diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json
index d89dbbd..c8b3df6 100644
--- a/.claude/settings.json
+++ b/.claude/settings.json
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
 {
+  "env": {
+    "CAVEMAN_DEFAULT_MODE": "off"
+  },
+  "enabledPlugins": {
+    "caveman@caveman": false
+  },
   "permissions": {
     "allow": [
       "Bash(git status*)", "Bash(git diff*)", "Bash(git log*)", "Bash(git pull*)",
@@ -16,9 +22,22 @@
       "Bash(bash scripts/preflight.sh*)",
       "Bash(python3 scripts/repo_lint.py*)",
       "Bash(python3 scripts/provider-bundle-check.py*)",
+      "Bash(python3 scripts/dc-dc-whole-host-budget.py*)",
       "Bash(bash tests/*)",
       "Bash(OPNSENSE_API_HOST=* bash scripts/opnsense-api.sh GET *)",
-      "Bash(bash scripts/opnsense-plugins.sh list*)"
+      "Bash(bash scripts/opnsense-plugins.sh list*)",
+      "Bash(bash scripts/creds-audit.sh *)",
+      "Bash(bash scripts/dc-dc-ceph-disk-budget.sh *)",
+      "Bash(bash scripts/site-baseleg.sh check*)",
+      "Bash(tofu validate*)",
+      "Bash(tofu -chdir=* validate*)",
+      "Bash(tofu state list*)",
+      "Bash(tofu -chdir=* state list*)",
+      "Bash(tofu state show*)",
+      "Bash(tofu providers schema*)",
+      "Bash(tofu version*)",
+      "Bash(ip route*)",
+      "Bash(systemctl is-active *)"
     ],
     "ask": [
       "Bash(juju destroy-model *)", "Bash(juju remove-machine *)",
@@ -42,9 +61,11 @@
       "Bash(git rebase*)", "Bash(git branch -D *)",
       "Bash(bash scripts/* apply*)", "Bash(bash scripts/* install*)",
       "Bash(ssh * sudo *)",
+      "Bash(ssh *'sudo *)", "Bash(ssh *\"sudo *)", "Bash(ssh *sudo -n *)",
+      "Bash(*creds-matrix.py *--privileged*)",
       "Bash(scp *)",
       "Bash(* | ssh *)",
-      "Bash(ssh * virsh *)",
+      "Bash(ssh * virsh *)", "Bash(ssh *'virsh *)", "Bash(ssh *\"virsh *)",
       "Skill(*)",
       "Edit(.claude/settings.json)", "Edit(.claude/settings.local.json)"
     ],
@@ -54,6 +75,7 @@
       "Bash(juju destroy-controller *)",
       "Bash(maas list*)",
       "Bash(git push --force*)", "Bash(git push -f*)",
+      "Bash(*python3 -m scripts*)", "Bash(*caveman-compress*)",
       "Read(~/vault-init/**)", "Read(~/as-executed/**)",
       "Read(~/tenant-*/**)", "Read(**/*-cred.txt)", "Read(**/*appcred*)",
       "Edit(~/vault-init/**)"
diff --git a/.claude/skills/openstack-cloud-ops-consolidated-20260727.md b/.claude/skills/openstack-cloud-ops-consolidated-20260727.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f0065e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.claude/skills/openstack-cloud-ops-consolidated-20260727.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1589 @@
+<!-- CONSOLIDATED SKILL SNAPSHOT for Chat/project upload.
+     Source: .claude/skills/openstack-cloud-ops/ (SKILL.md + references/) regenerated at repo HEAD 43256d6, 2026-07-27.
+     Regenerated at the Stage 4 close sweep. New INVARIANTS folded in this round: per-DC artifact
+     delivery is a per-DC STRATEGY (dc0 full mirror / dc1 caching proxy, D-135 amendments) and a
+     utility service OWNS ITS OWN network prerequisites; Stage 4 hands off READY nodes, not
+     deployed ones (DOCFIX-200); and "a checker that cannot fail is not a gate" with the
+     assert-on-content / enumerate-what-exists rules that came out of two measured false greens.
+     Chat's skill surface is single-file, so the on-demand references are FLATTENED here.
+     DERIVED artifact -- regenerate from the skill dir at each stage-close sweep (SKILL.md rule).
+     Authoritative copy remains .claude/skills/openstack-cloud-ops/ in the repo. -->
+
+# openstack-cloud-ops -- consolidated skill (Chat upload snapshot, 2026-07-27)
+
+================================================================================
+## SKILL.md (main entry -- always in context)
+================================================================================
+
+---
+name: openstack-cloud-ops
+description: "Operate, install, extend, and troubleshoot the Omega Cloud - a commercial multi-tenant Charmed OpenStack (Caracal 2024.1) deployment managed with Juju and MAAS, with Vault TLS, OVN, Ceph, Octavia, and Magnum/CAPI tenant Kubernetes. Use this skill for ANY work touching OpenStack, Juju, MAAS, Magnum, CAPI, Ceph, OVN, Octavia, Keystone, Vault-for-OpenStack, tenant onboarding, or the repository this skill operates against - including writing or reviewing bash/python operational scripts, debugging failed deploys or cluster creates, runbook work, design-decision (D-NNN) discussion, and incident triage. Use it even for seemingly simple OpenStack questions: this deployment has strict operating discipline and known charm traps that make generic answers wrong."
+---
+
+# openstack-cloud-ops
+
+Operating skill for the Omega Cloud: a commercial, multi-tenant, tenant
+self-administered OpenStack cloud, built as virtual rehearsals (VR0 single-DC
+"testcloud"; VR1 two-DC + Office1 headend) for a future bare-metal
+multi-datacenter deployment ("Roosevelt"). The CURRENT phase/stage lives in
+repo `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` ONLY (GA-R1) -- never trust a phase claim from
+this file or memory. The governing design constraint is
+MINIMIZE DELTA TO ROOSEVELT: the runbooks and scripts are primary deliverables
+alongside the running cloud, so transferable answers beat quick fixes.
+
+## Step 0 - locate the source of truth
+
+This repository (GitBucket, git.baldurkeep.com) is authoritative for
+everything: bundle, runbooks, scripts, design decisions, as-built values. This
+skill is a discipline-and-routing layer OVER that repo, not a substitute for
+it. Never hardcode the repo's own name/path in a command -- it has already been
+renamed/forked once (see D-110) and will again; discover it fresh each session.
+
+1. Look for a local clone: a repo dir in the working tree, or a `$HOME` entry
+   containing `bundle.yaml` + `docs/design-decisions.md`. If found, confirm
+   identity with `git remote -v`, then `git log -1` to note HEAD and work from it.
+2. No clone and you have shell + network: ask the operator for the exact clone
+   URL (org/group and repo name -- do not guess or reuse one from memory; it
+   may have moved, per this same repo's own history). The repo may be private;
+   if the clone fails, ask the operator to provide access or the relevant files.
+3. No clone obtainable (e.g. chat without sandbox network): say so, ask the
+   operator to paste the relevant runbook/script, and proceed only on what is
+   actually in front of you.
+
+**Divergence rule:** if this skill and repo HEAD disagree, the repo wins -
+but FLAG the divergence to the operator rather than silently following either.
+The repo is a living draft; this skill's invariants (discipline, hardening)
+change slowly, its facts (IPs, versions, phase status) go stale fast.
+
+**Session bookends (GA-R1/GA-R4).** OPEN: read `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` in full
+BEFORE any other doc (it is the only status authority), then `docs/session-ledger.md`
++ `bash scripts/ledger-scan.sh` to recover what is in flight and reconcile it against
+repo ground truth (open decisions, open SEC count, next-free numbers). Re-do this
+after any compaction. CLOSE: a bounded ledger summary (15-line hard cap, GA-R4 rule
+1); the full session body goes to `docs/archive/` in the same close commit; commit
+and push -- a session ending without its bookend is treated as NOT durable by the
+next session. See `references/operating-discipline.md` (Session continuity).
+## Step 1 - detect the environment
+
+- **Live shell to the jumphost / infra** (Claude Code on `vcloud` or
+  similar): you may RUN read-only audits directly. Every mutation remains
+  individually human-gated - present the command, state what it changes, wait
+  for approval. A live shell relaxes the transport, never the discipline.
+- **Chat / no infra shell**: operate the gated copy-paste model - prepare
+  labeled blocks, the operator runs them and pastes output back. Never assume
+  a block ran or succeeded; wait for the pasted evidence.
+
+Read `references/operating-discipline.md` before doing either.
+
+## The three hard operating rules (non-negotiable)
+
+1. **Execute only the current runbook step, exactly as written.** No added
+   scope, no adjacent improvements, no live re-architecture mid-step. Findings
+   and improvement ideas are LOGGED (changelog / D-NNN proposal), never
+   executed live mid-step.
+2. **Never use an inferred value.** No IP, ID, name, or scope goes into a
+   command unless it was measured this session or carried from confirmed
+   as-built. If a value would be inferred: stop and measure it. Never run a
+   destructive or session-altering command from memory without confirming it
+   is the minimal correct action for the current live state.
+3. **Prefer dynamic lookups over hardcoded literals.** Discover VIPs, project
+   names, IDs, and version sets at runtime. Where a literal is unavoidable it
+   is tagged and centralized (`scripts/lib-net.sh`, `lib-hosts.sh`), keyed by
+   stable identity (CIDR, hostname) - never by drifting IDs.
+
+Corollary that governs everything: **verify before mutate**. A read-only audit
+precedes every mutation; destructive and secret-handling steps are gated
+individually, never batched.
+
+## Routing - where to go for what
+
+| Task | Read first |
+|---|---|
+| Any command block, script, or paste block you are about to write | `references/script-authoring.md` |
+| Deploy / redeploy / teardown (VR0, single-DC testcloud) | repo `runbooks/README.md`, then the phase-NN runbook; conventions in `references/operating-discipline.md` |
+| VR1 DC-DC buildout (two-DC + Office1 headend -- the current live mission) | repo `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` FIRST (stage/gate STATUS lives there only), then `docs/dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md` (stage identity, links, gap register), then `runbooks/README.md`'s "VR1 DC-DC track" section for the `dc-dc-phase0..6` runbooks + `dc-dc-teardown-rollback.md`. SEPARATE track from VR0's phase-NN above -- do not conflate stage numbers between the two. |
+| Something is broken (triage, incidents) | `references/troubleshooting.md`, then repo `runbooks/appendix-A-troubleshooting.md` |
+| CAPI / Magnum / mgmt-VM recovery | repo `runbooks/ops-capi-recovery.md` |
+| Deliver ANY repo change (script, runbook, doc) | run `bash scripts/repo-lint.sh` + the touched script's `tests/<name>/run-tests.sh` BEFORE handing it over |
+| Pre-deploy gate (before add-model) | `bash scripts/preflight.sh` -- THE single entry; do not run the sub-gates piecemeal |
+| Is the cloud actually healthy? (post-deploy, post-restart, pre-change baseline, incident) | `bash scripts/cloud-assert.sh` (add `--capture` at deploy completion for the committed BOM) |
+| Full-cloud restart after outage/maintenance | repo `runbooks/ops-restart-procedure.md` |
+| VR1 site unreachable after a vcloud reboot (`ssh voffice1` / `office1-*` time out) | `bash scripts/site-baseleg.sh check office1` -- `office1-local` is an ISOLATED libvirt net, so the host's base L3 leg (`10.10.0.10/24` + compose route `10.10.1.0/24 via 10.10.0.20`) is dropped every reboot; the `After=libvirtd` unit re-adds it (D-126 amendment / D-128). If MISS and the unit is not yet installed: `sudo bash scripts/site-baseleg.sh apply office1`. This is the vcloud path; the workstation reaches the same over the tailnet (D-107). |
+| Starting any consequential live session | `bash scripts/run-logged.sh <label>` first (as-executed log; docs/as-executed-log-convention.md) |
+| Credential exposures / security TODOs | repo `docs/security-ledger.md` -- add a row, never only a script comment. The credential-LIFECYCLE policy (mint -> consolidate -> audit) is **D-137**, not the ledger (SEC-009's convention block is now a pointer); the expected-state register is `creds-matrix.tsv` + `scripts/creds-matrix.py` (tier 1 static, tier 2 existence, tier 3 validity), enforced as a BLOCKING preflight `P5`. `creds-audit` CLEAN is NOT evidence of completeness -- it is declaration-based |
+| Per-DC artifact delivery (apt mirror / caching proxy); "can the nodes get packages?" | dc0 = `bash scripts/dc-mirror.sh check dc0` (full mirror); dc1 = `bash scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh check dc1` (caching proxy). The two DCs DIFFER BY RULING (D-135 amendments) -- checking dc1 as a mirror fails by design. Both run ON the rack host over `ssh -J voffice1` with `sudo bash -s`; take rack transit IPs from `scripts/lib-hosts.sh`, never memory |
+| Resuming work / what is still in flight (esp. after compaction) | repo `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` first, then `docs/session-ledger.md` + `bash scripts/ledger-scan.sh` to reconcile against repo ground truth |
+| Tenant onboarding / tenant self-service | repo `scripts/tenant-onboard.sh` + `runbooks/tenant-onboarding-v2-DRAFT.md` + `appendix-C/D` |
+| Network / plane / IPAM questions | `references/environment.md`, repo `scripts/lib-net.sh`, NetBox (the IPAM apex -- but during VR1 the WORKING apex is `office1-netbox`, 10.10.1.10, per DOCFIX-195; `netbox.baldurkeep.com` is a READ-ONLY v1 reference, write-back deferred to end-of-deployment) |
+| ANY change request to a built surface | grep repo `docs/design-decisions.md` for the governing D-NNN FIRST - PROPOSED/OPEN means the operator has not ruled: present options, do not implement |
+| Why is it built this way? / proposing changes | repo `docs/design-decisions.md` (D-NNN); grep before assigning a new number |
+| Versions, channels, pins | repo `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` section 7 (VR1 substrate -- measured pin authority); `runbooks/appendix-B-asbuilt-version-lock.md` (VR0 charm channels) |
+| Environment facts (hosts, repo, planes) | `references/environment.md` |
+| OpenTofu / libvirt / MAAS / OPNsense IaC work (repo `opentofu/`) | `references/opentofu-provider-docs.md` FIRST (sources + fetch method), then repo `opentofu/README.md` (per-module ground truth, schema notes, audit findings -- but its OPNsense section is SUPERSEDED by D-112/D-113) |
+| Creating/changing a `libvirt_domain`; anything about nested KVM, a libvirt storage pool, LXD versions, an OPNsense edge, or a VM that boots wrong | `references/platform-traps.md` -- per-tool traps + version pins + a verbatim-error index (KiB-vs-MiB memory, `acpi=off`, missing `cpu` block = no `svm`, "in-place" bounces the guest, AppArmor on non-default pools, MAAS-vs-LXD 6.7, lxdbr0's dnsmasq, tcsh on the edge) |
+
+## Standard loops (repeatable session shapes)
+
+**Session bootstrap (jumphost):** Claude Code sessions launch from the repo
+root, always (GA-R7 rule 6 -- a session launched from a subdirectory gets its
+own empty project dir and a divergent auto-memory; the GA-F06 origin).
+`git -C "$REPO" pull` (set `$REPO` once per
+session -- see `runbooks/README.md` Conventions / `references/environment.md`) ->
+`bash scripts/repo-lint.sh` (0 fail expected) -> if touching the live cloud,
+`bash scripts/run-logged.sh <label>` to open the logged shell. Repo HEAD and a
+clean lint are the preconditions for everything else.
+
+**VR1 operating model (D-128 -- invariant; do not re-derive this each session):**
+Claude runs ON the vcloud jumphost -- do NOT relocate the session to a workstation.
+Work splits in two, origins FIXED BY DESIGN: **Plane 1** (substrate -- the OUTER
+`tofu` root `qemu:///system` + local `virsh`, creating the DC *host* VMs) runs on
+vcloud and has no Roosevelt analog; **Plane 2** (MAAS / NetBox / the INNER `tofu`
+root `qemu+ssh`-from-Office1 / tenant tests) EXECUTES on `voffice1` via `ssh
+voffice1 '...'` so runbooks read "from the Office1 headend" and transfer. Claude's
+host only picks the TRANSPORT, not where work runs. Durable Office1 reach = the
+D-126 base-leg oneshot (`scripts/site-baseleg.sh check office1` FIRST if `ssh
+voffice1` is dead post-reboot) -- NOT tailscale-on-vcloud (D-107 is the operator's
+WORKSTATION path / human GUI, left untouched). DCs sit outside the `/22` carve and
+keep the D-126 `-J`-through-`vvr1-dc0` shape. **Durable host->site reach is standing
+per-SITE tooling, DCs included (so the gap does not reopen per-DC):** `site-baseleg.sh`
+is site-keyed. At each DC standup, MEASURE how vcloud reaches that DC's containment/
+service net -- if it is an ISOLATED host-local net, add a MEASURED leg row + `install`
+the unit as part of standup definition-of-done (NEVER an inferred DC IP -- the harness
+fails on an un-commented DC supernet); a routed/NAT net or an already-reachable
+`qemu+ssh` path needs none. Register item 20 tracks this. **Rack-side twin invariant
+(D-131 sub-1, RULED 2026-07-21): every internet-isolated DC rack gets the repo-carried
+`scripts/dc-rack-net.sh install <site>` at standup (reboot-persistent rack bridge legs
++ the node-DNS dnsmasq forwarder aliased on metal-admin, forwarding to region BIND over
+the rack's own transit) -- MAAS 3.7's rack-only agent resolver SERVFAILs on isolated
+racks, so WITHOUT this, commissioning silently times out (appendix-A carries the
+symptom pair).** Two measured MAAS traps with standing consequences: MAAS virsh PODS
+are refuted for this repo's DCs (per-machine `power_type=virsh` via
+`scripts/maas-node-power.sh` is the ruled shape -- D-103/D-123 amendments 2026-07-20),
+and a pod delete CASCADES to its linked machine records -- read the pod's machine list
+BEFORE any `vm-host delete`; non-empty = STOP (appendix-A, 2026-07-21 incident).
+**Per-DC power credential (SEC-012 dc0, SEC-016 dc1, RULED 2026-07-23 -- standing
+DC-standup invariant): each DC gets its OWN dedicated MAAS->libvirt power key, NEVER
+a cross-DC reuse.** The REGION's MAAS snap dials the power address, so the split is:
+the maas-node-power SCRIPT's mapping virsh uses the DC SERVICE key (via the region's
+`~/.ssh/config` Host <rack-transit-ip>), while MAAS's own power ops use the dedicated
+key installed in the snap (`/var/snap/maas/current/root/.ssh/` + a per-host `ssh
+config` block so each rack uses its own key). FRAGILITY: the snap-side key lives under
+per-revision `/var/snap/maas/current/` and may not survive a snap refresh -- re-assert
+after any refresh. Roosevelt analog: per-DC IPMI/BMC credentials.
+
+**Per-DC ARTIFACT DELIVERY is a per-DC STRATEGY, and the two DCs deliberately differ
+(D-135 + its 2026-07-24/27 amendments -- standing invariant).** dc0 tests a FULL MIRROR
+(`dc-mirror.sh`, debmirror+nginx on the D-134 utility `.4`); dc1 tests an APT CACHING
+PROXY (`dc-cache-proxy.sh`, apt-cacher-ng on `.4:3142`, consumed via
+`juju apt-http-proxy`). This is the EXPERIMENT, not an interim state -- there is no
+fallback and no later convergence, and dc1's partial mirror was REMOVED 2026-07-27.
+Consequences that bite: **checking dc1 as a mirror FAILS BY DESIGN** (use its own
+checker), and each DC's gate is its own script's `check <site>`.
+**Corollary invariant, learned the hard way: a per-DC utility service OWNS ITS OWN
+NETWORK PREREQUISITES.** `dc-cache-proxy.sh` originally REUSED `dc-mirror.sh`'s
+`<site>-mirror-net.service` for the `.4` alias + edge default route, so on a proxy-only
+DC three files named `*-mirror-*` were load-bearing FOR THE PROXY: the documented
+mirror-removal procedure would have silently killed it, and the proxy could not be
+REBUILT afterward without reinstalling the whole mirror apparatus (enabled daily
+debmirror timer included). Never let one strategy's teardown be able to break the
+other's; name artifacts for the service that owns them. Roosevelt analog: a DC must be
+able to change artifact strategy without rebuilding the other strategy's apparatus.
+
+**Stage 4 hands off READY nodes, NOT deployed ones (DOCFIX-200, RULED 2026-07-23 --
+standing).** MAAS-deploy is SKIPPED; Juju provisions at Stage 5. Any surface saying
+"nodes Deployed" as a Stage-4 exit condition is a DEFECT, not a fact -- four were found
+and fixed on 2026-07-27 (workflow-doc gate cell, phase-3 DoD + Step 7, phase-4
+prerequisites). Practical consequence: **nothing node-side can be probed in Stage 4**
+(the nodes are powered off), so node-side checks belong at Stage 5 first boot -- that is
+why gate G17 exists.
+
+**A CHECKER THAT CANNOT FAIL IS NOT A GATE (this project's most productive audit move).**
+GA-R6 lets a stage close only on a named executable check, so the check itself must be
+verified capable of failing. Two measured instances, days apart: `creds-audit` is
+DECLARATION-based and read CLEAN on three sites while the D-137 matrix returned 13
+findings; `dc-mirror.sh check` asserted that `last-sync.status` EXISTED and printed its
+contents behind an unconditional `OK`, so a `FAIL` status and a four-day-stale `RUNNING`
+both passed. Working rules that came out of it: assert on CONTENT, never on existence;
+an unrecognised state REFUSES rather than defaulting to success; "could not look" is
+never "nothing there"; and **enumerate what EXISTS rather than only auditing what is
+declared** -- a register cannot report the absence of something it has no row for, which
+is how an unregistered credential at both DC edges survived every audit. When a test
+asserts a literal finding string, remediating the finding turns the harness red: REPLACE
+the assertion with the new invariant and say so, never delete it to go green.
+
+**Change-delivery loop:** grep for prior art (zeroth decision) -> grep
+design-decisions for the governing D-NNN -> edit -> `bash scripts/repo-lint.sh`
+-> run the touched script's harness (create one if missing -- no script change
+ships without its harness) -> deliver with an entry in the SESSION changelog
+(ONE changelog per session, GA-R2/D1 -- never per-topic files) carrying a
+per-item revert. Under blanket approval, the changelog IS the review surface:
+every item states what, why (evidence), and how to revert. Changelogs are
+session-scoped scratch: consolidated per-stage at stage close, NEVER citable
+as status or decision authority.
+
+**Deploy loop (VR0, single-DC testcloud):** phase-00 runbook (D-061 destroy
+path) -> `bash scripts/preflight.sh` PASS -> phase-01..08 gated -> `bash
+scripts/cloud-assert.sh --capture` -> commit the asbuilt/ BOM.
+
+**Deploy loop (VR1 DC-DC, the current live mission):** read
+`docs/dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md`'s tooling gap register FIRST -- check
+whether the stage you're about to run has any open blocking item -> Stage 1
+(`dc-dc-phase0-vcloud-prep.md`) gated -> Stage 2..7 gated in order, per
+`runbooks/README.md`'s "VR1 DC-DC track" table -> if a stage's `tofu apply`
+fails partway, read `runbooks/dc-dc-teardown-rollback.md`'s rollback decision
+tree BEFORE reaching for a teardown (fix-forward is usually correct). Run
+`bash scripts/opentofu-validate.sh` before any tofu step; whether a given
+root/step has been exercised for real is a STATUS question -- check
+CURRENT-STATE, never this file's memory of it. **At STAGE
+CLOSE** (GA-R6): a stage or verification-type gate CLOSES only on a NAMED executable
+check whose captured output the closing commit cites -- prose cannot close a stage,
+and there is NO conditional close (a remainder splits into its own gate row or the
+stage stays open, E3). Ruling-type gates close per GA-R5 (recorded, pushed ruling).
+The close-out set is executable: gauntlet ALL GREEN, repo-lint 0-fail, the stage's
+GA-R2 consolidation commit landed, the GA-R7 memory review run, MERGE the stage
+branch to `main` (merge commit, NOT squash; operator-gated), then RETIRE the branch
+(local + remote). **ALSO sweep THIS skill in the same close:** fold in any new
+INVARIANT the stage established and reconcile any divergence from repo HEAD (facts
+delegate to the repo and go stale; invariants live here and must be kept current). The
+AUTHORITATIVE, versioned skill is THIS dir (`.claude/skills/openstack-cloud-ops/` -- SKILL.md
++ references); keep it current here. THEN REGENERATE the dated single-file Chat-upload
+snapshot from it (concatenate SKILL.md + references -> `.claude/skills/openstack-cloud-ops-consolidated-<date>.md`,
+ASCII/LF byte-verified) so the Chat/project skill surface can be refreshed -- the snapshot
+is a DERIVED artifact, never the source, and the Chat mount going stale is a known failure
+mode (it caused a failed clone + a mis-shaped handoff, 2026-07-25; docs/audit/skill-divergence-20260725.md).
+The next stage branches off post-merge `main`. `main` is
+trunk-of-record only for stages that have merged (precedents: Stage 2 -> PR #1 `e468d2e`
+2026-07-15; Stage 3 -> merge commit 2026-07-21, vr1-dc0 scope, dc1 HELD under G12). See
+`docs/dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md` "Cross-cutting discipline".
+
+**Incident loop:** capture the verbatim error -> `bash scripts/cloud-assert.sh`
+(the service-own-verdict sweep localizes the layer) -> appendix-A by exact
+message -> recorded fix, gated -> log the finding (new root causes become
+appendix-A/DOCFIX material).
+
+## Record authority and session discipline (GA-R1..R7, ratified 2026-07-18)
+
+Ratified text: repo `docs/audit/ga-rulings.md` -- this is the operating summary.
+
+- **`docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` is the ONLY status authority (GA-R1).** Stage,
+  gates, plan counts, version pins, decision-queue state live THERE and nowhere
+  else; other surfaces point or are history. Any commit that changes a status it
+  carries updates it in the SAME commit (C1; repo-lint L10 enforces). It is
+  authoritative over documents, never over measurement -- a fresh capture wins
+  and corrects it in the capture's commit (C2).
+- **Plan counts and versions are quoted only from captured command output** --
+  a dated capture file or a quoted command + output; never from memory or
+  another document's prose (GA-R1 rule 2). Legal stage/gate status tokens are
+  OPEN / BLOCKED / HELD / CLOSED, used only in CURRENT-STATE (vocabulary ruling,
+  Option A: readiness is not a state; event words are history, never states).
+- **Rulings are gated like mutations (GA-R5).** ONE decision per operator
+  exchange -- batch adoptions are invalid. A ruling exists only when its Status
+  line quotes the question AND the operator's exact utterance, dated, committed
+  and pushed before dependent work. Ambiguous/template answers rule NOTHING:
+  stop and ask. Never adopt from an inferred or reconstructed ruling -- an
+  operator ruling is a value under hard rule 2.
+- **D-number admission (GA-R3):** a new D-number needs architectural consequence
+  beyond the stage, a Roosevelt-delta (the A1 test: a Roosevelt build session
+  would grep it before touching a built surface), or supersession. Everything
+  else is OPERATIONAL: runbook edit / session-changelog line / as-built row,
+  never a D-number. Entries carry [ARCH]/[OPS] tags; doubt resolves DOWN to OPS.
+- **Memory governance (GA-R7):** auto-memory records observations and
+  conventions ONLY -- never operator policy, priorities, or postures. Any
+  memory claiming operator intent is PROPOSED until confirmed verbatim; remove
+  on discovery. Durable observations GRADUATE to their repo surface; memory is
+  never the only copy. Stage close includes a full memory review (rules 1-4).
+- **Reconciliation circuit-breaker.** If you have been fixing records to match
+  records for more than one cycle without touching the actual deliverable,
+  STOP and report to the operator. Record-churn presenting as progress is this
+  project's measured failure mode (GA-F06); escalating is the correct move.
+
+## Posture
+
+- This is a commercial multi-tenant cloud with HARD tenant isolation (SCS
+  Domain Manager persona). Treat tenant-visible surfaces and cross-domain
+  boundaries as security-relevant in every change.
+- The operator community here values debate and industry best practice over
+  quick fixes. Push back with sources when you disagree; own mistakes plainly
+  and concisely. Fabricated flags, values, or version numbers are the cardinal
+  sin - if you have not verified an option name or version, say so and verify.
+- Responses stay concise. Decisions get explicit rationale.
+
+
+================================================================================
+## references/operating-discipline.md (load on demand)
+================================================================================
+
+# Operating discipline
+
+How work is executed on this cloud. These conventions exist because the
+runbooks and scripts ARE the product: a fix that works but is undocumented,
+unrepeatable, or Roosevelt-incompatible is a failure.
+
+## The gated execution model
+
+Every command block is labeled so a command line is never mistaken for prose,
+and so mutation risk is explicit (same convention as the repo runbooks):
+
+- `RUN -- <loc>` - the block CHANGES state; run it at <loc> (jumphost, a unit
+  via `juju ssh`, the mgmt VM...).
+- `CHECK (read-only) -- <loc>` - safe to re-run.
+- `GATE:` - hard stop. Do not proceed unless the stated condition holds.
+- `Expect:` - what a passing result looks like. Always state it: the operator
+  should never have to guess whether output is good.
+- `> CAUTION:` - destructive, secret-handling, or irreversible.
+
+Sequence discipline: read-only audit -> present the mutation -> operator
+approves/runs -> verify the result -> next step. One gated mutation at a time;
+never batch destructive steps. If output comes back unexpected, STOP and
+re-derive from the live state - do not improvise a correction inline.
+
+**Chat (no shell):** you prepare blocks, the operator runs and pastes output.
+Treat pasted output as the only evidence; a block you wrote but saw no output
+for did not happen.
+
+**Live shell:** you may execute `CHECK (read-only)` blocks yourself. `RUN` and
+`> CAUTION:` blocks still get presented and human-approved first - state what
+will change and why it is the minimal correct action.
+
+## Irreversible / one-shot / secret steps
+
+- Start every consequential session with `bash scripts/run-logged.sh <label>`
+  (opens a script(1)-logged shell to ~/as-executed/; index the session in
+  logs/as-executed-index.md -- content NEVER commits, the index always does).
+- Retrieve the exact prior working command from the as-executed log or runbook
+  VERBATIM. Never improvise vault init, unseal, authorize-charm, CA issuance,
+  or anything one-shot. (DOCFIX-006: a mis-redirected `vault operator init`
+  loses the unseal keys forever.)
+- Secrets never transit argv, clipboard, scrollback, or /tmp. Capture straight
+  to a 0600 file under $HOME with `umask 077`; unseal via hidden prompt (L4);
+  transfer via base64 pipe into a root-written 0600 file (L-P6-4). Never echo
+  a secret to verify it - verify by length/format from the file.
+- Never run `maas list` (prints the API key - DOCFIX-016). Never trust a juju
+  action's human-formatted output for a captured secret or cert - pull from
+  `--format json` (indented YAML block-scalars corrupt PEMs; DOCFIX-021).
+- Authorize charms with short-lived child tokens: `juju run` persists action
+  params in the operation log (DOCFIX-011).
+
+## Record-keeping: D-NNN / DOCFIX-NNN / BUNDLEFIX-NNN
+
+- `D-NNN` - design decisions (`docs/design-decisions.md`). Append-only:
+  superseded entries stay in place, marked, with the superseding entry
+  appended. `DOCFIX-NNN` - runbook fixes. `BUNDLEFIX-NNN` - bundle fixes.
+- ALWAYS grep the repo for the next free number before assigning one -
+  collisions have happened. State "next-free verified" when you assign.
+- PARALLEL WORK numbering: when more than one workstream edits the shared numbered
+  ledgers (this repo + a parallel Claude Code stream), do NOT each independently grab
+  "next-free" -- that collides. One stream owns a given number/block; each DECLARES every
+  identifier it consumes in its commit; the other re-greps AFTER the parallel push lands
+  and resumes above it. `scripts/ledger-scan.sh` derives next-free from decision HEADERS
+  (not prose mentions -- a "next-free D-072" pointer must not inflate the count).
+  Keep "Next-free:" pointer lines on ONE line (a word-wrapped continuation escapes the
+  line-based exclusion); or just rely on the scan, which is the next-free authority.
+- Mid-task findings are logged as proposals, not acted on (hard rule 1).
+  A finding that changes a runbook becomes a DOCFIX; one that changes
+  architecture becomes a D-NNN with status PROPOSED until the operator rules.
+- Status vocabulary: PROPOSED/OPEN -> ADOPTED/DECIDED -> SUPERSEDED (by
+  D-MMM). Do not implement PROPOSED items.
+- Before acting on any change request, grep design-decisions for the
+  governing decision on that surface (and its dependents - e.g. a runbook
+  step may rely on the current state). Finding a PROPOSED/OPEN decision
+  means presenting its recorded options for a ruling, not picking one.
+
+## Delivery rules (files handed to the operator)
+
+- Multi-file changes ship as repo-relative ZIPs, never loose files (the
+  Windows/GitHub Desktop loose-file workflow misplaces them).
+- Everything committed is ASCII-only, LF-only. Validate before delivery:
+  non-ASCII with `grep -nP '[^\x00-\x7F]'` (or a Python byte read); CR bytes
+  with a Python `data.count(b"\x0d")` - a `grep $'\r'` false-positives on
+  `$r...` tokens. Non-ASCII in OpenStack config has caused silent daemon
+  failures (mod_wsgi UnicodeDecodeError).
+- On-box script delivery over `juju ssh` goes as a base64 pipe decoded to a
+  file, then the FILE is executed - never a raw heredoc (paste-mangling and
+  stdin-consumption both bite; see script-authoring on `read` vs pipes).
+- Windows-side steps are PowerShell-native (no bash heredocs, no backslash
+  continuations). The operator commits from Windows; the jumphost only pulls.
+
+- Credential exposures and security obligations get a ROW in
+  docs/security-ledger.md at discovery time (owner + status) - never only a
+  script-comment note; the ledger is reviewed at every phase-00 and handoff.
+- Under operator-granted blanket approval, the delivery contract is: implement,
+  then hand over ONE cumulative repo-relative ZIP plus a changelog where every
+  item states what changed, the evidence for why, and a per-item revert. The
+  changelog is the review surface; opinion-weighted calls are flagged as such.
+
+## Session continuity: the in-flight ledger
+
+Long sessions on this cloud get COMPACTED, often several times. Work that lives only in
+chat scrollback is lost at compaction. `docs/session-ledger.md` is the durable record of
+what is IN FLIGHT (active build, backlog, operator-gated items, open decisions, numbering
+state, state facts). Standing practice:
+- Read the ledger AND run `scripts/ledger-scan.sh` at session start; reconcile.
+- The scan is the DRIFT CHECK: it derives open decisions (last Status line per block, so an
+  amendment closes it), OPEN security rows, and next-free numbers straight from the repo.
+  The narrative ledger must not claim CLOSED what the scan shows OPEN, nor omit what it
+  surfaces. A ledger without this check rots (cf. D-070's unexercised-snapshot critique).
+- Update the ledger at every deliverable/commit -- it is a standing deliverable like the
+  changelog. Changelog = what changed; ledger = what is still open.
+
+## Boundary mutations: adds-before-removes with a readback gate
+
+When tightening a security boundary (SG rules, firewall, policy) that a live flow depends on,
+NEVER remove the permissive rule before the specific replacements are proven present. Create
+the narrow rules, READ THEM BACK (fail if any is missing), and only THEN remove the wide rule
+by its MEASURED id. There must be no window in which a required flow (e.g. the magnum
+conductor -> mgmt apiserver poll) is unauthorized. Verify the tightened boundary by FUNCTIONAL
+outcome afterwards, not by assuming the rule text is sufficient.
+
+## Attestation gates for unautomatable safety items
+
+Some acceptance items cannot be scripted -- e.g. a SECOND person performing the Vault unseal
+(D-069). Never auto-pass such an item. Gate it on a ledger ROW (docs/security-ledger.md):
+report PASS_PENDING_MANUAL while the row is OPEN, PASS only when it is attested CLOSED/rehearsed,
+HOLD if the row is missing. Auto-passing an undone safety item is the exact failure D-070 retired.
+
+## Debate and correction norms
+
+- Challenge weak reasoning with sources; the operator prefers industry best
+  practice over the quick fix and will push back hard on unverified claims.
+  When challenged, verify (docs, source, live probe) rather than defend.
+- Own mistakes plainly, in one or two sentences, then fix. No self-flagellation.
+- When a prior decision looks wrong, propose superseding it through the D-NNN
+  process - do not quietly deviate from it.
+
+## Troubleshooting entry discipline
+
+Before any server-side hypothesis for "X used to work, now it doesn't" on a
+web UI: eliminate client state first (incognito window, ~10 seconds), then a
+server-side curl, THEN hypothesize. Before any command that acts on tenant
+resources: confirm which project/domain scope the shell holds
+(`openstack token issue`-level certainty) - `server create` and friends use
+ambient scope silently. Full triage method: references/troubleshooting.md.
+
+## Guards are load-bearing: reword the content, never weaken the check
+
+When a repo-lint guard (or any fail-closed check) goes RED on text you
+believe is legitimate, the fix is to REWORD the text or add the guard's
+own documented opt-out marker -- never to loosen the guard. Precedent: L3
+correctly flagged the config.xml tombstones; the tombstones were reworded
+and the guard kept. (Rotated from the session ledger's standing-lessons
+block, 2026-07-19.)
+
+
+================================================================================
+## references/environment.md (load on demand)
+================================================================================
+
+# Environment - Omega Cloud (VR0 DC0 testcloud)
+
+Facts here are ANCHORS, not command inputs. Anything marked (verify) must be
+re-measured or re-read from the repo/live cloud before use in a command -
+hard rule 2 applies. Snapshot date: 2026-07. The repo is fresher than this file.
+
+## The three deployments (this file covers VR0 in detail; VR1 is a pointer)
+
+- **Testcloud (VR0 DC0, now):** four KVM host VMs (openstack0-3) on a single
+  hypervisor, managed by MAAS + Juju. Single-DC virtual rehearsal. The rest
+  of THIS file is VR0's own ground truth.
+- **VR1 DC-DC (in progress, D-100..D-110):** two-DC + Office1-headend
+  rehearsal -- VR0's testcloud host is being REPURPOSED into DC1 (not a
+  second concurrent cloud). This file does NOT carry VR1's own facts (Office1
+  network, DC1/DC2 mesh links, per-DC MAAS/Vault roots, etc.) -- those live
+  in `docs/dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md` (master tracker: stage status +
+  tooling gap register, read this first for any VR1 work) and
+  `docs/dc-dc-buildout-design.md` (the design itself). Runbooks:
+  `runbooks/README.md`'s "VR1 DC-DC track" section. IaC: `opentofu/`
+  (UNVALIDATED -- see its own README).
+- **Roosevelt (future):** bare-metal, multi-DC, commercial production
+  (3310 Roosevelt Blvd, Eugene OR). Dedicated node roles (gateway/controller/
+  compute split) - unlike the hyperconverged testcloud. Every design choice is
+  judged by its transfer to Roosevelt -- VR1 is the rehearsal for THIS, not
+  an end in itself.
+
+## Stack (verify against appendix-B for pins)
+
+Charmed OpenStack Caracal 2024.1 - Juju/MAAS/component versions live in
+`runbooks/appendix-B-asbuilt-version-lock.md` (VR0) and `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md`
+section 7 (VR1 substrate) - Vault TLS (charm-pki
+root CA), OVN 24.03, Ceph Squid, Octavia (amphora), Barbican,
+mysql-innodb-cluster, RabbitMQ, Magnum + magnum-capi-helm driver + azimuth
+(SUBSTRATE below the charms -- pins + traps in `references/platform-traps.md`:
+libvirt/KVM via the `dmacvicar/libvirt` OpenTofu provider `0.9.8` (tofu +
+component pins: `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` section 7, the pin authority);
+**LXD pinned to the `5.21` LTS track** -- MAAS 3.6/3.7 cannot talk
+to LXD >= 6.7, D-114; OPNsense edges driven by REST API, D-113; the vcloud
+host is ITSELF a KVM guest, so nesting is a per-level requirement)
+capi-helm-charts (kubeadm engine), in-cloud single-homed CAPI mgmt VM
+(capi-mgmt-v2, k8s-snap, D-035). NetBox is the IPAM apex: never hand-edit
+downstream MAAS or overlays for network values.
+
+## Control points
+
+- **Jumphost:** `vcloud` - all live commands run here. Has juju,
+  the openstack CLI (SNAP - cannot read /tmp; use $HOME), jq, kubectl.
+- **Repo:** `https://git.baldurkeep.com/OpenStack/openstack-caracal-dc-dc`
+  (web) / `.../git/OpenStack/openstack-caracal-dc-dc.git` (clone) -- a
+  documented ANCHOR FACT (this repo's name/path has already changed once, see
+  D-110; re-verify with `git remote -v` before trusting it, same as any other
+  fact in this file). repo-lint: allow-selfref. Operator commits from Windows
+  (PowerShell / GitHub Desktop - strips exec bits; `.gitattributes` pins LF);
+  the jumphost only pulls.
+- **Session `$REPO` convention:** set `$REPO` once per session to your clone's
+  root (see `runbooks/README.md` Conventions); every runbook RUN block
+  references `$REPO`, never a hardcoded clone path. `repo-lint` L9 enforces
+  this for scripts/RUN-blocks/skill files.
+- **Juju model:** `openstack`. **MAAS profile:** `admin` (call
+  `maas admin ...` directly; NEVER `maas list` - it prints the API key).
+- **Management substrate (verify; NEVER touch in teardown):** the MAAS
+  machines hosting juju, lxd, and tailscale are hard-excluded from teardown
+  scripts. Resolve system_ids live via `scripts/lib-hosts.sh` - system_ids
+  are re-minted on every re-enrollment (DOCFIX-040).
+
+## The six network planes (D-052 / D-053; verify against scripts/lib-net.sh)
+
+| Plane | CIDR | Carries | Notes |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| provider-public | 10.12.4.0/22 | Public API VIPs + tenant FIPs (Pattern A, D-060) | gw .4.1; untagged |
+| metal-admin | 10.12.8.0/22 | MAAS PXE, operator/admin endpoint, default binding | gw .8.1; DC-local |
+| metal-internal | 10.12.12.0/22 | ALL service-to-service control (internal API, DB, MQ, Vault, peers) | tagged VID 103 via br-internal; no gw |
+| data-tenant | 10.12.16.0/22 | Tenant Geneve overlay | no gw |
+| storage | 10.12.32.0/22 | Ceph public | no gw |
+| replication | 10.12.36.0/22 | Ceph cluster (OSD replication) | no gw |
+
+- API VIPs: triple per clustered charm (provider/admin/internal), matching
+  last octet in the .50-.60 band, 11 clustered charms (verify count live).
+- Tenant pool: 10.20.0.0/16 (hybrid model D-016 - pool in NetBox, per-project
+  /24s Neutron-managed). Avoid collisions with capi-mgmt (10.20.0.0/24) and
+  existing tenant /24s - list live before allocating.
+- Provider NIC rule (D-057/D-060): the provider uplink must land in OVS
+  `br-ex`, never enslaved to a Linux bridge, and `br-ex` carries no L3 config.
+
+## Repo map (what lives where)
+
+- `bundle.yaml` - the canonical bundle; VIPs/units baked in for testcloud.
+- `runbooks/phase-00..08-*.md` - the gated deploy sequence, in order, each
+  ending in a hard gate. `runbooks/README.md` has the label conventions.
+- `runbooks/appendix-A-troubleshooting.md` - symptom->cause->fix index keyed
+  by D-NNN/DOCFIX-NNN. First stop for any known-looking failure.
+- `runbooks/appendix-B` - version lock. `appendix-C` - identity/RBAC.
+  `appendix-D` - Magnum trust model. `ops-capi-recovery.md` - CAPI/Magnum
+  post-deploy operations.
+- `docs/design-decisions.md` - the D-NNN architectural record (append-only
+  discipline; superseded entries stay, marked).
+- `scripts/` - phase scripts + `lib-net.sh` / `lib-hosts.sh` (pinned values)
+  + tenant onboarding/acceptance. `tests/<script>/` - offline fakebin
+  regression harnesses.
+- `policies/domain-manager-policy.yaml` + `policies/overrides.zip` - the SCS
+  Domain Manager RBAC override (D-051/D-064); the zip ships IN the bundle
+  (keystone resources, DOCFIX-071) and provider-bundle-check drift-guards it.
+- Operational tooling (2026-07 hardening set): `scripts/preflight.sh` (single
+  pre-deploy gate: lint -> bundle invariants -> Charmhub channel assert -> live
+  MAAS pre-flight), `scripts/repo-lint.sh`/`repo_lint.py` (static hygiene,
+  L1-L6), `scripts/cloud-assert.sh` (behavioral verifier + `--capture` BOM to
+  `asbuilt/<date>/`), `scripts/run-logged.sh` (as-executed session logger),
+  `scripts/channel_assert.py`. `runbooks/ops-restart-procedure.md` (full-cloud
+  restart). `docs/security-ledger.md` (exposure/obligation rows).
+  `logs/as-executed-index.md` (committed index; log content stays jumphost-only).
+- No KVM snapshot restore path exists (D-070 superseded D-012):
+  rebuild-from-runbooks IS the restore path; baselines come from cloud-assert
+  `--capture`.
+- **VR1 DC-DC additions (2026-07-09/10), not part of VR0's map above:**
+  `docs/dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md` (master tracker), `docs/dc-dc-buildout-
+  design.md` (design), `docs/design-decisions.md` D-100..D-110,
+  `runbooks/dc-dc-phase0..6-*.md` + `dc-dc-teardown-rollback.md`,
+  `opentofu/` (libvirt/MAAS/OPNsense IaC, UNVALIDATED -- see its own
+  README), `netbox/dc-dc-prefixes-import.py`, `scripts/dc-dc-*.sh` (MTU/Ceph
+  budget calculators, Ceph replication tooling).
+
+## Identity / tenancy model (see appendix-C/D and D-051, D-064, D-066)
+
+Domain-per-client. Operator provisions: domain + a domain `manager` (SCS
+Domain Manager persona - the plain `admin` role is NOT domain-confinable) +
+quotas. The tenant self-services everything inside: projects, users, roles
+(only member + load-balancer_member assignable - never admin/manager),
+app credentials, networks, templates, clusters. Magnum mints per-cluster
+trust app-creds carrying the trustor's roles frozen at mint time (D-039:
+trustor needs load-balancer_member or CAPO 403s on Octavia). Cluster create
+must run as a password identity, not an app-cred (trust-creation block,
+D-066). Every identity command is DOMAIN-QUALIFIED (`--domain`,
+`--user-domain`, `--project-domain`) - scope-default resolution silently
+lands in the wrong domain and 404s misleadingly.
+
+
+================================================================================
+## references/platform-traps.md (load on demand)
+================================================================================
+
+# Platform traps and version pins -- libvirt/KVM, MAAS+LXD, OPNsense
+
+The substrate BELOW the cloud (the hypervisor, the provisioner, the edge
+routers) has its own version boundaries and its own silent-failure modes.
+Every item below is either (a) sourced to a vendor/upstream URL, or (b)
+MEASURED on this project and sourced to the repo's own D-NNN / changelog.
+Nothing here is generic advice: each entry exists because it cost, or would
+have cost, a session.
+
+Companion files: `references/opentofu-provider-docs.md` (provider schema +
+fetch methodology), `references/troubleshooting.md` (method). Start at the
+verbatim-error index at the bottom if you have an error string in hand.
+
+## Version pins that actually matter (and why)
+
+| Thing | Pin | Why the pin exists |
+|---|---|---|
+| `dmacvicar/libvirt` provider | `0.9.8` | 0.9.0 was a compatibility-BREAKING rewrite; anything remembered from 0.8-era examples is wrong (see below) |
+| OpenTofu | live pin: CURRENT-STATE.md section 7 | Stage-1 as-run value is historical (git history) |
+| LXD | **`5.21` LTS track** | MAAS 3.6/3.7 is INCOMPATIBLE with LXD >= 6.7 (D-114; see below) |
+| MAAS | 3.7.2 (VR0) | the LXD ceiling above is a property of MAAS 3.6/3.7 |
+| OPNsense | live pin: CURRENT-STATE.md section 7 (26.7 as of 2026-07-18) | ISC-DHCP left core AT 26.1 -- Kea/dnsmasq only on every later release (see below) |
+| Vault charm | `1.8/stable` | 1.16 is an incompatible charm, deliberately NOT an upgrade (appendix-B, D-068) |
+
+Charm channels/revisions are appendix-B's job, not this file's. This file
+covers only the substrate the charms sit on.
+
+---
+
+## 1. dmacvicar/libvirt provider (pinned 0.9.8)
+
+### 1a. The 0.8 -> 0.9 break invalidates most examples you will find
+
+v0.9.0 (2025-11-08) is a deliberate, compatibility-breaking rewrite on the
+plugin framework, with the design principle "HCL maps almost 1:1 to libvirt
+XML"; the legacy provider stayed on the `v0.8` branch. v0.9.1 (2025-11-30)
+then code-generated the schema from libvirt's XML schema, renaming attributes
+again (`unit` -> `memory_unit`, `os.arch` -> `os.type_arch`, `os.machine` ->
+`os.type_machine`, `os.kernel_args` -> `os.cmdline`, camelCase -> snake_case
+throughout).
+- https://github.com/dmacvicar/terraform-provider-libvirt/releases/tag/v0.9.0
+- https://github.com/dmacvicar/terraform-provider-libvirt/releases/tag/v0.9.1
+
+**Consequence:** blog posts, StackOverflow answers, and model memory almost
+all describe 0.8. Nested structures are attribute-style objects
+(`os = { ... }`, `devices = { ... }`), not HCL blocks. Confirm against
+`docs/resources/*.md` + `examples/*.tf` at the pinned tag, or
+`tofu providers schema -json`.
+
+### 1b. Bare `memory` is KiB, not MiB -- 1024x too little RAM (DOCFIX-188)
+
+The 0.9.1 migration guide states the rule explicitly: "Value/unit pairs are
+explicit -- whenever libvirt exposes a value with a unit attribute the
+provider now has two attributes (`memory` + `memory_unit`, `capacity` +
+`capacity_unit`, etc.). **Leaving the unit unset lets libvirt use its
+default.**"
+(https://github.com/dmacvicar/terraform-provider-libvirt/releases/tag/v0.9.1)
+
+And libvirt's default is KiB: "The units for this value are determined by the
+optional attribute `unit`, which defaults to 'KiB'"
+(https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#memory-allocation).
+
+So `memory = 2048` with no `memory_unit` is **2 MiB**, not 2 GiB. In 0.8,
+`memory` meant MiB -- that is exactly how this shipped here.
+
+    memory      = var.memory_mib
+    memory_unit = "MiB"      # REQUIRED. Never omit.
+
+Signatures (all measured, 2026-07-12): QEMU cmdline `-m size=2048k`;
+`virsh dominfo` -> `Max memory: 2048 KiB`; a FreeBSD guest echoes
+`/boot.config` (262 bytes of serial output) and then triple-faults handing off
+to `/boot/loader`. `tofu validate` CANNOT catch it (the attribute is
+optional) -- `scripts/opentofu-validate.sh` check **S1** does.
