 IP-ONLY; R5 refused setting it at Stage 5 as a D-019 repeat), so when Stage 7
   turns FQDN endpoints on, both DCs' certs carrying `dc0.vr0` becomes wrong exactly when it
   starts mattering, and the likely disposition is REISSUE inside D-106's own FQDN-SAN step.
+- **`scripts/octavia-pki.sh verify` BUILT 2026-07-29, and the PKI's IDENTITY IS NOW VERIFIED.**
+  Operator direction: *"Build the verify mode first, then we'll rule the guard fork."* The
+  script asserts what the runbook only hoped for, and it exists because prose cannot be tested:
+  F8's paste hazard yields a certificate with NO SANs while every command in the chain prints
+  OK, and **nothing in this repo asserted the SAN set**.
+  **SCOPE DELIBERATELY NARROW: `verify` only.** `generate` exits 2 by design -- whether a
+  sanctioned script may mint is **D-137 open fork 1, UNRULED**, and building it now would
+  silently convert the PreToolUse guard from "blocks secret minting" into "blocks secret minting
+  except through any script". That is a posture change reserved to the operator. Recorded also:
+  this script is the FIRST CONSUMER of the `creds-mint.sh` pattern (D-137 proposal 2(a),
+  unbuilt, queued by R13), not a rival to it -- if that tool is built it absorbs the generate
+  half. It CANNOT leak key material by construction (every `openssl` call `-noout`; contents
+  only counted or pattern-matched; no `cat`, no `base64`), which is what makes it agent-runnable.
+  **LIVE RESULT, both DCs: 23 assertions PASS, 3 FAIL -- and the 3 are the SAME known E2 mode
+  defect, nothing else.** Every IDENTITY assertion passes: CA subjects name the correct DC
+  (`VR1 DC0` / `VR1 DC1`, so `DC_LABEL` was set on both runs -- the unguarded-variable risk did
+  not bite); the chain verifies against the CONTROLLER CA **and correctly does NOT verify
+  against the issuing CA**, proving two distinct trust domains rather than only that one link
+  works; the SAN set carries 2 DNS names plus each DC's OWN provider v4 and v6 VIPs
+  (`10.12.4.57` + `2602:f3e2:f02:11::57`; `10.12.64.57` + `2602:f3e2:f03:11::57`), so **F8's
+  failure mode did NOT occur** and the D-109 v6-SAN ruling is satisfied in the artifact;
+  overlay mode/keys/ASCII/gitignore all pass; and per-DC independence holds.
+  **THE ONLY OUTSTANDING DEFECT IS E2** -- the three certificates per DC at mode 664. Remediation
+  is a `chmod`, operator-gated, not yet applied.
+  **HARNESS 15/15** (`tests/octavia-pki`, manifest 88 -> 89). T1 is the non-zero floor; **T2 is
+  F8's SAN-less certificate**; T13 guards the OPPOSITE error, since openssl prints v6 SANs
+  expanded and uppercase while the overlay carries the compressed form and a naive compare would
+  FAIL a CORRECT cert; T9/T10 prove REFUSE on the wrong host and on an absent binding; T11 proves
+  an un-generated DC FAILS rather than refusing, because absence there is a conclusive
+  observation. Host binding is READ from `creds-manifests/host-identity`, so the script cannot
+  drift from the register.
+  **A DEFECT THE DELIVERY ITSELF PRODUCED, caught and fixed:** `.gitignore` carried
+  `octavia-pki/`, which git matches at ANY depth, so it silently swallowed `tests/octavia-pki/`
+  -- the first commit added the manifest entry and the script but git REFUSED the harness
+  directory and the commit succeeded anyway. A fresh clone would then have failed the gauntlet on
+  a harness that was never pushed, and **repo-lint cannot catch it** because the files exist
+  locally. Anchored to `/octavia-pki/` and verified three ways: the harness is trackable, a
+  root-level workspace copy is still ignored, and both per-DC overlays remain ignored. Same class
+  as F4 -- a gitignore pattern whose real scope differed from its intent, this time in the
+  direction that LOSES data rather than leaks it.
   **F3 -- both `~/octavia-pki/` and `overlays/octavia-pki.yaml` are ABSENT here** (existence
   checked, no contents read). So this is generation FROM SCRATCH for both DCs: there is
   nothing to reuse, which retires the reuse-vs-regenerate choice