+Evidence: `docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260712-libvirt-memory-unit-rootcause.md`,
+`docs/archive/incident-20260712-opnsense-edge-boot-triplefault.md`.
+
+The provider's own current domain examples now carry `memory_unit = "MiB"`
+(`docs/resources/domain.md`) -- a fresh reader of the docs would get this
+right; a reader of any 0.8-era example would not.
+
+### 1c. No `features` block => `acpi=off` => FreeBSD panics (DOCFIX-190)
+
+The whole `features` attribute is optional, so omitting it is schema-valid --
+and libvirt then renders the machine with `acpi=off` (measured on the QEMU
+cmdline: `-machine pc-i440fx-noble,...,acpi=off`).
+
+    features = {
+      acpi = true
+      apic = {}          # acpi is a Boolean; apic is a nested object
+    }
+
+(schema: `docs/resources/domain.md`, `features.acpi` (Boolean),
+`features.apic` (Attributes).)
+
+Three distinct consequences, only one of which is loud:
+- FreeBSD/OPNsense **panics** (it finds the local APIC via ACPI's MADT and
+  ships no `atpic` fallback): `panic: running without device atpic requires a
+  local APIC` -> `db>` prompt -> domain shows `running` while burning 100% of
+  one core forever.
+- Linux guests boot but degrade: no clean ACPI shutdown/reboot signalling.
+- **MAAS drives power off/on via ACPI**, so a MAAS-managed node VM without
+  ACPI can only ever be hard-stopped. That would have been a nasty Stage-3
+  debug.
+Evidence: `docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260712-libvirt-acpi-kernel-panic.md`.
+Guard: `scripts/opentofu-validate.sh` check **S2**.
+
+### 1d. No `cpu` block => generic CPU => NO `svm` => nested KVM impossible
+
+Found 2026-07-13. With no `cpu` attribute, libvirt hands the guest a generic
+emulated CPU model with no virtualization flag. Measured: host is an **AMD
+EPYC 9965**, the default-CPU guest was handed an **`Opteron_G3`**. Nothing
+errors -- the guest just has no `/dev/kvm` and no `svm` in `/proc/cpuinfo`.
+
+Ubuntu's own nested-virt guide states the guest-side requirement: set the
+guest `cpu mode` to `host-model` or `host-passthrough` for the guest to see
+`svm`/`vmx`
+(https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/how-to/virtualisation/enable-nested-virtualisation/).
+
+    cpu = {
+      mode = "host-passthrough"
+      # per-caller: pass svm through, or disable it as router hardening
+      features = var.expose_nested_virt ? [] : [
+        { name = "svm", policy = "disable" }
+      ]
+    }
+
+**The host side is a SEPARATE requirement and bites at every level.** The
+vcloud host is ITSELF a KVM guest (`systemd-detect-virt` -> `kvm`), so nesting
+must be enabled at each level, not just ours:
+- check: `cat /sys/module/kvm_amd/parameters/nested` -> `Y` or `1`
+  (Intel: `/sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/nested`)
+- persist: `options kvm-amd nested=1` in a file under `/etc/modprobe.d/`
+  (same source as above)
+
+Why this matters here (D-114): LXD **virtual machines** are qemu/KVM guests,
+so MAAS composing service VMs inside a site containment VM needs working
+nested KVM at that depth; and `nova-compute` on the DC nodes needs it one
+level deeper still. `modules/node-vm` still has the missing-`cpu`-block defect
+-- logged, NOT fixed, because DC1 is gated behind Office1
+(`docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260713-d114-voffice1-nested-virt.md`).
+
+### 1e. "will be updated in-place" DOES NOT mean "the guest stays up"
+
+A plan line reading `libvirt_domain.vm will be updated in-place` **bounced a
+live guest** (measured 2026-07-13: uptime 8m36s -> 6s; ~30s with no routing and
+no DHCP on the Office1 edge). "In-place" is a statement about the Terraform
+RESOURCE, not about the domain.
+
+Upstream confirms the mechanism: the v0.9.4 release notes describe domain
+update as "updating a domain (e.g. changing memory) **would undefine and
+re-define it**" (the 0.9.4 fix was only to preserve NVRAM/TPM files across
+that undefine), and v0.9.6 added "configurable update shutdown behavior so
+domain updates can request guest shutdown and wait with a configurable timeout
+before forcing a stop."
+- https://github.com/dmacvicar/terraform-provider-libvirt/releases/tag/v0.9.4
+- https://github.com/dmacvicar/terraform-provider-libvirt/releases/tag/v0.9.6
+
+**Rule: treat ANY `tofu apply` whose plan touches a `libvirt_domain` as an
+OUTAGE of that guest. Schedule and gate it as one.** Read the plan's resource
+list before applying; `0 to change` on the domains is the only assurance that
+a running guest is not about to bounce
+(`docs/session-ledger.md`, standing lesson 2).
+
+Corollary (DOCFIX-187/DOCFIX-188): some domain attributes are CREATE-time to
+libvirt (max boot memory, `machine`, `cpu`). The provider will happily plan an
+in-place update that libvirt then ignores. If a changed value does not show up
+in `virsh dominfo`, `destroy` + `undefine` the domain and re-apply (volumes
+survive an `undefine`).
+
+Second corollary (measured 2026-07-20/21): the undefine/redefine also
+**REGENERATES every UNPINNED NIC MAC**. The plan reads `0 to add, N to change,
+0 to destroy`, the apply succeeds -- and every touched domain now has brand-new
+MACs. Anything that keys on those MACs is silently stranded: in the 2026-07-21
+commissioning incident all 9 MAAS-enlisted nodes became UNKNOWN at PXE (no
+"Performing PXE boot" event, silent 30-min timeouts), because a serial-console
+retrofit apply had drifted every boot-interface MAC. **Rule: any domain whose
+MACs are load-bearing (MAAS-enlisted nodes above all) carries config-pinned
+MACs** -- `mac = { address = ... }` per interface; see `modules/node-vm`'s
+`interface_macs` + `tests/node-vm`. VR-only trap: Roosevelt metal has fixed
+MACs.
+
+### 1f. Two more upstream behaviours worth knowing (from the release notes)
+
+- `capacity_unit = "GiB"` on a volume caused **"Provider produced inconsistent
+  result after apply"** on every apply before 0.9.4 (libvirt normalizes to
+  bytes). Fixed in 0.9.4 -- if you see that error string, check the provider
+  version first.
+- `tofu destroy` of a **`dir` pool** used to DELETE the backing directory
+  (`StoragePoolDelete`). Since 0.9.4 the directory is preserved by default,
+  with an explicit `destroy.delete = true` to opt back in. Relevant to
+  `modules/dc-storage-pool`.
+  (https://github.com/dmacvicar/terraform-provider-libvirt/releases/tag/v0.9.4)
+- **UNVERIFIED:** the 0.9.4 notes name a `destroy.shutdown.timeout` option
+  while `docs/resources/domain.md` documents `destroy = { graceful, timeout }`,
+  and I could not find the 0.9.6 update-shutdown attribute documented at all.
+  Before relying on either, read the real schema:
+  `tofu providers schema -json | jq '.provider_schemas[].resource_schemas.libvirt_domain'`.
+
+### 1g. `forward=bridge` networks + `br_netfilter`: a global FORWARD-drop silently kills bridged frames (D-125)
+
+A `libvirt_network` with `forward = { mode = "bridge" }` (dmacvicar schema:
+`bridge = { name = "<host-bridge>" }`, no `ips`, no NAT) attaches guest taps to a
+**pre-existing** host bridge -- libvirt does NOT create the bridge, so it must
+already exist (declare it in the host's netplan, not the tofu) or the network
+fails to start. This is the Model B "bridge-in" WAN path (D-125): the inner
+OPNsense WAN rides `br-vr1-dc0-wan` out through `vvr1-dc0`'s IP-less uplink NIC to
+the single vcloud ISP NAT.
+
+Two silent-failure traps ride along:
+
+- **`br_netfilter` makes bridged frames traverse the L3 `FORWARD` chain.** So a
+  GLOBAL forward-drop -- `iptables -P FORWARD DROP`, or an nftables forward hook
+  with `policy drop` and no interface match -- silently kills the WAN bridge even
+  though it is "just L2". Keep any DC-LOCAL forward-drop (SEC-010) **scoped to the
+  transit interface** (`oifname/iifname "<transit>"`), never global. Note
+  `net.ipv4.ip_forward=0` is L3-only and does NOT affect pure bridging -- do not
+  reach for it expecting to gate a bridge, and do not assume `ip_forward=1` is
+  required just because an older NAT-based design needed it.
+- **Foreign-MAC egress across a nested bridge is unprovable until apply.** When the
+  bridged guest is itself inside another guest (OPNsense inside `vvr1-dc0`), the
+  outer NAT's `virbr` sees a foreign source MAC arriving on the containment VM's
+  port; an anti-spoof/nwfilter drop there blackholes egress. `tofu validate` is
+  clean regardless. TEST IN ISOLATION FIRST: attach a throwaway guest to the
+  bridge, confirm it gets an address and pings out, BEFORE the real chain rides
+  it. (D-125's fallback for this failure is double-NAT: masquerade at `vvr1-dc0`
+  instead of relying on nested L2.)
+
+## 2. AppArmor blocks qemu on any non-default pool path
+
+libvirt's stock `abstractions/libvirt-qemu` grants qemu the DEFAULT pool path
+(`/var/lib/libvirt/images`) only. A pool anywhere else is blocked by AppArmor
+**even with perfect POSIX permissions**, and the failure names nothing:
+
+- libvirt/qemu says only: `Could not open '<path>': Permission denied`
+- the actual denial is in the kernel log:
+  `apparmor="DENIED" operation="open" profile="libvirt-<domain-uuid>" name="<path>"`
+- the domain DEFINES fine and fails at START -- so `tofu apply` can "succeed"
+  into a dead guest.
+
+Upstream (still open, provider issue #920, with the same workaround):
+https://github.com/dmacvicar/terraform-provider-libvirt/issues/920
+
+Fix, in the vendor-sanctioned override include (survives package upgrade --
+do NOT edit the shipped abstraction):
+
+    # /etc/apparmor.d/local/abstractions/libvirt-qemu
+    /var/lib/libvirt/vr1/** rwk,
+
+This is now installed by `bash scripts/prereqs/install-apparmor-libvirt.sh`
+(pool parent overridable via `VR1_POOL_PARENT`), wired into
+`scripts/prereqs/install-all.sh` and reported by `check-prereqs.sh`. It cost a
+session on 2026-07-12 (DOCFIX-186) because it existed only as hand-applied host
+state; `docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260713-apparmor-libvirt-prereq.md`.
+
+## 3. MAAS + LXD
+
+### 3a. MAAS 3.6/3.7 is INCOMPATIBLE with LXD >= 6.7 (D-114)
+
+Canonical's own announcement: LXD 6.7 "consolidates some API endpoints" that
+MAAS's pinned **pylxd 2.3.5** cannot speak to (fixed in **pylxd >= 2.3.9**,
+not yet in a MAAS release). Verbatim guidance: "We recommend using LXD <=6.6
+or the 5.21 LTS release until further notice."
+https://discourse.maas.io/t/maas-incompatibility-with-lxd-6-7/15749
+
+VR0 runs LXD **5.21.4** and is therefore safe by accident of timing; D-114
+makes it a decision. **LXD 5.21 LTS is supported to June 2029**
+(https://canonical.com/blog/lxd_5-21-0_lts).
+
+**The live hazard is the snap auto-refresh, not the install.** LXD's docs:
+"By default, installed snaps update automatically when new releases are
+published to the channel they're tracking"; the `latest` track "typically
+points to the latest feature release", is "a continuously rolling release
+track", and is "not recommended for general use"; a bare `snap install lxd`
+uses the most recent LTS track, "which is currently 5.21".
+https://canonical.com/lxd/docs/latest/reference/releases-snap/
+=> install/refresh explicitly on `5.21/stable` and verify the tracked channel
+(`snap list lxd`, `snap info lxd`) before blaming MAAS for an LXD it can no
+longer talk to.
+
+### 3b. LXD's own bridge runs a dnsmasq DHCP server -- MAAS says turn it off
+
+"Bridges created by LXD are managed, which means that in addition to creating
+the bridge interface itself, LXD also sets up a local `dnsmasq` process to
+provide DHCP, IPv6 route announcements and DNS services to the network"
+(`ipv4.dhcp` defaults to **true**).
+https://canonical.com/lxd/docs/latest/reference/network_bridge/
+
+MAAS's own LXD VM-host procedure therefore has you disable exactly that,
+because MAAS must be the DHCP/PXE authority for the machines it composes:
+
+    lxc network set lxdbr0 dns.mode=none
+    lxc network set lxdbr0 ipv4.dhcp=false
+    lxc network set lxdbr0 ipv6.dhcp=false
+
+https://canonical.com/maas/docs/how-to-manage-machines
+
+This is the concrete form of D-114's DHCP warning. On `office1-local`,
+**OPNsense/Kea is authoritative** (10.10.0.0/24, pool .100-.199). Two DHCP
+servers on one L2 is an intermittent, genuinely unpleasant failure. Never
+bridge `lxdbr0` onto the site LAN without disabling its DHCP first.
+
+### 3c. Two different LXDs in this cloud -- do not conflate them (D-114)
+
+Conflating these caused a real, recorded error:
+- **Juju-created LXD CONTAINERS** on the OpenStack nodes (`lxd:N` placements
+  in `bundle.yaml`, 21 of them). MAAS never sees these and never needs to.
+- **A MAAS-registered LXD KVM host** (the VR0 `lxd` machine) into which MAAS
+  **COMPOSES VMs** (`maas $PROFILE vm-host compose ...`) -- VR0's `tailscale`
+  machine is one. These ARE MAAS machines: enlisted, commissioned, deployed,
+  powered, released.
+
+D-114 extends the second pattern per site; the first is explicitly out of
+scope. Also note: MAAS only sees VMs in the LXD **project** the VM host was
+registered with -- VMs in other projects are invisible to it and unaffected
+(MAAS LP#1923251, https://bugs.launchpad.net/maas/+bug/1923251).
+
+**Composed-VM networking -- MEASURE, do not assume.** A MAAS-bundled copy of
+the MAAS docs states: "When composing a virtual machine with LXD, MAAS uses
+either the 'maas' LXD profile, or (if that doesn't exist) the 'default' LXD
+profile. The profile is used to determine which bridge to use."
+(served by a MAAS instance's own docs:
+https://maas.cloud.cbh.kth.se/MAAS/docs/cli/how-to-use-lxd.html -- **I could
+NOT locate this sentence on canonical.com/maas.io today; the docs site has been
+reorganized and the old URLs 404. Treat the profile->bridge mechanism as
+PLAUSIBLE-BUT-UNCONFIRMED against a primary source.**) Since a composed machine
+that PXEs on the wrong L2 is the failure this predicts, do the cheap
+measurement instead of trusting either source: `lxc profile show maas` /
+`lxc profile show default` on the LXD host, and confirm the NIC's parent bridge
+before composing.
+
+Because LXD **VMs** (not containers) are qemu/KVM guests, this pattern needs
+nested KVM at whatever depth the LXD host sits -- see 1d.
+
+## 4. OPNsense edge (traps entered at 26.1; they persist on the live 26.7)
+
+### 4a. `config.xml` is GUI-owned. Do not hand-author it. (D-112, D-113)
+
+The config-xml path is **DELETED** (template, renderer, ISO builder, and the
+module's `config_seed` volume + cdrom disk -- D-113 amendment, 2026-07-13).
+Configure the edge over the **REST API** (`scripts/opnsense-api.sh`); mint an
+API key with `scripts/opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh`. Three separate defects
+(no sshd, no console, an inert `<dhcpd>` block) all traced to hand-writing
+that file, and a full-config push DROPS ~667 migration-populated elements --
+including the box's only two firewall pass rules -- surviving only on an
+UNDOCUMENTED self-heal at boot. If you think the API cannot express something,
+that is a finding to raise against D-113, not a reason to write XML.
+
+Two traps that follow:
+- **A config ISO can NEVER be read on a nano image** (D-112, root-caused in
+  upstream `opnsense/core:src/sbin/opnsense-importer`: the importer probes for
+  a read-only root and `bootstrap_and_exit 0`s on a pre-installed image before
+  scanning any media). Any instruction to build one is a trap.
+- Factory default: LAN `192.168.1.1/24`, **SSH disabled**, **all inbound
+  blocked on WAN**. An unanswered ping to the WAN address is NOT a fault.
+
+### 4b. ISC dhcpd is GONE from core in 26.1 -- an `<dhcpd>` config is inert
+
+26.1 release notes: "ISC-DHCP moves to a plugin. It will be automatically
+installed during upgrades. **It is not installed on new installations because
+it is not being used**, but you can still install and keep using it." Also:
+"Dnsmasq is now the default for DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 as well as RA out of the
+box."
+https://docs.opnsense.org/releases/CE_26.1.html
+
+So on a fresh 26.1-or-later image: an ISC `<dhcpd>` block configures nothing (that was
+DOCFIX-193), and the GUI default backend is **dnsmasq**, not Kea. This edge
+deliberately runs **Kea** (10.10.0.0/24, pool .100-.199, first real lease
+served to `voffice1` 2026-07-13).
+
+### 4c. REST API: auth, endpoints, and the reconfigure step everyone forgets
+
+- Auth is **HTTP basic with an API key/secret pair**, not the root password:
+  "API access is part of the local user authentication system, but uses
+  key/secret pairs to separate account information from machine to machine
+  communication." URL pattern: `https://<host>/api/<module>/<controller>/<command>`.
+  https://docs.opnsense.org/development/how-tos/api.html
+- Kea DHCPv4 (exact paths):
+  `/api/kea/dhcpv4/get`, `/set`, `/add_subnet`, `/set_subnet/$uuid`,
+  `/del_subnet/$uuid`, `/add_reservation`, `/set_reservation/$uuid`,
+  `/get_reservation`, `/add_option`; service control:
+  `/api/kea/service/reconfigure|restart|start|stop|status`.
+  **A `set*` call only edits config -- it is NOT live until you POST
+  `/api/kea/service/reconfigure`.** A silently-unapplied change looks exactly
+  like a change that did not take.
+  https://docs.opnsense.org/development/api/core/kea.html
+- **Firewall rules have a self-rollback safety net -- use it.** The filter
+  controller exposes `savepoint`, `apply/$rollback_revision`,
+  `cancel_rollback/$rollback_revision`, `revert/$revision`: "When calling
+  `savepoint()` a new config revision will be created and the timestamp will be
+  returned for later use. **If the `cancelRollback(savepoint)` is not called
+  within 60 seconds, the firewall will rollback to the previous state**."
+  For any remote rule change on a router you reach THROUGH that router, a
+  savepoint means a mistake self-reverts instead of locking you out.
+  https://docs.opnsense.org/development/api/core/firewall.html
+- Do NOT re-implement vendor internals to bootstrap. OPNsense stores API
+  secrets as `crypt(secret,'$6$')`; we deliberately do not mint keys offline --
+  a format drift would fail SILENTLY (keys that never authenticate). Call the
+  vendor's own model instead (`scripts/opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh`).
+  (D-113 amendment.)
+
+### 4d. root's shell is tcsh -- `$(...)` dies QUIETLY over SSH
+
+Measured on the Office1 edge: root's shell is **tcsh**. tcsh has no `$(...)`
+command substitution (it uses backquotes); a `$(...)` inside a quoted remote
+command is rejected with:
+
+    Illegal variable name.
+
+It already cost a defect: a pre-install snapshot silently no-op'd and the
+install then ran with no rollback point behind it
+(`docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260713-office1-dhcp-apply.md`). Because the step was
+non-fatal, nothing stopped.
+
+**Always feed remote commands to `sh -s`:**
+
+    ssh -i "$OPNSENSE_SSH_KEY" root@<edge> 'sh -s' <<'SH'
+    ...POSIX shell here...
+    SH
+
+(tcsh's substitution syntax: https://man.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=tcsh)
+
+---
+
+## Verbatim error -> cause index (grep this first)
+
+| Exact string you see | Cause | Where |
+|---|---|---|
+| guest triple-faults right after echoing `/boot.config`; `virsh dominfo` -> `Max memory: 2048 KiB`; QEMU `-m size=2048k` | `libvirt_domain.memory` with no `memory_unit` -- KiB, not MiB | 1b |
+| `panic: running without device atpic requires a local APIC` (then `db>`, 100% of one core, domain "running") | no `features` block -> `acpi=off` | 1c |
+| guest has no `/dev/kvm`; `/proc/cpuinfo` has no `svm`; CPU model reads `Opteron_G3` on an EPYC host | no `cpu` block -> generic emulated CPU | 1d |
+| `Could not open '<path>': Permission denied` (domain defines, then fails to START; nothing names AppArmor) -- check `dmesg` for `apparmor="DENIED" operation="open" profile="libvirt-<uuid>"` | non-default libvirt pool path not granted in AppArmor | 2 |
+| `Provider produced inconsistent result after apply` on a volume with `capacity_unit` | provider < 0.9.4 | 1f |
+| plan says `will be updated in-place`, guest uptime resets anyway | provider undefines + redefines the domain | 1e |
+| MAAS commissioning times out at 30 min, NO PXE event for a known machine | an in-place apply regenerated unpinned NIC MACs; MAAS records stale | 1e |
+| `Illegal variable name.` from an `ssh root@<edge> '...'` | root's shell is tcsh; `$(...)` unsupported | 4d |
+| OPNsense boots on FACTORY DEFAULTS with a correct config ISO attached; console shows `>>> Invoking import script 'importer'` and nothing more | the Configuration Importer can never fire on a nano image | 4a |
+| a Kea/firewall API `set` returns success but the box's behaviour does not change | no `service/reconfigure` (or no firewall `apply`) call | 4c |
+| MAAS cannot talk to an LXD VM host after an LXD update | LXD auto-refreshed past 6.6; MAAS 3.6/3.7 needs LXD <= 6.6 or 5.21 LTS | 3a |
+| a MAAS-composed VM gets a lease MAAS did not issue, or PXEs on the wrong L2 | `lxdbr0` runs its own dnsmasq (verified); the composing LXD profile's bridge is the other candidate (unconfirmed -- measure it) | 3b, 3c |
+
+---
+
+## NetBox (upstream, `netbox.baldurkeep.com`)
+
+### `HTTP 403 Forbidden` on every API call -- but the SAME token works from `curl`
+
+**Symptom.** `urllib`/`requests`/`pynetbox` get `403 Forbidden` from the upstream NetBox on every
+endpoint, including ones a valid token plainly reads. `curl` with the identical token and URL
+returns `200`. It reads exactly like a bad or revoked token; it is not.
+
+**Cause.** Something in front of upstream NetBox (WAF / reverse proxy) filters on **User-Agent**.
+The default Python UA (`Python-urllib/3.12`) is blocked; `curl/8.5.0` is allowed. Measured
+2026-07-13: same token, same URL, UA the only variable -- `None -> 403`, `curl/8.5.0 -> 200`.
+
+**Fix.** Send an accepted `User-Agent` header. This applies to **`pynetbox`** too (it sends
+`python-requests/...`), so the repo's NetBox tooling must set it:
+
+```python
+nb = pynetbox.api(url, token=tok)
+nb.http_session.headers["User-Agent"] = "curl/8.5.0"
+```
+
+**Do not** diagnose this as a token/permission problem and go re-mint credentials -- that is the
+trap. Confirm with `curl` first; if curl works and Python does not, it is the UA.
+
+**Note:** this is an UPSTREAM-only trap so far. The Office1 sandbox NetBox (4.6.4, no proxy in
+front) accepts the default Python UA. Upstream is 4.5.8 and also uses **v1** (40-char, bare) tokens,
+while the sandbox is 4.6 and uses **v2** (`nbt_<key>.<plaintext>`). Any tool pointed at BOTH must
+handle both auth shapes and the UA -- do not assume they are the same NetBox.
+
+
+================================================================================
+## references/script-authoring.md (load on demand)
+================================================================================
+
+# Script authoring - house style and hardening
+
+Every script and paste block in this project follows these rules. They are
+not style preferences: each one encodes a failure that actually happened.
+Read this in full before writing ANY bash or python for this cloud.
+
+## Zeroth decision: does it already exist?
+
+Before writing ANY operational script or check block, search the repo:
+`grep -rli <topic> scripts/ runbooks/` - the deploy/verify surface is heavily
+scripted and duplicating an existing script creates drift (e.g. the haproxy
+backend sweep already exists as `scripts/phase-03-core-verify.sh` 3.1b).
+Route to, extend, or fix the existing artifact; write new only when nothing
+covers the need, and say which search came up empty.
+
+## First decision: what kind of block is this?
+
+The error-handling regime depends on execution mode. Choosing wrong is itself
+a bug:
+
+1. **Executed script** (`bash script.sh`, own process): `set -uo pipefail`
+   at minimum; `set -e` acceptable and usually right, with the capture
+   caveats below. Exit codes are the interface.
+2. **Interactive paste block** (operator pastes into their shell): NEVER a
+   bare `exit` (it kills their shell) and no `set -e` (it can kill their
+   shell's options or abort mid-paste). Wrap the whole block in a subshell
+   `( { ...; } )` so a stray exit is contained; signal failure by printing
+   `FAIL: ...` lines the operator can read.
+3. **Verify/count-gate block** (greps that legitimately return zero matches):
+   run WITHOUT `set -e`, and end every count-grep with `|| true` - a zero
+   count is a valid answer, not an error (L1). `bash -n` cannot catch this;
+   it is behavior, not syntax.
+
+## The header contract (executed scripts)
+
+Every script opens with a comment block stating: path + argument synopsis;
+what it does (one paragraph, referencing the D-NNN/DOCFIX it implements);
+**whether it mutates anything** ("Mutates NOTHING" / what it changes and the
+gate protecting it); usage line; exit-code contract; and "ASCII + LF".
+House exit codes: `0` PROCEED, `1` HOLD (a gate failed), `2` precondition
+missing (tool absent, wrong model, helper not found). Then:
+
+    set -euo pipefail            # or set -uo pipefail; see regime above
+    shopt -s inherit_errexit 2>/dev/null || true
+    IFS=$'\n\t'
+
+Source shared constants instead of restating them:
+`. "$SCRIPT_DIR/lib-net.sh"` (planes, VIP bands, helpers) and `lib-hosts.sh`
+(hostnames, octets, system_id resolution). If a value you need is not in a
+lib, consider adding it there rather than inlining a literal.
+
+## Hardening rules (each one is a scar)
+
+**SIGPIPE races break guards in BOTH directions.** `cmd | grep -q X` under
+pipefail: on match, grep exits, the producer takes SIGPIPE (141), the pipeline
+reports failure despite the match. In an `... || die` verify this FALSE-DIES on
+success; in an `... && die` guard it FAILS OPEN -- the 2026-07 sweep found a
+duplicate-CIDR guard that let collisions through exactly this way. Treat every
+`| grep -q` on a live pipe as a defect regardless of which way the test points.
+
+**Pipefail + SIGPIPE race.** `cmd | grep -q X` under pipefail falsely fails:
+`grep -q` closes the pipe on first match, SIGPIPE (141) kills the producer
+(`juju ssh` especially). Capture, then test:
+
+    OUT=$(cmd 2>&1 || true)
+    grep -q "pattern" <<<"$OUT"
+
+**`set -e` kills id-captures silently.** `ID=$(openstack ... || die ...)` -
+if the subshell exits non-zero before your handler fires, `set -e` aborts the
+assignment line with no message. Append `|| true` to each capture, then
+validate the captured value explicitly (see whole-output validation below).
+
+**Whole-output validation, never extract-then-check.** Do not pipe raw output
+through `awk`/`grep` to extract a field and then test the fragment - a
+partial failure yields a plausible-looking fragment. Capture the WHOLE output,
+validate its shape (e.g. `is_id(){ [[ "$1" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{32}$ ]]; }` for a
+keystone id), and only then use it.
+
+**Centralize `</dev/null` in a wrapper, not per call.** The house pattern is a
+2-line helper (`rc()`, `rcap()`, `J()`) that appends `</dev/null 2>&1` once;
+every call site then stays clean and un-forgettable. Heredoc-payload ssh
+(`ssh ... bash -s <<'EOF'`) is the ONE exemption -- stdin IS the delivery there.
+
+**Inner stdin consumption.** Any `ssh`/`sudo`/`juju ssh` inside a heredoc,
+pipe, or loop eats the remaining stdin and truncates the block. Append
+`</dev/null` to EVERY inner invocation (`</dev/tty` only when it genuinely
+must prompt).
+
+**`read` and `... | bash` are mutually exclusive.** A script piped to bash
+has the pipe as stdin, so `read` returns empty at EOF - this once silently
+created a passwordless user. For paste-safety AND working prompts: base64-
+decode to a file, then run the file (it inherits the terminal stdin).
+
+**juju invocation shape.** `juju ssh -m <model>` - the `-m` flag goes BEFORE
+the target. `juju run <unit> <action>` output: use `--format json` for
+anything captured; confirm long actions via `juju show-operation <N>`, not
+the streamed log (a wait-timeout does not mean the hook failed).
+
+**Snap confinement.** The openstack CLI snap cannot read `/tmp` - stage files
+under `$HOME`. Same for `juju attach-resource` payloads.
+
+**Client output ordering.** `openstack -f value -c X -c Y` returns columns in
+ALPHABETICAL order, not flag order. When order matters: `-f json | jq`, or
+single-column queries. After any jq returning null, run `jq 'keys'` - key
+casing is command-specific (Title-Case in lists, hyphenated in quota show).
+
+**Environment isolation.** Any block that switches identity runs in a
+subshell that first unsets all OS_* vars:
+`( for v in $(env | awk -F= '/^OS_/{print $1}'); do unset "$v"; done; export ... )`
+Thread `OS_CACERT` explicitly into isolated subshells - it gets stripped.
+Confirm scope before acting: which project/domain the token holds, not which
+you intended.
+
+**Stable keys, not drifting IDs.** Look up MAAS subnets by CIDR, machines by
+hostname, CAPI CRs by LISTING then operating on the exact returned name
+(the OpenStackCluster suffix is random per create - a wrong-name patch
+silently no-ops). system_ids are re-minted on re-enrollment.
+
+**Verify the launched cmdline, not the config text.** For OpenStack debs run
+via LSB-init-wrapped systemd: a flag "present in a file" proves nothing.
+Gate on behavior - the init script's `show-args`, `ps -ww -C <daemon> -o args`
+on the live process, and probe under the daemon's RESTRICTED PATH
+(`env -i PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin sh -c 'command -v helm'`) - an
+interactive shell's PATH masks daemon-PATH failures.
+
+**sed is not a verifier.** A non-matching `sed -i` exits 0 having changed
+nothing. Assert the post-edit content; never trust sed's exit code as proof
+of the edit.
+
+**ASCII + LF, validated.** Non-ASCII: `grep -nP '[^\x00-\x7F]'` or a Python
+byte read. CR check: Python `data.count(b"\x0d")` - `grep $'\r'` false-
+positives on `$r...` tokens. Non-ASCII in conf.d has silently killed daemons.
+
+**Python helpers live in .py files** tested against fixtures - no inline
+python-in-bash beyond one-liners. Do not assume `jq` exists off-jumphost;
+gate on it (`need_jq`) or use python3.
+
+**Secrets in scripts:** whitelist-write to 0600 files under a 0700 dir
+(`umask 077` first), never echo, never argv, measure secret length from the
+file rather than asserting an expected length (this deployment's app-cred
+secrets are 86 chars, not the commonly assumed 43 - never hardcode either).
+
+**Structured-output captures take stdout ONLY; never merge stderr.** `x=$(openstack ... -f json 2>&1)`
+is a defect: any stderr line (a `--long` deprecation warning, an SDK notice) lands at char 0 and
+kills the JSON parse -- this fail-closed a live SG audit in 2026-07. Capture stdout alone; send
+stderr to a tempfile; surface it on parse failure, never discard it (`2>/dev/null` trades the bug
+for silent error-masking). The `vr_json` helper in `scripts/lib-validate.sh` encodes this. Also
+drop deprecated flags that only add stderr noise (`--long` is unneeded; fields are present without it).
+
+**Fixture-test throwaway probe one-liners like real code.** A measurement `ss`/`tcpdump`/`awk`
+pipeline is code, and it has the same parse traps: `ss` DROPS the State column under a
+`state established` filter (peer is then `$NF`, not `$5`); `cut -d:` splits IPv4-mapped IPv6
+(`[::ffff:10.0.0.1]:443`) at the wrong colon; `grep -oE 'src [0-9.]+'` greedily eats the trailing
+`.` into the next field; charmed magnum logs to `/var/log/magnum/magnum-conductor.log`, NOT
+journald. One measurement chain in 2026-07 shipped four such bugs before each was caught. Run the
+parse against a fixture line (mapped-v6, plain-v4, the real column layout) BEFORE handing the
+operator a probe -- the same discipline as a committed script.
+
+## Testing: nothing ships on `bash -n`
+
+`bash -n` validates parse, not behavior - and most of the failures above are
+behavioral. Every nontrivial script gets an offline regression harness at
+`tests/<script-name>/run-tests.sh` in the established pattern:
+
+- `fakebin/` contains fake `juju` / `openstack` / `maas` / `kubectl` /
+  `ssh` executables that replay fixture output and log the calls they
+  receive; real coreutils stay real.
+- The harness sets `PATH="$BIN:$PATH"`, a scratch `HOME`, and env-injected
+  fixture paths, runs the target, and asserts BOTH the exit code and an
+  output regex per case: `run <want_rc> <regex> <label>`.
+- Cover: the happy path, each gate's failure branch (asserting HOLD not
+  crash), each precondition (exit 2), and any DOCFIX behavior the script
+  claims (e.g. "verify-first never creates a rule when one exists").
+- Read an existing harness (e.g. `tests/phase-07-conductor-graft/`) before
+  writing a new one; match its shape.
+
+For MUTATING scripts, the harness fakebin is STATEFUL: the fake `maas`/`juju`
+advances a phase file on each mutation call so post-mutation verification reads
+post-mutation reality (see tests/phase-00-teardown-d061 -- canary survival,
+decompose-detection, substrate-collision aborts). A `--no-prompt` flag on a
+destructive script exists FOR its harness, nothing else.
+
+**Harnesses are HERMETIC: fakes shadow, deletion un-shadows.** Never simulate
+an unavailable tool by DELETING its fake -- on a real host that un-shadows the
+real binary and the test falls through to live infrastructure (a jumphost
+gauntlet run reached real Charmhub this way). Simulate failure with a FAILING
+fake (prints a realistic error, exits nonzero); keep the fail-loud-on-unmatched
+arm in every fake so an uncovered call can never silently hit a real CLI.
+
+**A script migration commit MUST carry its harness.** The D-060 revert updated
+the scripts and left their harnesses testing the retired D-058 world -- red-at-
+HEAD tests that trained everyone to ignore red. If you change a script's
+behavior or vocabulary, the same commit updates fixtures and expectations.
+
+**Static contract:** `bash scripts/repo-lint.sh` must exit 0 before anything is
+delivered (L1 ASCII/LF, L2 stale tokens, L3 ghost refs, L4 deprecated refs,
+L5 numbering, L6 bare invocations, L7 clientdocs sweep receipt). Changing any
+tenant-facing surface (tenant-*.sh, the onboarding contract, tenant runbooks,
+the policy zip, clientdocs/ itself) trips lint L7 until clientdocs/ has been
+reviewed for staleness and the receipt is re-recorded:
+`bash scripts/repo-lint.sh --record-clientdocs-sweep` (the sweep IS the review;
+recording without reviewing defeats the rule). A guard script that must NAME stale tokens
+opts out per-file with a `repo-lint: allow-stale-tokens` marker in its header.
+Committed binaries (e.g. policies/overrides.zip) need a `*.zip binary`
+.gitattributes rule or the LF normalization corrupts them in transit.
+Introducing a tool dependency (jq, python module) means adding its presence
+gate in the same change.
+
+Read-only verify scripts DETECT and report; remediation stays a gated human
+step even when the fix is obvious - the script's job is evidence, the
+operator's job is the mutation decision.
+
+**Mock worlds must be TRUTHFUL to the real CLI/contract, and test expectations must match the
+SPECIFIED contract.** A mock that emits a 409 must actually have the resource pre-exist; a mock of
+an openstack list command must emit the real deprecation warning ON STDERR (or the stderr-separation
+rule above never gets exercised); a harness assertion that contradicts the documented exit contract
+(e.g. expecting a lone SKIP to lower the overall verdict when the contract says SKIP never lowers it)
+is a TEST bug, not a code bug -- fix the test. Three 2026-07 "failures" were untruthful mocks or
+wrong assertions, each caught by running the harness before delivery.
+
+
+================================================================================
+## references/troubleshooting.md (load on demand)
+================================================================================
+
+# Troubleshooting - method, reflexes, and routing
+
+The repo's `runbooks/appendix-A-troubleshooting.md` is the operational
+symptom->cause->fix index, keyed by D-NNN/DOCFIX-NNN (it now includes the
+mysql-innodb-cluster recovery signatures and a point-of-use identifier index).
+ALWAYS check it before diagnosing from first principles - most failures on
+this cloud have been seen before and have a validated fix.
+`ops-capi-recovery.md` covers the CAPI/Magnum stack;
+`runbooks/ops-restart-procedure.md` covers full-cloud recovery.
+This file gives you the method and the reflexes that must fire BEFORE and
+WHILE you read those.
+
+**Substrate failures (libvirt/KVM guest won't boot, AppArmor, MAAS+LXD,
+OPNsense edge):** these are NOT in appendix-A. Go to
+`references/platform-traps.md` -- it ends in a verbatim-error -> cause index
+keyed to exact strings (`panic: running without device atpic requires a local
+APIC`, `Illegal variable name.`, a bare `Permission denied` that never names
+AppArmor, `-m size=2048k`, ...). Match the string BEFORE hypothesizing.
+
+**VR1 DC-DC track:** appendix-A above is VR0-specific -- nothing in the VR1
+DC-DC track (`docs/dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md`) has been executed yet, so
+there is no equivalent incident index for it (an OpenTofu/MAAS-`vm_host`/
+OPNsense-edge failure will not be in appendix-A). Apply the SAME triage
+method below regardless, but do not expect a pre-catalogued fix for a VR1-
+specific symptom -- log a genuinely new finding as a DOCFIX/D-NNN candidate
+per this repo's own discipline rather than assuming it must already be
+documented somewhere.
+
+## Triage method
+
+1. **Reproduce and capture verbatim.** The exact error text routes you in
+   appendix-A. Paraphrased symptoms match nothing.
+2. **Eliminate cheap layers first.** Web UI misbehaving: incognito/client
+   state (~10s) before any server hypothesis. CLI misbehaving: confirm the
+   token scope (project/domain) before blaming the service - wrong ambient
+   scope produces misleading 404s/403s, especially with domain-per-client
+   identity (an un-domain-qualified lookup resolves in the WRONG domain).
+3. **Establish what is actually true, live.** `bash scripts/cloud-assert.sh`
+   first - it runs every service-own-verdict gate in one read-only sweep and
+   localizes the failing layer. Then the targeted read-only audit of that
+   surface before touching anything. juju status, the service's own state
+   (haproxy admin socket, mysql cluster-status, vault status, ovn-appctl),
+   the relevant logs. Hard rule 2: measurements, not memory.
+4. **Match against appendix-A**, then design-decisions if it smells
+   architectural. If matched: follow the recorded fix exactly (verbatim-
+   reference rule for anything one-shot).
+5. **If unmatched:** smallest-possible hypothesis, read-only test to confirm
+   or kill it, and log the finding. New root causes become appendix-A /
+   DOCFIX material - capturing them is part of the fix.
+6. **Least-destructive first, individually gated.** Reload before restart,
+   restart before rebuild, rebuild before redeploy. Never batch.
+
+## Reflexes (internalize these; they override intuition)
+
+- **juju-green is necessary, not sufficient.** `active/idle` is BLIND to:
+  a DOWN haproxy backend (D-045 - hid a dead nova-api for 3 days), a missing
+  magnum trustee domain (D-046 - magnum reports ready regardless), an
+  unparsed-but-attached policy override, and per-backend/service state
+  generally. Gate on the service's OWN verdict (admin sockets, functional
+  probes), never on juju status alone.
+- **"Reports OK while broken" generalizes.** Charm-side validation is often
+  parse-level only (the keystone policy zip validates YAML, not semantics).
+  Acceptance is BEHAVIORAL: prove the capability works, not that the config
+  is present.
+- **Distinguish down from thrashing.** A host that looks "down" to juju/OVN
+  (ovsdb inactivity-probe storms) may be swap-thrashing, not down (D-040).
+  Check `who -b` / `uptime` / `journalctl -k | grep -i oom` before treating
+  it as an outage.
+- **Read the reason field before the status field.** Magnum health UNHEALTHY
+  has three signatures (D-042 amendment): reason EMPTY = conductor cannot
+  reach the mgmt API (VM down?); all-Ready except infrastructure "not found"
+  = the cosmetic driver-contract miss; a reason citing LB failure = real,
+  check Octavia. Same status, three different responses.
+- **Single-node mgmt VM does not self-heal (D-035/D-041).** Workload nodes
+  wedged with the `uninitialized` taint, magnum reconcile dead, addons
+  Pending -> check `capi-mgmt-v2` is ACTIVE before anything else. Manual
+  start is POLICY (down is a signal), not a defect.
+- **Known blast-radius traps:** `juju destroy-model` decomposes MAAS
+  pod-composed machines - machine retention is `juju remove-machine
+  --keep-instance` (D-061); mysql-innodb-cluster never bootstraps at
+  num_units 1 - deploy at 3 (D-062); `reboot-cluster-from-complete-outage`
+  is destructive against an already-healthy cluster - check cluster status
+  FIRST; vault restarts sealed by design - sealed-after-reboot is expected,
+  not a fault; the magnum `domain-setup` action must be re-run after every
+  redeploy (D-046).
+- **Green-in-the-shell, broken-in-the-daemon.** Interactive shells have a
+  different PATH, env, and stdin than LSB-init daemons. Verify under the
+  daemon's conditions (restricted PATH, live-process args) - see
+  script-authoring.
+- **The absence of an expected resource is a finding, not a gap to fill.**
+  If something that should exist does not (a domain, a rule, an image
+  property), find out WHY it is absent before recreating it - it may have
+  been removed deliberately (check design-decisions) or its absence may be
+  the actual root cause several layers up.
+
+**Prove event-driven flows by FUNCTIONAL OUTCOME, not packet/snapshot forensics.** For a
+bursty, per-operation client flow (e.g. the magnum conductor's helm/watch to the mgmt apiserver),
+an instantaneous `ss` snapshot or a short `tcpdump` window will usually catch NOTHING -- the
+connection is idle at rest and short-lived under load. That absence is expected, not a fault.
+The right proof is a forced real operation that SUCCEEDS end-to-end (a cluster resize reaching
+UPDATE_COMPLETE proves the conductor reached the mgmt apiserver through the boundary), plus a
+TCP handshake from the real source. Reach for established-state or a forced functional op before
+concluding a flow is broken; a service's own successful state transition outranks a captured packet.
+
+## Escalation and blockers
+
+- Missing vault unseal keys, lost one-shot secrets, or anything requiring
+  material only the operator holds: STOP and escalate. Do not improvise
+  around a recovery blocker (a vault re-init wipes the TLS plane).
+- If a fix would deviate from a runbook or contradict a D-NNN: log it as a
+  proposal and get a ruling. Mid-incident is exactly when discipline pays.
+- Two failed fix attempts on the same hypothesis = the hypothesis is wrong.
+  Step back to the audit stage; widen what you are measuring.
+
+
+================================================================================
+## references/opentofu-provider-docs.md (load on demand)
+================================================================================
+
+# OpenTofu / provider documentation -- sources, versions, and fetch method
+
+Read this before writing or extending anything under `repo opentofu/` (the
+VR1 DC-DC infrastructure-as-code, D-103). Built up during the 2026-07-09
+OpenTofu delivery; see `repo opentofu/README.md` for the full, per-module
+account (schema notes, an "Audit pass" section, and every finding's exact
+sourcing) -- this file is the index into that plus the fetch methodology,
+so a future session does not have to rediscover it by trial and error.
+
+## The core lesson: doc-summarization is lossy, real example code is not
+
+Every provider doc page fetched this session went through a summarizing
+model, which reliably got FIELD NAMES right but repeatedly lost or
+mis-stated CALL SYNTAX (block vs. attribute style, exact nesting). The
+`opentofu/` scaffold shipped with a real syntax bug from trusting doc
+summaries alone (fixed once real example `.tf` files were fetched and
+read directly -- see `repo opentofu/README.md`'s syntax-bug note). **For any
+new provider/resource: find real example `.tf`/`.go` source before trusting
+a doc-summary's syntax claims.** Doc-summaries are fine for "what fields
+exist"; they are not reliable for "how do I write this."
+
+## Fetch gotchas
+
+- The Terraform/OpenTofu Registry's own doc pages (`registry.terraform.io/
+  providers/.../docs`) are client-side-rendered -- a plain fetch returns only
+  the page shell, no content. Go straight to the provider's GitHub repo
+  instead.
+- GitHub's raw file URLs need the CORRECT default branch (varies: `main` for
+  some repos, `master` for others -- check `api.github.com/repos/<org>/<repo>`
+  for the `default_branch` field first, don't guess).
+- A general web search's own synthesized "summary" of a doc page can itself
+  be wrong (encountered once this session: a search summary confidently
+  named the wrong branch and file path). Treat search-result summaries as
+  leads to verify, not answers -- always follow through to the primary
+  source.
+- When a fetch refuses to "reproduce verbatim" (copyright caution), ask for
+  a specific, narrow thing instead -- "list bare field names only, no
+  prose" reliably works where "reproduce this page" does not.
+- `api.github.com/repos/<org>/<repo>/contents/<path>` (a JSON directory
+  listing) is a reliable way to discover the REAL current file layout when
+  a guessed raw-file path 404s -- doc reorganizations happen (one provider
+  moved from `website/docs/r/*.markdown` to `docs/resources/*.md` between
+  the versions training data and current reality disagree on).
+
+## Providers used in `repo opentofu/`
+
+### `dmacvicar/libvirt` (pinned `0.9.8`, confirmed 2026-07-09)
+
+**Before writing any `libvirt_domain`, read `references/platform-traps.md`
+section 1.** Four schema-level traps there have each cost real time and none
+of them is a validate-time error: bare `memory` is KiB not MiB; no `features`
+block means `acpi=off`; no `cpu` block means no `svm` (nested KVM silently
+impossible); and "will be updated in-place" still BOUNCES the guest.
+
+- Registry: https://registry.terraform.io/providers/dmacvicar/libvirt/latest
+  (JS-rendered -- use the GitHub repo for actual content)
+- GitHub: https://github.com/dmacvicar/terraform-provider-libvirt (default
+  branch `main`; there is no `CHANGELOG.md` -- the release NOTES on the
+  releases page are the changelog, and they are unusually informative:
+  `.../releases/tag/v0.9.0` is the breaking-rewrite rationale, `v0.9.1` is the
+  0.9.0->0.9.1 attribute-rename migration guide)
+- **Version boundary that invalidates most examples on the internet:** 0.9.0
+  (2025-11-08) is a compatibility-BREAKING rewrite (plugin framework, "HCL maps
+  almost 1:1 to libvirt XML"); the legacy provider lives on the `v0.8` branch.
+  0.9.1 then code-generated the schema and renamed attributes again. Anything
+  0.8-era -- including model memory -- is wrong for this pin.
+- Docs: `docs/resources/*.md`, `docs/data-sources/*.md` (NOT the older
+  `website/docs/r/*.markdown` layout some search results/training data
+  reference -- that's stale)
+- **Real example `.tf` files (the higher-value source): `examples/*.tf`** --
+  `domain_with_network.tf`, `alpine_cloudinit.tf` were the two that resolved
+  every syntax question this session. Fetch these FIRST for any new
+  resource, before the doc pages.
+- Key fact: this provider code-generates its schema as a 1:1 mirror of
+  libvirt's own domain/network/pool XML (confirmed via a general search of
+  provider discussion, not the docs pages themselves) -- when a Terraform
+  schema question stalls, libvirt's own native XML docs
+  (https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html, https://www.libvirt.org/pci-addresses.html)
+  are a legitimate, stable cross-reference for what a nested attribute is
+  likely to be named/shaped, since the mapping is direct.
+
+### `canonical/maas` (pinned `2.7.2`, confirmed 2026-07-09)
+- Registry: https://registry.terraform.io/providers/canonical/maas/latest
+  (same JS-rendering issue -- use GitHub)
+- GitHub: https://github.com/canonical/terraform-provider-maas (default
+  branch `master` -- NOT `main`, confirmed by checking `default_branch`
+  directly rather than assuming)
+- Docs: `docs/resources/*.md`, `docs/index.md` (provider block config)
+- Moved from an older `maas/maas` registry namespace -- use `canonical/maas`,
+  not `maas/maas`, for anything current.
+- Key lesson (see `repo opentofu/README.md`'s "MAAS registration + tc netem
+  research" section for the full account): `maas_vm_host` (register a virsh
+  chassis) and `maas_vm_host_machine` (MAAS composes/creates a new VM
+  itself) are NOT interchangeable -- read the schema (which fields are
+  INPUTS) before assuming a resource matches a design intent just because
+  its name sounds related.
+
+### OpenTofu core (language features, not a provider)
+- `local-exec` provisioner: https://opentofu.org/docs/language/resources/provisioners/local-exec/
+- `terraform_data` (built-in, replaces the older `null_resource` for
+  provisioner-only use): https://opentofu.org/docs/language/resources/tf-data/
+  (note the URL slug is `tf-data`, not `terraform_data` or `terraform-data`)
+- Both pages rendered cleanly on a direct fetch (static docs, no JS-rendering
+  issue) -- these were the most reliable fetches of the whole session.
+
+### OPNsense (not a Terraform provider -- the guest OS itself)
+
+**SUPERSEDED RESEARCH WARNING (2026-07-12/13).** `repo opentofu/README.md`'s
+"OPNsense deployment research" section and the 2026-07-09 changelogs describe a
+**config-ISO / Configuration-Importer** delivery path. That path is DEAD and its
+code is DELETED:
+- **D-112:** the Configuration Importer can NEVER fire on a pre-installed nano
+  image (upstream `opnsense-importer` probes for a read-only root and exits
+  before scanning media). The ISO was inert; nothing was ever going to read it.
+- **D-113 (ADOPTED 2026-07-13, option a2):** OPNsense STAYS, but config moves to
+  the **REST API**. `opentofu/templates/opnsense-config.xml.tmpl`,
+  `scripts/opnsense-render-config.sh` and `scripts/opnsense-build-config-iso.sh`
+  are DELETED, along with the module's `config_seed` volume + cdrom disk.
+  **A rendered-`config.xml` push would now CLOBBER live API-managed DHCP.**
+
+Current path: `scripts/opnsense-api.sh` (REST client) +
+`scripts/opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh` (mints a key via OPNsense's own model
+over SSH). Traps, exact endpoints, the mandatory `service/reconfigure` step, the
+60-second firewall auto-rollback, and the tcsh trap: `references/platform-traps.md`
+section 4.
+
+- Official docs: https://docs.opnsense.org/manual/install.html;
+  REST API: https://docs.opnsense.org/development/how-tos/api.html;
+  26.1 release notes (ISC-DHCP left core; dnsmasq is the new default):
+  https://docs.opnsense.org/releases/CE_26.1.html
+- Still-valid finding from the 2026-07-09 research: cloud-init is unreliable on
+  FreeBSD, so `modules/cloudinit-vm` genuinely does not apply to OPNsense
+  (https://forum.opnsense.org/index.php?topic=42517.0), and the nano image (not
+  the installer image) is the one to use.
+- Historical only (the ISO mechanism these describe cannot fire on nano):
+  https://github.com/opnsense/core/issues/5733, .../issues/10017.
+
+## Where the full findings live (don't duplicate here, it will drift)
+
+**Caveat first (2026-07-13):** `repo opentofu/README.md` predates D-112/D-113
+and its "OPNsense deployment research" section still describes the DELETED
+config-ISO path -- see the superseded-research warning above before acting on
+anything it says about OPNsense. Its libvirt schema notes also predate the four
+domain traps in `references/platform-traps.md` section 1. Everything else in it
+still stands.
+
+`repo opentofu/README.md` is the authoritative, per-module account --
+schema notes, what's confirmed vs. assumed per attribute, and a dated
+"Audit pass" section recording a later re-review (a real documentation
+error was found and fixed there: an early claim that libvirt interface
+list-order directly sets OPNsense's LAN/WAN role conflated two separate
+mechanisms -- read that section before trusting anything about NIC
+ordering/roles). Treat this file as the index/methodology; treat that one
+as the ground truth for what each module actually does and why.
diff --git a/.claude/skills/openstack-cloud-ops/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/openstack-cloud-ops/SKILL.md
index 711453d..b04acf2 100644
--- a/.claude/skills/openstack-cloud-ops/SKILL.md
+++ b/.claude/skills/openstack-cloud-ops/SKILL.md
@@ -93,7 +93,8 @@
 | Full-cloud restart after outage/maintenance | repo `runbooks/ops-restart-procedure.md` |
 | VR1 site unreachable after a vcloud reboot (`ssh voffice1` / `office1-*` time out) | `bash scripts/site-baseleg.sh check office1` -- `office1-local` is an ISOLATED libvirt net, so the host's base L3 leg (`10.10.0.10/24` + compose route `10.10.1.0/24 via 10.10.0.20`) is dropped every reboot; the `After=libvirtd` unit re-adds it (D-126 amendment / D-128). If MISS and the unit is not yet installed: `sudo bash scripts/site-baseleg.sh apply office1`. This is the vcloud path; the workstation reaches the same over the tailnet (D-107). |
 | Starting any consequential live session | `bash scripts/run-logged.sh <label>` first (as-executed log; docs/as-executed-log-convention.md) |
-| Credential exposures / security TODOs | repo `docs/security-ledger.md` -- add a row, never only a script comment |
+| Credential exposures / security TODOs | repo `docs/security-ledger.md` -- add a row, never only a script comment. The credential-LIFECYCLE policy (mint -> consolidate -> audit) is **D-137**, not the ledger (SEC-009's convention block is now a pointer); the expected-state register is `creds-matrix.tsv` + `scripts/creds-matrix.py` (tier 1 static, tier 2 existence, tier 3 validity), enforced as a BLOCKING preflight `P5`. `creds-audit` CLEAN is NOT evidence of completeness -- it is declaration-based |
+| Per-DC artifact delivery (apt mirror / caching proxy); "can the nodes get packages?" | dc0 = `bash scripts/dc-mirror.sh check dc0` (full mirror); dc1 = `bash scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh check dc1` (caching proxy). The two DCs DIFFER BY RULING (D-135 amendments) -- checking dc1 as a mirror fails by design. Both run ON the rack host over `ssh -J voffice1` with `sudo bash -s`; take rack transit IPs from `scripts/lib-hosts.sh`, never memory |
 | Resuming work / what is still in flight (esp. after compaction) | repo `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` first, then `docs/session-ledger.md` + `bash scripts/ledger-scan.sh` to reconcile against repo ground truth |
 | Tenant onboarding / tenant self-service | repo `scripts/tenant-onboard.sh` + `runbooks/tenant-onboarding-v2-DRAFT.md` + `appendix-C/D` |
 | Network / plane / IPAM questions | `references/environment.md`, repo `scripts/lib-net.sh`, NetBox (the IPAM apex -- but during VR1 the WORKING apex is `office1-netbox`, 10.10.1.10, per DOCFIX-195; `netbox.baldurkeep.com` is a READ-ONLY v1 reference, write-back deferred to end-of-deployment) |
@@ -153,6 +154,46 @@
 per-revision `/var/snap/maas/current/` and may not survive a snap refresh -- re-assert
 after any refresh. Roosevelt analog: per-DC IPMI/BMC credentials.
 
+**Per-DC ARTIFACT DELIVERY is a per-DC STRATEGY, and the two DCs deliberately differ
+(D-135 + its 2026-07-24/27 amendments -- standing invariant).** dc0 tests a FULL MIRROR
+(`dc-mirror.sh`, debmirror+nginx on the D-134 utility `.4`); dc1 tests an APT CACHING
+PROXY (`dc-cache-proxy.sh`, apt-cacher-ng on `.4:3142`, consumed via
+`juju apt-http-proxy`). This is the EXPERIMENT, not an interim state -- there is no
+fallback and no later convergence, and dc1's partial mirror was REMOVED 2026-07-27.
+Consequences that bite: **checking dc1 as a mirror FAILS BY DESIGN** (use its own
+checker), and each DC's gate is its own script's `check <site>`.
+**Corollary invariant, learned the hard way: a per-DC utility service OWNS ITS OWN
+NETWORK PREREQUISITES.** `dc-cache-proxy.sh` originally REUSED `dc-mirror.sh`'s
+`<site>-mirror-net.service` for the `.4` alias + edge default route, so on a proxy-only
+DC three files named `*-mirror-*` were load-bearing FOR THE PROXY: the documented
+mirror-removal procedure would have silently killed it, and the proxy could not be
+REBUILT afterward without reinstalling the whole mirror apparatus (enabled daily
+debmirror timer included). Never let one strategy's teardown be able to break the
+other's; name artifacts for the service that owns them. Roosevelt analog: a DC must be
+able to change artifact strategy without rebuilding the other strategy's apparatus.
+
+**Stage 4 hands off READY nodes, NOT deployed ones (DOCFIX-200, RULED 2026-07-23 --
+standing).** MAAS-deploy is SKIPPED; Juju provisions at Stage 5. Any surface saying
+"nodes Deployed" as a Stage-4 exit condition is a DEFECT, not a fact -- four were found
+and fixed on 2026-07-27 (workflow-doc gate cell, phase-3 DoD + Step 7, phase-4
+prerequisites). Practical consequence: **nothing node-side can be probed in Stage 4**
+(the nodes are powered off), so node-side checks belong at Stage 5 first boot -- that is
+why gate G17 exists.
+
+**A CHECKER THAT CANNOT FAIL IS NOT A GATE (this project's most productive audit move).**
+GA-R6 lets a stage close only on a named executable check, so the check itself must be
+verified capable of failing. Two measured instances, days apart: `creds-audit` is
+DECLARATION-based and read CLEAN on three sites while the D-137 matrix returned 13
+findings; `dc-mirror.sh check` asserted that `last-sync.status` EXISTED and printed its
+contents behind an unconditional `OK`, so a `FAIL` status and a four-day-stale `RUNNING`
+both passed. Working rules that came out of it: assert on CONTENT, never on existence;
+an unrecognised state REFUSES rather than defaulting to success; "could not look" is
+never "nothing there"; and **enumerate what EXISTS rather than only auditing what is
+declared** -- a register cannot report the absence of something it has no row for, which
+is how an unregistered credential at both DC edges survived every audit. When a test
+asserts a literal finding string, remediating the finding turns the harness red: REPLACE
+the assertion with the new invariant and say so, never delete it to go green.
+
 **Change-delivery loop:** grep for prior art (zeroth decision) -> grep
 design-decisions for the governing D-NNN -> edit -> `bash scripts/repo-lint.sh`
 -> run the touched script's harness (create one if missing -- no script change
@@ -186,7 +227,14 @@
 branch to `main` (merge commit, NOT squash; operator-gated), then RETIRE the branch
 (local + remote). **ALSO sweep THIS skill in the same close:** fold in any new
 INVARIANT the stage established and reconcile any divergence from repo HEAD (facts
-delegate to the repo and go stale; invariants live here and must be kept current). The next stage branches off post-merge `main`. `main` is
+delegate to the repo and go stale; invariants live here and must be kept current). The
+AUTHORITATIVE, versioned skill is THIS dir (`.claude/skills/openstack-cloud-ops/` -- SKILL.md
++ references); keep it current here. THEN REGENERATE the dated single-file Chat-upload
+snapshot from it (concatenate SKILL.md + references -> `.claude/skills/openstack-cloud-ops-consolidated-<date>.md`,
+ASCII/LF byte-verified) so the Chat/project skill surface can be refreshed -- the snapshot
+is a DERIVED artifact, never the source, and the Chat mount going stale is a known failure
+mode (it caused a failed clone + a mis-shaped handoff, 2026-07-25; docs/audit/skill-divergence-20260725.md).
+The next stage branches off post-merge `main`. `main` is
 trunk-of-record only for stages that have merged (precedents: Stage 2 -> PR #1 `e468d2e`
 2026-07-15; Stage 3 -> merge commit 2026-07-21, vr1-dc0 scope, dc1 HELD under G12). See
 `docs/dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md` "Cross-cutting discipline".
diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
index 390ad60..84c58c6 100644
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -37,6 +37,19 @@
 operations (init/rekey/generate-root) are operator-only, verbatim from the
 runbook -- the guard hook hard-blocks them.
 
+## Tooling guardrails (enforced by permission rules + repo-lint; also a norm)
+
+Never run `/caveman-compress` -- or its underlying `python3 -m scripts <file>`
+compressor -- against ANY repo-tracked file. It overwrites the target IN PLACE
+with a lossy caveman-speak rewrite and drops a `<name>.original.md` backup, which
+is incompatible with this repo's verbatim-record discipline (GA-R1 exact
+captures, GA-R5 quoted operator utterances, the append-only D-NNN log). The
+prose-record corpus is the whole hazard surface, not a short list: CLAUDE.md,
+`docs/CURRENT-STATE.md`, `docs/design-decisions.md`, `docs/security-ledger.md`,
+`docs/audit/*`, the runbooks, the skill, and every changelog. Layered
+enforcement: the caveman plugin is DISABLED (SEC-017); a permission `deny` blocks
+the compressor's invocation; repo-lint L11 FAILS on any `*.original.md` residue.
+
 ## Where things are
 
 - Deploy gate: `bash scripts/preflight.sh` (the ONLY pre-deploy entry).
diff --git a/_handoff-not-committed/00-DESTINATION-MAP.md b/_handoff-not-committed/00-DESTINATION-MAP.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d4139d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_handoff-not-committed/00-DESTINATION-MAP.md
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+# DESTINATION MAP -- read before unpacking
+
+Session 2026-07-25, Chat design seat -> Code.
+Authored against bc9a2df, revised against 4ed29aa.
+
+The previous version of this pack was a flat folder with no destinations. This version
+mirrors repo paths for the files that ARE repo artifacts, and quarantines the rest.
+
+================================================================================
+## Unpack behaviour
+================================================================================
+
+  docs/audit/...                 -> unzip over the repo root. Three NEW committed files.
+  _handoff-not-committed/...     -> DO NOT COMMIT. Working instructions whose CONTENT
+                                    lands inside existing surfaces. Delete after use.
+
+If `_handoff-not-committed/` ends up in a commit, that is the bug this revision exists
+to prevent. Nothing in it is a repo artifact.
+
+================================================================================
+## The three NEW committed files
+================================================================================
+
+  docs/audit/operating-model-plan-20260725.md
+      The NetBox -> approve -> apply operating model: recommendations, the agenda, and
+      the research scope the operator asked for. PINNED for a planning session.
+      Implement nothing from it.
+
+  docs/audit/sprygit-requirements-inputs-20260725.md
+      Pinned inputs for the SpryGit dev-handover document. The document itself is the
+      next Chat deliverable and is NOT in this pack.
+
+  docs/audit/skill-divergence-20260725.md
+      The stale-Chat-skill divergence list, for the skill sweep at stage close.
+
+WHY `docs/audit/` and not `docs/`: `docs/` top level is at 21 `.md` files against
+GA-R4's cap of <25 -- three slots of headroom, which dated advisory records should not
+consume. `docs/audit/` is uncapped and is the established home for dated advisory and
+plan documents; precedents already there include `phase5-sweep-plan.md`,
+`skill-additions-proposed.md`, `grounding-audit-charter.md` and
+`decision-recon-20260725.md`. `scripts/repo-lint.sh` carries no file-count or naming rule
+that these would trip (checked).
+
+================================================================================
+## Everything else: content, not files
+================================================================================
+
+| Working file | Content lands in | Form |
+|---|---|---|
+| `10-design-decisions-append.md` | `docs/design-decisions.md` | append at register tail; replace every `D-NNN` with the `ledger-scan` number |
+| `20-ruling-records.md` | distributes -- see below | three separate records |
+| `30-current-state-update.md` | `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` section 1, Stage-4 bullet | edits in place, SAME COMMIT as item 10 (GA-R1/C1) |
+| `40-session-changelog-items.md` | THIS session's changelog under `docs/changelog-<date>-<label>.md` | append items; do NOT mint a per-topic changelog file (GA-R2/D1) |
+| `50-ledger-bounded-summary.md` | `docs/session-ledger.md` tail | append the 15-line block; never touch the machine-derived fence |
+| `60-vault-vip-values.md` | splits -- see below | values + gates |
+
+### How `20-ruling-records.md` distributes
+
+There is no ruling-record file convention in this repo -- rulings attach to the surface
+they govern (precedent: D-134's amendment records its own question and utterance inline;
+D-131 sub-1 likewise). So:
+
+  Ruling 1, address family      -> an amendment note under `## D-101` in
+                                   `docs/design-decisions.md` (it CONFIRMS D-101 and
+                                   changes nothing in it, so a dated note, not a rewrite)
+                                   + the CURRENT-STATE bullet (b) rewrite in item 30
+  Ruling 2, keystone VERIFY-LIVE -> a gate row in `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` (item 30)
+                                   + a changelog line
+  Ruling 3, per-DC artifact shape -> already recorded inline in the new D-NNN entry's
+                                   "Artifact shape (RULED 2026-07-25)" paragraph; the
+                                   question and utterance travel with it
+
+Each carries its question and the operator's exact utterance (GA-R5).
+
+### How `60-vault-vip-values.md` splits
+
+  The four confirm-before-write gates -> the phase-4 runbook step that performs the
+      repair (`runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md`), so the gates sit where the
+      hand is
+  The derivation and the values       -> the changelog item for the repair, which is the
+      review surface
+  The `VIP_COUNT_EXPECT` 11 -> 12 change -> `scripts/lib-net.sh:59`, in the same commit
+      as the vault VIP, or `scripts/pre-flight-checks.sh:99-102` fails
+
+If you want the derivation citable rather than buried in a changelog, the consistent home
+would be `docs/audit/vault-vip-derivation-20260725.md`. Operator's call -- I have not
+created it, because the changelog is the ruled review surface and a fourth audit file
+may not earn its place.
+
+================================================================================
+## Order of operations (unchanged from the previous pack)
+================================================================================
+
+  0. Read `docs/audit/decision-recon-20260725.md`. This pack was revised against it:
+     the scope boundary was CORRECTED (apex writes are IN, not out), the gap statement
+     rewritten to the sub-prefix layer, and a sequencing prerequisite added.
+  1. `bash scripts/ledger-scan.sh` -- assign the D number and all THREE DOCFIX numbers.
+  2. Record the rulings BEFORE dependent work (GA-R5), commit and push.
+  3. Register append + CURRENT-STATE, same commit.
+  4. Changelog items into the existing session changelog.
+  5. Ledger block at session close only, 15-line cap.
+  6. Then the gated execution path.
+
+Placeholders are non-numeric on purpose (`D-NNN`, `DOCFIX-NNN`): `ledger-scan` keys the
+high-water on `^## D-[0-9]+`, and a digit-shaped placeholder inflates the counter -- the
+DOCFIX-174 hazard.
+
+All files ASCII-only, LF-only, byte-verified by Python read before packaging.
diff --git a/_handoff-not-committed/10-design-decisions-append.md b/_handoff-not-committed/10-design-decisions-append.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbc7219
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_handoff-not-committed/10-design-decisions-append.md
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+# 10 -- Append to docs/design-decisions.md (register tail)
+
+Replace every `D-NNN` with the number `ledger-scan` assigns. Land in the SAME commit
+as item 30 (GA-R1/C1). Status stays PROPOSED -- the operator rules per GA-R5.
+
+--- BEGIN append block ---
+
+## D-NNN: NetBox-coupled per-DC render pipeline for bundle overlays and tfvars [ARCH]
+
+**Status:** PROPOSED 2026-07-25 (Chat design seat, repo HEAD bc9a2df; operator has not
+ruled on the mechanism). Escalates the renderer deferral in
+`docs/audit/committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.md` (Fork 2, "hand-render dc1 now,
+extract the tool when dc0 forces the second render") to a NetBox-coupled generator.
+Supersedes nothing.
+
+**Problem.** Addressing is authoritative in NetBox (office1-netbox, the VR1 working
+apex, DOCFIX-195) but reaches the deploy as HAND-RENDERED static literals: NetBox ->
+imported by `netbox/*.py` -> literals in `scripts/lib-net.sh` / `lib-hosts.sh` and
+tfvars -> hand-rendered into `bundle.yaml` and `overlays/*.yaml`. There is no live pull
+and no generator. Measured fragility:
+
+- BUNDLEFIX-052 (ceph-rbd-mirror binding) and a YAML flow-comma slip, one session.
+- The app-to-VIP set exists in FOUR live places and no two agree: D-020's ratified list
+  (11 apps, includes vault, excludes ceph-radosgw); `bundle.yaml` and
+  `overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml` (11, vault dropped, ceph-radosgw added);
+  `overlays/dc-dc-ipv6-family-matrix.yaml` (10, plus octavia deliberately commented at
+  lines 140-152).
+- Two overlays own `vip:` for the same 10 applications under per-key REPLACE and
+  last-wins, so the deploy input depends on overlay ORDER, not on a reconciled value.
+- vault carries no `vip:` anywhere in the tracked tree while `overlays/dc-ha-scaleup.yaml`
+  scales it to 3 units and declares `vault-hacluster` at `cluster_count: 3`. HA intent
+  the artifact does not express, and an unrecorded departure from D-020.
+
+Under the 2026-07-25 family ruling (see the ruling record for this date) the per-app
+VIP becomes a six-address dual-family string, for BOTH DCs. That roughly doubles the
+hand-maintained literal count at the precise point where the hand-render has already
+failed twice.
+
+**What the pipeline PULLS** (verified present in
+`netbox/draft/vr1-office1-current-20260725.json`, captured 2026-07-25):
+
+- Six-plane v4 `/22`s and v6 `/60`+`/64` per DC, selectable by `scope_site`
+  (`vr1-dc0`, `vr1-dc1`); 92 of 139 prefixes carry `scope_site`, and the `role` slugs
+  match the plane names exactly.
+- The D-111 API-VIP `/64` per DC (`2602:f3e2:f02:11::/64` dc0, `2602:f3e2:f03:11::/64`
+  dc1) and the shared metal `/60` at `:20`, admin `/64` `:20`, internal `/64` `:21`.
+- Aggregates (`2602:f3e2::/36` ARIN, `fd50:840e:74e2::/48` org ULA, RFC1918,
+  `23.157.124.0/24`), the D-120 bands as ip-ranges, two rack-controller static IPs.
+
+**What it CANNOT pull today** (scoping constraint, not a defect): VIPs -- the record
+holds four ip-addresses and none is a VIP. MAC pins and node inventory -- there is no
+`dcim/devices` and no `dcim/interfaces` in the record at all. VLANs/VIDs -- no
+`ipam/vlans`; the VLAN-group buildout is the open G4 item at
+`docs/dc-dc-netbox-buildout-scope.md` section 4e.
+
+**Where the gap actually is (per `docs/audit/decision-recon-20260725.md`, 4-lens,
+2026-07-25).** The PREFIX layer is COMPLETE and DRIFT-FREE -- all 12 plane `/22`s, both
+transit `/30`s, both uplinks, both GUA `/48`s, the ARIN `/36`, the full v6 subcarves and
+the org ULA are present and match `lib-net.sh` value-for-value. The gap is entirely
+SUB-PREFIX, and it is what this decision exists to close:
+
+- **The D-134 bands** (as amended 2026-07-23, the CONTIGUOUS table: `.1-.3` infra,
+  `.4-.49` reserved utility, `.50-.99` VIP, `.100-.200` nodes with control `.100-.119` /
+  compute `.120-.149` / storage `.150-.200`, `.201-.254` dynamic) exist ONLY as decision
+  prose -- in neither NetBox nor `lib-net.sh`. `lib-net.sh` carries only the dc0 VIP
+  octet band `.50-.60`, UNSET for dc1.
+- **The 33 VIP addresses** (11 services x provider/admin/internal, `.50-.60`) exist ONLY
+  as hand-maintained literals in `overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml`. They are internally
+  consistent with the bundle octet-for-octet, but they are not a projection of the apex.
+
+So a generator has nothing to pull for either. **Division of labour, corrected:** the
+coupling MODELS the bands (as ip-ranges) and the VIP addresses (as scoped ip-addresses)
+IN the apex, then GENERATES the overlays from them, so the overlay becomes a projection
+of NetBox rather than a parallel hand-maintained truth. The per-DC values file is
+therefore TRANSITIONAL -- it carries bands and VIPs by hand only until they land in the
+apex, after which it shrinks to genuinely non-IPAM convention.
+
+**Options.**
+
+- **(A) Build the generator now and gate the dc1 deploy on it.** The forced dual-stack
+  reconciliation IS its first job, so hand-rendering then rebuilding pays twice.
+  Against: an unproven tool on the critical path of an otherwise-ready deploy; its
+  first output has nothing to diff against; MAC pins and VLANs are absent from the
+  record, so the tool cannot be complete on this timeline.
+
+- **(B) Hand-render both DCs dual-stack; build the generator for Roosevelt.** Fork 2's
+  lean, and "render once to learn the parameter surface" has real force. Against:
+  roughly 170 dual-family literals by hand, at the point the hand-render has already
+  produced two defects on the simpler v4-only artifact.
+
+- **(C) Split at the seam: build the BACK half now, add the FRONT half later.
+  RECOMMENDED.** Reconcile once, by hand, INTO a per-DC values file carrying every
+  plane CIDR, VIP band, app-to-VIP map (one reconciled dual-family string per app,
+  vault included) and role tag. Render the overlays from it with a thin deterministic
+  substitution step. Both DCs ship on it. The NetBox front half (record -> values file)
+  is added later without touching the back half, because the interface is frozen.
+
+**Why (C).** It captures the whole benefit -- one source of truth, no two lists to
+drift -- without absorbing the front half's unknowns (VIP representability, MAC and
+VLAN buildout, token handling, network reach), none of which are on this deploy's
+critical path. It makes the front half testable BY REPRODUCTION: once the schema is
+frozen, NetBox-generated values are validated by diffing against known-good
+hand-authored values for a DC that already deployed. Option (A) has no such gate. And
+the values file is not scaffolding -- it is the permanent seam between IPAM fact and
+deployment convention in the target operating model (pinned separately).
+
+**Honest cost of (C):** the schema and substitution layer are written before the NetBox
+schema is fully known, so the seam may need one refactor when the front half lands.
+
+**Eliminated by construction.**
+
+1. The VIP-overlay collision -- one reconciled `vip` per app per DC, emitted once; no
+   second overlay to race, so deploy input stops depending on overlay order.
+2. Vault decorative HA -- an application scaled with an `hacluster` peer and no VIP
+   becomes a GENERATOR-TIME error instead of a silent runtime condition.
+3. Family drift -- D-101's matrix applied once in code instead of by a human ~170
+   times. The validator asserts family-per-plane-per-SITE, not mere presence: the
+   record currently carries GUA storage prefixes for `vr0-dc0` and `willamette` while
+   VR1 storage is ULA, so a generator selecting on `role` alone pulls the wrong family.
+4. Reserved-range skew -- per D-074 the tenant-CIDR reserved set is the six plane
+   `/22`s (today sourced from `scripts/lib-net.sh` into `scripts/net_overlap.py` as
+   argv) plus the live-resolved `capi-mgmt-subnet` and the metadata range. Generating
+   the plane rows from the same values file removes the risk of onboarding a tenant
+   validated against the WRONG DC's planes.
+
+**DC-aware gates (part of this proposal).** `scripts/preflight.sh` validates the real
+per-DC deploy input via `scripts/provider-bundle-check.py --overlay --dc`, not the base
+bundle alone. `scripts/cloud-assert.sh` gains a per-hacluster VIP-owned check, so a
+scaled application with no VIP fails rather than passes. Bootstrap carries the
+controller-tag constraint.
+
+**Mechanism (front half, when built).** Extending `netbox/*.py` is preferred over a
+third-party NetBox OpenTofu provider. The existing tools already establish the correct
+posture: one script per SOURCE (`office1-record-dump.py` vs `prod-draft-dump.py`),
+read-only, token from the environment, never embedded or printed. A provider must
+additionally be mirrorable into the per-DC airgap mirror (D-107) or it is disqualified
+on Roosevelt, and it would put a write-capable credential in the tofu run while
+write-back is deferred (DOCFIX-195). Reads only; no write-back under this decision.
+
+**Scope boundary.**
+
+- IN: the six operator planes per DC, VIP bands, plane CIDRs, per-DC role tags, and the
+  generated per-DC overlays and tfvars.
+- OUT -- TENANT SPACE, permanently. Per `docs/dc-dc-netbox-buildout-scope.md:128`
+  per-tenant `/60`s are Neutron-managed (D-016/D-074) and not enumerated in NetBox. Per
+  D-074 tenant private CIDRs are TENANT-CHOSEN and MAY OVERLAP, enforced only against
+  the reserved-range registry. NetBox models pools, aggregates and reserved ranges; it
+  never models a tenant's own networks. A maintainer extending the generator "one more
+  table" into tenant space would either fight Neutron or gate tenant provisioning on an
+  operator-side IPAM write, breaking the tenant self-service model this cloud is sold
+  on.
+- IN: WRITES TO office1-netbox. DOCFIX-195 (operator ruling 2026-07-15) rules that
+  during VR1 `office1-netbox` takes ALL writes and `netbox.baldurkeep.com` stays a
+  READ-ONLY v1 reference with merge-back DEFERRED to end-of-deployment. Precedent tool:
+  `netbox/d120-compose-bands.py --commit` already loaded the D-120 bands into the apex.
+  (An earlier draft of this entry scoped apex writes OUT on a misreading of DOCFIX-195;
+  that would have scoped the coupling out of its own core job -- see the gap below.)
+- OUT: writes to `netbox.baldurkeep.com` (deferred, DOCFIX-195; P2 merge-back).
+- OUT: VLAN / space / fabric -- PERMANENTLY, not pending. office1-netbox holds zero VLAN
+  objects and that is CORRECT BY DESIGN: VR1 is untagged-per-fabric on every plane in
+  both DCs (D-133, superseding VR0's VID-103/104), so a VLAN object would document
+  tagging that does not exist on the wire. The bundle binds by SPACE NAME -> MAAS subnet
+  by CIDR, never by VLAN/fabric/subnet id. VLAN/space/fabric is MAAS-sourced; NetBox is
+  IPAM only.
+- OUT: MAC pins. They already have a working source of record and are drift-free across
+  substrate `main.tf` <-> `lib-hosts.sh` `HOST_BOOT_MAC` <-> bundle ovn-chassis <->
+  discovery. They stay substrate/lib-hosts-sourced; this is not a NetBox gap.
+
+**Roosevelt-delta (A1).** Roosevelt is N bare-metal DCs. Hand-rendering is O(N) human
+renders of a ~170-literal dual-family artifact; a generator plus one values file per DC
+plus one validator is O(1) tooling and O(N) data. The transferable artifact is the
+triple: renderer, values file, validator. This is why the back half is worth building
+even while the front half waits.
+
+**Artifact shape (RULED 2026-07-25 -- see the ruling record).** Symmetric per-DC
+overlays. `bundle.yaml` becomes VIP-free and holds topology only; every per-DC value,
+dc0's included, arrives via overlay. dc0's VIPs are extracted from base into
+`overlays/vr1-dc0-vips.yaml`. The renderer therefore has ONE output shape per DC and
+Roosevelt's Nth DC is the same shape as its first.
+
+**PREREQUISITE, sequenced FIRST (per the recon's sequencing insight).** Extend
+`netbox/sandbox-fidelity-check.py` BEFORE the coupling is built. Today it covers only the
+D-115/D-117/D-120 delta and diffs the FROZEN 90-prefix `netbox.baldurkeep.com` draft, not
+the current 139-prefix office1-netbox apex; it is blind to D-124 and D-134. It gates every
+apex reconciliation this coupling depends on, and the coupling's whole value proposition
+is eliminating the drift those reconciliations chase. An unextended checker cannot verify
+the apex mutations in the gap list above, so building the generator first would mean
+writing to the apex with no trustworthy fidelity gate.
+
+**A hard tooling coupling nobody has flagged.** `scripts/lib-net.sh:59` sets
+`VIP_COUNT_EXPECT=11`, consumed by `scripts/pre-flight-checks.sh` at :79 (warn on vip
+line count) and :99-102, where a count mismatch is a **fail**, not a warn. Adding vault's
+VIP takes the count to 12, so `VIP_COUNT_EXPECT` must move to 12 in the same change or
+the gate fails. Note that CURRENT-STATE flags `pre-flight-checks.sh` as VR0-frozen (no
+`$DC` selector), so whether it gates VR1 today needs confirming -- but the constant is in
+the shared library and any DC-aware successor inherits it. A generator emitting the VIP
+set should DERIVE this count rather than carry it as a second literal.
+
+**Gate relationship.** This decision does NOT gate the dc1 deploy. What the family
+ruling gates, and what must be resolved before deploy, is three items: (1) the vault
+VIP plus its band octet (a D-020 conformance repair, OPS not ARCH); (2) the octavia
+family sub-ruling; (3) the reconciled dual-family VIP literals for both DCs, in the
+symmetric overlay shape above. The subcarve is NOT among them -- D-111 (ADOPTED
+2026-07-11) already ratifies the per-plane v6 subcarve and the values are imported for
+both DCs.
+
+**Open questions (operator).**
+
+1. Metal VIP host addresses come straight out of the plane `/64` and share it with node
+   addresses; D-111's VIP-dedicated `/64` at `:11` exists only on the provider/GUA leg.
+   Confirm no MAAS deployed-node band claims the VIP octet on the metal planes. A
+   collision is repaired by a D-111 amendment (a metal VIP sub-range), not by values.
+2. Octavia family. D-101 places `lb-mgmt` in the IPv6-only ULA group, but
+   `overlays/dc-dc-ipv6-family-matrix.yaml:63-82` documents live upstream IPv6
+   breakage on that path (LP #1911788, #1913409). Recommendation: dual-stack octavia's
+   API endpoint like its ten peers, keep `lb-mgmt` v4 as a logged D-101 exception, on
+   the ruling's own standard -- a path with open upstream bugs is not where IPv6-only
+   "makes sense". This is an exception to an ADOPTED decision and is the operator's.
+3. Does the reserved-range registry become a first-class NetBox object, or continue to
+   be derived (plane rows from prefixes; `capi-mgmt-subnet` and metadata live-resolved
+   per D-074/D-035)? Deriving is recommended; D-074's stated gain is that NetBox's
+   uniqueness duty shrinks to the routed space. Operator has asked for more information
+   before ruling.
+4. Values-file format and location; and whether generated artifacts are COMMITTED
+   (reviewable diffs, recommended) or generated at deploy time (unreviewable).
+5. Runner and credential for any automated render. GitBucket has no Actions-style
+   runner and SSH access is v2-deferred, so an automated push needs a host (jumphost
+   timer, or a NetBox webhook worker) and an HTTPS credential. That is a
+   security-ledger row, not part of this decision.
+
+**Related:** D-020 (dual provider+metal VIPs -- NOT D-036, mis-cited as such in four
+live sites; see the DOCFIX in this session's changelog), D-100/D-101 (addressing,
+families, mesh), D-111 (per-DC v6 subcarve, ADOPTED), D-052/D-053 (bindings, six-plane
+split), D-104 + 2026-07-24 amendment (controller VM), D-107 (per-DC airgap mirror),
+D-108 (cross-DC), D-119 (region-qualified tags), D-121 (Option C + R-3), D-016/D-074
+(tenant CIDRs), D-035 (capi-mgmt reserved), D-067 (barbican-vault on metal-internal),
+D-110 (repo has moved; never hardcode its path), D-133 (flat per-NIC carve, no VLAN
+stack -- why VLANs are correctly absent from the apex), D-134 + its 2026-07-23
+AMENDMENT (the contiguous band table; the amendment is authoritative and the original
+table above it is superseded), D-124 (rack statics), D-131 (DNS forwarder .3), D-135
+(mirror .4), DOCFIX-195 (apex takes all VR1 writes; baldurkeep merge-back deferred),
+BUNDLEFIX-052. Companion audit records: `docs/audit/decision-recon-20260725.md`,
+`docs/audit/stage5-expansion-review-20260724.md`,
+`docs/audit/committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.md`.
+
+--- END append block ---
diff --git a/_handoff-not-committed/20-ruling-records.md b/_handoff-not-committed/20-ruling-records.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e11c5e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_handoff-not-committed/20-ruling-records.md
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+# 20 -- Operator ruling records (GA-R5)
+
+GA-R5: a ruling exists only when its Status line quotes the QUESTION and the operator's
+EXACT UTTERANCE, dated, committed and pushed BEFORE dependent work. One decision per
+operator exchange -- these three arrived in three separate exchanges on 2026-07-25 and
+were not batched at the point of ruling. If recording them in a single commit would
+read as a batch adoption, split into one commit per ruling; the safe reading wins.
+
+Chat has NOT adopted anything. These are records for Code to commit.
+
+================================================================================
+## RULING 1 -- address family policy (amends nothing; confirms D-101)
+================================================================================
+
+QUESTION PUT TO THE OPERATOR: whether dc1 phase-4 deploys v4-only (deferring IPv6, per
+the expansion review's option (b)) or dual-stack.
+
+OPERATOR UTTERANCE (2026-07-25), verbatim:
+  "Dual stack to be used where IPv4 is required, IPv6 where IPv6 only makes sense."
+
+CLARIFYING EXCHANGE, verbatim: "Dual stack deployment for DC0 and DC1. This is the
+deployment when the dual-stack is added"
+
+EFFECT:
+- This is D-101's family matrix restated, not a new policy. D-101's own rationale line
+  already reads "v6 wherever possible, v4 only where forced". No amendment required.
+- The expansion review's option (b) v4-only phasing is CLOSED.
+- `overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml` (v4-only triple) is not a D-101-conformant deploy input
+  on its own; the reconciliation is forced before deploy.
+- Applies to BOTH DC0 and DC1 in this deployment, so the literal burden is both DCs.
+- What it does NOT reduce: all three API VIP legs remain dual-stack under D-101
+  (provider-public GUA plus v4 for external clients and workload nodes reaching public
+  Keystone; metal-admin v4 because PXE is v4-first; metal-internal v4 for D-020's
+  `resolve_address(INTERNAL)` path). The six-value-per-app string in
+  `overlays/dc-dc-ipv6-family-matrix.yaml` is D-101-correct as authored.
+- STILL OPEN under this ruling: octavia. D-101 places `lb-mgmt` in the IPv6-only ULA
+  group, but the overlay documents live upstream IPv6 breakage there. That sub-ruling
+  is open -- see open question 2 in item 10.
+
+CURRENT-STATE consequence: bullet (b) "v4-only vs dual-stack phasing ... operator
+decides" is RESOLVED. See item 30.
+
+================================================================================
+## RULING 2 -- keystone policy-override VERIFY-LIVE gate
+================================================================================
+
+QUESTION PUT TO THE OPERATOR: whether to add a VERIFY-LIVE gate confirming the
+`policyd-override` resource lands on every keystone unit after `dc-ha-scaleup.yaml`
+scales keystone to 3, given that a broken override is atomic (the whole policy is
+discarded, silently reverting every tenant domain-manager to a plain user).
+
+OPERATOR UTTERANCE (2026-07-25), verbatim:
+  "dc-ha-scaleup: Yes to the verify-live"
+
+EFFECT: add to the Stage-4 VERIFY-LIVE set --
+  `juju status` shows `PO:` on EVERY keystone unit, never `PO (broken):`.
+
+Rationale for the gate's weight: this is the highest-consequence single check in the
+deploy. `bundle.yaml` carries `use-policyd-override: True` with
+`resources: {policyd-override: ./policies/overrides.zip}`; `policies/overrides.zip` is
+present (3419 bytes, single member `domain-manager-policy.yaml`) and
+`scripts/keystone-policy-drift.sh` byte-matches the member against source. The
+mechanism is intact at bc9a2df -- the gate confirms it SURVIVES scale-up. Failure has
+no other symptom, and it takes down the SCS Domain Manager persona (D-051, D-064) that
+the commercial tenant self-service model rests on.
+
+================================================================================
+## RULING 3 -- per-DC artifact shape
+================================================================================
+
+QUESTION PUT TO THE OPERATOR: there is no `vr1-dc0-vips.yaml`; dc0's VIPs are inline in
+`bundle.yaml` while dc1 has an overlay. Under ruling 1 both DCs need v6 legs, so the
+asymmetry must break -- (i) symmetric (extract dc0 to its own overlay, base becomes
+VIP-free, renderer has one output shape per DC) or (ii) asymmetric (dc0 v6 legs into
+base, two renderer output modes forever)?
+
+OPERATOR UTTERANCE (2026-07-25), verbatim:
+  "Your question about 1 or 2, go with 1. Base bundle and everything else is applied
+  via overlay."
+
+EFFECT (option (i), symmetric):
+- `bundle.yaml` becomes VIP-free and holds topology only.
+- dc0's VIPs are extracted from base into `overlays/vr1-dc0-vips.yaml`, mirroring
+  `overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml`.
+- Every per-DC value arrives via overlay, dc0 included. No DC is special.
+- The renderer has ONE output shape per DC; Roosevelt's Nth DC matches its first.
+
+IMPLEMENTATION NOTE for Code: this edits a render the operator has already validated
+(`e898c3b`). Treat the extraction as a mechanical move -- the dc0 VIP values currently
+in base (`keystone: 10.12.4.50 10.12.8.50 10.12.12.50`, and the peer applications on
+the `.50`-`.60` band) move unchanged into the new overlay in the same commit that
+removes them from base. Verify with `provider-bundle-check.py --overlay --dc vr1-dc0`
+that the merged result is byte-equivalent to the pre-move merged result before the
+dual-stack legs are added. Do the MOVE and the ADD as two commits, not one -- the move
+is provably neutral, the add is not.
diff --git a/_handoff-not-committed/30-current-state-update.md b/_handoff-not-committed/30-current-state-update.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7bf9763
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_handoff-not-committed/30-current-state-update.md
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+# 30 -- docs/CURRENT-STATE.md update (SAME COMMIT as item 10)
+
+GA-R1/C1: any commit changing a status CURRENT-STATE carries must update it in the same
+commit; repo-lint L10 enforces. GA-R1 rule 2: legal status tokens are OPEN / BLOCKED /
+HELD / CLOSED, and only in this file.
+
+Target: the Stage-4 / Phase-3 bullet, lines 173-193 (at bc9a2df; re-locate at 4ed29aa).
+It sits in **section 1 "Where the project IS"**, which the 2026-07-25 reconciliation
+confirms is authoritative.
+
+WARNING before editing this file -- `docs/audit/decision-recon-20260725.md` found
+**section 4 "RULED-BUT-NOT-BUILT" comprehensively STALE (HIGH)**: authored 2026-07-18 and
+never updated, with 4 of 5 bullets contradicted by section 1 and by on-disk state -- it
+claims DC0 is unbuilt (built/commissioned, G10 CLOSED), dc1 substrate UNBUILT (roots
+exist, G12 CLOSED), D-100 netem HELD as a comment (instantiated `main.tf:353`), D-129 qga
+not written (shipped, G13 CLOSED). The status authority contradicts itself. Do NOT read
+section 4 as current and do NOT reconcile these edits against it -- section 1 and the
+gate table in section 6 govern. The section-4 repair is queued and operator-deferred;
+this pack does not attempt it.
+
+Also queued from the same record, not addressed here: G14's SEC count says 12 open while
+`ledger-scan` reports 15 (adds SEC-017/-018/-019); and
+`runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md:192` still claims the bundle "ships NO
+designate", contradicting ADOPTED D-106 and `bundle.yaml:830`.
+
+================================================================================
+## Edit 1 -- the RESOLVE-BEFORE-DEPLOY list (currently lines 173-182)
+================================================================================
+
+Item (a) TEXT FIX plus scope widening. It currently reads "D-036 says vault carries
+VIPs" -- wrong decision (this is DOCFIX-NNN (A); see item 40) -- and "needs a dc1-band
+VIP overlay", which ruling 3 widens to both DCs:
+
+  (a) **vault VIP** -- vault is scaled to 3 with `vault-hacluster` at `cluster_count: 3`
+      but carries NO `vip:` anywhere in the tracked tree, so hacluster has no VIP
+      resource to manage and `vault:secrets` consumers resolve to a unit address.
+      **D-020** (not D-036) lists vault among the applications carrying provider+metal
+      VIPs. Needs a per-DC VIP in the symmetric overlay shape (ruling 3) plus the
+      vault-HA VERIFY-LIVE. Tenant-facing: `barbican-vault` is a `vault:secrets`
+      consumer and barbican holds tenant secrets plus Octavia's TLS material.
+
+Item (b) is RESOLVED by ruling 1 -- replace it:
+
+  (b) **address family: RULED 2026-07-25.** Dual-stack where IPv4 is required, IPv6-only
+      where IPv6-only is sound (D-101's matrix), for BOTH DC0 and DC1 in this
+      deployment. The v4-only phasing option is closed. Consequence: the
+      `vr1-dc1-vips` / `dc-dc-ipv6-family-matrix` per-key REPLACE collision must be
+      reconciled to ONE dual-family `vip` per app per DC before deploy -- it is no
+      longer deferrable. Octavia's family remains an OPEN sub-ruling (`lb-mgmt` IPv6
+      has live upstream breakage; see D-NNN open question 2).
+
+Add item (c):
+
+  (c) **per-DC artifact shape: RULED 2026-07-25.** `bundle.yaml` becomes VIP-free
+      (topology only); every per-DC value arrives via overlay, dc0 included. dc0's VIPs
+      extract from base into `overlays/vr1-dc0-vips.yaml`.
+
+Add to the VERIFY-LIVE gate list (ruling 2):
+
+  `juju status` shows `PO:` on EVERY keystone unit after scale-up, never `PO (broken):`.
+
+================================================================================
+## Edit 2 -- the NetBox-coupling bullet (currently lines 185-190)
+================================================================================
+
+It currently reads "being scoped as a new PROPOSED D-number (next-free per ledger-scan)
+in Chat ... Prompt handed to the operator 2026-07-24." Replace with the outcome:
+
+  - **NetBox->deploy coupling: PROPOSED as D-NNN (Chat, 2026-07-25).** A per-DC
+    renderer generating overlays and tfvars from the NetBox record, recommending option
+    (C) -- build the values-file back half now for both DCs, add the NetBox front half
+    for Roosevelt. Does NOT gate the dc1 deploy. Mechanism awaiting operator ruling.
+    The target OPERATING MODEL (NetBox draft -> approval on the rendered diff -> apply
+    -> bounded self-healing) is PINNED for a dedicated planning session, not ratified.
+
+================================================================================
+## Edit 3 -- correct a stale claim in the same bullet
+================================================================================
+
+The FOLLOW-UP line asserts `cloud-assert.sh` "false-passes decorative HA on the 12
+scaled API services". Keep it -- it is accurate and is what the D-NNN per-hacluster
+VIP-owned check closes. But note in the same bullet that D-111 is ADOPTED, so no
+subcarve trust gate exists on the v6 values (they are imported for both DCs and
+verifiable in `netbox/draft/vr1-office1-current-20260725.json`). This forecloses a live
+analysis error: the Chat seat briefly treated the subcarve as an open blocker on the
+strength of `docs/dc-dc-netbox-buildout-scope.md` section 5, which is stale -- that is
+DOCFIX-NNN (B).
+
+================================================================================
+## Verification
+================================================================================
+
+  bash scripts/repo-lint.sh     # L10 must pass: status change + CURRENT-STATE, same commit
+  grep -nE "OPEN|BLOCKED|HELD|CLOSED" docs/CURRENT-STATE.md | sed -n '1,5p'
+                                # status tokens only here, per GA-R1 rule 2
diff --git a/_handoff-not-committed/40-session-changelog-items.md b/_handoff-not-committed/40-session-changelog-items.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e41f9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_handoff-not-committed/40-session-changelog-items.md
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+# 40 -- Items for the CURRENT session changelog
+
+GA-R2/D1: ONE changelog per session -- append these to Code's existing session
+changelog. Do NOT mint per-topic changelog files. The changelog IS the review surface:
+every item states what, why (evidence), and how to revert. Changelogs are
+session-scoped scratch, consolidated at stage close, never citable as status or
+decision authority.
+
+================================================================================
+## ITEM -- D-NNN PROPOSED: NetBox-coupled per-DC render pipeline [ARCH]
+================================================================================
+
+WHAT: appended the PROPOSED entry to `docs/design-decisions.md`; updated the Stage-4
+bullet in `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` in the same commit (C1).
+
+WHY: escalates the Fork-2 renderer deferral
+(`docs/audit/committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.md`) to a NetBox-coupled
+generator. Evidence for the problem statement is measured at bc9a2df, not asserted:
+four disagreeing app-to-VIP lists; two overlays owning `vip:` for the same 10
+applications under per-key REPLACE; no `vip:` for vault anywhere in the tracked tree
+against `vault-hacluster cluster_count: 3`; and the pull/cannot-pull inventory taken
+from `netbox/draft/vr1-office1-current-20260725.json` (139 prefixes with `scope_site`
+on 92; four ip-addresses, none a VIP; no `dcim/interfaces`; no `ipam/vlans`).
+
+REVERT: `git revert <commit>` -- the entry is append-only text plus the CURRENT-STATE
+bullet; no behavioural surface changes. PROPOSED, so nothing downstream depends on it.
+
+================================================================================
+## ITEM -- DOCFIX-NNN (A): the dual-VIP decision is D-020, not D-036
+================================================================================
+
+WHAT: corrected four live citations of `D-036` where `D-020` is meant.
+
+  `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md:175`
+     "... anywhere; D-036 says vault carries VIPs; needs a dc1-band VIP overlay ..."
+  `docs/audit/stage5-expansion-review-20260724.md:74`
+     "... when vault was de-HA'd. D-036 lists vault among the apps carrying
+      provider+metal VIPs."
+  `docs/design-decisions.md:3425`
+     "already carries all 12 hacluster subordinates and, per **D-036**, both
+      provider+metal VIPs on every ..."
+  `docs/design-decisions.md:3541`
+     "D-036 (dual VIPs, already present), D-062 (mysql-at-3), ..."
+  `docs/audit/decision-recon-20260725.md:116`   (NEW -- created 2026-07-25)
+     "... rendered vault (no vip) vs D-036 ..."
+  `docs/audit/decision-recon-20260725.md:121`   (NEW -- created 2026-07-25)
+     "... cloud-assert --capture vs D-121 HA / D-036 vault / D-108 ..."
+
+ESCALATION: the two sites above did not exist when this DOCFIX was drafted. The
+reconciliation record created on 2026-07-25 propagated the mis-citation into a brand-new
+artifact, taking the live count from four to SIX. The error is actively spreading through
+new work, which raises this from bookkeeping to a fix worth doing before the next
+audit record is authored.
+
+WHY: `docs/design-decisions.md:392` is `## D-020: Dual provider + metal API VIPs on
+clustered charms`. `:498` is `## D-036: magnum-capi-helm driver / chart / CAPO coherence
+(resolved)` -- nothing to do with VIPs. The error has already escaped the repo: it
+appeared in the design brief handed to the Chat seat. It also masked substance --
+reading the correct decision is what surfaced that D-020's ratified set includes vault
+and excludes ceph-radosgw, while the deployed set does the exact opposite (one
+substitution, unrecorded in either direction).
+
+DO NOT TOUCH: `docs/design-decisions.md:462, 498, 516, 530, 599, 1182`;
+`runbooks/phase-07-conductor-graft.md:13`;
+`runbooks/phase-08-workload-cluster-acceptance.md:10`; anything under `docs/archive/`.
+Those eight are correct driver/chart/CAPO references.
+
+OPERATOR CHOICE BEFORE EDITING SITE 2: `stage5-expansion-review-20260724.md` is a dated
+audit record. Either (a) correct in place with a bracketed marker
+"[corrected DOCFIX-NNN: D-020, not D-036]" -- recommended, since the document is a live
+design signal still being consumed -- or (b) leave the record verbatim and add a
+correction note at the head. Do not let this be chosen silently.
+
+VERIFY: `git grep -n "D-036" -- ":!docs/archive"` -- expect 8 hits, all driver/chart
+context, zero in VIP context.
+
+REVERT: `git revert <commit>` -- text-only across three files, no behavioural effect.
+
+================================================================================
+## ITEM -- DOCFIX-NNN (B): buildout-scope section 5 contradicts adopted D-111
+================================================================================
+
+WHAT: demoted `docs/dc-dc-netbox-buildout-scope.md` section 5 item 1 from an open
+sub-decision to a pointer at D-111. Sites: line 5
+("(candidate D-111+; assign via `ledger-scan` at adoption)"), line 132 (the section
+heading "Sub-decisions requiring operator ratification (candidate D-111+)"), line 138
+("script's OWN proposal, explicitly un-ratified").
+
+WHY: `## D-111: VR1 per-DC v6 subcarve aligned to the deployed NN mnemonic` carries
+`**Status:** ADOPTED 2026-07-11` and names the very scope-doc sub-decision it ratifies.
+The scope doc was never updated to point back, so it has read as open for two weeks.
+Not cosmetic: it caused a live analysis error on 2026-07-25 -- the Chat seat recommended
+treating the subcarve as a blocking trust gate on the v6 values and withdrew the
+recommendation only after reading the register. Ratified state belongs in one place.
+
+Keep the reasoning below the pointer as history -- the two conflicts recorded there are
+why D-111 chose NN-mnemonic alignment. Audit the REST of section 5 the same way: check
+each remaining item against the register before leaving it as open.
+
+VERIFY: `bash scripts/ledger-scan.sh` -- D-111 must not appear under PROPOSED/OPEN;
+`grep -n "un-ratified\|candidate D-111" docs/dc-dc-netbox-buildout-scope.md` -- no hit
+presenting the subcarve as open.
+
+REVERT: `git revert <commit>` -- single-file text change, no behavioural effect.
+
+================================================================================
+## ITEM -- three operator rulings recorded (GA-R5)
+================================================================================
+
+WHAT: recorded the 2026-07-25 rulings on address family, the keystone policy-override
+VERIFY-LIVE gate, and per-DC artifact shape. Each carries its question and the
+operator's exact utterance, per item 20 of the handoff pack.
+
+WHY: GA-R5 -- dependent work is invalid until the ruling is committed and pushed. The
+artifact-shape ruling gates the dc0 VIP extraction; the family ruling gates the
+reconciliation; the VERIFY-LIVE ruling adds a Stage-4 gate row.
+
+REVERT: `git revert <commit>` per ruling. Reverting a ruling record invalidates the
+work that depends on it -- revert dependents first.
+
+================================================================================
+## ITEM -- DOCFIX-NNN (C): D-134's superseded band table carries no in-place marker
+================================================================================
+
+WHAT: mark the ORIGINAL D-134 band table as superseded, in place, at
+`docs/design-decisions.md` (the table under `## D-134:`, above
+`## D-134 -- AMENDMENT (2026-07-23)`).
+
+WHY: the amendment's header says it supersedes the original table, but the original table
+itself carries no marker. A reader who greps `D-134` and reads the first table gets
+SUPERSEDED bands -- control `.10-.19`, compute `.20-.49`, storage `.201-.254` -- instead of
+the authoritative contiguous table (`.4-.49` utility, `.50-.99` VIP, `.100-.200` nodes,
+`.201-.254` dynamic). The Chat seat did exactly this on 2026-07-25 and was one read away
+from flagging a false discrepancy against the reconciliation record, which quotes the
+amendment correctly. Anyone authoring the band-modelling tool from prose is in the same
+trap, and the bands are precisely what the coupling must model.
+
+Suggested minimal fix: a `**SUPERSEDED by the 2026-07-23 AMENDMENT below -- do not use
+these bands.**` line immediately above the original table. Do not delete it; the original
+is the record of what the operator rejected and why.
+
+VERIFY: `awk` from `## D-134:` to `## D-134 -- AMENDMENT` shows the marker before the
+first table row.
+
+REVERT: `git revert <commit>` -- single-line text addition, no behavioural effect.
diff --git a/_handoff-not-committed/50-ledger-bounded-summary.md b/_handoff-not-committed/50-ledger-bounded-summary.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d54d6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_handoff-not-committed/50-ledger-bounded-summary.md
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# 50 -- Session-ledger append (GA-R4 rule 1: 15-LINE HARD CAP)
+
+Append at the ledger TAIL as a new `## SESSION CLOSE ...` block. Do NOT touch the
+machine-derived fence (`<!-- SECTION: machine-derived ... -->` to
+`<!-- END: machine-derived -->`) -- owned by `ledger-scan`, never hand-edited. The full
+session body goes to `docs/archive/` in the same close commit.
+
+Re-count before committing. The block between the markers is 15 lines.
+
+--- BEGIN 15-line block ---
+## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-25 -- NetBox->deploy coupling scoped in Chat (bounded, GA-R4)
+- D-NNN PROPOSED [ARCH]: NetBox-coupled per-DC render pipeline, option (C) recommended;
+  revised against decision-recon-20260725 -- gap is SUB-PREFIX (D-134 bands + 33 VIP
+  addresses), apex writes are IN scope (DOCFIX-195), VLAN/space/fabric stays MAAS-sourced
+  (D-133), and extending sandbox-fidelity-check.py sequences FIRST. Non-gating for dc1.
+- 3 rulings recorded (GA-R5, exact utterances): family dual-stack-where-v4-required
+  DC0+DC1; keystone PO: per-unit VERIFY-LIVE after scale-up; per-DC shape symmetric
+  (base VIP-free, dc0 VIPs extract to a dc0 overlay).
+- DOCFIX-NNN (A) dual-VIP decision is D-020 not D-036 -- now SIX live sites, two created
+  by the recon itself; (B) buildout-scope s5 demoted to a D-111 pointer; (C) D-134's
+  superseded band table needs an in-place marker (it misled this seat).
+- Found: VIP_COUNT_EXPECT=11 (lib-net:59) is a HARD fail gate in pre-flight-checks
+  :99-102 -- must go to 12 with the vault VIP. Vault .61 is band-legal per D-134 amended.
+- PINNED: operating-model planning session; SpryGit dev-handover doc (Chat next).
+- Chat-side skill copy confirmed STALE vs repo (245 vs 130 lines); operator to upload.
+--- END 15-line block ---
diff --git a/_handoff-not-committed/60-vault-vip-values.md b/_handoff-not-committed/60-vault-vip-values.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c5a475
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_handoff-not-committed/60-vault-vip-values.md
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+# 60 -- Vault VIP: proposed values, derivation, and confirm-before-write gates
+
+Operator, 2026-07-25: "Give me a recommendation I can relay to Code." This is it.
+
+NOT paste-ready configuration. Hard rule 2 is in force: never use an inferred value in
+a command. Every address below is DERIVED from a point-in-time snapshot plus a ratified
+decision. Code CONFIRMS each against live state before writing. If a value cannot be
+confirmed, stop and report -- do not write it.
+
+This is a D-020 CONFORMANCE REPAIR, not a new decision. Per GA-R3 it is OPS: a
+changelog item plus a values change, no D-number. Doubt resolved down.
+
+Verified against repo HEAD bc9a2df.
+
+================================================================================
+## Why vault needs this
+================================================================================
+
+Measured (`git grep` across the tracked tree excluding `docs/archive`): NO `vip:` for
+vault anywhere. `bundle.yaml`'s vault stanza has no `options` block at all.
+`overlays/dc-ha-scaleup.yaml` sets `vault: {num_units: 3, to: [lxd:0, lxd:1, lxd:2]}`,
+declares `vault-hacluster` with `cluster_count: 3`, and re-adds
+`[vault:ha, vault-hacluster:ha]`.
+
+hacluster manages a VIP resource in pacemaker. With no `vip` on the principal there is
+no VIP resource to manage, so `vault:secrets` consumers resolve to a unit address rather
+than a virtual one. The exact consumer-side behaviour is charm-specific and is NOT
+asserted here -- it belongs in the VERIFY-LIVE set below.
+
+Tenant-facing consequence: `barbican-vault` is a `vault:secrets` consumer, and barbican
+is tenant-facing -- tenant secrets, plus the TLS material Octavia uses for terminated
+listeners. Losing one vault unit degrades tenant secret operations and TLS load
+balancers on a cloud sold on HA. D-020 lists vault among the applications carrying
+provider+metal VIPs; the artifact departs from it with no decision recording the
+departure.
+
+================================================================================
+## Proposed shape
+================================================================================
+
+PLANES: metal-admin + metal-internal ONLY. NO provider leg.
+
+  Vault has no external consumers. D-067 puts `barbican-vault -> vault` (vault-kv) on
+  metal-internal. A provider VIP would expose the cloud's TLS root beyond need for zero
+  benefit. Both planes are already bound in vault's stanza (`""` -> metal-admin;
+  `access`, `certificates`, `cluster`, `external`, `ha`, `secrets`, `shared-db` ->
+  metal-internal), so the VIP lands on bound spaces.
+
+  Tenants receive the Vault root CA as a FILE in the handoff packet, not as network
+  reachability, so omitting the provider leg does not affect tenant handoff.
+
+OCTET: `.61`. A RECOMMENDATION, NOT A DERIVATION. It is next after the band in
+`overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml`: keystone `.50`, barbican `.51`, cinder `.52`, glance
+`.53`, magnum `.54`, neutron-api `.55`, nova-cloud-controller `.56`, octavia `.57`,
+openstack-dashboard `.58`, placement `.59`, ceph-radosgw `.60`.
+
+ARTIFACT: per ruling 3 these land in the per-DC VIP overlays
+(`overlays/vr1-dc0-vips.yaml`, `overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml`), never in `bundle.yaml`.
+
+================================================================================
+## Proposed values
+================================================================================
+
+v4 bands: `netbox/draft/vr1-office1-current-20260725.json`, six-plane prefixes by
+`scope_site`. v6 bands: same snapshot plus the D-111 subcarve (metal `/60` at `:20`,
+admin `/64` `:20`, internal `/64` `:21`).
+
+  DC0 (site vr1-dc0)
+    metal-admin        10.12.8.0/22        -> 10.12.8.61
+    metal-internal     10.12.12.0/22       -> 10.12.12.61
+    metal-admin v6     fd50:840e:74e2:220::/64  -> fd50:840e:74e2:220::61
+    metal-internal v6  fd50:840e:74e2:221::/64  -> fd50:840e:74e2:221::61
+
+  DC1 (site vr1-dc1)
+    metal-admin        10.12.68.0/22       -> 10.12.68.61
+    metal-internal     10.12.72.0/22       -> 10.12.72.61
+    metal-admin v6     fd50:840e:74e2:320::/64  -> fd50:840e:74e2:320::61
+    metal-internal v6  fd50:840e:74e2:321::/64  -> fd50:840e:74e2:321::61
+
+Vault takes NO GUA leg, so it never touches the D-111 API-VIP `/64` at `:11`.
+
+================================================================================
+## CONFIRM BEFORE WRITE -- four gates, not suggestions
+================================================================================
+
+1. `.61` is unallocated in all four v4 plane bands above and in the four v6 `/64`s. The
+   snapshot is point-in-time; re-read live.
+
+2. NO MAAS deployed-node band claims the VIP octet on the metal planes. **Largely
+   answered by decision, 2026-07-25:** D-134 as AMENDED (the authoritative contiguous
+   table -- NOT the superseded original above it) reserves `.50-.99` as the VIP band on
+   row 0 of every VR1 DC plane `/22`, with nodes at `.100-.200` and dynamic/enlistment at
+   `.201-.254`. `.61` therefore sits inside the reserved VIP band with no node or dynamic
+   range anywhere near it, and CURRENT-STATE records the dynamic-range move to `.201-.254`
+   as in place. What remains is the narrow check: confirm `.61` is not already assigned.
+   The v6 side is unaffected -- D-111's VIP-dedicated `/64` at `:11` exists only on the
+   provider/GUA leg, and vault takes no GUA leg.
+   IF `.61` IS TAKEN: the next free octet inside `.50-.99` is the answer, not a band
+   change. A band change would be a D-134 amendment and an operator ruling.
+
+3. The vault charm on `1.8/stable` (pinned; D-068 keeps the 1.16 lineage ruled out)
+   accepts a space-separated dual-family `vip` value. Do not assume -- confirm against
+   the charm's config schema. If it does not, the fallback is single-family plus a
+   recorded D-101 exception, which is an operator ruling.
+
+4. After the change, confirm the VIP is OWNED by a unit, not merely configured.
+   `scripts/cloud-assert.sh` currently false-passes this per
+   `docs/audit/stage5-expansion-review-20260724.md`; the per-hacluster VIP-owned check
+   proposed in D-NNN is what closes it. Until it exists, verify by hand.
+
+================================================================================
+## A HARD GATE COUPLING -- do not miss this
+================================================================================
+
+`scripts/lib-net.sh:59` sets `VIP_COUNT_EXPECT=11`. It is consumed by
+`scripts/pre-flight-checks.sh` at :79 (warn on vip line count) and at :99-102, where a
+count mismatch is a **fail**, not a warn.
+
+Adding vault's VIP takes the real count to 12. `VIP_COUNT_EXPECT` must move to 12 in the
+SAME change, or the gate fails on a correct configuration.
+
+Caveat: CURRENT-STATE flags `pre-flight-checks.sh` as VR0-frozen (no `$DC` selector,
+host_sysid-by-hostname), so whether it gates VR1 today needs confirming. Either way the
+constant lives in the shared library and any DC-aware successor inherits it. D-134's band
+table also quotes `VIP_COUNT_EXPECT=11` in prose, so that reference goes stale in the same
+moment -- point it at the library rather than restating the number.
+
+Longer term: a generator emitting the VIP set should DERIVE this count, not carry it as a
+second literal that has to be remembered.
diff --git a/bundle.yaml b/bundle.yaml
index 5f61cdb..a232960 100644
--- a/bundle.yaml
+++ b/bundle.yaml
@@ -71,14 +71,30 @@
 
   # ----- Bindings for external-API-facing charms (public on provider) ----------
 machines:
+  # VR1 role-separated (D-121 Option C: 3 control / 2 compute / 4 storage). Juju machine
+  # ids 0-8 are LOGICAL (not MAAS ids). Base carries vr1-dc0 tags; the dc1 deploy retags
+  # via overlays/vr1-dc1-machines.yaml. Per-role sub-tags (control/compute/storage) are
+  # applied to the MAAS nodes at Stage 4 (Fork-3); the DC tag scopes selection to one DC
+  # under the single Office1 region. The Juju CONTROLLER is a dedicated 10th VM (D-104
+  # amendment), bootstrapped by its own tag -- NOT a bundle machine.
+  "0":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc0,control
+  "1":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc0,control
+  "2":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc0,control
+  "3":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc0,compute
+  "4":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc0,compute
+  "5":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc0,storage
+  "6":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc0,storage
+  "7":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc0,storage
   "8":
-    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack
-  "9":
-    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack
-  "10":
-    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack
-  "11":
-    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc0,storage
 
 # =====================================================================
 # Network-space bindings (D-052): EXPLICIT per-application blocks, no anchors.
@@ -105,7 +121,7 @@
     charm: mysql-innodb-cluster
     channel: 8.0/stable
     num_units: 3
-    to: [lxd:8, lxd:9, lxd:10]
+    to: [lxd:0, lxd:1, lxd:2]
     bindings:
       '': metal-admin
       certificates: metal-internal
@@ -119,7 +135,7 @@
     charm: rabbitmq-server
     channel: 3.9/stable
     num_units: 1
-    to: [lxd:10]
+    to: [lxd:0]
     bindings:
       '': metal-admin
       amqp: metal-internal
@@ -137,7 +153,7 @@
     # problem with 1.16 ruled out. See docs/D-068-vault-1.8-vs-1.16-analysis.md. BUNDLEFIX-010.
     channel: 1.8/stable
     num_units: 1                       # 3 on Roosevelt (D-009); HA backend decided there (C1)
-    to: [lxd:11]
+    to: [lxd:0]
     bindings:
       '': metal-admin
       access: metal-internal
@@ -179,7 +195,7 @@
     charm: keystone
     channel: 2024.1/stable
     num_units: 1                       # 3 on Roosevelt (D-009)
-    to: [lxd:8]
+    to: [lxd:0]
     options:
       vip: "10.12.4.50 10.12.8.50 10.12.12.50" # B1 front-loaded VIP; IS the catalog endpoint (B5, no os-public-hostname)
       use-policyd-override: true       # as-built reconcile 2026-06-09 (origin untraced -- Review-later)
@@ -218,7 +234,7 @@
     charm: glance
     channel: 2024.1/stable
     num_units: 1
-    to: [lxd:11]
+    to: [lxd:0]
     options:
       vip: "10.12.4.53 10.12.8.53 10.12.12.53" # B1
       image-conversion: true           # as-built; image conversion enabled (raw on Ceph-backed glance)
@@ -252,7 +268,7 @@
     charm: glance-simplestreams-sync
     channel: 2024.1/stable
     num_units: 1
-    to: [lxd:8]
+    to: [lxd:1]
     options:                           # B4 amphora-pipeline
       use-internal-endpoints: true     # use internal (IP) catalog endpoints
       use_swift: false                 # skip swift index; sidesteps radosgw object path for the amphora seed
@@ -272,7 +288,7 @@
     charm: nova-cloud-controller
     channel: 2024.1/stable
     num_units: 1
-    to: [lxd:11]
+    to: [lxd:0]
     options:
       console-access-protocol: novnc
       network-manager: Neutron
@@ -303,8 +319,8 @@
   nova-compute:
     charm: nova-compute
     channel: 2024.1/stable
-    num_units: 3
-    to: ["9", "10", "11"]
+    num_units: 2
+    to: ["3", "4"]
     options:
       config-flags: default_ephemeral_format=ext4
       enable-live-migration: true      # now genuinely usable -- shared Ceph storage = memory-only migrate (B3)
@@ -343,7 +359,7 @@
     charm: placement
     channel: 2024.1/stable
     num_units: 1
-    to: [lxd:11]
+    to: [lxd:0]
     options:
       vip: "10.12.4.59 10.12.8.59 10.12.12.59" # B1
     bindings:
@@ -376,7 +392,7 @@
     charm: neutron-api
     channel: 2024.1/stable
     num_units: 1
-    to: [lxd:9]
+    to: [lxd:0]
     options:
       enable-ml2-port-security: true
       flat-network-providers: physnet1
@@ -419,7 +435,7 @@
     charm: ovn-central
     channel: 24.03/stable
     num_units: 3
-    to: [lxd:8, lxd:9, lxd:10]
+    to: [lxd:0, lxd:1, lxd:2]
     bindings:
       '': metal-admin
       certificates: metal-internal
@@ -439,11 +455,13 @@
     options:
       ovn-bridge-mappings: physnet1:br-ex
       prefer-chassis-as-gw: true       # B2 -- elects gateway chassis so tenant routers get external egress
+      # VR1 dc1: the 2 compute nodes' provider-public (enp2s0) MACs = 52:54:01:d1:NN:02,
+      # NN = node ordinal (compute-01=04, compute-02=05), pinned in opentofu/vr1-dc1-substrate.
+      # The charm picks whichever MAC is local per unit; ovn-chassis is subordinate to the
+      # 2-unit nova-compute, so only the compute hosts carry br-ex.
       bridge-interface-mappings: >-
-        br-ex:52:54:00:3d:fd:54
-        br-ex:52:54:00:9d:63:77
-        br-ex:52:54:00:89:7f:ce
-        br-ex:52:54:00:99:fc:c2
+        br-ex:52:54:01:d1:04:02
+        br-ex:52:54:01:d1:05:02
     bindings:
       '': metal-admin
       amqp: metal-internal
@@ -465,7 +483,7 @@
     charm: cinder
     channel: 2024.1/stable
     num_units: 1
-    to: [lxd:9]
+    to: [lxd:0]
     options:
       block-device: None
       glance-api-version: 2
@@ -509,7 +527,7 @@
     charm: ceph-mon
     channel: squid/stable
     num_units: 3
-    to: [lxd:8, lxd:9, lxd:10]
+    to: [lxd:0, lxd:1, lxd:2]
     options:
       source: *ceph-source
       expected-osd-count: 4
@@ -536,7 +554,7 @@
     charm: ceph-osd
     channel: squid/stable
     num_units: 4
-    to: ["8", "9", "10", "11"]
+    to: ["5", "6", "7", "8"]
     options:
       source: *ceph-source
       osd-devices: /dev/vdb            # libvirt-attached, MAAS-untracked, wiped pre-deploy
@@ -552,7 +570,7 @@
     charm: ceph-radosgw
     channel: squid/stable
     num_units: 1
-    to: [lxd:8]
+    to: [lxd:0]
     options:
       source: *ceph-source
       vip: "10.12.4.60 10.12.8.60 10.12.12.60" # B1 -- radosgw HA un-deferred for Roosevelt fidelity (decorative HA on testcloud)
@@ -579,7 +597,7 @@
     charm: openstack-dashboard
     channel: 2024.1/stable
     num_units: 1
-    to: [lxd:10]
+    to: [lxd:0]
     options:
       debug: "false"
       vip: "10.12.4.58 10.12.8.58 10.12.12.58" # B1 -- browse HTTPS by IP (B5); ALLOWED_HOSTS must permit the VIP IP (verify at deploy)
@@ -624,7 +642,7 @@
     charm: octavia
     channel: 2024.1/stable
     num_units: 1
-    to: [lxd:11]
+    to: [lxd:0]
     options:
       debug: false
       openstack-origin: *openstack-origin
@@ -698,7 +716,7 @@
     charm: barbican
     channel: 2024.1/stable
     num_units: 1
-    to: [lxd:11]
+    to: [lxd:0]
     options:
       openstack-origin: *openstack-origin
       vip: "10.12.4.51 10.12.8.51 10.12.12.51" # B1
@@ -755,7 +773,7 @@
     charm: magnum
     channel: 2024.1/stable
     num_units: 1
-    to: [lxd:9]
+    to: [lxd:0]
     options:
       openstack-origin: *openstack-origin
       region: RegionOne
@@ -813,7 +831,7 @@
     charm: designate
     channel: 2024.1/stable
     num_units: 1
-    to: [lxd:9]
+    to: [lxd:0]
     bindings:
       '': metal-admin
       dns-backend: metal-internal
@@ -841,7 +859,7 @@
     charm: designate-bind
     channel: 2024.1/stable
     num_units: 1
-    to: [lxd:9]
+    to: [lxd:2]
     bindings:
       '': metal-admin
       dns-backend: metal-internal
@@ -887,7 +905,7 @@
     charm: ceph-rbd-mirror
     channel: squid/stable
     num_units: 1
-    to: [lxd:10]
+    to: [lxd:0]
     bindings:
       '': metal-admin
       ceph-local: replication
@@ -903,11 +921,11 @@
   # cluster_count: 1 (decorative on single-unit testcloud, D-009 / BUNDLEFIX-003).
   # VIPs front-loaded into the MAAS-reserved provider/metal /26 per B1 (.2-.63).
   # vault-hacluster stays commented (vault single-unit on mysql, C1 / BUNDLEFIX-002).
-  #
-    bindings:
-      '': metal-admin
-      certificates: metal-internal
-      dashboard: metal-internal
+  # BUNDLEFIX-052 (2026-07-24): removed an orphaned 4-space-indented `bindings:` block here
+  #   that YAML take-last had absorbed into ceph-rbd-mirror above, clobbering its real
+  #   ceph-local/ceph-remote (replication) + nrpe-external-master bindings (D-108/D-052) and
+  #   injecting a phantom `dashboard` binding (a charm with no such endpoint) -> juju deploy
+  #   validation reject. Confirmed via yaml.safe_load; committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.
   keystone-hacluster: {charm: hacluster, channel: 2.4/stable, options: {cluster_count: 1}, bindings: {'': metal-admin, ha: metal-internal, hanode: metal-internal, pacemaker-remote: metal-internal, peer-availability: metal-internal}}
   glance-hacluster: {charm: hacluster, channel: 2.4/stable, options: {cluster_count: 1}, bindings: {'': metal-admin, ha: metal-internal, hanode: metal-internal, pacemaker-remote: metal-internal, peer-availability: metal-internal}}
   neutron-api-hacluster: {charm: hacluster, channel: 2.4/stable, options: {cluster_count: 1}, bindings: {'': metal-admin, ha: metal-internal, hanode: metal-internal, pacemaker-remote: metal-internal, peer-availability: metal-internal}}
@@ -927,7 +945,7 @@
     charm: memcached
     channel: latest/stable
     num_units: 1
-    to: [lxd:8]
+    to: [lxd:0]
     bindings:
       '': metal-admin
       cache: metal-internal
diff --git a/creds-manifests/probes b/creds-manifests/probes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56fb143
--- /dev/null
+++ b/creds-manifests/probes
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# probes -- D-137 tier 3 behavioural probe declarations (consumed by scripts/creds-probe.sh).
+#
+# BOUNDARY: operator-ruled 2026-07-26, FULL scope including OpenStack service credentials.
+# Per-tenant credentials are excluded BY CONSTRUCTION and creds-probe.sh refuses them even
+# if declared here -- probing one means authenticating as a tenant, and D-069 plus ruling 3
+# already keep tenant surface out of this control.
+#
+# EVERY PROBE AUTHENTICATES (except `https-head`) and therefore writes an audit/login record
+# on its target. That is the cost of knowing a credential still works, and it is why this
+# runs at stage close and DC-standup close rather than in a deploy gate.
+#
+# FORMAT. Whitespace-separated: <matrix-id> <kind> <target>
+#   ssh            open an ssh connection with the key and run `true`. Narrowest real
+#                  authentication available: no payload, no API surface.
+#   https-head     unauthenticated reachability of the endpoint the credential is FOR.
+#                  Proves the service answers WITHOUT spending the credential -- use where
+#                  an authenticated probe would cost more than it tells us.
+#   declared-only  deliberately not probed; validity rests on V1 provenance and V2 declared
+#                  state. The reason goes in the target field so the decision is visible.
+#
+# A probe for an id whose mint stage is `pending` in stages-reached is SKIPPED, never
+# failed. Most OpenStack service credentials are stage5/stage6 and will skip until Stage 5
+# runs -- they are declared NOW so the coverage exists the moment the stage lands, rather
+# than being remembered later.
+
+# --- SSH keys: present today, narrowest authentication ---------------------------------
+office1-svc-key        ssh            voffice1
+dc0-svc-key            declared-only  dc0-rack-reachable-only-via-jumpbox-with-per-env-key-D-126
+dc1-svc-key            declared-only  dc1-rack-reachable-only-via-jumpbox-with-per-env-key-D-126
+
+# --- infrastructure APIs ----------------------------------------------------------------
+# The edge REST APIs answer on the DC provider-public gateway addresses; an unauthenticated
+# HEAD proves the service is up without spending the key. An authenticated GET is available
+# (the firmware-status call used at edge bootstrap) but costs an audit record per run for
+# information V1/V2 largely already give.
+office1-edge-api       declared-only  edge-API-probe-costs-an-audit-record-per-run;V1+V2-cover-it
+dc0-edge-api           declared-only  ABSENT-per-SEC-021;nothing-to-probe-until-consolidated
+dc1-edge-api           declared-only  edge-API-probe-costs-an-audit-record-per-run;V1+V2-cover-it
+netbox-sandbox-token   https-head     http://10.10.1.10:8000/
+netbox-upstream-token  declared-only  SEC-006-declares-this-BURNED;probing-a-burned-token-is-wrong
+
+# --- MAAS -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# The `admin` identity drives 19 automation call sites. A failed auth probe against it is
+# exactly the lockout risk the no-retry rule exists for, so it is reachability-only.
+maas-region-admin      https-head     http://10.10.0.20:5240/MAAS/
+dc0-maas-apikey        declared-only  probing-would-authenticate-as-the-juju-cloud-identity;stage5-verifies-in-use
+dc1-maas-apikey        declared-only  probing-would-authenticate-as-the-juju-cloud-identity;stage5-verifies-in-use
+
+# --- OpenStack service credentials (stage5+; declared now, will SKIP until the stage runs)
+keystone-admin         declared-only  stage5-not-reached;probe-shape-to-be-set-when-the-cloud-exists
+magnum-domain-admin    declared-only  stage5-not-reached;probe-shape-to-be-set-when-the-cloud-exists
diff --git a/creds-manifests/stages-reached b/creds-manifests/stages-reached
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e5cf65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/creds-manifests/stages-reached
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# stages-reached -- which mint stages THIS deployment has completed (D-137 tier 2).
+#
+# WHY THIS FILE EXISTS. Tier 2 must distinguish "this credential is MISSING" from "this
+# credential has not been minted YET". That distinction is a STATUS fact, and GA-R1 puts
+# status in docs/CURRENT-STATE.md and nowhere else -- so the checker carries no stage list
+# of its own, and until now the caller typed one on the command line with --pending-stage.
+# A gate whose verdict depends on a hand-typed parameter can be widened silently, so the
+# declaration moved here: config-as-data with a drift gate, the pattern the repo already
+# uses for state-bearing surfaces.
+#
+# THIS FILE IS A DERIVED STATUS CLAIM. docs/CURRENT-STATE.md remains the authority; this is
+# a machine-readable projection of it, and repo-lint L12 FAILS if it is edited without
+# CURRENT-STATE being touched in the same change set (the L10 pattern). If the two ever
+# disagree, CURRENT-STATE wins and this file is the defect.
+#
+# EXHAUSTIVE BY CONSTRUCTION. Every `mint-stage` token used in creds-matrix.tsv must appear
+# here exactly once. The checker FAILS on an unclassified token rather than defaulting it,
+# because either default is wrong in a dangerous direction: defaulting to `reached` floods
+# the run with false absences, and defaulting to `pending` silently defers real ones -- a
+# false green, which is the failure class this whole control exists to prevent.
+#
+# FORMAT. Whitespace-separated: <mint-stage-token> <reached|pending>
+#   reached  the stage has RUN in this deployment; its credentials are expected NOW and a
+#            missing one is a real finding.
+#   pending  the stage has NOT run; its credentials are deferred, reported as an explicit
+#            [ok] skip, never as a silent pass.
+# `#` comments and blank lines ignored.
+#
+# EVIDENCE for the current values (docs/CURRENT-STATE.md section 1): Stage 3 / Phase 2 is
+# CLOSED for both DCs; Stage 4 / Phase 3 is OPEN and executing; "stages 5-7 are authored,
+# not executed". The VR0 `phase-NN` track is the SEPARATE single-DC testcloud lineage -- do
+# NOT conflate the two numbering tracks (the operating skill warns on exactly this) -- and
+# none of its credential artifacts exist on this jumphost (measured 2026-07-26: the Vault
+# init and Octavia PKI directories are absent).
+
+# --- VR1 DC-DC track -------------------------------------------------------------------
+stage2          reached   # Office1 headend standup: region MAAS, LXD, NetBox
+stage3          reached   # per-DC substrate: rack, edge, node VMs, power + service keys
+# stage4 is deliberately ABSENT: Stage 4 (MAAS enlist/commission/deploy) is OPEN and
+# executing, but it MINTS NO CREDENTIAL -- no matrix row carries it. The exhaustiveness
+# check flags a classified-but-unused token as a stale declaration, which is how this was
+# caught; a stage only belongs here once a credential is attributed to it.
+stage5          pending   # Juju bootstrap + per-DC bundle deploy -- authored, not executed
+stage6          pending   # DR / rbd-mirror / radosgw multisite -- authored, not executed
+
+# --- VR0 single-DC testcloud track (separate lineage; artifacts absent here) ------------
+vr0-phase01     pending   # bundle deploy + Octavia PKI generation
+vr0-phase02     pending   # Vault bring-up (unseal shares, root token, charm-pki-local)
+vr0-phase03     pending   # admin-openrc materialization
+vr0-phase06     pending   # CAPI stack / mgmt cluster kubeconfig
+vr0-phase07     pending   # Magnum conductor graft
+
+# --- not stage-scoped ------------------------------------------------------------------
+tenant-onboard  pending   # per-tenant credential set; no tenant onboarded on this cloud
+adhoc           reached   # one-off mints (the 2026-07-25 `operator` MAAS superuser)
+-               reached   # rows with no stage: present-or-absent judged on their own
diff --git a/creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations b/creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82107e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+# vm-secret-locations -- the ABSOLUTE bound on credential discovery (D-137 ruling 3).
+#
+# RULING 3, 2026-07-26, operator utterance "Declared locations only": this list bounds
+# `--remote` ABSOLUTELY. The sweep visits these locations and NOTHING else. It never walks
+# a host looking for secrets, never expands beyond a listed path, and never touches a
+# tenant surface -- D-069 (tenant credential custody stays off-repo) is preserved BY
+# CONSTRUCTION rather than by the sweep's good behaviour.
+#
+# ADDING A ROW HERE IS DEFINITION-OF-DONE FOR ANY NEW MINT SITE. A location that is not
+# listed is not audited, and an unaudited location is how SEC-022 happened.
+#
+# WHY EACH CLASS IS PRESENT (the ruling's faithful-implementation note):
+#   - per-site creds folders on the JUMPHOST      -- the SEC-009 convention itself
+#   - per-site creds folders on the HEADEND       -- SEC-022, the shadow stores that were
+#     structurally invisible: creds-audit resolves the folder against $HOME on whatever
+#     host it runs on and contains no ssh at all, so a headend-resident store could never
+#     be seen. D-128 puts Plane-2 execution on the headend, so these keep appearing.
+#   - the region secrets dir                      -- SEC-020, where admin.pass sat
+#     root-only for 12 days while the audit read CLEAN
+#   - the three dirs outside the SEC-009 convention (research FINDING 2)
+#   - the PKI overlay inside the repo clone       -- a CA private key plus a plaintext
+#     passphrase, gitignored, in a repo SEC-004 records as currently PUBLIC
+#
+# ON THE TENANT DIRECTORIES, which look like a contradiction and are not: the per-tenant
+# directories listed below are LOCAL operator-held copies on the jumphost. They are NOT a
+# tenant surface. `ssh-target=local` is load-bearing -- no tenant VM, tenant project, or
+# tenant-operated host is reachable from this file, and none may ever be added to it.
+#
+# FORMAT. Whitespace-separated: <host-role> <site-key> <ssh-target> <path>
+#   host-role   the role token used by creds-matrix.tsv (jumphost|headend|netbox|...)
+#   site-key    region-qualified site this location belongs to, or `-` if not site-scoped.
+#               ADDED 2026-07-26 (committee finding): without it the checker matched
+#               credentials on (role, basename) alone, so a file in ONE site's folder
+#               satisfied the row for EVERY site -- which masked SEC-021's dc0
+#               opnsense-api.txt absence. A per-DC credential must be resolved against its
+#               OWN site's location or the check is decorative.
+#   ssh-target  `local` = the host this runs on (the jumphost), else an ssh alias from
+#               the D-126 ssh_config fragment (scripts/site-ssh-config.sh) -- these are
+#               MEASURED as-built aliases, never invented hostnames
+#   path        an absolute path or a `~`-relative one, expanded on the TARGET host.
+#               A trailing `/*` means "the files directly in this directory".
+# `#` comments and blank lines ignored. NO FIELD MAY CONTAIN WHITESPACE.
+#
+# A listed location that does not exist is NOT a failure -- it is reported as an explicit
+# skip. Several of these belong to deployment stages this rehearsal has not reached.
+
+# --- jumphost (vcloud): the SEC-009 convention -------------------------------
+jumphost  vr1-office1  local  ~/vr1-office1-creds/*
+jumphost  vr1-dc0      local  ~/vr1-dc0-creds/*
+jumphost  vr1-dc1      local  ~/vr1-dc1-creds/*
+
+# --- jumphost: OUTSIDE the SEC-009 convention (research FINDING 2) -----------
+# Named in CLAUDE.md as secret locations, so KNOWN -- simply outside the control until now.
+jumphost  -            local  ~/vault-init/*
+jumphost  -            local  ~/octavia-pki/*
+jumphost  -            local  ~/tenant-*/*
+# The PKI overlay lands INSIDE the repo clone (gitignored). `<repo>` is substituted at
+# runtime from the checker's own location -- the repo has been renamed once already
+# (D-110) and its name must never be hardcoded into a command or a data file.
+jumphost  -            local  <repo>/overlays/octavia-pki.yaml
+# DOCFIX-175: the Office1 MAAS API key reaches tfstate in PLAINTEXT. A secret-at-rest
+# location with no mint of its own -- declared so the copy is audited, not just the mint.
+jumphost  vr1-office1  local  <repo>/opentofu/terraform.tfstate
+# Committee finding: the tfstate SIBLINGS carry the same plaintext key and were unaudited.
+jumphost  vr1-office1  local  <repo>/opentofu/terraform.tfstate.backup
+jumphost  vr1-office1  local  <repo>/opentofu/terraform.tfstate.pre-*
+# ~/as-executed/ is DELIBERATELY NOT declared. CLAUDE.md names it as material never to
+# read into context, and the PreToolUse guard enforces that -- but it holds session LOGS,
+# not registered credentials, so declaring it made every log a false UNDECLARED finding.
+# Its risk is transcript CONTENT, which this register does not model; that is the guard's
+# job, not the matrix's. Recorded here so the omission is a decision, not an oversight.
+# The Octavia PKI artifacts are written into THREE SUBDIRECTORIES (phase-01:288), so the
+# bare ~/octavia-pki/* pattern matched ZERO of the 8 artifacts incl. two CA private keys.
+jumphost  -            local  ~/octavia-pki/issuing-ca/*
+jumphost  -            local  ~/octavia-pki/controller-ca/*
+jumphost  -            local  ~/octavia-pki/controller/*
+# Predicted Stage-5 exposure (SEC-023): phase-03 writes $HOME/admin-openrc.
+jumphost  -            local  ~/admin-openrc
+
+# --- headend (voffice1): the SEC-022 shadow stores + the region secrets dir ---
+# The region dir is root-owned; the sweep reads METADATA ONLY (existence, mode, digest)
+# and never file content.
+headend   vr1-dc0      voffice1  ~/vr1-dc0-creds/*
+headend   vr1-dc1      voffice1  ~/vr1-dc1-creds/*
+headend   vr1-office1  voffice1  /root/maas-secrets/*
+# MEASURED 2026-07-26: the CLI profile, the Juju client store, the MAAS snap ssh dir (which
+# holds the per-DC power keys) and the rack-enrollment secret all live OUTSIDE the region
+# secrets dir. Each was an inferred path in the first matrix draft; these are the real ones.
+headend   vr1-office1  voffice1  ~/snap/maas/current/.maascli.db
+headend   -            voffice1  ~/.local/share/juju/*
+headend   -            voffice1  /var/snap/maas/current/root/.ssh/*
+headend   vr1-office1  voffice1  /var/snap/maas/common/maas/secret
+
+# --- netbox VM: the founding SEC-009 miss ------------------------------------
+netbox    vr1-office1  office1-netbox  /root/netbox-secrets/*
diff --git a/creds-manifests/vr1-dc0.manifest b/creds-manifests/vr1-dc0.manifest
index f8f8563..63f7ad5 100644
--- a/creds-manifests/vr1-dc0.manifest
+++ b/creds-manifests/vr1-dc0.manifest
@@ -15,3 +15,36 @@
 
 vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519         600  local
 vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519.pub     644  local
+# Edge service keypair (D-112(c) console bootstrap; minted on vcloud at the dc0
+# edge-bootstrap step). BACKFILL 2026-07-25: these rows were the queued finding
+# named in creds-manifests/vr1-dc1.manifest -- dc1 declared its equivalents at
+# mint time, dc0's never were, so both showed as UNDECLARED creds-audit FAILs.
+vr1-dc0-edge_ed25519        600  local
+vr1-dc0-edge_ed25519.pub    644  local
+# Dedicated dc0 MAAS admin API key for the Juju cloud credential (SEC-018;
+# MAAS superuser juju-vr1-dc0). Generated FROM the jumphost 2026-07-24 so it
+# never persisted on the region -- hence provenance "local", not a <vm>:<path>.
+# A runtime copy also lives in Juju's client credential store on voffice1
+# (off-manifest -- that store is not this folder). Declared 2026-07-25.
+maas-api-key.txt            600  local
+# Dedicated MAAS->libvirt power key (SEC-012, per-DC isolation; minted 2026-07-20
+# at the step-D power wiring). CONSOLIDATED 2026-07-27 -- the SEC-021(b) remediation:
+# "dc0's key should gain a jumphost copy + manifest row". PROVENANCE, stated here
+# because the machine field cannot carry it: dc0's key had NO jumphost copy at all,
+# so this pair was NOT generated on vcloud. The private half was copied from the
+# voffice1 shadow store (~/vr1-dc0-creds/maas-virsh_ed25519, the SEC-022 class),
+# sha256-verified byte-identical at both ends; the public half NEVER EXISTED
+# anywhere and was DERIVED here with `ssh-keygen -y`, its fingerprint verified
+# equal to the key installed in the region MAAS snap (SHA256:Dt/YXTXSF4nXGj9cz8f0
+# owL+qreVpMYBVm/igW10FXY). Provenance reads "local" (held on the jumphost) to stay
+# consistent with `creds-matrix.py --render`; the sentences above are the record.
+# NAMED for its purpose, per SEC-021(b)'s "reconciliation to the dc1 shape". The
+# key's own INTERNAL comment still reads "maas-virsh-pod (D-123 amendment)" -- it
+# was minted for the qemu+ssh POD attempt that was REFUTED the same day, and the
+# per-machine `power_type=virsh` ruling correctly retained the dedicated key. The
+# stale comment is cosmetic and was NOT rewritten (that would alter key material);
+# the file name is now authoritative. This copy is also what SEC-012/-016's snap
+# fragility needs: /var/snap/maas/current/ is per-revision, and dc0 previously had
+# no jumphost copy to re-assert from after a snap refresh.
+vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519      600  local
+vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519.pub  644  local
diff --git a/creds-manifests/vr1-dc1.manifest b/creds-manifests/vr1-dc1.manifest
index d53bd99..161e4ed 100644
--- a/creds-manifests/vr1-dc1.manifest
+++ b/creds-manifests/vr1-dc1.manifest
@@ -28,3 +28,10 @@
 # voffice1's region MAAS snap (off-manifest -- the snap is not this folder).
 vr1-dc1-maas-power_ed25519      600  local
 vr1-dc1-maas-power_ed25519.pub  644  local
+# Dedicated dc1 MAAS admin API key for the Juju cloud credential (SEC-019;
+# MAAS superuser juju-vr1-dc1). Generated FROM the jumphost 2026-07-24 so it
+# never persisted on the region -- hence provenance "local", not a <vm>:<path>.
+# A runtime copy also lives in Juju's client credential store on voffice1
+# (off-manifest -- that store is not this folder). Declared 2026-07-25; it was
+# an UNDECLARED creds-audit FAIL until then.
+maas-api-key.txt            600  local
diff --git a/creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest b/creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest
index 3b6f8eb..4e6447d 100644
--- a/creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest
+++ b/creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest
@@ -9,6 +9,34 @@
 #                              office1-netbox:/root/netbox-secrets/api.token went
 #                              un-consolidated until it was needed).
 #
+# MAAS region GUI/superuser passwords (SEC-020, 2026-07-25).
+#   maas-admin-password -- the `admin` superuser's password, MINTED ON THE REGION VM
+#     by scripts/site-headend-install.sh:452 (newpass -> 28 chars, alphanumeric, NO
+#     trailing newline) and left root-only at /root/maas-secrets/admin.pass until this
+#     consolidation. This is the SEC-009 miss class the NetBox token established: a
+#     VM-minted secret with no forcing function to reach the folder. Byte-identical
+#     copy (sha256-verified); the VM copy remains source-of-record, this is the working
+#     copy. `admin` doubles as the automation identity (the `maas admin` CLI profile,
+#     19 call sites), which is WHY nobody ever needed its password -- see SEC-020.
+#   maas-operator-password -- the `operator` superuser, minted 2026-07-25 for HUMAN GUI
+#     login so a person no longer has to authenticate as the service identity. 32-char
+#     base64, generated on vcloud, set via stdin (never argv, per SEC-018 discipline).
+# STILL UN-CONSOLIDATED on voffice1 (logged finding, NOT actioned -- hard rule 1):
+#   /root/maas-secrets/{admin.apikey,db.pass,lxd-trust.pass}. admin.apikey is trivially
+#   regenerable (`maas apikey --username=admin`) so it is deliberately NOT copied here;
+#   db.pass + lxd-trust.pass are region infrastructure, out of scope of this task.
+maas-admin-password         600  voffice1:/root/maas-secrets/admin.pass
+maas-operator-password      600  local
+# NetBox web-GUI `admin` password (SEC-025). CONSOLIDATED 2026-07-27: it was minted
+# on the NetBox VM at stage 2 and had NEVER been pulled to the jumphost -- the SAME
+# miss class as the api.token below (the founding SEC-009 defect) and as SEC-020's
+# admin.pass, i.e. a VM-minted HUMAN GUI login with no forcing function to reach the
+# folder. Found by the 2026-07-27 consolidation audit, which asked which accounts
+# actually exist rather than which the register already knew about. Byte-identical
+# copy, sha256-verified at both ends, 28 bytes; the VM copy REMAINS source-of-record,
+# so any future rotation must update BOTH copies or this one becomes a stale trap
+# (the caveat SEC-020 records for maas-admin-password applies identically here).
+netbox-admin-password       600  office1-netbox:/root/netbox-secrets/admin.pass
 office1_svc_ed25519         600  local
 office1_svc_ed25519.pub     644  local
 opnsense-api.txt            600  local
diff --git a/creds-matrix-notes.md b/creds-matrix-notes.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f58ac8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/creds-matrix-notes.md
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+# creds-matrix-notes.md -- `notes-ref` targets for creds-matrix.tsv (D-137)
+
+The `notes-ref` column of `creds-matrix.tsv` points here. Free text lives HERE and never
+in the TSV, so the TSV stays logical-keys-only (SEC-004) and greppable. Added by the
+12-column amendment 2026-07-26 (`docs/D-137-implementation-plan.md`).
+
+**Parse contract.** One `## <key>` heading per note; the body is every line until the next
+heading. `scripts/creds-matrix.py --render` emits a note as the manifest comment above the
+rows that reference it -- this is how D-137 ruling 2's "prose must not be dropped"
+obligation is met for per-row governance text.
+
+**No secret values, no paths, no hostnames** -- the same discipline as the TSV. Where a
+note must refer to a location it names the role token and the register row that holds the
+detail (`docs/security-ledger.md` remains the custody/exposure register of record).
+
+---
+
+## n-maas-region-admin
+The MAAS region `admin` superuser. Password 28 characters, alphanumeric, NO trailing
+newline -- that format spec is the verify-by-format basis; never verify by printing.
+The REGION copy is source-of-record and the jumphost copy is a byte-identical working
+copy (sha256-verified 2026-07-25). SEC-020 ruling: `admin`'s password was deliberately
+NOT rotated, so **any future rotation MUST update both copies in one operation or the
+region copy becomes a stale trap**.
+This identity is also the automation identity, which is why it carries both a `human`
+and a `service` row -- see `n-maas-cli-profile`. That is the ruling-5 violation D-137
+exists to make machine-detectable, not a data-entry error.
+
+## n-maas-admin-apikey
+Deliberately NOT consolidated (SEC-020(i)): trivially regenerable, and a second copy is
+pure added surface. `not-consolidated-ruled` records that this is a settled decision, so
+`--remote` must not report it as an undeclared find.
+
+## n-maas-cli-profile
+The installer logs the CLI in as profile `admin`; 19 `maas admin ...` call sites across
+4 scripts hardcode that profile (SEC-020(b)). ROOT CAUSE of the SEC-020 miss: automation
+only ever needed the API key, so nobody ever needed the password, so nothing forced it
+into the folder. Remediation is the `operator`/`admin` split begun 2026-07-25 -- migrate
+those call sites to a service identity, which is what clears the ruling-5 FAIL.
+
+## n-maas-region-operator
+Minted 2026-07-25 for HUMAN GUI login so a person no longer authenticates as the service
+identity. 32-char base64, generated on the jumphost, set via **stdin -- never argv**
+(`createadmin --password` would expose it in argv, the shape the installer uses).
+The first human-only MAAS identity.
+
+## n-region-infra-carveout
+Region infrastructure, ruled OUT of the consolidation task's scope (SEC-020(i)). Present
+at a declared location by decision, not by oversight.
+
+## n-rack-enroll
+Side effect of `maas init region+rack`; consumed by each DC rack at enrollment via a
+0600 copy. Mint and consume are different stages -- minted at region standup, consumed at
+each DC standup.
+
+## n-no-mint-command
+**Research FINDING 1 -- reproducibility debt.** `ssh-keygen` returns ZERO hits repo-wide;
+there is likewise no `mkpasswd`, `htpasswd`, `pwgen`, `uuidgen`, nor any Terraform
+`random_password`/`tls_private_key`. This credential's only provenance record is a
+manifest comment, so **it is not reproducible**: if the jumphost is rebuilt, no repo
+artifact states how to recreate it. That is a Roosevelt-transfer defect, not merely
+hygiene. `mint-ref=operator-terminal` rows are the debt to convert, and must be admitted
+by the parser rather than treated as errors.
+
+## n-edge-api
+OPNsense REST API key+secret, minted ON the edge via the vendor model (D-113(a2)) into a
+0600 temp file that is then wiped, and retrieved to the jumphost creds folder by the
+bootstrap driver.
+
+## n-third-party
+Operator-supplied from a third-party control server. Correctly has NO repo mint command --
+this is the one FINDING 1 row that is not a defect.
+
+## n-netbox-upstream
+Minted on the upstream NetBox apex. SEC-006 records this credential as BURNED; the
+rotation obligation stands at v1 close.
+
+## n-netbox-sandbox
+**The founding SEC-009 miss.** Minted on the NetBox VM and never pulled into the creds
+folder; it went unnoticed until the fidelity re-check needed it. That case is why
+`creds-audit` exists at all, and why the source-of-record vs consolidated distinction is
+modelled: a VM-minted secret has no forcing function to reach the folder.
+
+## n-netbox-vm-secrets
+Held on the NetBox VM, outside the jumphost creds folder. `netbox-secret-key` was rotated
+off netbox-docker's PUBLIC default. The admin password is a human GUI login and is a
+separate identity from the service SECRET_KEY -- do not merge these ids.
+
+`netbox-admin` CONSOLIDATED 2026-07-27 (SEC-025): the VM copy is now `source-of-record` and
+`~/vr1-office1-creds/netbox-admin-password` is a `verbatim-copy`, so tier-3 V1 asserts the two
+stay byte-identical. It had never left the VM it was minted on -- the THIRD instance of the
+miss class that SEC-009 (`api.token`) founded and SEC-020 (`admin.pass`) repeated: a
+VM-minted HUMAN login with no forcing function to reach the operator's folder. It was
+invisible to every control because `off-manifest-known` asserts nothing about the jumphost,
+so no check could report it missing. Found only by ENUMERATING the accounts that actually
+exist (`maas admin users read` for MAAS, this row's account by inspection) rather than
+auditing the ones the register already knew about -- the register cannot report an absence
+it has no row for. `netbox-secret-key` is deliberately NOT consolidated: it is a service
+secret consumed only by the container, with no human who needs to read it.
+
+## n-tofu-apikey
+Office1 MAAS API key consumed by OpenTofu as `TF_VAR_maas_api_key`.
+
+## n-tfstate-plaintext
+DOCFIX-175: the same API key reaches `terraform.tfstate` in PLAINTEXT. A secret-at-rest
+location with no mint of its own -- it exists only as a second copy, which is exactly what
+the (credential, location) row shape is for. Any rotation of `n-tofu-apikey` must account
+for this copy.
+
+## n-office1-env
+Environment file carrying the edge root-password hash and an SSH key path. One of the
+three files whose loose, 0664 placement in the home directory WAS SEC-009.
+
+## n-readme
+NOT a credential -- the human index of the creds folder, declared in the manifest so the
+folder's undeclared-file check does not fire on it. `principal` is `-` deliberately; the
+ruling-5 invariant must skip rows with no principal rather than fault them.
+
+## n-edge-key
+Edge service SSH keypair for the D-112(c) console bootstrap. The runbook describes the
+bootstrap step but does NOT contain the key generation itself -- see `n-no-mint-command`.
+
+## n-dc0-edge-api-absent
+**SEC-021, tier-1 detectable.** dc1 declares an edge API credential and dc0 does not, so
+this expected row has no manifest row to satisfy it. This is an EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT
+failure, not a matrix error: do not delete the row to make the checker green.
+
+## n-dc0-power-key-divergence
+**SEC-021, per-DC asymmetry.** dc1's power key is consolidated on the jumphost under a
+DC-qualified name; dc0's equivalent exists under a DIFFERENT name and on a DIFFERENT
+host-role (the headend shadow store, SEC-022). Both the name and the location diverge from
+the per-DC pattern, so the expected jumphost rows fail EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT while the
+divergent copy shows up at a declared remote location.
+
+## n-snap-key-fragility
+The private half is installed into the region MAAS snap so MAAS's own power operations can
+dial the rack. **The snap path is per-revision and may not survive a snap refresh -- it
+must be re-asserted after any refresh** (a standing DC-standup item). Per-DC isolation is
+mandatory here: NEVER a cross-DC power key (SEC-012 dc0, SEC-016 dc1).
+
+## n-dc1-power-key
+Dedicated dc1 MAAS->libvirt power key, minted under the SEC-016 ruling "Mint a dedicated
+dc1 power key" (per-DC isolation). Roosevelt analog: per-DC IPMI/BMC credentials.
+
+## n-dc-maas-apikey
+Per-DC MAAS admin API key backing the Juju cloud credential. Generated FROM the jumphost
+so it never persisted on the region -- which is why its provenance is local rather than a
+VM path. Verified by FORMAT ONLY (parts=3, 70 chars); never printed, echoed, or placed in
+argv. GRANT is admin-scoped MAAS API. The owning MAAS superuser's password is random and
+unstored by ruling -- see `n-juju-user-nopassword`.
+
+## n-juju-cred-store
+A runtime copy lives in the Juju client credential store on the HEADEND, a consequence of
+running the Juju client there per D-128. The jumphost file stays canonical. Recorded
+off-manifest in the manifests today (SEC-018/-019); this row is what makes it visible to
+the checker instead.
+
+## n-juju-user-nopassword
+`createadmin` is invoked with NO `--password`, so the value is stored NOWHERE. Kept random
+and unstored by operator decision recorded in SEC-018/SEC-019 (2026-07-24): the API key
+is what is load-bearing, and the
+`operator` identity removes any need to log in as this user. `filename` is `-` because
+there is no host artifact -- existence checks must skip such rows rather than fail them.
+
+## n-headend-shadow-store
+**SEC-022 -- a scope gap in the control itself, not a one-off miss.** An entire parallel
+`*-creds/` store exists on the headend holding real key material. `creds-audit.sh:29-31`
+resolves the folder against `$HOME` on whatever host it runs on, and the script contains
+no ssh/scp at all, so these stores are structurally invisible to every check that exists
+today. The D-128 operating model puts Plane-2 execution on the headend, so headend-resident
+credentials are EXPECTED to keep appearing -- this is why ruling 3's declared-locations
+list must include the headend, and why adding a location row is DoD for any new mint site.
+
+## n-outside-convention
+**Research FINDING 2.** A credential directory outside the SEC-009 `*-creds/` convention
+and outside `creds-audit` entirely -- the audit checks the per-site folders plus a loose
+FILE glob in the home directory, and never inspects these DIRECTORIES. Named in CLAUDE.md
+as a secret location, so it is KNOWN; it is simply outside the control. Materially extends
+SEC-023. The Vault directory holds the cloud's entire root of trust and its mint is an
+irreversible one-shot.
+
+## n-overlay-in-clone
+Contains base64 CA cert/key blobs PLUS the issuing-CA passphrase in PLAINTEXT, written
+**inside the repo clone** and gitignored. Given SEC-004 (this repo is currently PUBLIC),
+that gitignore is the only thing standing between a CA private key and publication.
+
+## n-tenant-dir
+Per-tenant credential directory outside the `*-creds/` convention (research FINDING 2).
+Hard tenant isolation applies: D-069 keeps custody off-repo, and D-137 ruling 3 bounds
+`--remote` to declared locations precisely so no tenant surface is ever walked. The
+runbook `tenant-onboarding-v2-DRAFT.md` documents the SAME credential set as the onboard
+script -- two creation locations, ONE set; do not double-count them into extra rows.
+
+## n-charm-minted
+Charm-minted at bundle apply with no repo mint site, then MATERIALIZED to a file by the
+operator. In matrix scope per the operator-ruled materialization test (in-matrix if a
+credential is ever written to a file, presented by a human, or consumed out-of-band,
+regardless of who generated it) -- a generation-based test would have missed it entirely.
+
+## n-predicted-openrc
+**PREDICTED, not present (SEC-023).** The script that writes it runs at a stage this
+deployment has not reached, so the checker must report this row as not-yet-expected via an
+explicit skip with an `[ok]`, never as a silent pass. Both readings of the acceptance test
+apply: this row exercises the not-yet-expected path, and the harness separately proves the
+widened sprawl glob CATCHES the file once it appears.
+
+## n-cloud-only
+Lives in the cloud or on a unit rather than in a host file, but is consumed out-of-band
+(captured by an operator command at a documented step), so the materialization test puts
+it in scope. `filename` may be `-`; existence checks skip such rows.
+
+## n-ephemeral-unit
+Written to a 0600 temp file ON the unit during a stage step. In scope because it is written
+to a file, but it is short-lived by design -- absence outside its step is normal, so this
+row must never drive an existence failure.
+
+## n-libvirt-power-pw
+The libvirt SSH password for MAAS virsh power control. Read INTERACTIVELY (never a CLI
+arg, never echoed, never logged, never in the repo) and injected into MAAS `power_pass`.
+`reenroll-hosts.sh:22-25` records that it was exposed in plaintext on 2026-06-26 --
+`maas machine power-parameters` echoes `power_pass` -- with a standing instruction to
+ROTATE it. It is in scope by the materialization test (presented by a human, consumed
+out-of-band) and had NO row until the 2026-07-26 committee found it: a credential with a
+live rotation obligation that the credential-lifecycle authority could not see.
+
+---
+
+## Checker behaviour worth knowing before you "fix" it
+
+**E2 reports FILE MODE, not reachability -- read an E2 finding before calling it an
+exposure.** SEC-024 was opened on a 0664 state file and first written up as
+"group- and world-readable"; measuring the path showed `opentofu/` is 0700 and `~` is 0750,
+so no other account could actually reach it. It was a defence-in-depth defect, not a live
+exposure, and the row had to be corrected the same day. Reporting mode alone is the RIGHT
+default for a credential gate -- directory modes change, a `cp -p` or a tarball escapes
+them, and a gate that reasons about traversal would go quiet the moment someone tightened a
+parent directory for an unrelated reason. But it means the human writing up an E2 finding
+owes a reachability check before using the word "exposed".
+
+**S5 compares `mint-stage` and `mint-ref` as part of the per-DC shape, deliberately.**
+Today both DCs agree on both, so it does not fire on them. A future DC that legitimately
+mints the same credential at a DIFFERENT stage -- one standing up after Stage 5, say --
+would trip S5 on a non-defect. That strictness is INTENDED: a per-DC credential appearing
+at a different stage or from a different mint site is exactly the drift the register
+exists to surface, and it should be argued about rather than absorbed. If a future DC
+makes it genuinely wrong, narrow it with a recorded reason -- do not silently drop the two
+fields from the comparison.
+
+**S3 is a partial gate on ruling 2, not a full one.** It compares parsed row fields for
+rows present on both sides; it does not compare manifest header prose, and `--render`
+emits only the consolidated jumphost rows. Byte-equality becomes enforceable once the
+manifests are actually replaced by rendered output, which is operator-gated because it
+changes what `creds-audit` demands at three sites.
+
+## n-colocated-nonsecret
+NOT a credential -- a config or known-hosts artifact that happens to sit in a declared
+credential location. Declared so the undeclared-file check stays meaningful instead of
+crying wolf on every config file next to a key. `principal` is `-`, so ruling 5 skips it.
+
+---
+
+## Deliberate EXCLUSIONS (recorded so the decision is not silent)
+
+These credentials appear in the research capture but are NOT matrix rows, because they
+fail the materialization test -- never written to a file, never presented to a human,
+never consumed out-of-band:
+
+- Per-service DB / RabbitMQ / Ceph keyring credentials -- charm relation data (the capture
+  confirms 56 apps, zero hardcoded secret options in the bundle).
+- Vault-issued per-service TLS certificates -- they cascade from the charm-pki-local root;
+  the verify script checks them, nothing mints them.
+- The charm-pki-local root CA itself -- created inside Vault and never materialized.
+- The short-lived (10-minute TTL) child Vault token and the charm authorization token --
+  printed once, deliberately so the root token never reaches juju logs.
+- CAPI/CAPO per-cluster CAs and bootstrap tokens, and per-cluster trustee users/trusts --
+  in-cluster Kubernetes Secrets and cloud-side objects, minted at every cluster create.
+- Throwaway acceptance-run credentials -- created and deleted within the same run.
+- Tenant end-user passwords and client-minted CI application credentials -- these live on
+  CLIENT infrastructure, outside this cloud's custody entirely.
+
+If any of these later becomes materialized to a file, it acquires a row at that moment --
+adding one is DoD for the change that materializes it.
diff --git a/creds-matrix.tsv b/creds-matrix.tsv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dec3ea1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/creds-matrix.tsv
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+# creds-matrix.tsv -- D-137 expected-state credential register (ADOPTED 2026-07-26).
+#
+# THE SINGLE SOURCE. creds-manifests/*.manifest are DERIVED from this file
+# (D-137 ruling 2: `scripts/creds-matrix.py --render`); do not hand-edit a manifest.
+#
+# WHY A FORWARD REGISTER. creds-audit is DECLARATION-based, so an undeclared secret is
+# structurally invisible -- and no discovery sweep can ever detect a credential that was
+# never minted at all. Absence is invisible to discovery. This file states what SHOULD
+# exist so absence becomes a detectable FAIL.
+#
+# LOGICAL KEYS ONLY (SEC-004 -- this repo is currently PUBLIC). No values, no hostnames,
+# no IPs, no grants, no paths. `host-role` is a role token, never a VM name.
+#
+# FORMAT. Whitespace-separated positional records in the manifests' idiom (the same shape
+# creds-audit.sh:49 reads). `#` comments and blank lines ignored. NO FIELD MAY CONTAIN
+# WHITESPACE. `-` means not-applicable.
+#
+# A ROW IS ONE (credential, location) PAIR -- not one credential (12-column amendment,
+# 2026-07-26). Copies of one credential share an `id`, one row per place it lives. `id` is
+# therefore the IDENTITY, which is what makes ruling 5 checkable: if the rows sharing an id
+# carry more than one `principal`, that identity serves two principal types -> FAIL.
+#
+# columns:
+#   id           logical identity (rows sharing an id are copies/forms of one identity)
+#   cardinality  singleton | per-site | per-DC | per-node | per-tenant
+#   site-key     region-qualified (vr1-dc0), bare `dc0` REJECTED; `-` = not site-scoped
+#   host-role    jumphost|headend|rack|edge|netbox|cloud|unit|client   (NEVER a VM name)
+#   filename     basename at that location; `-` = no host artifact (skips existence checks)
+#   access-type  gui|api|ssh|cli-profile|console|none
+#   principal    human|service|-      (ruling 5 keys off this)
+#   custody      consolidated|source-of-record|off-manifest-known|not-consolidated-ruled
+#   mint-stage   stage2..stage6 | vr0-phaseNN | tenant-onboard | adhoc | -
+#   mint-ref     script:<path>:<line> | runbook:<path>:<line> | operator-terminal | -
+#   sec-ref      SEC-NNN | -
+#   notes-ref    key into creds-matrix-notes.md | -
+#
+# EXPECTED RED. This register is deliberately not satisfiable by today's tree; the
+# failures are the defects D-137 exists to surface (see the notes file, and the
+# "EXPECTED RED BY DESIGN" section of docs/D-137-implementation-plan.md).
+#
+# id                          cardinality  site-key     host-role  filename                          access-type  principal  custody                 mint-stage      mint-ref                                                    sec-ref  notes-ref
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------- vr1-office1 (headend region + jumphost)
+maas-region-admin             singleton    vr1-office1  headend    admin.pass                        gui          human      source-of-record        stage2          script:scripts/site-headend-install.sh:450                  SEC-020  n-maas-region-admin
+maas-region-admin             singleton    vr1-office1  jumphost   maas-admin-password               gui          human      verbatim-copy            stage2          script:scripts/site-headend-install.sh:450                  SEC-020  n-maas-region-admin
+maas-region-admin             singleton    vr1-office1  headend    admin.apikey                      api          service    not-consolidated-ruled  stage2          script:scripts/site-headend-install.sh:453                  SEC-020  n-maas-admin-apikey
+maas-region-admin             singleton    vr1-office1  headend    .maascli.db                  cli-profile  service    off-manifest-known      stage2          script:scripts/site-headend-install.sh:455                  SEC-020  n-maas-cli-profile
+maas-region-operator          singleton    vr1-office1  jumphost   maas-operator-password            gui          human      consolidated            adhoc           operator-terminal                                           SEC-020  n-maas-region-operator
+maas-region-db                singleton    vr1-office1  headend    db.pass                           none         service    not-consolidated-ruled  stage2          script:scripts/site-headend-install.sh:430                  SEC-020  n-region-infra-carveout
+maas-region-lxd-trust         singleton    vr1-office1  headend    lxd-trust.pass                    none         service    not-consolidated-ruled  stage2          script:scripts/site-headend-install.sh:485                  SEC-020  n-region-infra-carveout
+maas-rack-enroll-secret       singleton    vr1-office1  headend    secret                none         service    off-manifest-known      stage2          script:scripts/site-headend-install.sh:445                  -        n-rack-enroll
+office1-svc-key               per-site     vr1-office1  jumphost   office1_svc_ed25519               ssh          service    consolidated            stage2          operator-terminal                                           SEC-007  n-no-mint-command
+office1-svc-key               per-site     vr1-office1  jumphost   office1_svc_ed25519.pub           none         service    consolidated            stage2          operator-terminal                                           SEC-007  n-no-mint-command
+office1-edge-api              per-site     vr1-office1  jumphost   opnsense-api.txt                  api          service    consolidated            stage2          script:scripts/opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh:115              -        n-edge-api
+office1-edge-root             per-site     vr1-office1  jumphost   opnsense-root-password            gui          human      consolidated            stage2          operator-terminal                                           SEC-007  n-no-mint-command
+office1-edge-root             per-site     vr1-office1  jumphost   opnsense-root-hash                none         human      consolidated            stage2          operator-terminal                                           SEC-007  n-no-mint-command
+office1-tailscale-authkey     singleton    vr1-office1  jumphost   tailscale-authkey.txt             api          service    consolidated            stage2          operator-terminal                                           SEC-008  n-third-party
+netbox-upstream-token         singleton    vr1-office1  jumphost   vr1-netbox.env                    api          service    consolidated            stage2          operator-terminal                                           SEC-006  n-netbox-upstream
+netbox-sandbox-token          singleton    vr1-office1  netbox     api.token                         api          service    source-of-record        stage2          runbook:runbooks/dc-dc-phase1-office1-standup.md:643        SEC-009  n-netbox-sandbox
+netbox-sandbox-token          singleton    vr1-office1  jumphost   vr1-netbox-sandbox.env            api          service    consolidated            stage2          runbook:runbooks/dc-dc-phase1-office1-standup.md:643        SEC-009  n-netbox-sandbox
+netbox-secret-key             singleton    vr1-office1  netbox     secret_key                        none         service    off-manifest-known      stage2          operator-terminal                                           -        n-netbox-vm-secrets
+netbox-admin                  singleton    vr1-office1  netbox     admin.pass                        gui          human      source-of-record        stage2          operator-terminal                                           SEC-025  n-netbox-vm-secrets
+netbox-admin                  singleton    vr1-office1  jumphost   netbox-admin-password             gui          human      verbatim-copy           stage2          operator-terminal                                           SEC-025  n-netbox-vm-secrets
+office1-tofu-maas-apikey      singleton    vr1-office1  jumphost   vr1-stage1.env                    api          service    consolidated            stage2          runbook:runbooks/dc-dc-phase1-office1-standup.md:464        SEC-009  n-tofu-apikey
+office1-tofu-maas-apikey      singleton    vr1-office1  jumphost   terraform.tfstate                 api          service    off-manifest-known      stage2          runbook:runbooks/dc-dc-phase1-office1-standup.md:464        -        n-tfstate-plaintext
+office1-env                   singleton    vr1-office1  jumphost   vr1-office1.env                   none         service    consolidated            stage2          operator-terminal                                           SEC-009  n-office1-env
+creds-folder-readme           per-site     vr1-office1  jumphost   README                            none         -          consolidated            -               -                                                           -        n-readme
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------- vr1-dc0
+dc0-svc-key                   per-DC       vr1-dc0      jumphost   vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519               ssh          service    consolidated            stage3          operator-terminal                                           -        n-no-mint-command
+dc0-svc-key                   per-DC       vr1-dc0      jumphost   vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519.pub           none         service    consolidated            stage3          operator-terminal                                           -        n-no-mint-command
+dc0-svc-key                   per-DC       vr1-dc0      headend    vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519               ssh          service    off-manifest-known      stage3          operator-terminal                                           SEC-022  n-headend-shadow-store
+dc0-svc-key                   per-DC       vr1-dc0      headend    vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519.pub           none         service    off-manifest-known      stage3          operator-terminal                                           SEC-022  n-headend-shadow-store
+dc0-edge-key                  per-DC       vr1-dc0      jumphost   vr1-dc0-edge_ed25519              ssh          service    consolidated            stage3          operator-terminal                                           -        n-edge-key
+dc0-edge-key                  per-DC       vr1-dc0      jumphost   vr1-dc0-edge_ed25519.pub          none         service    consolidated            stage3          operator-terminal                                           -        n-edge-key
+dc0-edge-api                  per-DC       vr1-dc0      jumphost   opnsense-api.txt                  api          service    consolidated            stage3          script:scripts/opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh:115              SEC-021  n-dc0-edge-api-absent
+dc0-maas-power-key            per-DC       vr1-dc0      jumphost   vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519        ssh          service    consolidated            stage3          operator-terminal                                           SEC-021  n-dc0-power-key-divergence
+dc0-maas-power-key            per-DC       vr1-dc0      jumphost   vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519.pub    none         service    consolidated            stage3          operator-terminal                                           SEC-021  n-dc0-power-key-divergence
+dc0-maas-power-key            per-DC       vr1-dc0      headend    maas-virsh_ed25519                ssh          service    off-manifest-known      stage3          operator-terminal                                           SEC-021  n-dc0-power-key-divergence
+dc0-maas-power-key            per-DC       vr1-dc0      headend    id_ed25519                        ssh          service    off-manifest-known      stage3          runbook:runbooks/dc-dc-phase2-tofu-dc-substrate.md:770      SEC-012  n-snap-key-fragility
+dc0-maas-apikey               per-DC       vr1-dc0      jumphost   maas-api-key.txt                  api          service    consolidated            stage5          runbook:runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md:136     SEC-018  n-dc-maas-apikey
+dc0-maas-apikey               per-DC       vr1-dc0      headend    credentials.yaml                  api          service    off-manifest-known      stage5          runbook:runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md:141     SEC-018  n-juju-cred-store
+dc0-juju-maas-user            per-DC       vr1-dc0      -          -                                 api          service    off-manifest-known      stage5          runbook:runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md:128     SEC-018  n-juju-user-nopassword
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------- vr1-dc1
+dc1-svc-key                   per-DC       vr1-dc1      jumphost   vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519               ssh          service    consolidated            stage3          operator-terminal                                           -        n-no-mint-command
+dc1-svc-key                   per-DC       vr1-dc1      jumphost   vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519.pub           none         service    consolidated            stage3          operator-terminal                                           -        n-no-mint-command
+dc1-svc-key                   per-DC       vr1-dc1      headend    vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519               ssh          service    off-manifest-known      stage3          operator-terminal                                           SEC-022  n-headend-shadow-store
+dc1-svc-key                   per-DC       vr1-dc1      headend    vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519.pub           none         service    off-manifest-known      stage3          operator-terminal                                           SEC-022  n-headend-shadow-store
+dc1-edge-key                  per-DC       vr1-dc1      jumphost   vr1-dc1-edge_ed25519              ssh          service    consolidated            stage3          operator-terminal                                           SEC-015  n-edge-key
+dc1-edge-key                  per-DC       vr1-dc1      jumphost   vr1-dc1-edge_ed25519.pub          none         service    consolidated            stage3          operator-terminal                                           -        n-edge-key
+dc1-edge-api                  per-DC       vr1-dc1      jumphost   opnsense-api.txt                  api          service    consolidated            stage3          script:scripts/opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh:115              -        n-edge-api
+dc1-maas-power-key            per-DC       vr1-dc1      jumphost   vr1-dc1-maas-power_ed25519        ssh          service    consolidated            stage3          operator-terminal                                           SEC-016  n-dc1-power-key
+dc1-maas-power-key            per-DC       vr1-dc1      jumphost   vr1-dc1-maas-power_ed25519.pub    none         service    consolidated            stage3          operator-terminal                                           SEC-016  n-dc1-power-key
+dc1-maas-power-key            per-DC       vr1-dc1      headend    id_dc1_power                      ssh          service    off-manifest-known      stage3          runbook:runbooks/dc-dc-phase2-tofu-dc-substrate.md:770      SEC-016  n-snap-key-fragility
+dc1-maas-apikey               per-DC       vr1-dc1      jumphost   maas-api-key.txt                  api          service    consolidated            stage5          runbook:runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md:136     SEC-019  n-dc-maas-apikey
+dc1-maas-apikey               per-DC       vr1-dc1      headend    credentials.yaml                  api          service    off-manifest-known      stage5          runbook:runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md:141     SEC-019  n-juju-cred-store
+dc1-juju-maas-user            per-DC       vr1-dc1      -          -                                 api          service    off-manifest-known      stage5          runbook:runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md:128     SEC-019  n-juju-user-nopassword
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------- outside the SEC-009 *-creds/ convention (research FINDING 2)
+vault-unseal-shares           singleton    -            jumphost   init.txt                          none         service    off-manifest-known      vr0-phase02     runbook:runbooks/phase-02-vault-bringup.md:71               SEC-023  n-outside-convention
+vault-root-token              singleton    -            jumphost   init.txt                          none         service    off-manifest-known      vr0-phase02     runbook:runbooks/phase-02-vault-bringup.md:71               SEC-023  n-outside-convention
+octavia-issuing-ca-passphrase singleton    -            jumphost   passphrase.txt                    none         service    off-manifest-known      vr0-phase01     runbook:runbooks/phase-01-bundle-deploy.md:299              SEC-023  n-outside-convention
+octavia-issuing-ca-key        singleton    -            jumphost   issuing-ca.key.enc                none         service    off-manifest-known      vr0-phase01     runbook:runbooks/phase-01-bundle-deploy.md:302              SEC-023  n-outside-convention
+octavia-issuing-ca-cert       singleton    -            jumphost   issuing-ca.cert.pem               none         service    off-manifest-known      vr0-phase01     runbook:runbooks/phase-01-bundle-deploy.md:305              SEC-023  n-outside-convention
+octavia-controller-ca-pass    singleton    -            jumphost   passphrase.txt                    none         service    off-manifest-known      vr0-phase01     runbook:runbooks/phase-01-bundle-deploy.md:321              SEC-023  n-outside-convention
+octavia-controller-ca-key     singleton    -            jumphost   controller-ca.key.enc             none         service    off-manifest-known      vr0-phase01     runbook:runbooks/phase-01-bundle-deploy.md:324              SEC-023  n-outside-convention
+octavia-controller-ca-cert    singleton    -            jumphost   controller-ca.cert.pem            none         service    off-manifest-known      vr0-phase01     runbook:runbooks/phase-01-bundle-deploy.md:327              SEC-023  n-outside-convention
+octavia-controller-key        singleton    -            jumphost   controller.key                    none         service    off-manifest-known      vr0-phase01     runbook:runbooks/phase-01-bundle-deploy.md:343              SEC-023  n-outside-convention
+octavia-controller-bundle     singleton    -            jumphost   controller.bundle.pem             none         service    off-manifest-known      vr0-phase01     runbook:runbooks/phase-01-bundle-deploy.md:375              SEC-023  n-outside-convention
+octavia-pki-overlay           singleton    -            jumphost   octavia-pki.yaml                  none         service    off-manifest-known      vr0-phase01     runbook:runbooks/phase-01-bundle-deploy.md:391              SEC-004  n-overlay-in-clone
+tenant-domain-admin           per-tenant   -            jumphost   <client>-domain-admin-cred.txt    gui          human      off-manifest-known      tenant-onboard  script:scripts/tenant-onboard.sh:64                         SEC-023  n-tenant-dir
+tenant-cluster-user           per-tenant   -            jumphost   <client>-cluster-cred.txt         api          human      off-manifest-known      tenant-onboard  script:scripts/tenant-onboard.sh:90                         SEC-023  n-tenant-dir
+tenant-svc-user               per-tenant   -            jumphost   <client>-svc-cred.txt             api          service    off-manifest-known      tenant-onboard  script:scripts/tenant-onboard.sh:90                         SEC-023  n-tenant-dir
+tenant-svc-appcred            per-tenant   -            jumphost   <client>-svc-appcred.txt          api          service    off-manifest-known      tenant-onboard  script:scripts/tenant-onboard.sh:141                        SEC-023  n-tenant-dir
+tenant-nova-key               per-tenant   -            jumphost   <client>-key.pem                  ssh          service    off-manifest-known      tenant-onboard  script:scripts/tenant-onboard.sh:167                        SEC-023  n-tenant-dir
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------- in scope by the materialization ruling (charm/platform-minted, then materialized)
+keystone-admin                singleton    -            cloud      -                                 api          service    off-manifest-known      vr0-phase01     -                                                           -        n-charm-minted
+keystone-admin                singleton    -            jumphost   admin-openrc                      none         service    off-manifest-known      vr0-phase03     script:scripts/phase-03-admin-openrc.sh:52                  SEC-023  n-predicted-openrc
+magnum-domain-admin           singleton    -            cloud      -                                 api          service    off-manifest-known      vr0-phase07     script:scripts/phase-07-conductor-graft.sh:90               -        n-cloud-only
+capi-mgmt-kubeconfig          singleton    -            cloud      config                            none         service    off-manifest-known      vr0-phase06     script:scripts/phase-06-capi-stack.sh:91                    -        n-cloud-only
+rbd-mirror-peer-token         per-DC       -            unit       rbd-mirror-bootstrap-token        none         service    off-manifest-known      stage6          script:scripts/dc-dc-rbd-mirror.sh:88                       -        n-ephemeral-unit
+rgw-multisite-system-key      singleton    -            unit       -                                 api          service    off-manifest-known      stage6          operator-terminal                                           -        n-cloud-only
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------- non-secret artifacts colocated at declared locations
+juju-client-clouds            singleton    -            headend    clouds.yaml                       none         -          off-manifest-known      stage5          -                                                           -        n-colocated-nonsecret
+juju-client-public-clouds     singleton    -            headend    public-clouds.yaml                none         -          off-manifest-known      stage5          -                                                           -        n-colocated-nonsecret
+maas-snap-ssh-config          singleton    -            headend    config                            none         -          off-manifest-known      stage3          -                                                           -        n-colocated-nonsecret
+maas-snap-known-hosts         singleton    -            headend    known_hosts                       none         -          off-manifest-known      stage3          -                                                           -        n-colocated-nonsecret
+maas-snap-known-hosts-old     singleton    -            headend    known_hosts.old                   none         -          off-manifest-known      stage3          -                                                           -        n-colocated-nonsecret
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------- added 2026-07-26 (committee coverage findings)
+# Read from a human and injected into MAAS power_pass; reenroll-hosts.sh:22-25 records a
+# STANDING rotation obligation after a 2026-06-26 plaintext exposure. Passes the
+# materialization test verbatim and was absent from both the matrix and the exclusions.
+libvirt-power-password        singleton    -            -          -                                 console      human      off-manifest-known      -               script:scripts/reenroll-hosts.sh:122                        -        n-libvirt-power-pw
+# The tfstate SIBLINGS carry the same DOCFIX-175 plaintext key as the live state file.
+# They are real secret-at-rest copies, so they are ROWS, not merely declared locations.
+office1-tofu-maas-apikey      singleton    vr1-office1  jumphost   terraform.tfstate.backup          api          service    off-manifest-known      stage2          runbook:runbooks/dc-dc-phase1-office1-standup.md:464        -        n-tfstate-plaintext
+office1-tofu-maas-apikey      singleton    vr1-office1  jumphost   terraform.tfstate.pre-<tag>       api          service    off-manifest-known      stage2          runbook:runbooks/dc-dc-phase1-office1-standup.md:464        -        n-tfstate-plaintext
+vault-ca-root                 singleton    -            jumphost   vault-ca-root.pem                 none         service    off-manifest-known      vr0-phase02     operator-terminal                                           SEC-023  n-outside-convention
diff --git a/docs/CURRENT-STATE.md b/docs/CURRENT-STATE.md
index 18100db..ac71406 100644
--- a/docs/CURRENT-STATE.md
+++ b/docs/CURRENT-STATE.md
@@ -34,8 +34,330 @@
   GA-R7 memory review + merge of `dc-dc-stage3-phase2-dc-substrate`
   to `main` (merge commit) + branch retirement; stage record
   `docs/archive/stage-records/vr1-stage3-record.md`. Stages 0-2
-  precede it; stages 4-7 are authored, not executed (workflow
-  doc:873). The NEXT stage branches off post-merge `main`.
+  precede it; stages 5-7 are authored, not executed (workflow
+  doc:873).
+- **Stage 4 / Phase 3 -- "MAAS enlist / commission / deploy (per DC)"
+  (`runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md`): OPEN 2026-07-23** on
+  branch `dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy` (off post-merge `main`).
+  Precondition PASS + discovery CAPTURED read-only
+  (`docs/audit/stage4-discovery-20260723.txt`): both DC racks enrolled
+  (vvr1-dc0 `7chphy`, vvr1-dc1 `nmpcq4`); 9 nodes per DC ALL Ready,
+  power=virsh, dc0 boot fabric-4 / dc1 fabric-142, zone/pool both
+  `default` (no zone/pool convention -- fabric + MAC prefix is the
+  grouping signal). Runbook deltas vs reality: commissioning (Step 3)
+  already satisfied by Stage 3; order is carve-then-deploy per the
+  runbook's own Ready-state sequencing note; VR1 nodes have 6 flat
+  per-plane NICs (enp1s0 metal-admin/boot, enp2s0 provider-public,
+  enp3s0 metal-internal, enp4s0 data-tenant, enp5s0 storage, enp6s0
+  replication). **D-133 ADOPTED 2026-07-23** (flat per-NIC carve for
+  VR1; next deployment rehearses hardware-faithful bonds/trunks).
+  **D-134 ADOPTED + AMENDED 2026-07-23** (contiguous bands, Option B:
+  .4-.49 utility, .50-.99 VIP, nodes one run .100-.200 (control
+  .100-.119, compute .120-.149, storage .150-.200), dynamic MOVES to
+  .201-.254 -- the carve's first gated mutation per DC. VR1 nodes:
+  control .100-.102, compute .120-.121, storage .150-.153, keyed by
+  tofu name / pinned boot MAC). **CARVE EXECUTED 2026-07-23, BOTH DCs
+  (logged window stage4-carve; capture
+  `docs/audit/stage4-carve-verify-20260723.txt`):** dynamic ranges
+  .201-.254 in place (office1 untouched); 10 named plane fabrics; 90
+  NIC re-homes (18 nodes, read-back each, pinned MACs matched); 2
+  provider subnets moved off fabric-5 (+ ruled .1 gateways) + 8 plane
+  subnets created; 6 spaces (bundle binding names) with 12 VLANs
+  assigned; 18 nodes' statics + br-ex OVS (D-133 flat, D-100
+  provider-raw). ALL 18 nodes still Ready. Flagged residue (cleanup
+  gated at stage close): 192.168.1.0/24 + emptied fabric-5, ~90 empty
+  auto-created fabrics. **Post-carve rulings, all 2026-07-23 (this
+  entry lands one commit late -- an owned L10 defect, changelog item
+  8):** deploy model = READY handoff (MAAS-deploy SKIPPED; Juju
+  provisions at Stage 5 per the phase-01 precondition; DOCFIX-200
+  rewrote the runbook's Step 4, which would have broken Stage 5);
+  jammy boot images SYNCED to the region (selection id=2;
+  `ubuntu/jammy` reads Synced); placement tags =
+  `openstack-vr1-dc0`/`-dc1` APPLIED 9+9 (D-119 naming). Mirror
+  gate: rehearsal exception REJECTED -- **D-135 ADOPTED** (per-DC
+  mirror BUILT on the rack hosts at the D-134 utility .4 address;
+  item 1 apt+UCA debmirror+nginx builds in-stage; items 2-3 pinned
+  to Stage 5; egress narrowing is the closing mutation).
+  **dc-mirror.sh SHIPPED 2026-07-23** (site-keyed check/install/sync;
+  D-134 utility .4 + edge default route -- egress path MEASURED
+  working, edge DNS answers; debmirror GPG-verified jammy triple +
+  UCA caracal; harness 18/18; gauntlet **ALL GREEN (77)**,
+  `docs/audit/gauntlet-20260723-stage4-dcmirror.txt`). **INSTALLED
+  BOTH RACKS 2026-07-23** (check PASS 15/15 each; mirrors answer 200
+  on 10.12.8.4 / 10.12.68.4; initial syncs RUNNING -- HOME-under-
+  systemd fix shipped same-hour, harness 19/19). **INCIDENT resolved
+  same-hour (changelog item 9):** the fresh dc1 edge passed NO LAN
+  traffic -- pf ruleset never regenerated after v4 addressing (the
+  set-interface script reloads the interface, not the filter; dc0 was
+  masked by its 07-20 plugin work). Fix: `configctl filter reload`;
+  dc1 rack egress now 0% loss / HTTP 301. **Delivery batch LANDED
+  2026-07-23 (changelog item 11):** lib-hosts VR1 arms populated
+  (tofu-name keys, pinned MACs, D-134 octets, per-DC power/tags, new
+  host_sysid_by_bootmac resolver; dc-selector 48 PASS), D-133 guards
+  in reenroll-hosts + carve-host-interfaces (VR0 flows refuse vr1-*),
+  lib-net VID caveat, appendix-A edge-pf entry, DoD items 8-9 + item-4
+  range correction; gauntlet ALL GREEN (77). Still QUEUED to stage
+  close: set-interface-v4 reload amendment (option, unruled);
+  permission-rules prune. **D-135 AMENDED 2026-07-24 (operator-ruled --
+  DC0/DC1 artifact-path split):** DC0 = the full-mirror deployment under
+  test (debmirror RUNNING, measured ~70% / 665 GiB of ~948 at
+  2026-07-24T15:35Z); DC1 debmirror PAUSED at ~330 GiB (measured: the
+  vcloud uplink was NOT the shared bottleneck -- solo dc0 did not speed up
+  after pausing dc1; kept dormant as the fallback) and switched to an
+  INTERIM apt CACHING PROXY (apt-cacher-ng, proxy mode at utility .4:3142)
+  to unblock the DC1 build now, consumed via juju apt-http-proxy; DC1
+  proxy REPLACED by a full mirror afterward -- **that clause is SUPERSEDED by the
+  D-135 AMENDMENT 2026-07-27: the per-DC split is the DELIBERATE EXPERIMENT (dc0
+  tests the full mirror, dc1 tests the proxy), there is no fallback and no later
+  convergence, and dc1's partial mirror + apparatus were REMOVED that day.**
+  scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh
+  SHIPPED (site-keyed check/install; harness 15/15) + INSTALLED + verified
+  on the DC1 rack 2026-07-24 (check PASS 8/8 -- apt-cacher-ng
+  3.7.4-1ubuntu5.24.04.1 active on .4:3142; proxy serves archive + UCA
+  200). DC1 build consumes the proxy (juju apt-http-proxy=http://10.12.68.4:3142).
+  **DC1 STAGE-5 (proxy-method deploy) STARTED 2026-07-24, then BLOCKED on a
+  bundle-rework gap (committee-reviewed):**
+  - DONE (committed, valid regardless of the blocker): per-DC MAAS service creds
+    (SEC-018 dc0 / SEC-019 dc1, staged vcloud, juju-store copy on voffice1);
+    Juju 3.6.25 on voffice1 (headend, D-128; removed from vcloud); `juju add-cloud
+    vr1-maas` (region 10.10.0.20:5240) + `add-credential` both DCs; VIP overlay
+    `overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml` (11 apps -> dc1 bands); phase-4 Step 2.0
+    (MAAS-cred deployment task) added to the runbook.
+  - **DNS = GREEN for bootstrap (committee Q2, live-probed 2026-07-24):** the
+    D-131 forwarder (10.12.68.3, no-resolv -> recursive region BIND) resolves
+    BOTH maas-internal AND external (streams.canonical.com/archive/snap NOERROR);
+    the SERVFAIL hang class CANNOT recur (nodes use configured resolver). **HARD
+    ORDERING CAVEAT: `juju bootstrap` fetches the juju agent stream + juju/juju-db
+    SNAPS pre-apt (not covered by the apt proxy; D-135 items 2-3 agent/snap mirror
+    NOT built) -- it works ONLY while the DC1 edge egress is OPEN. Do NOT apply the
+    D-135/D-107 egress-narrowing until AFTER bootstrap (or mirror agents/snaps first).**
+  - **RENDER (committee-adjudicated 2026-07-24; record
+    `docs/audit/committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.md`).** The committed
+    `bundle.yaml` is still VR0's 4-node HYPERCONVERGED layout (machines "8"-"11",
+    `tags=openstack`); VR1 dc1 is 9 ROLE-SEPARATED nodes (3 control/2 compute/4
+    storage, tag `openstack-vr1-dc1`, D-121 Option C). Architecture DECIDED; deploy
+    ARTIFACTS not yet rendered. A 4-lens committee reviewed it and every load-bearing
+    claim was re-verified against the repo -- TWO corrected the brief: designate IS
+    in-bundle (`bundle.yaml:812/840/922`, D-106 supersedes D-019), so the phase-4
+    "ships NO designate" (line 192) is STALE and part of the de-stale work; and the
+    inner caller is `for_each`-keyed (`opentofu/vr1-dc1-substrate/main.tf:140`) so a
+    10th node is ADDITIVE (`1 add/0/0`), not a substrate reopening. Correcting an
+    earlier characterization: `dc-ha-scaleup.yaml` DELIBERATELY excludes
+    ceph-osd/nova-compute (scale-out, not control containers) -- it is NOT "stale
+    ceph-osd 3"; its real gaps are the dc0-named tokens + that the machines block
+    belongs in `bundle.yaml`.
+  - **Fork 1 RULED 2026-07-24 (operator, GA-R5 -- D-104 AMENDMENT):** "Dedicated
+    10th VM (Recommended)" -- a dedicated per-DC Juju-controller node VM, separate
+    from the 9 role nodes, distinct tag (`juju-controller-vr1-dc1`, no role tag).
+    Capacity GATE PASS (measured): `scripts/dc-dc-whole-host-budget.py` 10-node x
+    2-DC = RAM 854/1024 GiB = 83%, FIT, 170 GiB headroom (baseline 3+2+4 = 838/82%);
+    capture `docs/audit/stage5-controller-capacity-20260724.txt`. Fork 2 (hand-render
+    NOW + EXTEND `provider-bundle-check.py` with placement/anti-affinity/count
+    assertions; DEFER a renderer tool) and Fork 3 (per-role MAAS tags +
+    re-enlist-runbook wiring) = OPS, committee-UNANIMOUS, doubt-resolves-DOWN
+    (GA-R3) -- executed under gating; the Fork-3 tag mutation and the 10th-VM apply
+    stay individually operator-gated.
+  - **BUNDLEFIX-052 FIXED 2026-07-24:** `ceph-rbd-mirror` carried a duplicate
+    `bindings:` (an orphan at the old line ~907) that YAML take-last absorbed,
+    clobbering its D-108 replication bindings (`ceph-local`/`ceph-remote`) +
+    injecting a phantom `dashboard` binding -> `juju deploy` reject. Orphan removed;
+    `yaml.safe_load` confirms the correct set restored; `provider-bundle-check.py`
+    PASS. Pre-existing latent defect (app was prep-only, never deployed).
+  - **DONE 2026-07-24 (committed+pushed):** ruling batch `72cad5f`; validator spine
+    `c3970a9` (provider-bundle-check overlay-merge + per-DC bands + placement
+    invariants, harness 15/15); **the 9-node role-separated bundle RENDER** (bundle.yaml
+    machines "0"-"8" role+DC tags, all `to:` re-homed, nova-compute 3->2, ceph-osd on
+    4 storage, ovn-chassis -> the 2 dc1 compute provider MACs; new
+    `overlays/vr1-dc1-machines.yaml` retag overlay; `dc-ha-scaleup` tokens rendered to
+    logical 0/1/2). VALIDATED: base + full dc1 deploy input (3 overlays, --dc vr1-dc1)
+    PASS, harness 15/15, gauntlet ALL GREEN (78), repo-lint 0-fail. Deployment-expansion
+    review (3 read-only reviewers) recorded `docs/audit/stage5-expansion-review-20260724.md`;
+    it confirmed relations/bindings/subordinates HOLD under role-sep (uniform 6-NIC,
+    SEC-011) and no channel/pin change is needed.
+  - **OPEN before deploy (from the expansion review):** RESOLVE-BEFORE-DEPLOY --
+    (a) **vault VIP** (decorative-HA regression: vault scaled 3 + `vault-hacluster
+    cluster_count:3` but NO vip -> `vault:secrets` consumers hit a unit address). **D-020**
+    (not D-036) lists vault among the apps carrying provider+metal VIPs. Needs a per-DC VIP
+    in the symmetric overlay shape (ruling 3; metal-admin+metal-internal only, no provider
+    leg; octet .61 band-legal per D-134-amended .50-.99) + the vault-HA VERIFY-LIVE. OPS
+    (D-020 conformance repair), not a new D; (b) **address family: RULED 2026-07-25** (D-101 CONFIRMED via a dated ruling note under
+    ## D-101; GA-R5) -- dual-stack where IPv4 is required, IPv6-only where IPv6-only is
+    sound, for BOTH DC0 and DC1 this deployment; the v4-only phasing option is CLOSED.
+    Consequence: the vr1-dc1-vips / dc-dc-ipv6-family-matrix per-key REPLACE collision must
+    be reconciled to ONE dual-family `vip` per app per DC before deploy -- no longer
+    deferrable. Octavia family remains an OPEN sub-ruling (see D-136 open question 2).
+    (c) **per-DC artifact shape: RULED 2026-07-25** (ruling 3) -- `bundle.yaml` becomes
+    VIP-free (topology only); every per-DC value arrives via overlay, dc0 included; dc0's
+    VIPs extract from base into `overlays/vr1-dc0-vips.yaml` (2 commits: neutral MOVE proven
+    via `provider-bundle-check --overlay --dc vr1-dc0`, then the dual-stack ADD; MIGRATE the
+    inline VIP-line operational comments). FOLLOW-UP scripts/gates (2026-07-25 pack-review
+    blockers fold in here) -- preflight.sh runs the checker BARE (must pass the dc1 overlays
+    + --dc vr1-dc1); **BLOCKER-1** the VIP-free bundle makes pre-flight-checks.sh CHECK 1
+    see 0 VIPs -> hard-fail (point it at the MERGED bundle, not the VIP_COUNT_EXPECT 11->12
+    bump); **BLOCKER-2** provider-bundle-check.py rejects vault's non-triple/no-provider/.61
+    VIP once DC-aware (allow it + widen the octet band to .50-.99; bump VIP_OCTET_MAX 60);
+    pre-flight-checks.sh VR0-frozen (no $DC selector, host_sysid-by-hostname);
+    cloud-assert.sh false-passes decorative HA on the 12 scaled API services; `juju
+    bootstrap` needs a controller-tag constraint; phase-4 Step 4 de-stale. VERIFY-LIVE gates: vault 1.8 HA-on-MySQL@3 (D-121), hacluster
+    cluster_count:3 semantics, Ceph pools size=3/min_size=2/failure-domain=host,
+    machines-block overlay merge (`--dry-run`); **keystone policyd-override (RULED
+    2026-07-25): `juju status` shows `PO:` on EVERY keystone unit after scale-up, never
+    `PO (broken):`** -- a broken override is atomic (whole policy discarded, silently
+    reverting every tenant domain-manager to a plain user; protects D-051/D-064).
+  - **NetBox->deploy coupling: PROPOSED as D-136 (Chat, 2026-07-25).** A per-DC renderer
+    generating overlays + tfvars from the NetBox record, recommending option (C) -- build
+    the values-file BACK half now for both DCs, add the NetBox FRONT half for Roosevelt.
+    Does NOT gate the dc1 deploy; mechanism awaiting operator ruling. Prerequisite sequenced
+    FIRST: extend `netbox/sandbox-fidelity-check.py` (blind to D-124/D-134 today). The v6
+    subcarve is NOT an open gate (D-111 ADOPTED; values imported both DCs). The target
+    OPERATING MODEL (NetBox draft -> approve-on-rendered-diff -> apply -> bounded
+    self-healing) is PINNED for a planning session
+    (`docs/audit/operating-model-plan-20260725.md`), not ratified.
+  - **FULL DECISION RECON 2026-07-25 (4-lens committee; record
+    `docs/audit/decision-recon-20260725.md`).** office1-netbox holds the entire IP
+    PREFIX layer (all 12 planes + transit + uplink + v6 GUA/ULA), DRIFT-FREE across
+    netbox/lib-net/artifacts, and is correctly VLAN-empty (untagged-per-fabric, D-133 --
+    VLANs are a MAAS construct, not NetBox). **The GAP is sub-prefix:** the D-134 per-DC
+    bands + the 33 VIP addresses live only in prose/overlays, NOT the apex -- the exact
+    thing the NetBox->deploy coupling must close. Node/MAC/power config is drift-free;
+    Fork-3 role tags + the 10th VM are pending gated (deploy-blocking); live MAAS tag
+    state is NEEDS-LIVE-VERIFY (no tag column in the discovery capture). **Decision-status
+    integrity flagged STALE surfaces (fixes QUEUED, operator-deferred): this doc's
+    section 4 "RULED-BUT-NOT-BUILT" is comprehensively stale (HIGH -- 4/5 bullets
+    contradicted by section 1 + on-disk; do NOT read section 4 as current), G14 SEC count
+    12 -> 15, phase-4 runbook:192 "no designate".** The reconciliation backlog (the
+    "what else to queue" answer, P0-P2) is in the record; extend
+    `netbox/sandbox-fidelity-check.py` FIRST (it gates every apex recon).
+  - **MAAS REGION ACCOUNTS -- recovered/consolidated 2026-07-25 (SEC-020; capture
+    `docs/audit/maas-admin-recovery-20260725.txt`).** The 2026-07-25 ledger claim that
+    MAAS web-GUI login "does NOT exist / was never minted" is **FALSIFIED**: the `admin`
+    superuser's password was minted 2026-07-13 by `site-headend-install.sh:452` and is
+    MEASURED working (login 204 with the stored value vs 400 wrong-password control;
+    `has_usable_password=True` for all accounts). The real defect was narrower -- it sat
+    root-only at `voffice1:/root/maas-secrets/admin.pass`, un-consolidated (the SEC-009
+    miss class). Operator-ruled scope "New account + consolidate only": `admin` password
+    CONSOLIDATED byte-identical (sha256-verified) to `~/vr1-office1-creds/maas-admin-password`
+    -- **the VM copy REMAINS source-of-record; any future rotation must update both copies
+    or the VM copy becomes a stale trap**; NEW superuser `operator` minted for human GUI
+    login (password via stdin, never argv). NO existing password rotated -- `juju-vr1-dc0/dc1`
+    stay random+unstored BY RULING (their SEC-018/019 API keys are load-bearing for the
+    bootstrap below, and passwords are independent of API keys). `MAAS` + `maas-init-node`
+    are MAAS-internal, untouched. `creds-audit` now CLEAN on all THREE sites (was RED: dc0 3
+    + dc1 1 undeclared files, incl. the dc0 edge-keypair rows that were a queued backfill
+    finding). ROOT CAUSE recorded: `admin` doubles as the automation identity (its API key
+    drives the `maas admin` CLI profile across 19 call sites in 4 scripts), so automation
+    never needed the password and nothing forced it into the folder -- proposable as the
+    next-free D-number [ARCH], NOT assigned.
+  - **THEN, gated (per the D-104-amendment + the open items above):** per-role MAAS tags;
+    author + apply the 10th controller VM (egress OPEN); resolve the vault-VIP + phasing;
+    fix the deploy-gate scripts; `juju bootstrap` (controller tag, egress OPEN) -> deploy.
+    Separately: DC0 full-mirror completes -> reachability gate -> stage close-out.
+- **STAGE 4 CLOSE-OUT OPENED 2026-07-27** (operator-directed, ahead of resuming the DC1
+  Stage-5 chain -- the two are SEPARATE tracks sharing one branch by the 07-24 one-branch
+  ruling, and no Stage-5 item is a Stage-4 close precondition). Of the DoD's six bullets
+  (`runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md:472-485`), four are met and captured (nodes
+  READY+carved+tagged, six planes per node, provider NIC raw, PXE v4). The remaining two are
+  BOTH defective as written:
+  - **Bullet 5 "per-DC mirror reachable" -- NOT MET, and the check it closes on was
+    FALSE-GREENING.** `dc-mirror.sh check` asserted only that `last-sync.status` EXISTS,
+    printing its contents behind an unconditional `OK`, so it could not fail. MEASURED both
+    racks 2026-07-27: dc0 read `FAIL ... ubuntu=255`, dc1 read a FOUR-DAY-STALE
+    `RUNNING 2026-07-23T21:49:35Z` left by the debmirror the D-135 amendment killed -- both
+    printed OK and PASSED. FIXED (status word now case-analysed; RUNNING is an explicit
+    UNKNOWN cross-checked against the unit; absent and unrecognised both refuse; harness
+    **24/24**, was 19). Re-run now reports the true state: **dc0 FAIL / dc1 FAIL**, capture
+    `docs/audit/stage4-mirror-gate-20260727.txt`. Substance: dc0's mirror CONTENT is intact
+    (949G+342M, all three dists + pool) and only the overnight INCREMENTAL failed, on a
+    transient upstream `500 read timeout` for `dists/jammy/Release`; dc1's PROXY -- its RULED
+    artifact path per the D-135 amendment -- checks PASS genuinely (apt-cacher-ng on .4:3142
+    serving archive + UCA 200), while its dormant fallback debmirror is dormant only
+    ACCIDENTALLY (timer `enabled` with EMPTY next-elapse because the unit sits in
+    failed/Result=signal, so a `reset-failed` re-arms a 330G->949G pull; the ruling is not
+    enforced by anything). **The node-side half of bullet 5 is SPLIT OUT to new gate row G17
+    by operator ruling 2026-07-27 (GA-R5, utterance quoted in the G17 row) -- NOT closed
+    conditionally, which GA-R6 E3 forbids.** Nodes are powered off in `Ready` by the
+    READY-handoff ruling, so no node-side probe can run inside Stage 4; G17 carries it to
+    Stage 5 first boot. What REMAINS in Stage 4 for bullet 5 is the RACK-side half only: the
+    artifact source answers on its own address with an attested-current sync. dc1's proxy
+    already satisfies that (PASS). **dc0's sync was RE-RUN 2026-07-27 (gated) and completed in
+    20s: `OK 2026-07-27T08:43:46Z ubuntu=0 uca=0`; the fixed `dc-mirror.sh check dc0` now
+    reports PASS -- a PASS that is trustworthy precisely because the same check FAILED on the
+    same rack twenty minutes earlier. BULLET 5 IS THEREFORE MET FOR BOTH DCs** (dc0 mirror
+    PASS, dc1 proxy PASS), with the node-side half at G17.
+  - **dc1's full mirror REMOVED 2026-07-27, not paused** (D-135 AMENDMENT that day; operator:
+    "DC0 is the test of a full mirror. DC1 is the test of the mirror proxy."). The earlier
+    "dormant as the fallback" record was wrong about intent. Sequenced per operator direction
+    "Do the net layer first, then rip it all down", because a coupling trap made the naive
+    order destructive: `dc-cache-proxy.sh` did not own its utility net layer, so three files
+    named `dc1-mirror-*` were load-bearing FOR THE PROXY -- the recorded removal procedure
+    would have killed the dc1 apt path, and the proxy could not be rebuilt afterward without
+    reinstalling the whole mirror apparatus (enabled daily timer included), so
+    teardown-and-rebuild did not converge. FIXED FIRST: the net layer moved into
+    `dc-cache-proxy.sh` as `<site>-cache-proxy-net.service` + apply helper + its own resolved
+    drop-in (harness **20/20**), installed on the dc1 rack, and INDEPENDENCE PROVEN by
+    deleting the live address and default route outright and applying the proxy-owned unit
+    ALONE -- `check dc1` PASS with `dc1-mirror-net.service` disabled. THEN removed wholesale:
+    all mirror units, the timer, the sync helper, the nginx vhost, the resolved drop-in, the
+    `debmirror` package, and the 330G of partial mirror (33,037 files, `rm -rf` 47.6s; rack
+    disk 339G -> 9.0G). Zero mirror-named residue; proxy PASS throughout, never down. nginx
+    LEFT installed deliberately (generic, now serving only its stock vhost). Capture
+    `docs/audit/dc1-mirror-teardown-20260727.txt`.
+  - **Bullet 6 "NTP from the DC's own OPNsense edge working" is STALE and unsatisfiable as
+    written** -- SUPERSEDED by D-129(iv), RULED 2026-07-21 ("Keep MAAS hierarchy
+    (Recommended)", no NTP role on the edge). The bullet survives in FOUR surfaces
+    (`docs/dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md:206`, `docs/dc-dc-buildout-design.md:120`,
+    `runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md:412,484`,
+    `runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md:26`) and needs a DOCFIX re-expressing it as
+    MAAS-hierarchy time verification before it can be checked at all.
+  - **CARVE RESIDUE CLEANED 2026-07-27** (capture
+    `docs/audit/stage4-carve-residue-cleanup-20260727.txt`): **108 fabrics -> 17**. Deleted
+    subnet id=8 `192.168.1.0/24` (the superseded OPNsense FACTORY LAN -- both edges were
+    re-addressed to 10.12.4.1 / 10.12.64.1), then fabric-5, then the 90 auto-created empties
+    (ids 6..95). The audit caught an ORDERING dependency the original flag did not state: the
+    192.168.1.0/24 subnet was the ONLY occupant of fabric-5, so deleting the fabric first
+    would have cascaded the subnet away. Emptiness was PROVEN per fabric (zero subnets, zero
+    ipranges, zero node interfaces across all its VLANs) against a fresh occupancy snapshot
+    taken immediately before the batch, and the cascade check was re-run AFTER -- the inverse
+    of the 2026-07-21 pod-delete incident, where the association check ran too late and cost 9
+    machine records. POST-STATE: 18 Ready + 2 Deployed office1 guests, all 18 still
+    `power_type=virsh`, 7 interfaces each (6 flat planes per D-133 + br-ex), **ZERO orphaned
+    interfaces**, placement tags 9+9 intact, both artifact paths re-verified PASS. The 17
+    survivors are all load-bearing and enumerated in the capture (office1 base+GUA+compose,
+    both transits, both metal-admin/boot fabrics, libvirt default, and the 10 named plane
+    fabrics). **dc1's leftover nginx also removed** the same day (purged nginx + nginx-common,
+    `/etc/nginx` gone, nothing listening on :80, proxy still PASS on :3142; it had been a
+    MIRROR prereq only -- dc0 keeps its nginx and is unaffected).
+  - **`set-interface-v4` RELOAD AMENDMENT RULED + SHIPPED 2026-07-27** (operator utterance
+    "a" to the three presented options; OPS under GA-R3, governed by D-113 -- no new
+    D-number). `--commit` now runs `configctl filter reload` and reads the automatic NAT
+    rules back via `pfctl -s nat`, so the appendix-A "edge passes no LAN traffic after v4
+    addressing" defect cannot be reached through the normal addressing path. Prose-only
+    prevention was rejected on evidence: DoD item 8 existed and did NOT fire at dc1.
+    PLACEMENT IS THE SUBSTANCE: the reload runs over a FRESH connection to the post-move
+    address, NOT on the next line of the `interface reconfigure` heredoc -- re-addressing the
+    interface you arrived on drops the session DURING the reconfigure, so a reload there
+    would never execute in exactly the dc1 scenario that caused the defect. The NAT read-back
+    is REPORTED not gated (a first addressing may legitimately have no gateway yet); the hard
+    gate stays address-on-the-kernel. Harness **59/59** (was 53), cases 15-15f. No live edge
+    touched -- both DC edges are already addressed, so this affects the NEXT one.
+  - **CLOSE-OUT SET EXECUTED 2026-07-27; only the MERGE remains.** GA-R2 consolidation done
+    (7 stage changelogs archived, top-level `docs/` 25 -> 18, stage record
+    `docs/archive/stage-records/vr1-stage4-record.md`; 12 stale `docs/changelog-*` paths in
+    live surfaces rewritten to the archive, including some already-dangling from the G12
+    close). Skill sweep done -- three new INVARIANTS folded in (per-DC artifact delivery is a
+    per-DC STRATEGY and a utility service owns its own net prerequisites; Stage 4 hands off
+    READY nodes not deployed ones; "a checker that cannot fail is not a gate", with the
+    assert-on-content / enumerate-what-exists rules) plus two routing rows. Dated snapshot
+    REGENERATED as `.claude/skills/openstack-cloud-ops-consolidated-20260727.md` (1589 lines,
+    ASCII/LF verified) and the superseded 20260725 one REMOVED -- a stale snapshot being
+    uploaded is the exact failure `docs/audit/skill-divergence-20260725.md` records, and it is
+    a derived artifact regenerable from any commit. GA-R7 memory review done: NO new memory
+    (everything durable graduated to the skill/repo, which is the correct GA-R7 outcome); both
+    existing entries verified against the repo and extended with the two reasoning traps this
+    stage produced. Gauntlet **ALL GREEN (81)**, repo-lint 0-fail.
+  **REMAINING: the operator-gated merge of `dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy` to `main` as a
+  MERGE commit (not squash), then branch retirement (local + remote).** Every substantive
+  in-stage item is closed or split to gate row G17.
 - Position inside Stage 3: deploy step A EXECUTED 2026-07-19 (6/0/6
   exact; convergence zero --
   `docs/audit/outer-plan-20260719-postA-converged.txt`). **Deploy step B
@@ -488,9 +810,10 @@
 | G11 | Operator signs THIS document | [R] read top-to-bottom; discrepancies resolved in the document | operator | CLOSED: RE-SIGNED 2026-07-19 at audit exit, section 11 (replaces the 2026-07-18 signature) |
 | G12 | `vr1-dc1` build | [R] operator rules dc1 transit/rack addressing; then vars + substrate authored | operator + session | CLOSED 2026-07-23 (operator-ruled "Merge to main + full close"; commissioning 9/9 READY, merge commit on `main`, branch retired) -- [R] leg CLOSED 2026-07-21: addressing RATIFIED (D-124 amendment 2026-07-21, utterance quoted). [V] leg IN PROGRESS (branch `dc-dc-g12-dc1-substrate`): apex confirm-free DONE 2026-07-21 -- planes/uplink already assigned+consistent, transit 172.31.0.4/30 + rack 10.12.68.2 FREE (`docs/audit/dc1-apex-confirm-20260721.txt`); importer per-site dc1 support shipped (harness 117/117) with live dry-run preflight PASS (`docs/audit/dc1-rack-import-dryrun-20260721.txt`). vars + substrate root + lib-net dc1 arm COMMITTED 2026-07-22 (successor session landed the disconnected item 3 + the harness reconcile as changelog item 4): six harnesses reconciled to the ratified dc1 arm, phase-00 PLANES parity guard added, rbd-mirror/radosgw cross-DC reminder fixed; gauntlet **ALL GREEN (76)** (`docs/audit/gauntlet-20260722-g12-reconcile.txt`), repo-lint 0-fail. Apex `--commit` EXECUTED 2026-07-22 (operator-gated): 172.31.0.4/30 + 10.12.68.2/22 CREATED, post-commit read-back idempotent (`docs/audit/dc1-rack-import-commit-20260722.txt`). dc1 svc key minted (creds-audit CLEAN), tfvars authored (local), **outer step-A apply DONE 2026-07-22**: saved plan 5/0/0 exact, converged ZERO DIFF (section 5), vvr1-dc1 RUNNING, prior guests untouched (as-executed log dc1-deploy; changelog-20260722-g12-dc1-build.md). **Step B COMPLETE 2026-07-22**: cloudinit-vm interface_macs port + voffice1 dc1-transit NIC (0/2/0 exact, MACs pinned both domains, post-bounce battery ALL PASS, converged zero diff -- `docs/audit/outer-plan-20260722-voffice1-dc1nic.txt`), transit LIVE (voffice1 .5/30 <-> rack .6/30, dc1-key ssh proven), rack ENROLLED (region lists vvr1-dc1 `nmpcq4`), SEC-010 applied+verified BOTH ends, OPNsense 26.7 base staged via hash-verified copy of dc0's proven artifact; named gate EXIT 0 `docs/audit/dc1-stepB-check-20260722-final.txt` (changelog-20260722 items 5-8, three queued findings). **Step C COMPLETE 2026-07-22**: inner apply FROM voffice1 -- plan 28/0/0 exact (54 pinned MACs verified in-capture), one fix-forward (serial-log staging dir absent on dc1; queued to standup DoD), resume 10/0/0 exit 0; 28/28 in state, convergence ZERO DIFF (`docs/audit/inner-converge-20260722-dc1-stepC.txt`), **10/10 domains RUNNING inside vvr1-dc1**, edge at the 26.7 FreeBSD login prompt (D-112 datapoint #2); dc1 inner tfstate ON voffice1 (site backup set). **D-125 egress gate PASS 2026-07-22** (two identical runs, dc0 criteria exact, isolation confirmed -- `docs/audit/d125-egress-gate-20260722-dc1.txt`). **Edge bootstrap + v4 addressing COMPLETE 2026-07-23** (changelog-20260723-g12-dc1-edge.md): D-112(c) console bootstrap done (SSH + dc1 edge key materialized; payload needed `util.inc`/`shell_safe()` -- dc0 lesson iv the `.b64` artifact lacked), key-only SSH VERIFIED (`15.1-RELEASE-p1`); D-113(a2) API key MINTED via the vendor model + smoke test `GET core/firmware/status` exit 0 `product_abi 26.7` (second 26.7 datapoint); edge ADDRESSED -- WAN `172.30.3.2/24` gw `172.30.3.1` (egress 1.1.1.1 0% loss), LAN `192.168.1.1` -> `10.12.64.1/22` (ruled provider-public gw), API answers at the new LAN; interim reach leg removed, rack provider-public leg `10.12.64.2/22` LIVE on virbr4. Creds consolidated to `~/vr1-dc1-creds/opnsense-api.txt` (creds-audit CLEAN, 5 entries); rack edge-key copy shredded (**SEC-015** transient, remediated). Two queued findings: bootstrap `.b64` missing `util.inc`; `opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh` scp had a transient post-restart-sshd failure (readiness-wait/retry candidate). **Rack standup + region MAAS config DONE 2026-07-23** (changelog-20260723 items 7-11): dc-rack-net.sh dc1 arm shipped (harness 18/18, gauntlet 76 GREEN) + INSTALLED on the rack (check 10/10, forwarder answers authoritative maas-internal SOA -- D-131 fix; `docs/audit/dc1-rack-net-install-20260723.txt`); region MAAS on metal-admin subnet 11 -- D-120 range 10.12.68.100-.200, D-131 dns_servers=10.12.68.3 allow_dns=false, DHCP dhcp_on=true primary_rack=nmpcq4 (dhcpd verified RUNNING on virbr6, no Temporal incident); **dc1 enlistment PROVEN** via canary (machines 11->12 in ~2 min). **SEC-016 RULED + WIRED 2026-07-23** (operator: "Mint a dedicated dc1 power key" -- per-DC isolation; dedicated key authorized on the rack + installed in the region MAAS snap with per-host ssh config, dc0's SEC-012 key untouched). **COMMISSIONING 9/9 READY 2026-07-23** (`docs/audit/dc1-commissioning-verify-20260723.txt`): all 9 nodes PXE-enlisted by pinned 52:54:01:d1 MACs, `power_type=virsh` set + verified by real query-power-state (SEC-016 path proven), commissioned to **ALL 9 READY in ~3.5 min** (no timeout, no SERVFAIL), shapes EXACT to D-121 Option C (3x16cpu/64GiB + 2x12cpu/48GiB + 4x8cpu/24GiB). dc0's two stacked faults pre-empted by pinned MACs + the dc-rack-net forwarder. **G12 [V] leg (the dc1 build) is COMPLETE.** NEXT: G12 close-out only -- consolidate this session's changelogs (GA-R2), final gauntlet + repo-lint, GA-R7 memory review, skill sweep, **operator-gated merge of `dc-dc-g12-dc1-substrate` -> `main`** (merge commit), branch retirement; then G12 CLOSES. NOTE open SEC rows now include SEC-014/-015/-016 (G14 row count stale -- reconcile in the close). |
 | G13 | D-129 residuals | [R] operator-gated live plugin install on office1-opnsense; qga channel retrofit at that edge's next scheduled restart. All 4 sub-decisions RULED 2026-07-21 (D-129 Status line) -- only the two execution items remain | operator | CLOSED 2026-07-23 (operator-approved full maintenance bundle, logged window ops-sec010-reassert): qga channel retrofitted via outer tofu saved-plan apply 0/1/0 exact (`docs/audit/outer-plan-20260723-office1-qga.txt`; the apply's edge bounce = the ruled "next scheduled restart"; MACs were pinned 07-22 so the in-place-update trap class was closed); edge updated 26.7 -> 26.7.1 via REST (no reboot required; os-iperf had been REFUSED on 26.7 pending exactly this update); both plugins installed=1 by firmware-info read-back, `guest-ping` -> `{"return":{}}`, agent reports both legs, egress 0% loss, outer plan re-converged ZERO DIFF (`docs/audit/outer-plan-20260723-postqga-converged.txt`). Named close capture: `docs/audit/g13-close-20260723.txt` |
-| G14 | 12 OPEN SEC rows (SEC-001, -003..-008, SEC-012, -013, -014, plus SEC-015 + SEC-016 opened 2026-07-23 for dc1 credentials; SEC-010/-011 CLOSED) | [R] per-row: rotations/flips at v1 close (external to VR1 track); SEC-012/-016 carry the same libvirt-group SCOPE hardening question; SEC-016 also a snap-refresh re-assert (queued to DC standup DoD) | operator / external | `docs/security-ledger.md` (register of record, GA-R4/F3); count re-verified vs `bash scripts/ledger-scan.sh` 2026-07-23 (12 open) |
+| G14 | 12 OPEN SEC rows (SEC-001, -003..-008, SEC-012, -013, -014, plus SEC-015 + SEC-016 opened 2026-07-23 for dc1 credentials; SEC-010/-011 CLOSED) | [R] per-row: rotations/flips at v1 close (external to VR1 track); SEC-012/-016 carry the same libvirt-group SCOPE hardening question; SEC-016 also a snap-refresh re-assert (queued to DC standup DoD) | operator / external | `docs/security-ledger.md` (register of record, GA-R4/F3). **COUNT RECONCILED 2026-07-27: 21 open**, measured `bash scripts/ledger-scan.sh` (SEC-001, -003..-008, -012..-025; SEC-024 opened 2026-07-26, SEC-025 opened 2026-07-27 for the consolidated NetBox GUI admin password). Earlier figures in this cell (19 at 2026-07-25) are history. The row's own title text ("12 OPEN SEC rows") is the 2026-07-23 figure and is SUPERSEDED by this cell -- the gate is the ledger, not the count. Since 07-23: SEC-017 (caveman supply-chain), -018/-019 (per-DC MAAS API keys), -020 (MAAS region superuser passwords), and **-021/-022/-023 opened 2026-07-25** from the D-137 credential research -- dc0 custody defects (a consolidated credential ABSENT from its recorded location + per-DC power-key divergence), UNAUDITED shadow `*-creds/` stores on voffice1 (a scope gap in `creds-audit` itself, which has no remote capability), and sprawl-glob blind spots incl. a PREDICTED Stage-5 `~/admin-openrc` exposure. All three are logged-not-actioned (hard rule 1); remediation is coupled to the unruled D-137 forks. Creation-point research capture: `docs/audit/creds-creation-points-20260725.md` -- 55 MINT sites inventoried, and **12 declared secrets have NO mint command anywhere in the repo** (`ssh-keygen` returns ZERO hits repo-wide; six SSH keypairs + the OPNsense root password/hash are operator-terminal mints recorded only in a manifest comment, i.e. NOT reproducible if the jumphost is rebuilt -- a Roosevelt-transfer defect, not just hygiene). It also names three credential DIRECTORIES outside the SEC-009 `*-creds/` convention and outside `creds-audit` entirely: `~/vault-init/` (Vault 5 unseal shares + root token), `~/octavia-pki/` (8 PKI artifacts incl. CA private keys), `~/tenant-<client>/`; plus `overlays/octavia-pki.yaml`, which lands a CA key + plaintext passphrase INSIDE the repo clone (gitignored -- and SEC-004 says the repo is still PUBLIC) |
 | G15 | D-068 / D-071 rulings | [R] operator rules (section 8); neither blocks the VR1 substrate | operator | D-071 ADOPTED 2026-07-21 (all four points); D-068 items 2-3 RULED 2026-07-21; item 1: plan DRAFTED + Q1/Q2-structure/Q3 ALL RULED 2026-07-23 (three amendments, utterances quoted; monthly-review lines delivered). Sole D-068 remainder: Q2 path selection at Roosevelt Vault design time -- G15 is otherwise decision-complete |
 | G16 | office1 edge `channels = []` state reconcile (the D-129 module-schema residual) | [R] operator rules the mechanism; then [V] the converged re-plan capture | operator + session | CLOSED 2026-07-21: RULED "State surgery (Recommended)" (GA-R5, session changelog item 16); executed per G6 precedent -- channels null -> [] injected, serial 29 -> 30, backup kept, guests untouched (office1-opnsense Id 2 running throughout); convergence = ZERO DIFF (`docs/audit/outer-plan-20260721-postG16-converged.txt`); section 5 re-recorded |
+| G17 | **Per-DC artifact source reachable FROM A NODE** -- the node-side half of Stage 4 DoD bullet 5, split out of Stage 4 by operator ruling rather than closed conditionally | [V] a NAMED executable check run from a node that has actually booted an OS on its real NICs, per DC, each capturing: dc0 -> `curl -sI http://10.12.8.4/` returns 200 from the node (the D-135 item-1 full mirror); dc1 -> the node resolves and fetches through the apt proxy at `10.12.68.4:3142` (the D-135-AMENDED ruled artifact path -- dc1 has NO node-facing mirror, so checking it as one would fail by design). The natural trigger is Stage 5 first boot, when Juju provisions the nodes and they run apt for real; a gated MAAS rescue-boot is the alternative if it must be answered sooner | session (each boot operator-approved) | **OPEN 2026-07-27.** WHY THIS EXISTS: the DoD bullet reads "per-DC mirror reachable from nodes", but the READY-handoff ruling (2026-07-23, DOCFIX-200) leaves all 18 nodes powered off in `Ready` -- MAAS-deploy is SKIPPED and Juju provisions at Stage 5 -- so no node-side probe can run inside Stage 4 at all. GA-R6 E3 forbids a conditional close, so the remainder splits here. RULING (GA-R5). Question as presented 2026-07-27: "The node-side half of bullet 5. Nodes are powered off by the READY-handoff ruling, so no node-side probe can run as things stand. Either a gated rescue-boot check on one node per DC now (closes it inside Stage 4), or split it into its own gate row targeted at Stage 5 first boot (GA-R6 E3 explicitly permits this; a conditional close is not permitted)." Operator answer, exact utterance: **"split it into its own gate row"**. SCOPE NOTE: what stays in Stage 4 is the RACK-side half -- the artifact source answers on its own address with an attested-current sync -- which is what `dc-mirror.sh check` / `dc-cache-proxy.sh check` verify (both fixed this session to stop false-greening; capture `docs/audit/stage4-mirror-gate-20260727.txt`). G17 is NOT a Stage-5 precondition and must not be conflated with one: Stage 5's own bootstrap needs OPEN edge egress for the juju agent stream + snaps (D-135 items 2-3 unbuilt), which is a different path from the apt artifact source this gate covers. |
 
 ## 7. Version pins (measured; the authority for every pin)
 
@@ -559,6 +882,275 @@
    vendor guidance on the "utility nodes" DC-to-DC configuration) --
    executes at next-deployment design time; feeds the sub-4 ruling
    with the LP outcome.
+9. D-137 -- credential mint-and-consolidate pipeline (PROPOSED
+   2026-07-25, operator-requested: "a durable rule to make sure when
+   accounts are created there is a consolidation that happens every
+   time"). Diagnosis is MEASURED: the SEC-009 audit is
+   DECLARATION-based, so an undeclared secret is structurally
+   undetectable -- `creds-audit vr1-office1` read CLEAN on 2026-07-15
+   while four region-VM secrets minted 2026-07-13 sat undeclared, and
+   `admin.pass` surfaced only 2026-07-25 (SEC-020). It is also wired in
+   exactly ONE place and as PROSE (phase-3 runbook:498), not in
+   preflight/cloud-assert/repo-lint/gauntlet -- and that line did not
+   fire at EITHER DC standup (dc0 3 + dc1 1 undeclared at this
+   session's open). THREE forks await a ruling, one exchange each
+   (GA-R5): enforcement strength (advisory / preflight-blocking /
+   plus a PreToolUse guard); `--remote` discovery scope
+   (declared-directories vs broader sweep, a tenant-isolation
+   concern); policy home (this D as authority with SEC-009 demoted to
+   a pointer, vs policy stays in the ledger). NOT implemented --
+   PROPOSED means present options, never build. **SUB-RULING 1 RULED 2026-07-25
+   (GA-R5, utterance quoted in the D-137 Status block): "Blocking in preflight"** --
+   the check lands as a new `Pn` in `scripts/preflight.sh` and HARD-FAILS on any
+   expected-but-absent / undeclared / per-DC-asymmetric credential. The PreToolUse
+   guard and advisory-only were NOT adopted. **SUB-RULING 2 RULED 2026-07-25: "Derive
+   manifests from matrix"** -- the matrix is SINGLE SOURCE, `--render` regenerates
+   `creds-manifests/*.manifest`, gauntlet fails on rendered-vs-checked-in drift; accepted
+   cost is that manifests become generated (their governance prose must become matrix
+   fields, not be dropped). **SUB-RULING 3 RULED 2026-07-26: "Declared locations only"** --
+   a `creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations` list bounds `--remote` absolutely (no tenant
+   surface touched, D-069 preserved). To be faithful the list must include the headend
+   shadow stores (SEC-022), the region maas-secrets dir, and the three dirs outside the
+   SEC-009 convention found by the creation-point inventory. **SUB-RULING 4 RULED 2026-07-26:
+   "D-137 is the authority"** -- D-137 becomes the credential-lifecycle policy authority and
+   the SEC-009 convention block demotes to a pointer (its founding history stays in the
+   ledger as history); gates may then cite a D-number instead of an exposure register.
+   **SUB-RULING 5 RULED 2026-07-26: "Fold in as a D-137 invariant"** -- the invariant is
+   ONE IDENTITY SERVES ONE PRINCIPAL TYPE, enforced by the matrix `principal` column, so
+   the SEC-020 conflation becomes machine-detectable and needs no separate D-number.
+   **ALL FIVE SUB-RULINGS RULED -> D-137 is ADOPTED 2026-07-26 and implementation is
+   UNBLOCKED, with the build spec at `docs/D-137-implementation-plan.md`** (Status line in design-decisions.md is the authority). Expect the first
+   run to be RED by design: `admin` serves both a human and a service row, which is the
+   defect the invariant names. Research capture:
+   `docs/audit/creds-creation-points-20260725.md` -- its APPENDIX now carries the FULL
+   per-row inventory (55 MINT rows with file:line, host, destination, stage and
+   human/service classification), transcribed in-repo 2026-07-26 so the matrix SEED does
+   not depend on a session transcript.
+   **TIER 1 BUILT 2026-07-26** (offline/STATIC half only; tiers 2-3 NOT built, and the
+   preflight `Pn` of ruling 1 is NOT wired -- see the sequencing question below). Shipped:
+   `creds-matrix.tsv` (72 rows), `creds-matrix-notes.md`, `scripts/creds-matrix.py`
+   (S1 schema / S2 manifest coverage both-bounds / S3 render drift / S4 mint-ref
+   resolution / S5 per-DC symmetry / S6 ruling-5 principal invariant / S7 notes
+   integrity), harness `tests/creds-matrix/run-tests.sh` **24/24**; gauntlet **ALL GREEN
+   (80)**, repo-lint 0-fail. **SCHEMA AMENDED 10 -> 12 columns** (operator-ruled
+   2026-07-26, "go with the 12-column amendment"): `custody` + `notes-ref` added and rows
+   re-keyed to (credential, location), because a read-first round-trip check proved the
+   10-column form could not carry what ruling 2 forbids dropping -- and because ruling 3
+   puts four deliberate, reasoned credential copies INSIDE `--remote`'s declared
+   locations, where `creds-audit.sh:63-67` would report every one as UNDECLARED. Detail +
+   rationale in `docs/D-137-implementation-plan.md`; OPS under GA-R3, the five sub-rulings
+   are untouched. **RED BY DESIGN AND CORRECTLY SO -- 5 findings, do not "fix" by deleting
+   rows:** the ruling-5 identity conflation on `maas-region-admin` (its own SEC-020
+   defect), 3x EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT for SEC-021 (dc0 declares neither an edge API
+   credential nor a jumphost-consolidated power key, both of which dc1 declares), and the
+   S5 asymmetry of dc0's divergently-named headend power key. 27 rows carry
+   `mint-ref=operator-terminal` = the research FINDING 1 reproducibility debt, admitted and
+   counted, not faulted. **Acceptance test PARTIALLY met** (corrected from the plan's
+   original text): SEC-021's DECLARATION half is tier-1 detectable and is reproduced;
+   SEC-022/-023 and SEC-021's on-disk half need tier 2. **OPEN SEQUENCING QUESTION for the
+   operator:** ruling 1 lands the check as a BLOCKING preflight `Pn` and the first run is
+   red, so wiring it hard-fails `preflight.sh` until the credential defects are remediated;
+   wiring-as-ruled is the default and deferring until after per-row remediation is the
+   departure. **RESOLVED + EXECUTED 2026-07-26.** Question as presented: wire the blocking
+   `Pn` as ruled, or defer it until after per-row remediation. Operator answer, exact
+   utterance: "wire tier 1 as the blocking preflight Pn". TIER 1 IS NOW WIRED as
+   `preflight.sh` **P5**, blocking, ahead of the stage-2 reminders block so its verdict
+   participates in the deploy decision; it FAILS CLOSED if the checker is absent (a missing
+   file made `python3` exit 2, which `note` maps to WARN -- so deleting the gate would have
+   downgraded it to a warning; harness T9 encodes this). Tier 2's `Pn` is NOT wired and
+   remains a separate decision: it needs `--remote`/`--privileged` and a caller-supplied
+   `--pending-stage`, none of which belong in an unattended gate.
+   **CONSEQUENCE, STATED PRECISELY: `preflight.sh` exits 1 and P5 is one of the reasons --
+   but preflight was ALREADY exiting 1 before this change** (P4: `overlays/octavia-pki.yaml`
+   absent, and MAAS unreachable from the jumphost). P5 adds a fifth reason to an
+   already-red gate; it did NOT flip preflight from pass to fail, and no deploy path that
+   was open is closed by it.
+   **TIER 2 TOOLING BUILT 2026-07-26, NOT YET RUN LIVE.** Shipped:
+   `creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations` (ruling 3's absolute bound -- jumphost creds
+   folders, the headend shadow stores of SEC-022, the region secrets dir of SEC-020, the
+   three dirs outside the SEC-009 convention, the in-clone PKI overlay, and the DOCFIX-175
+   plaintext tfstate; tenant dirs are LOCAL-only so no tenant surface is reachable and
+   D-069 holds by construction); `creds-matrix.py --tier2 [--remote]` (E1 expected-but-
+   absent / E2 mode / E3 undeclared-at-a-declared-location, with an unreachable host
+   SKIPPED explicitly because "could not look" must never read as "nothing there", and a
+   `--pending-stage` selector so a not-yet-reached mint stage defers instead of failing --
+   the CALLER supplies it, the script carries no status claim, GA-R1); `creds-audit.sh`
+   sprawl globs WIDENED for the SEC-023 blind spots (`admin.pass`, `*.apikey`, `*.key`,
+   `*.pem`, `*_ed25519`, `*_rsa`, `*openrc*`) -- the old six patterns could not have seen
+   the SEC-020 secret or the predicted Stage-5 `~/admin-openrc`. Harnesses
+   **creds-matrix 33/33** and **creds-audit 13/13** (was 7); gauntlet ALL GREEN (80),
+   repo-lint 0-fail.
+   **LIVE TIER-2 SWEEP RUN 2026-07-26, read-only, no sudo** (capture
+   `docs/audit/d137-tier2-sweep-20260726.txt`; jumphost local + voffice1 + office1-netbox,
+   `stat` over ssh, metadata only). **SEC-021's ON-DISK half is now REPRODUCED as a named
+   failure** -- `vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519{,.pub}` are genuinely ABSENT from the dc0
+   jumphost creds folder, not merely undeclared. The sweep ALSO corrected two of its own
+   false-greens, both found by running it: (a) an unprivileged `[ -d ]` on a root-owned
+   directory is indistinguishable from absent, so `/root/maas-secrets` and
+   `/root/netbox-secrets` first reported "does not exist" -- they are now correctly
+   reported **UNREADABLE** ("could not look" is never "nothing there"), which is a FAIL,
+   not a skip; (b) a role with any unprobed location no longer lets its other locations'
+   listings manufacture false EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT findings -- 14 headend/netbox rows are
+   explicitly NOT JUDGED instead. **STILL OUTSTANDING: the two root-owned directories need
+   a privileged read**, so SEC-022's shadow-store verification and the SEC-020 region
+   secrets remain unconfirmed; that run is a remote-sudo shape and is operator-gated.
+   **ESCALATION PATH WIRED BUT BLOCKED 2026-07-26:** `--privileged` adds a `sudo -n` retry
+   attempted ONLY where an unprivileged probe returned `unreadable`, so the privileged
+   surface stays as small as the ruling-3 bound keeps the search surface (still metadata
+   only, `stat`, never content). The operator APPROVED the run, but the Claude Code
+   AUTO-MODE CLASSIFIER denied the remote-sudo shape -- the same wall recorded at the
+   2026-07-23 close, whose noted fix is `manual` permission mode (a targeted ask rule is
+   the alternative). NOT worked around.
+   **PRIVILEGED SWEEP COMPLETED 2026-07-26** (capture
+   `docs/audit/d137-tier2-privileged-20260726.txt`; supersedes the unprivileged capture).
+   ROOT CAUSE of the block was NOT the classifier overriding a rule: `Bash(ssh * sudo *)`
+   was ALREADY in the project ask list, but the pattern needs a literal space before
+   `sudo` and the command was `ssh <host> 'sudo ...'` -- the quote meant NO rule matched,
+   so it fell through to the classifier. Fixed by adding the quoted variants
+   (`ssh *'sudo *`, `ssh *"sudo *`, `ssh *sudo -n *`) plus a targeted ask rule for the
+   privileged invocation; all are `ask`, never `allow`. `Bash(ssh * virsh *)` carried the
+   IDENTICAL latent gap; it was flagged-not-fixed at discovery (hard rule 1) and then
+   **FIXED 2026-07-26 under operator direction** (commit `6d43619`, quoted variants added).
+   **MEASURED RESULTS** -- capture `docs/audit/d137-location-listing-20260726.txt` (a
+   `stat` listing; the tier-2 capture cited here previously is a checker VERDICT file and
+   contains none of these values -- a GA-R1 rule 2 defect found by the committee and
+   corrected in this commit). Region secrets dir: `admin.apikey`, `admin.pass`, `db.pass`,
+   `lxd-trust.pass` (0600) -- precisely the SEC-020(i) carve-out list. Netbox dir:
+   `admin.pass`, `api.token`, `secret_key` (0600). SEC-022 shadow stores confirmed. The
+   claim that **"ZERO undeclared files remain, so SEC-020/SEC-022 are fully accounted
+   for" is WITHDRAWN** -- it rested on a site-blind check (see the committee block below).
+   **INFERRED-FILENAME MISS (hard rule 2), corrected count:** the session first reported
+   SIX; the committee measured **~21**, because only the rows the sweep physically touched
+   were re-measured. `.maas.cli` was itself never measured and is WRONG -- the MAAS snap
+   CLI stores its profile at `~/snap/maas/current/.maascli.db` (measured this session).
+   Matrix 77 rows at that point. The 9 findings then reported were true so far as they
+   went, but the run that produced them is superseded below.
+   **COMMITTEE AUDIT 2026-07-26 (6 independent read-only lenses: correctness, coverage,
+   claim-verification, ruling-fidelity, record-integrity, Roosevelt-transfer). VERDICT:
+   the register's DESIGN holds, but TIER 2's VERDICTS ARE NOT TRUSTWORTHY as delivered and
+   this document overstated what was verified.** Every defect below was REPRODUCED, and
+   FOUR lenses converged independently on the first one.
+   *Superseding figures (these are current; earlier figures in this entry are history):*
+   matrix **77 rows**, creds-matrix harness **35/35**, creds-audit **13/13**, gauntlet
+   **ALL GREEN (80)**. The earlier "14 rows NOT JUDGED" was from the unprivileged run; the
+   privileged run reports **2**. The widened sprawl glob is `*.pass`, not `admin.pass`.
+   *Confirmed false greens (a real missing or misplaced credential passes a green sweep):*
+   (1) **tier 2 is SITE-BLIND** -- `observed`/`declared` are keyed by host-role only, so a
+   file in the wrong site's folder satisfies the row; this masked SEC-021's `opnsense-api.txt`
+   on-disk absence, so **"SEC-021's on-disk half REPRODUCED" is corrected to the power-key
+   artifacts ONLY**; (2) `probe_remote` reports UNREACHABLE for a location it successfully
+   read (empty-but-readable dir, or absent literal-file path), which gates the whole role
+   and converts every absence FAIL at that role into an `[ok]`; (3) literal-file locations
+   get no absent/unreadable detection at all -- the T33 fix covered only `dir/*` patterns;
+   (4) an empty locations file bypasses ruling 3's refusal and affirms existence over zero
+   locations; (5) no non-empty floor -- a 0-row matrix passes every check; (6) a mint-ref
+   pointing at a directory crashes with exit 1, indistinguishable from findings, and S5/S6/S7
+   never run; (7) `E2 MODE` is custody-gated so 43 of 77 rows are never mode-checked;
+   (8) S5's dc1->dc0 direction is untested -- deleting it leaves the harness green (the
+   in-repo both-bounds precedent, in the symmetry check itself).
+   *Also outstanding:* ruling 4's SEC-009 demotion is NOT done and its stated trigger
+   (tier 2 built) has passed; the 12-column amendment is recorded in no D-numbered surface;
+   `sec-ref` mis-attribution recurs (both `juju-maas-user` rows cite SEC-020; correct is
+   SEC-018/-019); the libvirt SSH power password (standing rotation obligation,
+   `reenroll-hosts.sh:22-25`) has no row; and T24 asserts literal finding strings, so
+   remediating the ruling-5 conflation would turn the GAUNTLET red -- the test punishes the
+   fix it exists to protect. Remediation is IN PROGRESS under operator direction
+   ("Do as many as you can autonomously"); this block is the authority on what is fixed.
+   **REMEDIATION COMPLETE 2026-07-26 (phases 1-3), capture
+   `docs/audit/d137-tier2-postcommittee-20260726.txt`** (supersedes the pre-committee
+   privileged capture, whose verdicts predate the site-scoping fix and are NOT comparable).
+   ALL EIGHT false greens are FIXED and individually regression-locked; harness
+   **44/44** (was 35), creds-audit **15/15**, gauntlet **ALL GREEN (80)**, repo-lint 0-fail.
+   **PROOF THE SITE FIX WORKS: `E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: dc0-edge-api 'opnsense-api.txt'`
+   now appears.** That on-disk absence was masked in EVERY prior run, so **SEC-021's
+   on-disk half is NOW genuinely reproduced in full** (the earlier withdrawal stands as
+   history). The ~21 inferred filenames were re-measured against their mint-refs (octavia's
+   8 real basenames + its three SUBDIRECTORIES, which the bare `~/octavia-pki/*` pattern
+   matched none of; vault's `init.txt`; the tenant rows' `<client>-` instance prefix, now
+   supported by a placeholder matcher); `sec-ref` mis-attributions corrected (both
+   `juju-maas-user` rows SEC-020 -> SEC-018/-019; tfstate SEC-009 -> none); `admin.pass`'s
+   mint-ref moved from the consumer (`:452`) to the mint (`:450`); the libvirt power
+   password and `vault-ca-root` added as rows. Matrix **81 rows**. Findings 35 -> **13, all
+   TRUE**: SEC-021 (3x S2 + 3x E1), 3x S5 power-key asymmetry, the ruling-5 conflation, one
+   SEC-022 shadow-store gap, SEC-024, and 2 rows disclosed as UNCHECKABLE.
+   **NEW EXPOSURE FOUND BY THE FIXED CHECKER -- SEC-024 OPENED:**
+   `opentofu/terraform.tfstate.backup` is mode **0664** (group- and world-readable) and
+   carries the Office1 MAAS API key in plaintext per DOCFIX-175; the live state file is
+   correctly 0600. Invisible to every prior control because the world-readable check was
+   custody-gated and the siblings were undeclared. **REMEDIATED 2026-07-26 (mode):** operator-approved `chmod 600` on
+   `terraform.tfstate.backup` and `.pre-G16-20260721`, read-back verified -- all four state
+   files now 0600 and the E2 finding cleared. **SEVERITY CORRECTED first:** the row's
+   original "group- and world-readable" overstated it -- `opentofu/` is 0700 and `~` is
+   0750, so no other account could traverse to it, and neither file is git-tracked, so
+   SEC-004 was never implicated. It was defence-in-depth, not live exposure. **The RETENTION
+   question is RULED 2026-07-27 (GA-R5). Question as presented: whether to delete both
+   `pre-*` state-surgery snapshots (cleanest, closes SEC-024 fully), keep both and let P5
+   keep watching them, or keep `pre-G6` and delete `pre-G16`; noting both gates are CLOSED,
+   both carry the MAAS API key in plaintext per DOCFIX-175, and deletion is irreversible
+   with no other copy of that pre-surgery state. Operator answer, exact utterance: "Keep
+   both".** So `terraform.tfstate.pre-G6-20260719` and `.pre-G16-20260721` are RETAINED as
+   the only record of what the state looked like before the two direct tfstate edits; both
+   are 0600 and neither is git-tracked. SEC-024 stays OPEN as a standing WATCH rather than
+   an open remediation: its mode defect is remediated, but the umask CAUSE was out of ruled
+   scope, so a future apply may rewrite 0664 -- P5 is the detection. The key reaching state
+   files in plaintext at all remains DOCFIX-175, rotation owed under SEC-018/-019.
+   **STILL OUTSTANDING (not done, not silently dropped):** ruling 1's TIER 2 remote `Pn`
+   (tier 1 + tier-2-local ARE wired -- see the tier-2 gate block below); `--render`'s
+   source-field derivation and the manifest flip to generated output; and the `cardinality`
+   field remains largely inert with a one-token S5 bypass (`per-DC` -> `singleton`).
+   (A dangling fragment here, left by an earlier edit in this same session, was repaired at
+   session close -- noted rather than silently fixed, since CURRENT-STATE is the status
+   authority and its defects are worth seeing.)
+   **CONSOLIDATION BATCH EXECUTED 2026-07-27** (operator question: is there a consolidated set
+   of login creds on vcloud for every account that exists; operator direction after the audit:
+   "clear the whole consolidation batch first"). Capture
+   `docs/audit/creds-consolidation-audit-20260727.txt`; detail
+   `docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260727-creds-consolidation.md`. Superseding figures: matrix **82 rows**,
+   creds-matrix harness **60/60** (was 56; V2 had shipped with ZERO cases), creds-audit
+   **CLEAN on all three sites**, gauntlet **ALL GREEN (81)**, repo-lint 0-fail, findings
+   **13 -> 7**. **VERIFIED POSITIVE, both previously only asserted:** the MAAS account set is
+   COMPLETE -- all 6 accounts enumerated live (`maas admin users read`) are accounted for
+   (`admin` + `operator` passwords on vcloud, `juju-vr1-dc0/dc1` random+unstored BY RULING
+   with their API keys present, `MAAS`/`maas-init-node` MAAS-internal) -- and tier-3 V1 now
+   MEASURES `maas-admin-password` byte-identical to the headend source-of-record, so the
+   stale-trap risk SEC-020 records is clear as of this date. DONE: dc0's SEC-012 power key
+   consolidated to vcloud + `.pub` DERIVED (SEC-021(b) as written; measured first --
+   the headend `maas-virsh_ed25519` and the snap's `id_ed25519` are the SAME key, it IS
+   dedicated (distinct from the dc0 service key), and dc0 using the snap default identity is
+   SEC-016's ruled design, so NO re-mint and no live power path touched); dc1 svc `.pub`
+   backfilled to the headend; NetBox web-GUI `admin` password consolidated (**SEC-025 OPENED**
+   for the at-rest exposure the copy creates -- open rows **20 -> 21**); V2 taught the
+   ruled-deferral state so SEC-006's standing "revoke at completion of this deployment" ruling
+   is ACKNOWLEDGED (still naming the credential as live and exposed) instead of failing every
+   run -- reissuing it would have CONTRAVENED that ruling. Tier 3 is not in preflight P5, so
+   the blocking gate's behaviour is unchanged. **RESIDUAL 7 findings, expected, NOT green:**
+   dc0-edge-api x2 (the `opnsense-api.txt` re-mint is a live edge mutation, deliberately
+   EXCLUDED from the batch -- sole remaining SEC-021(a) item), S5 x3 (RULED by SEC-016, the
+   register needs a ruled-exception mechanism -- operator decision), S6 conflation x1 (the
+   SEC-020 defect), E4 uncheckable x2 (Stage-5/6 rows). **NEW FINDINGS LOGGED NOT ACTIONED:**
+   (i) NO registered root/console credential at EITHER DC edge -- measured absence of row,
+   manifest entry and SEC row; what those passwords ARE is UNKNOWN and deliberately unprobed
+   (hard rule 2), vector is the LAN-reachable GUI + serial console, not SSH (key-only, proven);
+   (ii) two structural blind spots that let (i) hide -- S5 compares only `cardinality=per-DC`
+   while all six `per-site` rows are office1-only, and `vm-secret-locations` declares no
+   `rack`/`edge`/`cloud`/`unit`/`client` location though the checker accepts them (SEC-015 was
+   rack-resident, so the class is real). The lesson generalises D-137's founding argument one
+   level up: absence of a ROW is invisible to the register, so enumerating what EXISTS is a
+   distinct control from auditing what is declared.
+   **QUEUED FINDINGS CAPTURED 2026-07-26 at session close:
+   `docs/audit/queued-findings-20260726.txt`** -- an end-of-session sweep for content that
+   existed ONLY in the session transcript. Part A: the three secrets-storage items NOT
+   already repo-carried (Tang/Clevis as the no-HSM unseal mechanism; **MAAS 3.7's Vault
+   integration MEASURED `status: disabled`**, with the MAAS/Vault circular dependency that
+   must be designed around before enabling it on bare metal; a Vault SSH CA to retire the
+   static keypairs) plus sequencing advice -- framed so a future session does not re-propose
+   what D-068's analysis and D-137 item 2(a) ALREADY carry. Part B: ten committee findings
+   ACKNOWLEDGED but deliberately NOT acted on, the most consequential being that `mint-ref`
+   line pins rot SILENTLY (S4 checks existence and EOF, never content, so every pin becomes
+   wrong-but-passing when the runbooks are rewritten for Roosevelt) and that ruling-5
+   REMEDIATION and ruling-5 EVASION are indistinguishable to S6. Part C: items deferred by
+   ruling, recorded so they are not later mistaken for oversights. NONE of it is ruled or
+   built; `cardinality` (B6) needs an operator ruling.
 
 ## 9. Additional defect found while authoring (FIXED in sweep Batch 0.3,
 2026-07-19 -- wrap-aware exclusion, GA-F15; history below)
diff --git a/docs/D-137-implementation-plan.md b/docs/D-137-implementation-plan.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..125385a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/D-137-implementation-plan.md
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+# D-137 implementation plan -- credential matrix build spec
+
+**Status of this document.** Build spec for D-137, ADOPTED 2026-07-26 with all five
+sub-rulings recorded. `docs/design-decisions.md` D-137 is the ruling authority; this file
+is the executable detail. Written 2026-07-26 so the build survives a fresh session --
+the design originated in a plan file outside the repo, which the GA-R4 bookend path would
+not surface. Precedent: `docs/D-068-vault-migration-plan-draft.md`.
+
+**NOTHING IN HERE IS BUILT YET.** No matrix file, no checker, no `--render`, no preflight
+`Pn`, no SEC-009 demotion.
+
+## Why (the short version)
+
+`creds-audit` is DECLARATION-based: the manifest IS the declaration, so an undeclared
+secret is structurally invisible. It reported CLEAN on 2026-07-15 while four region-VM
+secrets minted 2026-07-13 sat undeclared; `admin.pass` surfaced 12 days later only
+because someone looked (SEC-020). The operator's insight closed the other half: **a
+discovery sweep can never detect a credential that was never minted at all** -- absence is
+invisible to discovery. Hence a forward EXPECTED-state register (the matrix), reconciled
+against measured state.
+
+## The five ruled decisions (authority: D-137 Status block)
+
+1. **Enforcement = blocking in preflight.** The check runs as a new `Pn` in
+   `scripts/preflight.sh` and HARD-FAILS (exit 1) on expected-but-absent, undeclared, or
+   per-DC-asymmetric credentials. No PreToolUse guard. Advisory was rejected as the
+   posture that demonstrably failed.
+2. **Manifests are DERIVED from the matrix.** Matrix is single source; `--render`
+   regenerates `creds-manifests/*.manifest`; the gauntlet FAILS if checked-in differs from
+   rendered. ACCEPTED COST: manifests become generated, so their governance prose (SEC
+   linkage, mint dates, off-manifest carve-outs, un-consolidated findings) must become
+   MATRIX FIELDS or be regenerated into the rendered header -- it must not be dropped. That
+   prose is load-bearing; `vr1-dc1.manifest:18-20` is what recorded the dc0 backfill debt.
+3. **`--remote` is bounded to declared locations.** New `creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations`
+   (`<host-role> <path>`); never walks outside it. No tenant surface, D-069 preserved.
+   The list MUST include (faithful-implementation note in the ruling): per-site creds
+   folders on the jumphost AND the headend (SEC-022 shadow stores), the region's
+   `/root/maas-secrets/` (SEC-020), and the three dirs outside the SEC-009 convention
+   (the Vault init dir, the Octavia PKI dir, the per-tenant dirs -- capture FINDING 2),
+   plus `overlays/octavia-pki.yaml` in the clone. Adding a row is DoD for any new mint site.
+4. **D-137 is the policy authority.** SEC-009's convention block demotes to a POINTER;
+   the ledger returns to being purely an exposure/rotation register. The demotion MOVES
+   the rule text -- SEC-009's founding history (the NetBox-token miss) stays as history.
+5. **Identity folded in.** Invariant: **one identity serves one principal type.** The
+   `principal` column enforces it -- a credential serving both `human` and `service` is a
+   FAIL. Absorbs the SEC-020 conflation question; no separate D-number.
+
+## Matrix schema (logical keys ONLY -- SEC-004, repo is currently PUBLIC)
+
+`creds-matrix.tsv`, positional records in the manifests' idiom (do NOT invent a format
+language; `scripts/site-ssh-config.sh:44-50` uses the same shape):
+
+    id | cardinality | site-key | host-role | filename | access-type | principal | custody | mint-stage | mint-ref | sec-ref | notes-ref
+
+Whitespace-separated positional records -- the same shape `creds-audit.sh:49` already
+reads, which is what "the manifests' idiom" means; the file is column-aligned for human
+review and NO FIELD MAY CONTAIN WHITESPACE. `#` comments and blank lines ignored; `-`
+means not-applicable. The doc renders the columns pipe-delimited for readability only.
+
+- `cardinality`: `singleton` | `per-site` | `per-DC` | `per-node` | `per-tenant`.
+  REQUIRED for Roosevelt transfer -- without it the matrix cannot express "9 nodes".
+- `site-key`: region-qualified ONLY (`vr1-dc0`), bare `dc0` REJECTED -- import the
+  discipline at `scripts/lib-net.sh:160-162` / `lib-hosts.sh:153-155`.
+- `host-role`: role token (`jumphost`, `headend`, `rack`, `edge`) -- NOT `voffice1` or an
+  IP. This still expresses "the copy is on the wrong role" without publishing topology.
+- `access-type`: `gui` | `api` | `ssh` | `cli-profile` | `console` | `none`.
+- `principal`: `human` | `service`. Ruling 5's invariant keys off this.
+- `mint-ref`: MUST admit THREE provenance kinds -- `script:line`, `runbook:step`, and
+  `operator-terminal`. Capture FINDING 1: `ssh-keygen` returns ZERO hits repo-wide, so 12
+  declared secrets have NO mint command; those rows are the DEBT the matrix exists to
+  surface and must be admitted, not treated as parse errors.
+- NO grants, hostnames, IPs, or values (ruling: logical keys only).
+
+### AMENDMENT 2026-07-26 -- 10 columns -> 12; rows keyed by (credential, location)
+
+Operator-approved 2026-07-26 ("go with the 12-column amendment") after a read-first
+round-trip check of the three manifests against the 10-column schema found it could not
+carry what ruling 2 forbids dropping. This is ruling 2 being IMPLEMENTED, not departed
+from -- its own words are that the prose "must become MATRIX FIELDS". OPS under GA-R3
+(mechanism detail of an adopted decision, no Roosevelt-delta of its own); D-137's five
+sub-rulings are untouched and remain the authority.
+
+**A row is one (credential, location) pair, not one credential.** A credential with
+copies in several places gets one row per place, sharing an `id`. This was already
+`host-role`'s stated intent ("expresses that the copy is on the wrong role") and it is
+what makes the SEC-020 stale-trap machine-checkable: tier 3 cannot compare digests across
+hosts without knowing which locations hold the same `id` and which one is authoritative.
+
+**`custody`** (NEW) -- `consolidated` | `source-of-record` | `off-manifest-known` |
+`not-consolidated-ruled`. A four-token logical enum, NOT the "custody detail" the original
+bullet excludes: no paths, no hostnames, no holders. It exists because ruling 3 puts
+`/root/maas-secrets/` and the headend shadow stores INSIDE `--remote`'s declared
+locations, so `creds-audit.sh:63-67`'s undeclared-file check will visit four credential
+copies that are deliberate, reasoned decisions and report every one as UNDECLARED:
+  - the Juju client credential store copies of both DCs' `maas-api-key.txt`
+    (`vr1-dc0.manifest:27-28`, `vr1-dc1.manifest:34-35`; also SEC-018);
+  - the MAAS snap copy of the dc1 power key (`vr1-dc1.manifest:27-28`; also SEC-016);
+  - `voffice1:/root/maas-secrets/{admin.apikey,db.pass,lxd-trust.pass}`, ruled
+    not-consolidated with per-file reasons (`vr1-office1.manifest:24-27`; SEC-020(i)).
+Without the column the checker either fails forever on settled questions or the decisions
+get deleted to silence it. `source-of-record` additionally carries SEC-020's ruling that
+the REGION copy of the `admin` password is authoritative and the jumphost copy is the
+working copy -- the fact the stale-trap warning depends on.
+
+**`notes-ref`** (NEW) -- an `id`-keyed pointer into `creds-matrix-notes.md`, or `-`.
+Free text lives THERE, never in the TSV, so the TSV stays logical-keys-only and greppable.
+`--render` emits the referenced note as the manifest comment above its row, which is how
+ruling 2's "regenerated into the rendered header" obligation is met for per-row prose.
+Load-bearing content this preserves: mint dates; the not-reproducible debt on the 12
+`operator-terminal` rows; format specifications used for verify-by-format (e.g. the
+`admin` password's 28 chars, alphanumeric, NO trailing newline); and the reason text on
+every `not-consolidated-ruled` / `off-manifest-known` row.
+
+**Knowledge-loss qualifier (measured, do not overstate the gap).** Most of this prose is
+ALREADY duplicated in `docs/security-ledger.md` -- SEC-018 carries the Juju-store copy,
+SEC-020 carries source-of-record, the stale-trap warning, and all three carve-out reasons.
+The real defect the two columns fix is that the CHECKER had no machine-readable field for
+facts that are otherwise well recorded, not that the facts were about to be lost.
+
+## Checker: `scripts/creds-matrix.py`
+
+Model on `scripts/provider-bundle-check.py` -- the repo's canonical declarative gate:
+expectations as top-of-file constants keyed by a region-qualified slug, `--dc` selector
+with a safe default, `oks`/`fails` accumulators, `[ok]`/`[FAIL]` lines, ONE verdict line,
+`return 1 if fails`, and checks that SELF-SKIP with an explicit ok when a precondition is
+absent (`:281`) rather than silently passing -- needed for sites not yet deployed.
+
+Import the BOTH-BOUNDS discipline from `netbox/sandbox-fidelity-check.py:131-143`, which
+records the identical false-green in-repo: *"EXPECTED_NEW was an upper bound masquerading
+as an assertion. It must be BOTH bounds."* A credential matrix has the same failure mode
+one level up: enumerate no sites -> nothing undeclared -> false CLEAN. Reuse its four-way
+drift vocabulary -- MISSING / UNEXPECTED-EXTRA / EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT / FIELD DRIFT.
+Provenance drift is a FIELD mismatch, not a presence mismatch.
+
+### Three tiers, increasing cost
+
+1. **STATIC** (offline, gauntlet): matrix parses; every row has a manifest row; rendered
+   manifests == checked-in (ruling 2); every `script:line`/`runbook:step` `mint-ref`
+   resolves to a real location; per-DC rows are SYMMETRIC; principal invariant (ruling 5).
+2. **EXISTENCE** (local + remote, preflight `Pn`): every expected credential present at
+   the expected host-role with expected mode; nothing undeclared at any declared location
+   INCLUDING remote ones (ruling 3).
+3. **VALIDITY** (stage close, `--probe`): provenance digests match across hosts; per-row
+   behavioral probes where defined. Motivated by: `creds-audit` PARSES provenance and
+   NEVER verifies it (`fsrc` used only in the MISSING message), so the SEC-020 stale-trap
+   warning is unchecked today.
+
+## Hard constraints inherited
+
+- **Metadata only, enforced by source-grep.** `tests/creds-audit/run-tests.sh:90-92` fails
+  on any `cat|head|tail|less|more|od|xxd|hexdump` in the audit source. Remote provenance
+  verification MUST compare `sha256sum` digests over ssh -- never transfer content. A new
+  checker should carry the same guard test.
+- **Gauntlet registration is pure glob** over `tests/*/run-tests.sh`
+  (`scripts/run-tests-all.sh:22`); only `tail -1` is shown, so the LAST line must
+  self-describe. Failure-detail excerpting matches `^\s*(FAIL|\[XX\]|MISS|LEAK|COUNT)` --
+  it does NOT match `[FAIL]`, which is why creds-audit failures currently surface with no
+  detail. Lead detail lines with bare `FAIL`.
+- **preflight** aggregation is `note $?` worst-exit (1 dominates 2 dominates 0); add one
+  banner + one call honouring the 0/1/2 contract.
+- **repo-lint L1**: new `design-decisions.md` text must be pure ASCII. **L10**: any commit
+  touching `docs/audit/`, a `**Status:` line, or a gate row must touch CURRENT-STATE in the
+  SAME commit.
+- Harness style: mutation-of-a-real-artifact fixtures + `rc` AND output-regex assertions,
+  one case per invariant, each named for the real defect it encodes
+  (`tests/provider-bundle-check/run-tests.sh`).
+
+## Files
+
+NEW: `creds-matrix.tsv`, `creds-matrix-notes.md` (the 2026-07-26 amendment's `notes-ref`
+target), `creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations`, `scripts/creds-matrix.py`,
+`tests/creds-matrix/run-tests.sh`.
+MODIFY: `scripts/preflight.sh` (new `Pn`), `scripts/creds-audit.sh` (`--all`, `--remote`,
+VERIFY provenance, widen sprawl globs -- currently miss `admin.pass`, `*.apikey`, `*.key`,
+`*.pem`, `*_ed25519`, `admin-openrc`), `creds-manifests/*.manifest` (become generated),
+`docs/security-ledger.md` (SEC-009 demotion per ruling 4), `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` (C1).
+
+## Verification / acceptance
+
+- `bash tests/creds-matrix/run-tests.sh` -- every invariant FAILS when violated.
+- **ACCEPTANCE TEST:** `scripts/creds-matrix.py --all` must reproduce SEC-021/-022/-023 and
+  the openrc case as NAMED failures on today's tree. A checker that goes green on the
+  current tree is wrong.
+  - **Tier boundary (clarified 2026-07-26; corrected after the matrix was seeded).**
+    SEC-022 and SEC-023 are pure EXISTENCE failures needing tier 2's remote reads across
+    three sites. **SEC-021 SPLITS across the tiers:** its DECLARATION asymmetry -- dc1
+    declares an edge API credential and a jumphost-consolidated power key, dc0 declares
+    neither -- is caught at TIER 1 by the per-DC symmetry and manifest-coverage checks; only
+    its on-disk absence needs tier 2. So tier 1 + its harness partially satisfies the
+    acceptance test and must be reported that way -- neither as fully satisfying it nor as
+    unable to touch it.
+  - **The `admin-openrc` case resolves to BOTH readings, which are complementary.**
+    `~/admin-openrc` is PREDICTED, not present: `phase-03-admin-openrc.sh` runs at Stage 5,
+    not yet reached. So it is (a) a matrix row whose `mint-stage` is in the future, which
+    the checker reports as not-yet-expected via the explicit-skip-with-`[ok]` pattern
+    (`provider-bundle-check.py:281`) rather than a silent pass, AND (b) a harness fixture
+    proving the widened sprawl glob CATCHES it when it does appear. Build both.
+- `bash scripts/run-tests-all.sh` ALL GREEN; `bash scripts/repo-lint.sh` 0-fail;
+  `bash scripts/preflight.sh` exercises the new `Pn`.
+
+## EXPECTED RED BY DESIGN -- do not "fix" by weakening the check
+
+The first full run SHOULD fail, and these are the defects, not bugs in the checker:
+- `admin` serves a `human` GUI row AND a `service` api row -> ruling-5 invariant FAIL.
+  Remediation is the `operator`/`admin` split already begun 2026-07-25, i.e. migrate the
+  19 `maas admin` call sites to a service identity.
+- 27 rows carry `mint-ref=operator-terminal` (the plan's original figure of 12 counted
+  only FINDING 1's declared secrets; the delivered matrix admits every undocumented mint) -> reproducibility debt to convert.
+- SEC-021 (dc0 `opnsense-api.txt` ABSENT; power-key name/host divergence), SEC-022
+  (headend shadow stores), SEC-023 (sprawl blind spots + predicted `~/admin-openrc`).
+
+Going green is a REMEDIATION project separate from the build. Do not scope-creep it into
+the build; land the checker red, record the failures, then gate remediation per row.
+
+## Fresh-session start
+
+1. Normal bootstrap: `git pull`, `bash scripts/repo-lint.sh`, read
+   `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` in full, then `docs/session-ledger.md` +
+   `bash scripts/ledger-scan.sh`.
+2. Read `docs/design-decisions.md` D-137 (the ruling authority -- all five sub-rulings and
+   their verbatim operator selections), then this file.
+3. Read the research capture `docs/audit/creds-creation-points-20260725.md` -- it is the
+   matrix SEED (55 MINT sites classified by host, destination, stage, human/service).
+   **55 mint SITES is not 55 rows** (clarified 2026-07-26): A1/A10 are generator helpers,
+   not credentials; A21-A25 are flagged in the capture itself as the SAME set as A11-A14
+   ("do not double-count"); B30 is explicitly not a mint; A8+A9 are one credential minted
+   then retrieved; and `per-tenant`/`per-node`/`per-cluster` sets collapse to ONE row under
+   `cardinality`. Conversely the materialization ruling ADDS rows the inventory excluded as
+   MATERIALIZE (the Keystone `admin` password, `~/admin-openrc`), and the 12 no-mint
+   declared secrets of FINDING 1 are rows with `mint-ref=operator-terminal`. Derive the row
+   set from credential IDENTITY; never transcribe the table 1:1.
+4. Build tier 1 first (offline, no live access needed), harness it, then tier 2, then tier 3.
diff --git a/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260723-caveman-optin-guard.md b/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260723-caveman-optin-guard.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b328c98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260723-caveman-optin-guard.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# Changelog -- 2026-07-23 -- caveman plugin: off-by-default opt-in guard
+
+Session scope: operator-directed install of the `caveman` Claude Code plugin
+(third-party, `JuliusBrussee/caveman`) plus guards so it never auto-arms while
+operating the cloud. Harness-config only -- NO cloud mutation, NO script/runbook
+change, no status implication (CURRENT-STATE untouched). Kept as an available
+tool for future hardened-workflow deployment testing, where terse
+gated-approval-only output is wanted; verbose fully-gated output stays the
+default for live operations.
+
+## Item 1 -- caveman plugin installed (user scope), hooks inspected read-only
+
+- Installed `caveman@caveman` at user scope (`~/.claude/plugins/`, git SHA
+  `0d95a81`) via `claude plugin marketplace add` + `claude plugin install`,
+  per operator instruction. Purpose: terse "caveman-mode" output (~65% fewer
+  output tokens, per its README).
+- Both auto-wired hooks read in full before trusting them (this host holds
+  cloud credentials + reaches juju/MAAS/OpenStack, so a plugin's hooks are a
+  supply-chain surface): `src/hooks/caveman-activate.js` (SessionStart) and
+  `src/hooks/caveman-mode-tracker.js` (UserPromptSubmit). Finding: purely
+  behavioral -- NO network calls, NO credential-file access, NO exfiltration;
+  the only subprocess spawned is the plugin's own stats script, and only on an
+  explicit `/caveman-stats`. Default mode is `full` (auto-arms on session
+  start unless guarded) -- the reason for item 2.
+- **Revert:** `claude plugin uninstall caveman@caveman`; remove the
+  `extraKnownMarketplaces.caveman` + `enabledPlugins."caveman@caveman"` keys
+  from `~/.claude/settings.json`.
+
+## Item 2 -- opt-in guard: CAVEMAN_DEFAULT_MODE=off (repo + user scope)
+
+- Repo `.claude/settings.json`: added an `env` block setting
+  `CAVEMAN_DEFAULT_MODE=off` -- committed, so the intent is durable/shared for
+  this operating clone. Effect: `getDefaultMode()` returns `off`, the
+  SessionStart hook skips activation and clears any stale flag; an explicit
+  `/caveman lite|full|ultra` still activates on demand. `jq` valid, repo-lint
+  0 fail / 1 legacy warn (unchanged).
+- User `~/.claude/settings.json`: same `env` entry added so the plugin is
+  off-by-default in ALL of the operator's repos, not just this one (the plugin
+  is installed user-wide; its bare default is `full`). This file is OUTSIDE the
+  repo -- NOT committed here; recorded for provenance only.
+- Verified `off` is a valid mode (`VALID_MODES` in the plugin's
+  `caveman-config.js`), so the guard is honored rather than silently ignored.
+- **Revert:** remove the `env.CAVEMAN_DEFAULT_MODE` key from whichever
+  settings.json (repo revert via `git revert <sha>` for the committed one; hand
+  edit for the user-level one). With the plugin still installed, removing the
+  guard restores its `full` auto-arm default.
diff --git a/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260723-stage4-open.md b/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260723-stage4-open.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5901d3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260723-stage4-open.md
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+# Changelog -- 2026-07-23 -- Stage 4 open: discovery + D-133 carve ruling
+
+Session scope: open Stage 4 (Phase 3, MAAS enlist/commission/deploy per DC) on
+branch `dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy` off post-merge `main`. Bootstrap ran
+clean (pull up-to-date at bff71d4; repo-lint 0 fail / 1 legacy warn; ledger-scan
+reconciled -- 12 open SEC rows, D next-free 133). No cloud mutation this session
+yet; everything below is read-only measurement + repo records.
+
+## Item 1 -- Stage 4 OPENED: precondition + discovery (read-only), captured
+
+- Branch `dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy` created off `main` (bff71d4).
+- Runbook Step 0 precondition PASS: both DC rack controllers enrolled
+  (vvr1-dc0 `7chphy`, vvr1-dc1 `nmpcq4`).
+- Step 2 discovery complete for BOTH DCs, all read-only, captured to
+  `docs/audit/stage4-discovery-20260723.txt`: 9 nodes per DC, ALL Ready,
+  power=virsh; dc0 = boot fabric-4 / MACs 52:54:00:*, dc1 = fabric-142 /
+  pinned 52:54:01:d1:*; zone/pool `default` everywhere (no zone/pool
+  convention exists -- fabric + MAC prefix is the grouping signal).
+  Also captured: one dc0 node's full physical NIC list (6 flat per-plane
+  NICs), `default_distro_series=noble`, and the synced boot-resources list
+  (noble ONLY -- no jammy images on the region).
+- Runbook-vs-reality deltas recorded in CURRENT-STATE (the runbook predates
+  Stage 3's execution): Step 3 commissioning already satisfied; carve comes
+  BEFORE deploy per the runbook's own Ready-state sequencing note; gap #6
+  (pod-discovery landing status) is moot -- the pod path was refuted 2026-07-20.
+- **Revert:** `git branch -D dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy` (after moving off
+  it); delete `docs/audit/stage4-discovery-20260723.txt`; revert the
+  CURRENT-STATE Stage-4 bullet. No live state was touched.
+
+## Item 2 -- D-133 ADOPTED: flat per-NIC carve (VR1); hardware-faithful NIC topology next deployment
+
+- New entry `docs/design-decisions.md` D-133 [ARCH], Status ADOPTED 2026-07-23,
+  operator utterance quoted verbatim per GA-R5 ("Fine, keep it flat but on the
+  next deployment we need to build the VMs with exact hardware duplicated
+  networking so we can work out any bonding/trunking kinks.").
+- Part 1: VR1 DC nodes carve every plane FLAT on its dedicated NIC; no
+  VLAN-103 stack in VR1 (supersedes the D-052-era Pattern A shape for VR1 DC
+  nodes only; VR0 untouched).
+- Part 2 (pinned to next deployment): node VMs duplicate target hardware's
+  exact NIC topology (bond members, trunks) -- composes with D-132.
+- Affected-surfaces list recorded IN the entry (buildout-design VID-103 text,
+  workflow Stage 4 row, phase3 runbook Step 5 tree, lib-net vr1-dc0 arm's
+  inherited METAL_INTERNAL_VID) -- queued as this stage's DOCFIX/delivery work,
+  not silently edited.
+- CURRENT-STATE section 1 updated in the same commit (GA-R1 C1): Stage 4 OPEN
+  bullet with discovery facts + the open decision points (deploy OS series,
+  octet plan, mirror gap #5, tag shape).
+- **Revert:** remove the D-133 block from design-decisions.md and the Stage-4
+  bullet from CURRENT-STATE.md (single commit; `git revert <sha>`).
+
+## Item 3 -- D-134 ADOPTED: per-role octet bands for VR1 DC node statics
+
+- New entry `docs/design-decisions.md` D-134 [ARCH], ADOPTED 2026-07-23.
+  Sequence per GA-R5: the flat .40-.48 proposal was presented and REJECTED
+  ("Different band"); operator directed "Per role bands with headroom. Give me
+  a recommendation"; the recommended band table was presented with measured
+  collision checks (bundle VIPs .50-.60 grep, 10.12.12.4, FIP pool, D-120
+  dynamic range) and adopted ("Adopt as recommended").
+- Bands: .1-.9 infra (.4-.9 utility-reserved), .10-.19 control, .20-.49
+  compute, .50-.99 formal VIP band, .100-.200 dynamic (D-120), .201-.254
+  storage. One octet per node across all six planes, both DCs; VR1
+  assignments control .10-.12 / compute .20-.21 / storage .201-.204 keyed by
+  tofu node name via pinned boot MAC.
+- CURRENT-STATE Stage-4 bullet updated in the same commit (octet plan RULED;
+  carve now unblocked on D-133 + D-134).
+- **Revert:** remove the D-134 block + the CURRENT-STATE bullet edit
+  (`git revert <sha>`).
+
+## Item 4 -- D-134 AMENDED: contiguous band table (Option B swap)
+
+- Operator rejected the original table's interleaving (node roles split by the
+  VIP + dynamic blocks); movability analysis presented (pinned: .1/.2/.3 live,
+  .50-.60 bundle VIPs, FIP rows 1-3 on provider; movable: the D-120-inherited
+  dynamic range). Option B ruled: nodes get the contiguous .100-.200 run
+  (control .100-.119 / compute .120-.149 / storage .150-.200), dynamic moves
+  to .201-.254, utility .4-.49, VIP .50-.99.
+- VR1 assignments now: control .100-.102, compute .120-.121, storage
+  .150-.153 (identity table unchanged -- tofu name via pinned boot MAC).
+- Consequence queued: the dc0/dc1 metal-admin dynamic-range MOVE is the
+  carve's first gated live mutation per DC (before static assignment; nodes
+  powered off). Office1's own D-120 ranges untouched.
+- CURRENT-STATE Stage-4 bullet updated same-commit.
+- **Revert:** remove the amendment block + CURRENT-STATE edit
+  (`git revert <sha>`); no live state touched yet.
+
+## Item 5 -- Approvals workflow: session-log-keyed permission rules (operator-directed)
+
+- Operator directed session-length approvals mid-carve (manual mode was
+  prompting per command; the earlier auto-mode classifier BLOCKED the first
+  mutation outright -- the known dc1-session behavior, ledger 2026-07-23).
+- `.claude/settings.local.json` (uncommitted, personal): ADDED allow
+  `Bash(script -aqe ~/as-executed/2026-07-23-stage4-carve.log -c *)` (the
+  logged-window wrapper -- inherently session-scoped, the rule names this
+  window's log file) + ask rule keeping `maas admin machine *` shapes
+  (commission/deploy) prompting inside that same wrapper. PRUNED seven dead
+  rules keyed to retired log files (2026-07-21-ops-commissioning-diag,
+  2026-07-22-dc1-deploy).
+- FLAGGED for stage close, not acted on: local allow list carries a broad
+  `Bash(ssh *)` from a prior session -- prune candidate.
+- Review surface stays the as-executed log + this changelog (GA-R2
+  blanket-approval precedent).
+- **Revert:** remove the two added rules from settings.local.json (file is
+  local-only, not committed).
+
+## Item 6 -- Stage 4 carve EXECUTED, both DCs (logged window stage4-carve)
+
+- All mutations in ~/as-executed/2026-07-23-stage4-carve.log (per-command
+  wrap; helper scripts' full content logged verbatim before first use).
+  Verification capture: `docs/audit/stage4-carve-verify-20260723.txt`.
+- Set 0: dc0+dc1 metal-admin dynamic ranges MOVED to .201-.254 in place
+  (iprange ids 2/3; office1 id 1 untouched) -- the D-134-amendment
+  consequence, done before statics.
+- Set 1: 10 named plane fabrics created (vr1-dc0-* ids 188-192 / vlans
+  5189-5193; vr1-dc1-* ids 193-197 / vlans 5194-5198).
+- Set 2: 90 NIC re-homes, one node per approval-unit, read-back each: every
+  non-boot NIC moved from its private auto-fabric to its plane fabric;
+  boot NICs stay fabric-4 (dc0) / fabric-142 (dc1). MACs matched
+  config-of-record pins throughout.
+- Set 3: provider subnets 10.12.4.0/22 + 10.12.64.0/22 MOVED off shared
+  fabric-5 to their per-DC provider fabrics (+ ruled gateways .1); 8 plane
+  subnets CREATED (dc0 12/16/32/36, dc1 72/76/80/84).
+- Set 4: 6 spaces created (bundle binding names verified against
+  bundle.yaml first); 12 untagged VLANs assigned (metal-admin = the two
+  boot fabrics). Office1/transit subnets remain in `undefined` untouched.
+- Set 5: 18 nodes' statics per D-134-amended assignments (control
+  .100-.102, compute .120-.121, storage .150-.153, same octet all six
+  planes) -- five raw-NIC statics + br-ex (OVS, Pattern A) carrying the
+  provider static, provider NIC left raw (D-100). All nodes remain Ready.
+- Residue NOT touched (flagged): fabric-5 still holds 192.168.1.0/24
+  (factory-LAN residue, both edges re-addressed) and the now-empty
+  ex-provider fabric-5 itself; the ~90 empty auto-created fabrics
+  (fabric-98..187 class) also remain -- cleanup candidates, gated
+  separately at stage close, zero functional impact.
+- **Revert:** MAAS-record-level; reverse order: unlink statics + delete
+  br-ex per node, delete the 8 created subnets, move the 2 provider subnets
+  back to fabric-5, unassign spaces + delete the 6 spaces, re-home NICs to
+  auto-fabrics (or delete the 10 named fabrics after), move dynamic ranges
+  back to .100-.200. Nodes were powered off throughout; no OS-level state
+  exists to revert.
+
+## Item 7 -- Deploy-model ruling + DOCFIX-200 + jammy sync + placement tags
+
+- **RULING (operator: "Ready + jammy images (Recommended)"):** Stage 4 ends
+  with nodes READY + carved + tagged; MAAS-deploy is SKIPPED -- Juju
+  provisions Ready machines at Stage 5 and requests the bundle's
+  `default-base` (ubuntu@22.04). The phase3 runbook's Step 4 as written
+  (`maas machine deploy` per node) contradicted phase-01's own precondition
+  ("machines Ready/power=off") and would have made all 18 nodes
+  un-allocatable to Juju. [OPS -- encoded in the proven phase-01 precedent;
+  no D-number.]
+- **DOCFIX-200:** `runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md` Step 4
+  rewritten (tag + base-image sync, nodes STAY Ready; ruling quoted),
+  sequence table line + GATE "Nodes deployed" bullet corrected against
+  the buildout-design wording.
+- **Jammy images:** boot-source selection id=2 (ubuntu/jammy amd64) created
+  on source 1 + import triggered; `ubuntu/jammy` reads Synced (re-verify at
+  close while sub-resources finish).
+- **RULING (operator: "Adopt per-DC tags (Recommended)"):** deploy-placement
+  tags are region-qualified per-DC -- `openstack-vr1-dc0` /
+  `openstack-vr1-dc1` (D-119 naming), applied 9+9, add=9/remove=0 both.
+  Stage 5's per-DC bundle parameterization constrains on them.
+- **RULING (operator: "Build the mirror now"):** the D-107 per-DC artifact
+  mirror gets BUILT in-stage (rehearsal exception REJECTED); Stage 4's
+  mirror gate bullet stays OPEN until it exists and nodes' reachability is
+  verified. Design presented as its own decision (D-135 candidate).
+- Queued findings: `phase-00-maas-standup.sh`'s hardcoded PLANES table
+  asserts the VR0 VLAN-103 shape and would false-DRIFT against the ruled
+  D-133 flat carve (Step 8 satisfied instead by the spaces cross-check in
+  the carve capture); Step 7's edge-NTP check text is superseded by the
+  D-129(iv) ruling (MAAS hierarchy stays time authority; nodes measured
+  NTP-ing to their rack during Stage 3 commissioning).
+- **Revert:** runbook edits `git revert`; tags
+  `maas admin tag update-nodes <tag> remove=...` x9 + tags delete;
+  boot-source-selection delete id=2 (images age out).
+
+## Item 9 -- INCIDENT (resolved): dc1 edge passed NO LAN traffic -- pf ruleset never regenerated
+
+- Found at the dc1 mirror install: apt through the edge timed out. Measured
+  chain: rack default route present, edge LAN gw ping 0%, internet 100% loss;
+  `pfctl -s nat` on the dc1 edge showed ZERO outbound NAT rules while dc0's
+  edge (identical config -- both carry the single WAN_GW gateway_item) showed
+  the full automatic set. Root cause: the fresh dc1 edge's pf ruleset was
+  NEVER REGENERATED after v4 addressing -- `opnsense-set-interface-v4
+  --commit` runs `configctl interface reconfigure` but NOT a filter reload.
+  dc0 was masked: its 07-20 plugin/qga work triggered filter reloads as a
+  side effect. My dc0-only egress probe earlier this session was wrongly
+  taken as covering dc1 (symmetry inference -- owned).
+- Fix (minimal, logged): `configctl filter reload` on the dc1 edge -> NAT
+  rules present, rack egress 0% loss / HTTP 301 -- identical to dc0.
+- QUEUED: appendix-A entry (symptom: LAN clients of a freshly-addressed DC
+  edge get 100% loss with reachable gateway; check `pfctl -s nat`); DC-standup
+  DoD addition (filter reload + LAN-client egress probe after edge
+  addressing); candidate opnsense-set-interface-v4 amendment (add the filter
+  reload) -- a built-surface change, presented at stage close, not slipped in.
+- **Revert:** n/a (the reload materializes the edge's own committed config).
+
+## Item 10 -- dc-mirror installed BOTH racks; syncs RUNNING; HOME fix (harness 19)
+
+- dc0: install pass-1 net layer up -> apt debmirror/nginx/ubuntu-cloud-keyring
+  -> install PASS (15 checks; mirror answers http://10.12.8.4/ 200).
+- dc1: same, after the item-9 incident fix (install PASS; http://10.12.68.4/
+  200).
+- First sync attempt FAILED both debmirror runs: "HOME not defined in
+  environment!" under systemd's empty env (debmirror needs a GPG home).
+  Fixed in gen_sync_unit (`Environment=HOME=/root`), harness case T19 added
+  (19/19), REINSTALLED both racks (config-diff regeneration path exercised),
+  syncs restarted: both RUNNING and downloading (dc0 400M / dc1 343M within
+  the first minute). Daily timers enabled.
+- Mirror gate remains OPEN until: initial syncs complete (last-sync.status
+  OK) + mirror serves a real node (node-side probe at Stage 5 first boot or
+  a gated rescue-boot check). Stage 4 close blocks on the mirror gate per
+  the operator's build-now ruling.
+- **Revert:** `systemctl stop/disable <site>-mirror-sync.timer + -net.service`,
+  rm the generated files, `rm -rf /var/lib/dc-mirror`, apt remove the three
+  packages; the edge filter reload stands (item 9).
+
+## Item 11 -- Delivery batch: lib-hosts VR1 arms, D-133 guards, appendix-A, DoD
+
+- **lib-hosts.sh VR1 arms POPULATED** (the runbook's standing delivery item):
+  vr1-dc0/vr1-dc1 blocks with tofu-name-keyed HOSTS, D-134-amended octets,
+  config-pinned boot MACs, per-DC power URIs (ruled step-D shape), per-DC
+  tags; NEW `host_sysid_by_bootmac()` (the VR1 resolver -- MAAS hostnames are
+  random and re-minted; MACs survive re-enlistment); one-selection-per-shell
+  guard (lib-net precedent). dc-selector harness rewritten for the populated
+  arms + identity/guard cases: 48 checks PASS.
+- **D-133 guards:** `reenroll-hosts.sh` + `carve-host-interfaces.sh` now
+  REFUSE vr1-* explicitly (VR0 flows: hostname-keyed re-enroll / Pattern-A
+  VLAN-103 carve, both superseded for VR1) -- without the guard, populated
+  VR1 arms would have let VR0 mechanics run against VR1 fleets. Harnesses
+  updated to the refusal messages. Gauntlet **ALL GREEN (77)** after.
+- **lib-net vr1-dc0 arm:** D-133 caveat comment -- inherited
+  METAL_INTERNAL_VID/IFACE are VR0 carve artifacts; never consume for VR1.
+- **appendix-A:** new entry for the edge-pf symptom (LAN 100% loss, gateway
+  fine, `pfctl -s nat` empty; masking trap named). **DoD:** items 8 (filter
+  reload + LAN egress probe) and 9 (dc-mirror install/sync) added; item 4's
+  dynamic-range position corrected to the D-134-amended .201-.254.
+- **Revert:** `git revert <sha>` (repo-only; no live state).
+
+## Item 8 -- OWNED: pipe-masked L10 lint FAIL on the D-135 commit (abd6b92)
+
+- The D-135 commit changed a design-decisions Status line WITHOUT
+  CURRENT-STATE in the same commit (GA-R1 C1 / lint L10) and shipped anyway:
+  my lint invocation piped through `tail`, masking the nonzero exit --
+  the EXACT defect the 2026-07-23 queue-pass session owned same-hour
+  yesterday. Repeated; owned.
+- Repair: this commit carries the owed CURRENT-STATE update (post-carve
+  rulings + D-135 + refreshed NEXT line). Practice fixed in-session: lint
+  exit now checked via PIPESTATUS, never inferred from tail output.
+- **Revert:** n/a (repair commit).
diff --git a/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260724-caveman-disable.md b/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260724-caveman-disable.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b0c5d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260724-caveman-disable.md
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+# Changelog -- 2026-07-24 -- caveman plugin: disable on live host + governance + guardrails
+
+Session scope: acting on a 4-seat council review of the third-party `caveman`
+Claude Code plugin (installed + off-by-default-guarded 2026-07-23, commit
+338c919). Operator accepted the review recommendations (exact utterance: "I'll
+accept your recommendations"). Harness-config + repo-governance only -- NO cloud
+mutation, NO runbook change. CURRENT-STATE deliberately untouched (adding a SEC
+row is not an L10 trigger; the G14 open-SEC count reconciles at Stage 4 close --
+see item 2). Council finding that drove the disable: `enabled:true` runs
+third-party `node` on every session start + every prompt REGARDLESS of
+`CAVEMAN_DEFAULT_MODE=off` (the env guard gates arming/terse-output, not hook
+execution), and the plugin's own honest docs put net token savings at
+break-even-to-negative on this host's gated-approval workload -- so a standing
+per-turn execution surface on a credential-bearing jumphost was not worth
+carrying.
+
+## Item 1 -- caveman DISABLED on the live host (enabled:false, both scopes)
+
+- `~/.claude/settings.json` (user scope, authoritative for vcloud):
+  `enabledPlugins."caveman@caveman"` flipped `true` -> `false`. Stops the
+  SessionStart + UserPromptSubmit hooks from wiring at the next session start.
+- `/home/jessea123/openstack-caracal-dc-dc/.claude/settings.json` (committed
+  repo scope): added `enabledPlugins {"caveman@caveman": false}`. Project scope
+  outranks user scope (Local > Project > User), so this is a fail-closed,
+  travels-with-the-clone off-switch across the operator's workstations --
+  mirrors the dual placement used for the env guard.
+- `CAVEMAN_DEFAULT_MODE=off` retained in both files as a residual layer; the
+  `extraKnownMarketplaces.caveman` entry RETAINED (plugin stays installed) so a
+  deliberate re-enable for hardened-workflow deployment testing remains cheap.
+- Verified: both settings.json parse (`jq`); user + repo
+  `enabledPlugins."caveman@caveman"` = `false`; no `~/.claude/.caveman-active`
+  flag (not armed). repo-lint 0 fail / 1 legacy warn (unchanged).
+- **Revert:** set both `enabledPlugins."caveman@caveman"` back to `true`
+  (repo copy via `git revert`/edit; user copy by hand). Note: re-enabling
+  re-incurs the SEC-017 re-verify duty.
+
+## Item 2 -- SEC-017 opened (supply-chain re-verify obligation)
+
+- Added row **SEC-017** to `docs/security-ledger.md` (next-free by grep;
+  highest prior = SEC-016). Records the standing third-party per-turn
+  code-execution surface, its point-in-time benign verdict at SHA `0d95a81`,
+  the not-declaratively-pinnable caveat, the disable disposition, and the
+  STANDING DUTY to re-verify the hooks on any re-enable or plugin update.
+- Register call = OPS (no D-number): fails GA-R3's Roosevelt-delta / A1 grep
+  test (no bare-metal analog of a jumphost output-style plugin); precedent
+  D-129 (OPS plugin-install stays OPS). The SEC row is the durable home the
+  security-ledger mandate requires ("a row at discovery, never only a note") --
+  the prior changelog (338c919) is GA-R2 non-citable/archive-bound, so the
+  posture had no durable home before this.
+- Count: open SEC rows 12 -> 13. This is NOT an L10 status-couple trigger
+  (L10 fires on docs/audit/*, design-decisions Status lines, and session-ledger
+  gate rows -- not security-ledger.md), so CURRENT-STATE is untouched; the G14
+  count reconciles at Stage 4 close per its existing deferral pattern.
+- **Self-measured drift baseline (sha256, 2026-07-24; executing cache copy ==
+  git clone at `0d95a81`, only a `.in_use` runtime marker differing):**
+  - `src/hooks/caveman-activate.js`        `bc0af3ba327657630e5f6c60be619e6b5394bf03edc29b1384a15f09a1b348bf`
+  - `src/hooks/caveman-mode-tracker.js`    `3e34f004d4a9e65609f8c95b47dfe5f0e3a6f2d16b88c7f8af730187ee2fb246`
+  - `src/hooks/caveman-config.js`          `f47fe2e6440578eeb20408bc3131b63fb8e1ae4f6ea26dbdcca33e7901e5ee8c`
+  - `src/hooks/caveman-stats.js`           `433a345a279c2d54be51864ef77c0a7b19d0f8604b9a441ce0a1eded31f113e8`
+  - `src/hooks/cavecrew-model-overrides.js` `9f2601e8551653609f0b9d700c9bd75bffa43747d2db18ffe83fb73de5dc3607`
+  - `.claude-plugin/plugin.json`           `b76999bd244fa59c2b8805b1c2b573458e2d065b58e5904fc8e9e545e3dac7a6`
+- **Revert:** delete the SEC-017 row from `docs/security-ledger.md`
+  (`git revert <sha>` for the commit).
+
+## Item 3 -- guardrails: repo-lint L11 + fail-closed compress prohibition
+
+Council-reviewed guardrail set. (a) a repo-lint hash-baseline of the plugin
+files was REJECTED (layering violation -- the plugin lives outside the repo
+under `~/.claude`, non-portable across workstations, and duplicates the
+plugin's own `checksums.sha256`; drift-on-update belongs in the SEC-017
+re-verify duty, not repo-lint). Built (b) and (c):
+
+- **(b) repo-lint L11 -- caveman-compress residue detector.** `scripts/repo_lint.py`
+  gains L11: FAIL on any `*.original.md` in the tree (the backup signature of a
+  lossy in-place `/caveman-compress` rewrite). Excludes `.git`, `.claude`
+  worktrees, `.terraform`, `__pycache__` (reuses the `all_text()` skip set);
+  opt-out marker `repo-lint: allow-original-md` per the L9 convention. Docstring
+  catalog + `repo-lint.sh` header updated L1-L10 -> L1-L11. Harness
+  `tests/repo-lint/run-tests.sh` gains T42 (residue FAILS), T43 (opt-out
+  suppresses), T44 (worktree excluded): **45/45 PASS** (was 42). It is a
+  POST-HOC detector (the original is already overwritten when the backup
+  exists) -- it complements, not replaces, (c).
+- **(c) fail-closed compress prohibition.** Mechanism measured read-only:
+  `/caveman-compress <file>` is a SKILL that mutates by running
+  `python3 -m scripts <file>` from the skill dir (in-place overwrite +
+  `<name>.original.md` backup). Two layers added: (1) `.claude/settings.json`
+  `deny` rules `Bash(*python3 -m scripts*)` + `Bash(*caveman-compress*)` --
+  verified no legit repo usage collides (the strings appear only inside
+  `repo_lint.py`'s L11 text, never in an executed argv); (2) a CLAUDE.md
+  "Tooling guardrails" section prohibiting the compressor against ANY
+  repo-tracked prose file, scoped to the whole record corpus (not a 4-file
+  hand-list, which would rot). Note the pre-existing `Skill(*)` ask rule already
+  gates the skill invocation itself; the deny is the fail-closed backstop that
+  does not depend on that routing.
+- Net enforcement stack: plugin DISABLED (item 1) is primary; `Skill(*)` ask +
+  the compress `deny` gate invocation; L11 catches residue; CLAUDE.md is the
+  human-readable rationale.
+- Verification: `jq` valid; all touched files ASCII/LF; repo-lint 0 fail / 1
+  legacy warn; `bash scripts/run-tests-all.sh` -> **GAUNTLET: ALL GREEN
+  (77 harnesses)**.
+- **Revert:** `git revert <sha>` -- removes L11 (+ its 3 harness cases), the two
+  `deny` rules, and the CLAUDE.md section together.
+
+---
+
+(Session continued into the VR1 DC-mirror work -- distinct topic, same session, so
+per GA-R2 it lands in this one changelog.)
+
+## Item 4 -- DC1 debmirror PAUSED; bandwidth measured NOT the bottleneck
+
+- Operator asked to pause one sync so a single mirror completes before tomorrow,
+  on the premise the two syncs share the vcloud uplink. PAUSED dc1 (live):
+  `systemctl stop dc1-mirror-sync.service dc1-mirror-sync.timer` on the dc1 rack;
+  debmirror killed (0 procs), held at **329.9 GiB** (resumable; status left stale
+  "RUNNING"). Timer stopped so it cannot auto-restart and re-contend.
+- MEASURED result: pausing dc1 did NOT speed dc0 up -- solo dc0 averaged ~37 GiB/h
+  vs ~35 GiB/h while contended. So the vcloud uplink is NOT the binding
+  constraint (it is per-connection/per-file, dominated by universe's small-package
+  tail). The pause neither helped nor hurt dc0; dc0 is on track (~70% at
+  2026-07-24T15:35Z, ETA ~this evening UTC). This finding fed the DC1 decision
+  (item 5): rather than idle dc1, switch it to a caching proxy.
+- **Revert:** resume dc1's full sync -- on the dc1 rack:
+  `systemctl daemon-reload && systemctl start dc1-mirror-sync.service dc1-mirror-sync.timer`
+  (debmirror resumes from 329.9 GiB, skipping downloaded files).
+
+## Item 5 -- DC1 interim apt caching proxy: D-135 amendment + dc-cache-proxy.sh
+
+- **D-135 AMENDED 2026-07-24 (GA-R5, operator utterance quoted in
+  design-decisions.md):** DC1 gets an INTERIM apt caching proxy to unblock its
+  build now; DC0 stays the full-mirror deployment under test; DC1 proxy REPLACED
+  by a full mirror afterward. Both artifact-delivery models exercised this
+  rehearsal (Roosevelt input, D-132/D-133). The paused dc1 debmirror (~330 GiB)
+  is KEPT dormant as the fallback, not deleted.
+- **Shipped `scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh`** (site-keyed check/install; apt-cacher-ng
+  in proxy mode at the D-134 utility `.4:3142`, consumed via
+  `juju model-config apt-http-proxy=http://<LISTEN>:3142`; caches archive +
+  security + UCA with no per-repo remap). REUSES the `<site>-mirror-net.service`
+  net layer (does not re-create it; fails loud if absent, pointing at dc-mirror.sh).
+  Feasibility recon confirmed read-only first: apt-cacher-ng installable
+  (`3.7.4-1ubuntu5.24.04.1`), all three upstreams 200 via the edge, port 3142 free.
+- **Harness `tests/dc-cache-proxy/run-tests.sh`** (15 static cases: syntax, both
+  sites' utility .4 + ruled edge gw, stable-identity keying, port pin, proxy-mode
+  consumption, archive+UCA smoke coverage, net-layer reuse, MEASURED-tag
+  discipline, arg/site validation) -- **15/15 PASS**.
+- CURRENT-STATE Stage-4 narrative updated (DC0/DC1 artifact-path split). repo-lint
+  0 fail / 1 legacy warn; `bash scripts/run-tests-all.sh` -> **GAUNTLET: ALL GREEN
+  (78 harnesses)** (was 77; +tests/dc-cache-proxy).
+- Live install on the DC1 rack (`apt-get install apt-cacher-ng` + `dc-cache-proxy.sh
+  install dc1`) DONE + verified 2026-07-24 (gated): apt-cacher-ng
+  `3.7.4-1ubuntu5.24.04.1` active on `.4:3142`, drop-in matches, net layer present,
+  **check PASS 8/8 -- proxy serves archive (200) AND UCA caracal (200)** (UCA cached
+  with no remap, as expected in proxy mode). NOTE: the DC1 rack reports a pending
+  kernel reboot (running 6.8.0-134 vs installed -136) -- pre-existing, deferred to a
+  maintenance window (a reboot would disrupt the paused mirror).
+- **Revert:** `git revert <sha>` (removes the script, harness, D-135 amendment
+  paragraph, and CURRENT-STATE split); if installed live, on the dc1 rack:
+  `systemctl disable --now apt-cacher-ng; rm -f /etc/apt-cacher-ng/acng.conf.d/dc1-cache-proxy.conf`.
+
+## Item 6 -- phase-4 runbook: per-DC MAAS service-credential step (Step 2.0)
+
+- Operator-directed: the MAAS API key Juju needs is created by NO prior stage --
+  a standing DEPLOYMENT-TIME task, so it belongs in the runbook. Added **Step 2.0**
+  to `runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md` (before the bootstrap MUTATION):
+  create a DEDICATED per-DC MAAS admin service user (`sudo maas createadmin`) +
+  issue its own API key (`sudo maas apikey --generate`) -- per-DC credential
+  isolation (SEC-012/-016; Roosevelt: per-DC cloud creds), never a cross-DC reuse.
+- **Creds location corrected (operator-directed):** the key stages in the JUMPHOST
+  per-site creds folder (`~/vr1-<dc>-creds/maas-api-key.txt` on vcloud, SEC-009
+  convention) -- NOT a new location on the region (voffice1) as the first
+  walkthrough had it. Generated FROM the jumphost so it transits ssh stdout with
+  no persistent copy on the region; never printed (SEC-006); consumed by Juju via
+  path/stdin, never argv. Each issued key = a per-DC SEC rotation row.
+- Revert: `git revert <sha>` (removes Step 2.0). No live/cloud state touched.
+
+## Item 7 -- Per-DC MAAS service credentials created (SEC-018/-019) [CLOUD MUTATION, driven]
+
+- Executed phase-4 Step 2.0 for both DCs (operator: "You drive it"), logged
+  window `~/as-executed/2026-07-24-dc-maas-creds.log`. Passwordless sudo on
+  voffice1 confirmed; `maas createadmin --password` supported (read-only precheck).
+- Created dedicated MAAS superusers **`juju-vr1-dc0`** and **`juju-vr1-dc1`**
+  (random passwords generated ON the region, UNSTORED -- Juju auths via the API
+  key), and staged each user's API key into the vcloud per-site folder:
+  `~/vr1-dc0-creds/maas-api-key.txt` and `~/vr1-dc1-creds/maas-api-key.txt` (0600).
+  Keys generated FROM the jumphost (no persistent region copy), verified by
+  FORMAT ONLY (both parts=3, 70 chars), never printed. Result fail=0.
+- **SEC-018** (dc0 key) + **SEC-019** (dc1 key) opened -- per-DC rotation
+  obligations (open SEC 13 -> 15; reconciled at Stage 4 close per the G14 pattern).
+  as-executed index entry added (log itself stays uncommitted, secret-adjacent).
+- Revert: on voffice1 `sudo maas apikey --username=juju-vr1-dc0 --delete=<key>`
+  (+ dc1) and `sudo maas deleteuser juju-vr1-dc0` (+ dc1); `shred -u` the two
+  vcloud key files; `git revert <sha>` for the SEC/index/changelog rows.
+
+## Item 8 -- dc1 VIP overlay drafted (overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml)
+
+- Operator OK'd the overlay approach (vs editing bundle.yaml in place). Drafted
+  `overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml`: re-homes the 11 API-service VIPs from bundle.yaml's
+  vr1-dc0 bands into vr1-dc1's MEASURED bands (lib-net vr1-dc1 PLANE_NAME):
+  provider-public 10.12.4 -> 10.12.64, metal-admin 10.12.8 -> 10.12.68,
+  metal-internal 10.12.12 -> 10.12.72; host octets .50-.60 unchanged. Base
+  bundle.yaml stays the vr1-dc0 source of truth; overlay applied only for the dc1
+  deploy (`juju deploy ./bundle.yaml --overlay ./overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml`).
+  YAML valid (11 apps), repo-lint 0 fail.
+- Revert: `git revert <sha>` (removes the overlay). No live/cloud state.
+
+## Item 9 -- Juju client setup on voffice1 (cloud + credentials) [client config, not a cloud mutation]
+
+- **Juju client location = voffice1** (operator-ruled after reconsideration): the
+  Office1 headend has a Roosevelt analog and D-128 runs MAAS-facing work there so
+  runbooks read "from the headend"; vcloud (substrate host) has no Roosevelt
+  analog, so driving the cloud from it would not transfer. Juju 3.6.25 (3/stable,
+  matches VR0 + the bundle's Juju 3.6 target) installed on voffice1; removed from
+  vcloud.
+- `juju add-cloud --client vr1-maas` -- the ONE Office1 MAAS region
+  (type=maas, endpoint `http://10.10.0.20:5240/MAAS`). `juju add-credential`
+  both DCs: `vr1-dc0-cred` + `vr1-dc1-cred` from the staged keys, piped
+  vcloud->voffice1 into a home-dir yaml (snap can't read /tmp), never printed,
+  `shred -u`'d. Juju credential store on voffice1 now holds runtime copies (noted
+  on SEC-018/-019; canonical files stay on vcloud). Credentials validate at
+  bootstrap (juju does not pre-validate).
+- Two snap gotchas measured + worked around: the juju snap has a private /tmp
+  (stage bundle/overlay/cred files under $HOME); voffice1 ssh sessions have
+  per-session /tmp. Both relevant to the deploy steps.
+- Revert: `ssh voffice1 'juju remove-credential vr1-maas vr1-dc0-cred; juju
+  remove-credential vr1-maas vr1-dc1-cred; juju remove-cloud --client vr1-maas'`;
+  `git revert <sha>` for the SEC/changelog rows.
diff --git a/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260724-stage5-committee-fork1.md b/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260724-stage5-committee-fork1.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c465909
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260724-stage5-committee-fork1.md
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+# Session changelog 2026-07-24 -- Stage-5 bundle-render committee + Fork-1 ruling
+
+Branch `dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy`. Session resumed the DC1 Stage-5
+bundle-rework blocker under a committee review (operator-requested). Status lives
+ONLY in `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` (GA-R1); this changelog is the review surface --
+each item states what / why / revert. No cloud state was mutated this session.
+
+## Item 1 -- Committee record (Track 2 bundle render)
+
+**What:** new `docs/audit/committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.md` -- a 4-lens
+(Roosevelt-delta / HA-DR / operational-risk / Juju-MAAS-mechanism) read-only
+committee review of the vr1-dc1 deploy-artifact render, with the adjudication and
+open operator decisions. Advisory/audit record; adopts nothing (GA-R5).
+**Why:** operator: "Deploy a committee to review Track 2 and provide
+recommendations based on overall end project goals and decisions already
+researched." Durable, citable authority (commissioning-committee precedent).
+**Revert:** `git rm docs/audit/committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.md`.
+
+## Item 2 -- Capacity gate capture (Fork-1 option a)
+
+**What:** new `docs/audit/stage5-controller-capacity-20260724.txt` -- captured
+`scripts/dc-dc-whole-host-budget.py` runs: baseline built layout 3+2+4 x2 DC =
+838/1024 GiB (82%, FIT); +controller (+8 GiB/+4 vCPU per-DC containment overhead)
+= 854/1024 GiB (83%, FIT, 170 GiB headroom). Read-only calculator; nothing
+queried live.
+**Why:** GA-R1 -- the Fork-1 (a) capacity claim must be MEASURED, not inferred
+(the signed doc's 790/77% is the OLD 8-node layout). Gate = PASS.
+**Revert:** `git rm docs/audit/stage5-controller-capacity-20260724.txt`.
+
+## Item 3 -- D-104 amendment (Fork-1 ruling: dedicated 10th controller VM)
+
+**What:** appended a D-104 amendment (2026-07-24) in `docs/design-decisions.md`
+recording the operator's GA-R5 ruling -- the per-DC Juju controller is a DEDICATED
+10th node VM (distinct tag `juju-controller-vr1-dc1`, no role tag), separate from
+the 9 Option C role nodes; additive (`for_each`-keyed); capacity gate PASS
+(cites item 2); the 9-node D-121 layout is unchanged.
+**Why:** Fork 1 was the blocking architectural decision; operator selected
+"Dedicated 10th VM (Recommended)" over shrink-a-role and co-locate. Controller
+placement is D-104's subject; recorded as its amendment (not a new D-number).
+**Revert:** delete the "### D-104 -- AMENDMENT (2026-07-24)" block in
+`docs/design-decisions.md` (git range-diff of this commit).
+
+## Item 4 -- CURRENT-STATE Stage-4 bullet update (GA-R1 / C1)
+
+**What:** rewrote the Stage-4 bullet's render sub-bullets: committee-adjudicated;
+Fork 1 RULED (a) + capacity gate; Fork 2/3 as OPS committee-unanimous
+recommendations (gated at execution); BUNDLEFIX-052 fixed; a corrected NEXT list.
+Also corrected an earlier inaccurate characterization (dc-ha-scaleup is not "stale
+ceph-osd 3" -- it deliberately excludes ceph-osd) and the "consumes 1 of 9"
+arithmetic (now a dedicated 10th VM).
+**Why:** GA-R1/C1 -- a status-changing commit updates CURRENT-STATE in the SAME
+commit (repo-lint L10). Status authority stays single-sourced.
+**Revert:** restore the prior Stage-4 bullet text (git range-diff of this commit).
+
+## Item 5 -- BUNDLEFIX-052: ceph-rbd-mirror duplicate `bindings:`
+
+**What:** removed an orphaned 4-space-indented `bindings:` block in `bundle.yaml`
+(old line ~907) that `yaml.safe_load` take-last had absorbed into `ceph-rbd-mirror`,
+clobbering its real `ceph-local`/`ceph-remote` (replication) + `nrpe-external-master`
+bindings (D-108/D-052) and injecting a phantom `dashboard` binding (a charm with no
+such endpoint) -> `juju deploy` validation reject.
+**Why:** confirmed pre-existing latent defect (committee mechanism lens; verified
+via `yaml.safe_load`). Fork-independent; fix now so the dc1 render starts clean.
+**Validation:** `yaml.safe_load` confirms `ceph-rbd-mirror.bindings` restored to
+`{'': metal-admin, ceph-local: replication, ceph-remote: replication,
+nrpe-external-master: metal-internal}`; `provider-bundle-check.py bundle.yaml` PASS.
+**Revert:** re-insert the orphan block after the vault-hacluster comment (not
+advised -- it is the bug).
+
+## Item 6 -- provider-bundle-check.py: overlay merge + per-DC VIP bands + placement invariants
+
+**What:** extended `scripts/provider-bundle-check.py` with (a) `--overlay FILE`
+(juju-like merge, so the checker validates the EFFECTIVE deploy input), (b) `--dc
+vr1-dc0|vr1-dc1` selecting expected VIP bands (default dc0 = base bundle, so an
+un-parameterized run is byte-identical to before), and (c) placement invariants that
+activate ONLY on a role-separated bundle (machines tagged control/compute/storage)
+and self-skip on the base/un-rendered bundle: no dangling `to:`; LXD containers on
+control, ceph-osd on storage, nova-compute on compute; each num_units>=2 app spread
+across that many DISTINCT machines (anti-affinity); ceph-osd == storage count,
+nova-compute == compute count. Dropped the "controller-tag" idea (the controller is
+the bootstrap machine, not a bundle machine -- verified at the MAAS-tagging step).
+**Why:** the committee's non-negotiable "spine" -- the checker was placement-blind,
+so any render could silently ship decorative HA. Makes the hand-render machine-checked;
+also closes the committee's dc1-VIP-outside-the-check gap.
+**Caveat (VERIFY-LIVE):** the checker's machines-block overlay merge MIRRORS juju's
+documented behavior; the actual machines-retag-via-overlay is confirmed at
+`juju deploy --dry-run` before deploy (no offline juju merger exists). Fallback if it
+does not take: inline the dc1 tags into a rendered bundle.
+**Validation:** harness `tests/provider-bundle-check/run-tests.sh` 15/15 (7 new
+behavioral cases). Gauntlet ALL GREEN (78). repo-lint 0 fail.
+**Revert:** `git checkout <this-commit>~ -- scripts/provider-bundle-check.py
+tests/provider-bundle-check/run-tests.sh`.
+
+## Item 7 -- vr1-dc1 bundle render (9-node role-separated) + retag overlay
+
+**What:** rendered `bundle.yaml` from VR0's 4-node hyperconverged layout to VR1 dc1's
+9-node role-separated one: machines block "8"-"11" (`tags=openstack`) -> "0"-"8" with
+role+DC tags (block style -- flow `{...}` would split the comma-tag); every app `to:`
+re-homed (mysql/ovn-central/ceph-mon -> control 0/1/2; nova-compute 3->2 on compute 3/4;
+ceph-osd -> storage 5/6/7/8; the 14 scaled apps -> control placeholder that the overlay
+spreads; utilities -> control); ovn-chassis MACs -> the 2 dc1 compute provider NICs.
+Rendered `overlays/dc-ha-scaleup.yaml` tokens -> logical control ids 0/1/2 (now
+DC-neutral) + updated its header + fixed the stale ceph-osd-3 comment. New
+`overlays/vr1-dc1-machines.yaml` (per-DC retag; machines-overlay merge is VERIFY-LIVE at
+`juju deploy --dry-run`).
+**Why:** the committee-adjudicated render (Fork 2 = hand-render now); unblocks the dc1
+Stage-5 deploy. Done as an asserted one-shot line-transform (preserves all D-NNN comments)
+reviewed via git diff + the validator.
+**Validation:** `provider-bundle-check.py bundle.yaml` (base standalone) PASS; the FULL dc1
+deploy input (`--overlay vr1-dc1-machines --overlay vr1-dc1-vips --overlay dc-ha-scaleup
+--dc vr1-dc1`) PASS; harness 15/15; gauntlet ALL GREEN (78); repo-lint 0-fail. The
+validator CAUGHT a real render bug (YAML flow-comma dropping the role tag) -- exactly its
+purpose.
+**Revert:** `git checkout <this-commit>~ -- bundle.yaml overlays/dc-ha-scaleup.yaml` +
+`git rm overlays/vr1-dc1-machines.yaml`.
+
+## Item 8 -- provider-bundle-check ovn-chassis role-sep branch + expansion review record
+
+**What:** (a) `provider-bundle-check.py` -- computes `role_sep` early; the ovn-chassis MAC
+check now skips the VR0 openstack0-3 Pattern-A set on a role-separated bundle (verifies
+present + well-formed instead), since dc chassis are the compute-node provider MACs.
+(b) new `docs/audit/stage5-expansion-review-20260724.md` -- three read-only reviewer
+verdicts (relations/bindings/cross-DC; config/pins; deploy-scripts), dispositioned
+(handled / follow-up / VERIFY-LIVE / resolve-before-deploy / no-change).
+**Why:** the operator-requested deployment-script expansion review; captures the
+cross-connection/pinning/gate findings durably so the Chat design session (NetBox-deploy
+coupling) reads them from the repo.
+**Validation:** harness 15/15 (T9's role-sep fixture exercises the ovn role-sep branch);
+gauntlet ALL GREEN (78).
+**Revert:** `git checkout <this-commit>~ -- scripts/provider-bundle-check.py` +
+`git rm docs/audit/stage5-expansion-review-20260724.md`.
+
+## Item 9 -- office1-netbox RECORD dumper (source separation) + current snapshot
+
+**What:** new `netbox/office1-record-dump.py` -- a dedicated READ-ONLY dumper for the
+**office1-netbox RECORD** (the VR1 working apex, `10.10.1.10:8000`, 4.6.4, v2 token),
+separate from `netbox/prod-draft-dump.py` (which pulls the FROZEN v1 reference
+`netbox.baldurkeep.com`). Operator-directed source separation ("one script per source" --
+each holds only its own credential/URL; the token never travels, read from env). Added a
+source-clarity note to `prod-draft-dump.py`'s docstring. New offline harness
+`tests/office1-record-dump/run-tests.sh` (5/5: slim / prefix-scope rewrite / range key /
+source-target). Committed the current snapshot `netbox/draft/vr1-office1-current-20260725.json`.
+**Why:** a Chat design session (NetBox->deploy coupling) has no live infra; the existing
+`vr1-draft.json` is the FROZEN reference (dated 07-15), NOT the current in-cloud state.
+This captures the live apex so Chat designs against current data. Discovery: the standard
+dump targets baldurkeep, not office1-netbox -- corrected before committing wrong-source data.
+**Validation:** dump succeeded READ-ONLY (139 prefixes / 11 sites incl. vr1-dc0/dc1/off1;
+dc1 bands 10.12.64/68/72.0/22 present -- confirms current buildout; differs from the 90-prefix
+frozen reference). Harness 5/5; nothing written to NetBox.
+**Revert:** `git rm netbox/office1-record-dump.py netbox/draft/vr1-office1-current-20260725.json
+tests/office1-record-dump/run-tests.sh` + restore `prod-draft-dump.py` docstring.
+
+## Item 10 -- dc-mirror upstream-host preference note (mirror.uoregon.edu)
+
+**What:** added an UPSTREAM HOST NOTE to `scripts/dc-mirror.sh`'s header (operator,
+2026-07-25): PREFER `http://mirror.uoregon.edu/ubuntu/` (closest/fastest for this
+deployment) over `archive.ubuntu.com` for the MAIN archive debmirror -- future change,
+NOT yet applied. Scoped: main archive only (`--host=mirror.uoregon.edu`, root stays
+`ubuntu`); the UCA cloud-archive uses a separate host uoregon does not mirror; applies
+to dc-cache-proxy.sh + the Roosevelt dedicated mirror too; verify jammy coverage before
+flipping. Header comment only -- does NOT change the generated `<site>-mirror-sync` unit.
+**Why:** operator-provided performance preference, logged for a future mirror-tuning
+session (findings LOGGED, not executed mid-step).
+**Revert:** delete the UPSTREAM HOST NOTE block in `scripts/dc-mirror.sh`.
+
+## Item 11 -- full decision reconciliation (record)
+
+**What:** new `docs/audit/decision-recon-20260725.md` -- a 4-lens read-only recon of
+every ruled IP/VLAN/node decision against the authoritative surfaces (office1-netbox
+apex snapshot, lib-net/lib-hosts, bundle/overlays, MAAS carve captures). CURRENT-STATE
+Stage-4 bullet updated (GA-R1/C1) with a pointer + the key findings + a WARNING that
+this doc's section 4 is stale.
+**Why:** operator-requested full decision recon + "what other reconciliations to queue."
+Feeds the Chat NetBox->deploy coupling design and the stage close.
+**Findings (headline):** IP prefix-layer COMPLETE + drift-free; VLANs correctly absent
+(untagged-per-fabric, D-133); GAP = sub-prefix (D-134 bands + 33 VIP addresses, in
+prose/overlays only) -- blocks the coupling. Node/MAC/power drift-free; Fork-3 tags +
+10th VM pending gated. Decision-status: STALE surfaces flagged (CURRENT-STATE section 4
+HIGH; G14 SEC 12->15; phase-4 designate) -- fixes QUEUED (operator-deferred). Recon
+backlog P0-P2 in the record; extend sandbox-fidelity-check.py first.
+**Revert:** `git rm docs/audit/decision-recon-20260725.md` + restore the CURRENT-STATE
+Stage-4 recon bullet.
+
+## Item 12 -- Ruling 1 recorded (GA-R5): address-family policy
+
+**What:** recorded the operator's 2026-07-25 address-family ruling as a dated RULING NOTE
+under `## D-101` in `docs/design-decisions.md` (verbatim question + utterance) + resolved
+the CURRENT-STATE resolve-before-deploy bullet (b). Confirms D-101's matrix; NO amendment.
+**GA-R5 record.** Question: v4-only vs dual-stack for dc1 phase-4. Operator utterance,
+verbatim: "Dual stack to be used where IPv4 is required, IPv6 where IPv6 only makes sense."
+Clarifying, verbatim: "Dual stack deployment for DC0 and DC1. This is the deployment when
+the dual-stack is added".
+**Why:** GA-R5 -- the VIP reconciliation (dependent work) is invalid until this is
+committed+pushed. Closes the v4-only phasing option for both DCs. From the Chat handoff
+pack (`_handoff-not-committed/20-ruling-records.md`, ruling 1); the verbatim was
+transcribed into durable homes (D-101 note + here) rather than left in the delete-after-use
+pack file (committee BLOCKER-1 fix).
+**Revert:** `git revert <commit>` -- deletes the D-101 ruling note + restores bullet (b).
+
+## Item 13 -- Ruling 2 recorded (GA-R5): keystone policy-override VERIFY-LIVE gate
+
+**What:** added a Stage-4 VERIFY-LIVE gate to CURRENT-STATE -- after `dc-ha-scaleup` scales
+keystone to 3, `juju status` must show `PO:` on EVERY keystone unit, never `PO (broken):`.
+**GA-R5 record.** Question: whether to add a VERIFY-LIVE gate confirming the
+`policyd-override` resource lands on every keystone unit after scale-up (a broken override
+is atomic -- the whole policy is discarded, silently reverting every tenant domain-manager
+to a plain user). Operator utterance, verbatim: "dc-ha-scaleup: Yes to the verify-live".
+**Why:** highest-consequence single check in the deploy -- it protects the SCS Domain
+Manager persona (D-051/D-064) the commercial tenant self-service model rests on, and
+failure has no other symptom. Mechanism intact at HEAD (`bundle.yaml` `use-policyd-override:
+true` + `resources: policyd-override` -> `policies/overrides.zip` 3419 bytes;
+`keystone-policy-drift.sh` byte-matches source) -- the gate confirms it SURVIVES scale-up.
+From the Chat handoff pack ruling 2; verbatim transcribed to a durable home (here), not
+left in the delete-after-use pack file.
+**Revert:** `git revert <commit>` -- removes the gate line.
+
+## Item 14 -- D-136 PROPOSED (NetBox-coupled render pipeline) + Ruling 3 recorded (GA-R5)
+
+**What:** appended D-136 (PROPOSED, [ARCH]) to `docs/design-decisions.md` register tail;
+CURRENT-STATE Stage-4 bullet updated SAME COMMIT (C1) -- bullet (c) artifact-shape, the
+coupling bullet -> "PROPOSED as D-136 / option (C)", the FOLLOW-UP gate blockers. Ruling 3
+is recorded INLINE in D-136's "Artifact shape (RULED 2026-07-25)" paragraph with the
+verbatim question + utterance.
+**GA-R5 (Ruling 3).** Question: symmetric (extract dc0 VIPs to an overlay, base VIP-free)
+vs asymmetric (dc0 v6 into base, two renderer modes)? Operator utterance, verbatim: "Your
+question about 1 or 2, go with 1. Base bundle and everything else is applied via overlay."
+Effect: symmetric per-DC overlays; bundle.yaml VIP-free; gates the dc0 VIP extraction.
+**Pack-review committee corrections folded in (2026-07-25):** verbatim inlined into durable
+homes (D-136 paragraph + here), not the delete-after-use pack file (BLOCKER-1); added the
+`VIP_OCTET_MAX=60` sibling constant + the 2nd stale `VIP_COUNT_EXPECT` site; mis-citation
+count corrected to SEVEN. **Chat correction (2026-07-25) folded in:** open question 5
+rewritten -- Jenkins IS the runner (gap VOID); real requirements are webhooks + status-back
+(unverified vs GitBucket); placement OPEN (voffice1/VR1, per-DC agents Roosevelt, D-132/D-105
+caveats); carry-forward `handoff-20260703-open-items.md:159`.
+**Why:** escalates the Fork-2 renderer deferral; scopes the sub-prefix gap fix. PROPOSED --
+operator rules the mechanism.
+**Revert:** `git revert <commit>` -- deletes D-136 + restores the CURRENT-STATE bullets.
+
+## Item 15 -- DOCFIX-201: the dual-VIP decision is D-020, not D-036 (SEVEN sites)
+
+**What:** corrected SEVEN VIP-context citations of `D-036` where `D-020` is meant
+(`## D-020: Dual provider + metal API VIPs`; `## D-036` is the magnum-capi-helm decision):
+`docs/design-decisions.md` (3: the D-121 "problem this fixes" `per D-036`, the `D-009,
+D-036` HA-scaleup table row, the References `D-036 (dual VIPs)`), `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md`
+(the vault-VIP bullet), `docs/audit/decision-recon-20260725.md` (2 backlog rows), and
+`docs/audit/stage5-expansion-review-20260724.md` (in-place with the bracketed marker
+`[corrected DOCFIX-201: D-020, not D-036]`, operator-chosen).
+**Why:** the mis-citation had spread to SIX sites (2 created by the recon itself); the 7th
+(the `D-009, D-036` table row) was caught by the pack-review committee -- the pack listed
+only 6 and its own verify count would have failed at 9. Reading the correct D-020 also
+surfaced that D-020's ratified set includes vault + excludes ceph-radosgw while the deployed
+set does the opposite (fed into D-136).
+**Verify:** `git grep -n "D-036" -- ':!docs/archive' ':(exclude)_handoff-not-committed/*'`
+-> 8 hits, all driver/chart/CAPO, zero VIP-context.
+**Revert:** `git revert <commit>` -- text-only across four files, no behavioural effect.
+
+## Item 16 -- DOCFIX-202: buildout-scope section 5 demoted to a D-111 pointer
+
+**What:** `docs/dc-dc-netbox-buildout-scope.md` section 5 presented the per-DC v6 subcarve
+(sub-decision 1) as open/un-ratified at lines 5, 132, 138 -- contradicting the ratified
+pointer already present at line 146 ("RATIFIED as D-111 (2026-07-11)"). Demoted the three
+open-framing sites to acknowledge D-111 (ADOPTED); kept the reasoning below as history.
+**Why:** `## D-111` is ADOPTED 2026-07-11 and names this exact sub-decision; the stale open
+framing misled the Chat seat 2026-07-25 (it treated the subcarve as a blocking trust gate,
+withdrawn only after reading the register). Committee-confirmed the targets; the rest of
+section 5 has no other adopted-decision contradiction.
+**Verify:** `bash scripts/ledger-scan.sh` -- D-111 not under PROPOSED/OPEN; `grep -n
+"un-ratified\|candidate D-111" docs/dc-dc-netbox-buildout-scope.md` -- no hit presenting
+the subcarve as open.
+**Revert:** `git revert <commit>` -- single-file text change, no behavioural effect.
+
+## Item 17 -- DOCFIX-203: mark D-134's superseded original band table in place
+
+**What:** added a `**SUPERSEDED ... do NOT use these bands**` marker immediately above the
+ORIGINAL D-134 band table in `docs/design-decisions.md` (control .10-.19 / compute .20-.49 /
+storage .201-.254), pointing at the authoritative 2026-07-23 AMENDMENT (contiguous: .4-.49
+utility, .50-.99 VIP, .100-.200 nodes, .201-.254 dynamic). Original kept as history.
+**Why:** the amendment header says it supersedes the original, but the original table carried
+NO in-place marker -- a reader grepping `D-134` hits the original first and gets the rejected
+bands. The Chat seat did exactly this 2026-07-25 (one read from a false discrepancy), and the
+band-modelling this coupling (D-136) must do reads these bands. Committee-confirmed.
+**Verify:** `awk '/## D-134:/,/## D-134 -- AMENDMENT/'` shows the marker before the first
+table row.
+**Revert:** `git revert <commit>` -- single text addition, no behavioural effect.
+
+## Next (not done this session; gated)
+
+Commit+push this batch (GA-R5: rulings land before dependent work). Then, each
+operator-gated: per-role MAAS tags; author + apply the 10th controller VM
+(egress OPEN); render the 9-node `bundle.yaml` (re-home base placements, re-scope
+tokens) + extend `provider-bundle-check.py` with placement assertions + wire
+overlays + de-stale phase-4 Step 4; gated `juju bootstrap` (by controller tag,
+egress OPEN) -> deploy. Deploy-time VERIFY-LIVE gates: vault-3-unit HA-on-MySQL,
+hacluster cluster_count:3, dc1 VIPs, CRUSH failure-domain=host.
diff --git a/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260725-maas-admin-recovery.md b/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260725-maas-admin-recovery.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f53e79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260725-maas-admin-recovery.md
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+# Session changelog 2026-07-25 -- MAAS admin-account recovery + creds consolidation
+
+Branch `dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy`. Operator task: "complete the recovery of
+the MAAS admin accounts ... complete password resets, and save the creds in their
+proper folders so I can retrieve them." Status lives ONLY in `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md`
+(GA-R1); this changelog is the review surface -- each item states what / why / revert.
+
+Measured evidence for every claim below:
+`docs/audit/maas-admin-recovery-20260725.txt` (42 lines, no secret values).
+
+**The task premise was FALSIFIED by measurement before any mutation.** The
+session-ledger's 2026-07-25 "IMMEDIATE NEXT" asserted MAAS web-GUI login "does NOT
+exist ... never minted; no prior task did it". It did exist: the `admin` superuser's
+password was minted 2026-07-13 by `scripts/site-headend-install.sh:452` and is
+MEASURED working (login POST 204 with the stored value, 400 with a wrong-password
+control; `has_usable_password=True`). It was merely root-only on voffice1 at
+`/root/maas-secrets/admin.pass` and never consolidated to `~/vr1-office1-creds/` --
+the SEC-009 miss class, not a missing account. Only the ledger's `juju-*` clause was
+correct. That finding was reported and the scope RE-RULED by the operator before
+execution: **"New account + consolidate only"** -- no existing password rotated.
+
+## Item 1 -- NEW MAAS superuser `operator` (live region mutation, gated)
+
+**What:** minted MAAS superuser `operator` / `jesse.austin@neumatrix.com` on the
+Office1 region for HUMAN GUI login. Password 32-char base64, generated ON vcloud
+straight into `~/vr1-office1-creds/maas-operator-password` (0600), then fed to
+`maas createadmin` over **stdin** -- never in argv, never printed, never in context.
+Verified: account present + `superuser=True`; stored password authenticates (204)
+against a wrong-password control (400).
+**Why:** operator-ruled scope. Gives a human identity distinct from the service
+identity -- until now the only usable GUI login was `admin`, which is simultaneously
+the automation identity (item 6). Note `maas changepassword` has NO `--password`
+flag and `createadmin --password` would place the secret in argv (the shape
+`site-headend-install.sh:452` uses); the stdin path satisfies the SEC-018
+"never printed/echoed/in argv" discipline and is the transferable technique.
+**Revert:** `ssh voffice1 'maas admin user delete operator'` then
+`rm ~/vr1-office1-creds/maas-operator-password` and drop its manifest row (item 3).
+
+## Item 2 -- `admin` password CONSOLIDATED to the jumphost (no rotation)
+
+**What:** copied `voffice1:/root/maas-secrets/admin.pass` ->
+`~/vr1-office1-creds/maas-admin-password` (0600, 28 bytes). Byte-identical,
+sha256-verified both ends. Value moved over ssh into the file; never printed.
+Verified the CONSOLIDATED copy authenticates as `admin` (204).
+**Why:** closes the SEC-009 miss for this secret -- it is now retrievable from the
+operator's own folder instead of being root-only on a VM. Deliberately NOT rotated
+(operator ruling), so **the VM copy REMAINS source-of-record** and the vcloud file is
+a working copy; a future `admin` rotation must update BOTH in one operation or the VM
+copy becomes a stale trap. Recorded in SEC-020.
+**Revert:** `rm ~/vr1-office1-creds/maas-admin-password` + drop its manifest row.
+No loss -- the source-of-record copy on voffice1 was never modified.
+
+## Item 3 -- `creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest`: two new declared secrets
+
+**What:** declared `maas-admin-password` (provenance
+`voffice1:/root/maas-secrets/admin.pass` -- the `<vm>:<path>` class the manifest
+format exists for) and `maas-operator-password` (`local`), with a header comment
+recording the mint mechanism, the byte format, and the still-un-consolidated
+residue (item 7).
+**Why:** the manifest is the forcing function -- an undeclared secret is exactly how
+the NetBox token went missing. Declaring makes `creds-audit` enforce presence+mode.
+**Revert:** `git checkout HEAD -- creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest`.
+
+## Item 4 -- dc0/dc1 manifest BACKFILL -> `creds-audit` CLEAN on all three sites
+
+**What:** declared the four files that were failing `creds-audit` as UNDECLARED:
+dc0 `maas-api-key.txt` + `vr1-dc0-edge_ed25519{,.pub}`, dc1 `maas-api-key.txt`.
+Provenance `local` for all four (SEC-018/019 state the API keys were generated FROM
+the jumphost so they never persisted on the region; the edge keypair likewise).
+**Why:** `creds-audit` was RED on two of three sites at session open (dc0 3 fails,
+dc1 1 fail) -- the same convention the operator's task is about, so leaving the gate
+red would have been incoherent. The dc0 edge-keypair rows were a KNOWN queued
+finding, named in `creds-manifests/vr1-dc1.manifest:18-20` ("dc0 precedent, whose
+manifest rows are a queued backfill finding") -- this closes it.
+Result: `creds-audit` CLEAN x3 (13/5/8 entries), harness 7/7.
+**Revert:** `git checkout HEAD -- creds-manifests/vr1-dc0.manifest creds-manifests/vr1-dc1.manifest`
+(returns both sites to FAIL).
+
+## Item 5 -- SEC-020 opened (register of record)
+
+**What:** new row in `docs/security-ledger.md` covering (a) the un-consolidated
+VM-minted `admin` password + the falsified "no GUI login" claim, (b) the human/service
+identity conflation that CAUSED the miss, (c) the new `operator` standing credential.
+Status: OPEN -- rotation obligation on TWO region superusers, plus three logged-not-
+actioned residues. Open SEC rows 15 -> 16.
+**Why:** ledger mandate -- every credential exposure/obligation gets a row, never
+only a comment. A new standing credential is a new rotation obligation.
+**Revert:** delete the SEC-020 row.
+
+## Item 6 -- session-ledger: falsified claim corrected + machine block re-seeded
+
+**What:** (a) struck the 2026-07-25 "IMMEDIATE NEXT" block and annotated it
+FALSIFIED + RESOLVED with what was actually true and what was done. (b) Re-seeded the
+machine-derived block from a fresh `ledger-scan.sh`: it was stale on EVERY line --
+open SEC 12 -> **16**, next-free D 133 -> **137** / DOCFIX 200 -> **204** /
+BUNDLEFIX 052 -> **053**, and D-136 was missing from the open-decision list while
+D-071/D-129 were still listed despite being ADOPTED/RESOLVED.
+**Why:** (a) GA-R1 -- a falsified claim left standing misdirects the next session,
+and this one would have sent it to create an account that already existed. (b) my
+SEC-020 changes the count that block carries, so re-seeding is required by this
+change, not added scope; the block's own rule is "regenerate, never hand-edit".
+**Revert:** `git checkout HEAD -- docs/session-ledger.md`.
+
+## Item 7 -- Findings LOGGED, not executed (hard rule 1)
+
+**What:** recorded in SEC-020, no action taken:
+- (i) `voffice1:/root/maas-secrets/{admin.apikey,db.pass,lxd-trust.pass}` remain
+  un-consolidated. `admin.apikey` deliberately NOT copied -- trivially regenerable
+  (`maas apikey --username=admin`) so a second copy is pure added surface;
+  `db.pass`/`lxd-trust.pass` are region infrastructure, outside this task's scope.
+- (ii) the DURABLE fix for the miss class is a `site-headend-install.sh` amendment to
+  consolidate at mint time (the script currently leaves all four secrets on the VM).
+  Queued, unruled -- a script change needs its harness and a ruling.
+- (iii) the human/service conflation is proposable as a D-number, [ARCH] -- still
+  UNASSIGNED after item 9 took D-137 for the credential pipeline; the two are kept
+  separate deliberately (see D-137's "Related, deliberately NOT folded in"):
+  `admin` is both the GUI login and the automation identity (its API key drives the
+  `maas admin` CLI profile across **19 call sites in 4 scripts** --
+  `site-headend-install.sh` 10, `phase-04-network-verify.sh` 5,
+  `phase-04-network-create.sh` 3, `phase-00-teardown-release.sh` 1). Roosevelt-delta:
+  per-identity MAAS separation / audit attribution on a multi-tenant cloud. NOT
+  assigned -- GA-R3 doubt-resolves-DOWN, operator's call.
+**Why:** findings are logged, never executed mid-task.
+**Revert:** n/a (records only).
+
+## Item 8 -- evidence capture
+
+**What:** `docs/audit/maas-admin-recovery-20260725.txt` -- generated, not
+hand-written: user list, Django password-state booleans, both login probes with
+wrong-password controls, the sha256 fidelity compare, file modes/sizes, `creds-audit`
+x3 + harness, and an automation-unaffected check. Machine-scanned for password bytes
+(0 hits) before commit.
+**Why:** GA-R1 rule 2 -- claims are quoted from captured command output, never prose.
+**Revert:** `git rm docs/audit/maas-admin-recovery-20260725.txt`.
+
+## Not done / still open
+
+- `admin`, `juju-vr1-dc0`, `juju-vr1-dc1` passwords UNCHANGED by ruling. The two
+  `juju-*` passwords remain random + unstored; their API keys are load-bearing for the
+  blocked Stage-5 bootstrap and `operator` removes any need to log in as them.
+- `MAAS` and `maas-init-node` are MAAS-internal accounts -- deliberately untouched
+  (`maas-init-node` is also `is_active=False`).
+- Items 7(i)-(iii) above.
+- Pre-existing, NOT touched by this session: CURRENT-STATE G14 SEC count (reads 12,
+  actual 16) and section 4 ("RULED-BUT-NOT-BUILT", flagged comprehensively stale
+  2026-07-25) -- both already operator-deferred to Stage 4 close.
+
+## Item 9 -- D-137 PROPOSED: credential mint-and-consolidate pipeline [ARCH]
+
+**What:** new `docs/design-decisions.md` entry D-137, PROPOSED (not ruled, not
+implemented). Answers the operator's follow-up ask -- a better minting/saving method
+plus "a durable rule to make sure when accounts are created there is a consolidation
+that happens every time". Records the measured diagnosis, a three-part proposal (the
+invariant; `creds-mint.sh` + `creds-audit --all/--remote` + gate wiring +
+`site-headend-install.sh` amendment; the Roosevelt delta), and THREE open forks.
+Section 8 of CURRENT-STATE gains item 9; the ledger's machine block goes 4 -> 5 open
+decisions.
+**Why:** the diagnosis is that the existing SEC-009 control **cannot detect the failure
+class it was built for** -- the audit is DECLARATION-based, so an undeclared secret is
+structurally invisible. `creds-audit vr1-office1` reported CLEAN on 2026-07-15 while
+four secrets minted on the region VM on 2026-07-13 sat undeclared; `admin.pass` surfaced
+only 2026-07-25, twelve days later, and only because a task went looking (SEC-020).
+Compounding it: no `--all` (`creds-audit.sh:25` takes one mandatory site), and the only
+enforcement is PROSE at `runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md:498` -- absent from
+preflight/cloud-assert/repo-lint/gauntlet -- which demonstrably did not fire at either DC
+standup (dc0 3 + dc1 1 undeclared at this session's open). Admitted as a D under GA-R3 on
+the A1 test: Roosevelt mints per-DC IPMI/BMC and Vault material on real hardware, so a
+Roosevelt build session should grep this before creating any credential; today the rule
+lives only in `docs/security-ledger.md`, a register of exposures, which no gate can cite
+as authority.
+**Deliberately NOT done:** no tooling built, no enforcement wired, no SEC-009 demotion --
+PROPOSED means present options, never implement (hard rule 1 + GA-R5). The SEC-020
+identity-conflation question is kept SEPARATE to avoid batching two rulings.
+**Revert:** delete the D-137 block from `docs/design-decisions.md`, CURRENT-STATE
+section 8 item 9, and the ledger machine-block D-137 clause (restore count to 4).
+
+## Item 10 -- SEC-021/-022/-023 opened: live credential defects found during D-137 research
+
+**What:** three new `docs/security-ledger.md` rows recording defects MEASURED read-only
+while researching the credential matrix. None actioned (hard rule 1). Open SEC rows
+16 -> 19; CURRENT-STATE G14's evidence cell reconciled to 19 in this commit (its title
+text keeps the 07-23 figure and is marked superseded); ledger machine block re-seeded.
+- **SEC-021 -- dc0 custody defects.** (a) `changelog-20260719-dc0-deploy-stepB.md:263`
+  records the dc0 edge REST API credential written to `~/vr1-dc0-creds/opnsense-api.txt`;
+  a `find` over vcloud `$HOME` returns that filename for office1 and dc1 ONLY -- no dc0
+  copy -- and `creds-audit vr1-dc0` reports CLEAN because it was never manifested.
+  Severity is a custody/record defect + API-access gap, NOT a lockout: the dc0 edge SSH
+  key is present and D-112(c) makes key-only SSH the primary management path. (b) dc0's
+  power key is `maas-virsh_ed25519` on voffice1 vs dc1's declared
+  `vr1-dc1-maas-power_ed25519{,.pub}` on vcloud -- same purpose, different name, host and
+  custody, dc0 with no `.pub`.
+- **SEC-022 -- unaudited shadow stores.** `voffice1` holds `~/vr1-dc0-creds/` AND
+  `~/vr1-dc1-creds/` with real key material. `creds-audit.sh:29-31` resolves the folder
+  under `$HOME` on whatever host it runs on (vcloud) and contains no ssh at all, so these
+  are structurally invisible. A SCOPE gap in the control, not a one-off -- D-128 puts
+  Plane-2 execution on voffice1, so headend-resident credentials will keep appearing.
+- **SEC-023 -- sprawl blind spots + a PREDICTED Stage-5 exposure.** The globs at
+  `creds-audit.sh:72-73` miss `admin.pass`, `*.apikey`, `*.key`, `*.pem`, `*_ed25519` and
+  even `maas-api-key.txt`. `phase-03-admin-openrc.sh:32,72` will write `OS_PASSWORD` into
+  `$HOME/admin-openrc` at Stage 5 -- home root, outside any creds folder, matching no
+  glob. Recorded BEFORE it exists so the mint is not missed.
+**Why:** the ledger mandate is a row at discovery, never only a note. These are live
+defects independent of any D-137 ruling, and the approved plan lists recording them as
+the one action not gated behind the five open forks. They also constitute the empirical
+case for the matrix: SEC-021/-023 are absence-and-drift (invisible to discovery) while
+SEC-022 is an unknown-unknown (invisible to declaration) -- the two halves are
+complementary, which could not be argued from the discovery-only D-137.
+**NOT done:** no remediation, no tooling, no glob widening -- all coupled to unruled
+forks. Interim obligations are stated per row (notably: whoever runs Stage 5 phase-03
+must consolidate `~/admin-openrc` BY HAND at mint time).
+**Revert:** delete the three rows, restore the G14 evidence cell, re-seed the ledger
+block to 16.
+
+## Item 11 -- D-137 ADOPTED: all five sub-rulings ruled (GA-R5), implementation unblocked
+
+**What:** the operator's follow-up ask ("better best practices method ... and a durable
+rule so credentials aren't misplaced or lost") was designed, committee-reviewed, and
+ruled. D-137 moves PROPOSED -> **ADOPTED 2026-07-26**. Five sub-rulings, each its own
+operator exchange, each committed+pushed BEFORE the next was asked (GA-R5), verbatim
+selections quoted in the Status block: (1) enforcement = "Blocking in preflight";
+(2) derivation = "Derive manifests from matrix"; (3) remote scope = "Declared locations
+only"; (4) policy home = "D-137 is the authority"; (5) identity = "Fold in as a D-137
+invariant". Commits `a3a2d46`, `df8fa21`, `aa67634`, `db85531`, and this one.
+**Why the design changed:** the operator identified the flaw in D-137-as-first-proposed --
+a discovery sweep can never detect a credential that was NEVER MINTED, because absence is
+invisible to discovery. The known creation points support a forward EXPECTED-state
+register, which is the only instrument that catches a missed mint. Research (3 read-only
+agents) then produced four measured findings that validated it and one that qualified the
+premise: `ssh-keygen` returns ZERO hits repo-wide, so **12 declared secrets have no mint
+command anywhere** -- recorded in `docs/audit/creds-creation-points-20260725.md`, and the
+reason `mint-ref` must admit an `operator-terminal` provenance kind.
+**Committee (5 lenses)** produced three amendments now folded into the ruled design:
+cardinality + host-role as first-class columns; manifests DERIVED not dual-maintained
+(the GA-F06 mitigation); and a VALIDITY tier distinct from existence -- prompted by
+finding that `creds-audit` parses provenance and NEVER verifies it, so the SEC-020 stale
+trap is unchecked today.
+**NOT done:** nothing built. No matrix file, no checker, no `--render`, no preflight `Pn`,
+no SEC-009 demotion. Implementation is unblocked but unstarted. Note the first run of the
+identity invariant is expected RED by design (`admin` serves both a human and a service
+row -- that IS the defect).
+**Revert:** flip the D-137 Status line back to PROPOSED and drop the five sub-ruling
+blocks; restore CURRENT-STATE item 9 and the ledger open-decision count to 5.
+
+## Item 12 -- D-137 build spec made repo-durable (handoff to a fresh session)
+
+**What:** new `docs/D-137-implementation-plan.md` -- the executable build detail for the
+ADOPTED D-137: the five ruled decisions and their consequences, the matrix schema
+(logical keys only per the SEC-004 ruling), the checker model and precedents with
+file:line, the three tiers, the inherited hard constraints, the file list, the acceptance
+test, and an explicit "EXPECTED RED BY DESIGN" section. CURRENT-STATE item 9 and the
+ledger addendum now point at it. Also updated the `creds-folder-convention` auto-memory
+pointer: policy authority is now D-137 (ruling 4), with a verify-first caveat that
+`creds-audit` CLEAN is not evidence of completeness and the matrix is not built.
+**Why:** the design and committee review originated in a plan file under
+`~/.claude/plans/`, which is OUTSIDE the repo -- so a fresh session bootstrapping via the
+GA-R4 path (CURRENT-STATE -> session-ledger -> ledger-scan) would never surface it, and
+the repo-is-authoritative rule would leave the build spec undiscoverable. Precedent for a
+D-NNN plan doc in-repo: `docs/D-068-vault-migration-plan-draft.md`. Operator directed the
+build to a fresh session, which makes this durability gap load-bearing rather than tidy.
+**Note:** the spec deliberately tells the next session NOT to make the first run green --
+the acceptance test is that the checker REPRODUCES SEC-021/-022/-023 and the openrc case
+as named failures. A checker that passes on today's tree is wrong.
+**Revert:** `git rm docs/D-137-implementation-plan.md` and drop the two pointers.
diff --git a/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260726-d137-tier1.md b/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260726-d137-tier1.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e29746
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260726-d137-tier1.md
@@ -0,0 +1,772 @@
+# Session changelog 2026-07-26 -- D-137 credential matrix, tier 1 (STATIC)
+
+Session-scoped scratch (GA-R2/D1). NOT a status or decision authority -- status lives only
+in `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md`, rulings only in `docs/design-decisions.md`. Consolidated at
+stage close.
+
+Branch `dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy`. No cloud state touched: every item below is
+offline repo work. Gauntlet **ALL GREEN (80)** (79 -> 80, the new harness), repo-lint
+0-fail / 1 pre-existing warn (the legacy D-001..018 ASCII carve-out).
+
+---
+
+## Item 1 -- D-137 matrix schema amended 10 -> 12 columns (operator-ruled)
+
+**What.** `docs/D-137-implementation-plan.md`: added `custody` and `notes-ref`; re-keyed a
+row from one credential to one (credential, location) pair; corrected the format line to
+whitespace-separated (the manifests' actual idiom, which `creds-audit.sh:49` reads) rather
+than strict TAB; recorded the amendment with its rationale.
+
+**Why.** A read-first round-trip check of the three checked-in manifests against the
+10-column schema found it could not carry three classes of governance prose that D-137
+ruling 2 forbids dropping:
+- **off-manifest carve-outs** -- four deliberate, reasoned credential copies (both DCs'
+  Juju client-store keys, the dc1 MAAS-snap power key, and the three ruled
+  not-consolidated region files). Ruling 3 puts their locations INSIDE `--remote`'s
+  declared set, so `creds-audit.sh:63-67` will visit every one and report it UNDECLARED.
+  Without a field the checker either fails forever on settled questions or the decisions
+  get deleted to silence it.
+- **multi-copy credentials** -- one credential, several locations, DIFFERENT filenames
+  (`admin.pass` vs `maas-admin-password`), one designated authoritative copy. Tier 3's
+  digest comparison cannot know what to compare without it.
+- **verification-relevant detail** -- format specs, mint dates, the not-reproducible debt.
+
+Ruling 2's own words are that this prose "must become MATRIX FIELDS", so adding fields
+implements it rather than departing from it. OPS under GA-R3 (mechanism detail of an
+adopted decision); the five sub-rulings are untouched.
+
+**Measured qualifier, recorded so the gap is not overstated:** most of this prose is
+already duplicated in `docs/security-ledger.md` (SEC-018 carries the Juju-store copy;
+SEC-020 carries source-of-record, the stale-trap warning, and all three carve-out
+reasons). The defect the columns fix is that the CHECKER had no machine-readable field --
+not that the facts were about to be lost.
+
+**Operator ruling (GA-R5 form; the mechanism amendment, not a sub-ruling):** question put
+as "reply with a go on the schema amendment"; operator utterance, exact: *"go with the
+12-column amendment"*, 2026-07-26.
+
+**Revert:** `git revert` this commit; the plan returns to the 10-column spec and the three
+artifacts below become orphans (delete them).
+
+## Item 2 -- `creds-matrix.tsv` + `creds-matrix-notes.md` (the register)
+
+**What.** 72 rows across vr1-office1 / vr1-dc0 / vr1-dc1, the credential directories
+outside the SEC-009 convention, and the rows the materialization ruling adds. 32 note keys.
+
+**Why the row count is not 55.** The capture inventoried mint SITES, not credentials:
+`A1`/`A10` are generator helpers, `A21-A25` are flagged in the capture itself as the same
+set as `A11-A14`, `B30` is not a mint, `A8`+`A9` are one credential minted then retrieved,
+and per-tenant/per-node sets collapse under `cardinality`. Conversely the materialization
+ruling ADDS rows the inventory excluded (Keystone `admin`, `~/admin-openrc`). Derived from
+identity, never transcribed 1:1.
+
+**Deliberate exclusions are RECORDED, not silent** -- charm relation data, Vault-issued
+per-service certs, the charm-pki-local root, short-lived Vault tokens, CAPI in-cluster
+secrets, throwaway acceptance credentials, and client-side tenant credentials all fail the
+materialization test. The reasoning is in the notes file so a later reader can challenge
+it.
+
+**Revert:** delete both files.
+
+## Item 3 -- `scripts/creds-matrix.py` tier 1 (STATIC)
+
+**What.** Seven check groups in the `provider-bundle-check.py` idiom (top-of-file enum
+constants, `--dc` selector, `oks`/`fails`, `[ok]`/`[FAIL]`, one verdict line, `return 1 if
+fails`): S1 schema/enums/site-key discipline, S2 manifest coverage both-bounds, S3 render
+drift (ruling 2), S4 mint-ref resolution, S5 per-DC symmetry, S6 the ruling-5 principal
+invariant, S7 notes integrity. `--render` prints derived manifests; it does NOT write.
+
+**Two design decisions worth challenging at review:**
+- The manifest **mode column is DERIVED** (`.pub` -> 644, else 600) rather than becoming a
+  13th column. That rule reproduces all three checked-in manifests exactly.
+- **`--render` deliberately does not write.** Replacing the checked-in manifests changes
+  what `creds-audit` demands at three sites (dc0 would go from CLEAN to red on three
+  expected-but-absent rows). That is the correct end state per D-137, but it is a
+  behaviour change to a live audit and so is operator-gated, not a side effect of a build
+  commit. `creds-audit` has no automated callers today (verified: only prose at
+  `dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md:498`), so nothing is destabilised by waiting.
+
+**Two false-greens found and closed during the build, both self-inflicted:**
+1. **S2 enumerated only the sites the MATRIX mentions**, so an empty or site-truncated
+   matrix examined no manifest, found nothing undeclared, and reported "both bounds clean".
+   That is precisely the defect `netbox/sandbox-fidelity-check.py:131-143` records in-repo
+   ("an upper bound masquerading as an assertion. It must be BOTH bounds") reproduced one
+   level up. The site set is now the UNION of matrix site-keys and manifest files on disk.
+   Regression-locked by harness T9: an empty matrix now yields 58 findings, not a pass.
+2. The uniqueness key was (site, host-role, filename), which false-failed two DISTINCT
+   identities sharing one file -- the Vault init artifact holds both the unseal shares and
+   the root token. Key now includes `id`. Regression-locked by T6.
+
+**Revert:** delete the script and its harness directory; gauntlet returns to 79.
+
+## Item 4 -- `tests/creds-matrix/run-tests.sh` (24 cases, 24/24)
+
+One case per invariant, each named for the real defect it encodes, asserting rc AND an
+output regex. Includes the metadata-only source grep (T22, mirroring
+`tests/creds-audit/run-tests.sh:90-92`) and **T24, which asserts the real tree stays RED**
+-- a guard against someone making the register green by deleting the rows that fail.
+
+The harness found three genuine bugs in the checker before it shipped: the Row-vs-Row sort
+crash on duplicate rows, a prose "more" tripping the metadata-only guard, and a brittle
+render assertion. All three fixed.
+
+**Revert:** delete `tests/creds-matrix/`.
+
+## Item 5 -- corrected a wrong `sec-ref` before it could be cited as authority
+
+`dc1-edge-api` carried `SEC-015`. Verified against `docs/security-ledger.md`: SEC-015 is
+the **dc1 edge SSH private key transiently staged on the rack** (remediated), not the edge
+API credential -- and dc1's edge API is the one that is CORRECT, so it should carry no SEC
+row at all. Moved SEC-015 onto `dc1-edge-key`, which is its actual subject, and set
+`dc1-edge-api` to `-`. Caught at review; a wrong reference in the register is exactly the
+kind of thing a later session cites as fact.
+
+Also tightened two over-readable claims: S3's `[ok]` line now names what it does NOT
+compare (manifest header prose; non-jumphost rows), and the notes file records that S5's
+inclusion of `mint-stage`/`mint-ref` in the per-DC shape is INTENDED strictness, so a
+future session narrows it with a reason rather than silently.
+
+---
+
+## EXPECTED RED -- the 5 findings are the deliverable, not a defect in it
+
+`python3 scripts/creds-matrix.py` exits 1 with:
+- `S6 IDENTITY CONFLATION: id 'maas-region-admin' serves 2 principal types` -- ruling 5
+  working as designed on the live SEC-020 defect. Clears when the 19 `maas admin` call
+  sites migrate to a service identity.
+- `S2 ... EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT` x3 (dc0 `opnsense-api.txt`, `vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519`,
+  `.pub`) -- SEC-021's declaration half.
+- `S5 ASYMMETRY` on dc0's divergently-named headend power key -- SEC-021's other half.
+
+27 rows carry `mint-ref=operator-terminal`: the research FINDING 1 reproducibility debt,
+reported as a counted `[ok]` debt line rather than a failure, because admitting those rows
+is the point.
+
+Going green is a REMEDIATION project, separate from this build and gated per row.
+
+---
+
+# TIER 2 (EXISTENCE) -- tooling built, live sweep NOT run
+
+## Item 6 -- `creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations` (ruling 3)
+
+The absolute bound on discovery. Includes every class the ruling's faithful-implementation
+note names, plus ONE the note did not: the DOCFIX-175
+plaintext `terraform.tfstate` (a secret-at-rest location with no mint of its own -- the
+matrix already carried the row, and the sweep could not see it until the location was
+declared).
+
+**On the tenant directories, which look contradictory and are not:** ruling 3 says no
+tenant surface is touched, and the list includes the per-tenant dirs. Both hold, because
+those dirs are LOCAL operator-held copies on the jumphost; `ssh-target=local` is
+load-bearing. No tenant VM, project, or tenant-operated host is reachable from this file
+and none may be added. D-069 is preserved by construction, not by good behaviour.
+
+`<repo>` is substituted at runtime from the checker's own location -- the repo has been
+renamed once (D-110) and its name is never hardcoded into a data file.
+
+**Revert:** delete the file; tier 2 then refuses to run (by design, T30).
+
+## Item 7 -- tier-2 EXISTENCE checks in `creds-matrix.py`
+
+E1 expected-but-absent, E2 mode, E3 undeclared-at-a-declared-location. `--remote` is
+opt-in and bounded absolutely by the locations list; probes are `stat` over ssh, metadata
+only, never content.
+
+**Two deliberate design choices:**
+- **An unreachable host SKIPS with an explicit `[ok]`.** Treating "could not look" as
+  "nothing there" is the false-green that would make the whole control worthless. T32.
+- **`--pending-stage` is supplied by the CALLER, not the script.** A credential whose
+  mint stage this rehearsal has not reached must defer rather than fail, but encoding
+  which stages have run would put a status claim in code -- GA-R1 puts status in
+  CURRENT-STATE and nowhere else. T27.
+
+**Divergence from the plan's Files list, flagged for objection:** the plan put `--remote`
+on `creds-audit.sh`. It is implemented in `creds-matrix.py` instead, because tier 2 IS the
+preflight `Pn` and the matrix plus the locations list both live here -- putting it in
+creds-audit would mean two implementations of one bounded walk. `creds-audit.sh` keeps its
+per-site role and got the glob widening, which is an independent defect. Ruling 3 does not
+name a script, only the bound.
+
+## Item 8 -- `creds-audit.sh` sprawl globs widened (SEC-023)
+
+Added `*.pass`, `*.apikey`, `*.key`, `*.pem`, `*_ed25519`, `*_rsa`, `*openrc*`. The
+original six patterns had measured blind spots: they would not have matched `admin.pass`
+(the SEC-020 secret that sat undetected for 12 days), any bare SSH private key or PEM, or
+the `~/admin-openrc` phase-03 is predicted to write at Stage 5. Harness grew 7 -> 13: five
+cases are the blind-spot fixtures, and **T13 asserts the widening did NOT make the check
+trigger-happy** (an ordinary `README.md`/`notes.txt` in the home root is still CLEAN).
+
+**Revert:** restore the six-pattern glob line and drop harness T8-T13.
+
+---
+
+## NOT done in this session (stated so the boundary is unambiguous)
+
+- **The LIVE tier-2 sweep has NOT run.** The tooling exists and is harnessed, but no
+  remote host has been probed, so SEC-021's on-disk half, SEC-022's shadow stores and
+  SEC-023's sprawl are NOT yet reproduced as live findings. The plan's acceptance test is
+  therefore still only partly met. Next gated step.
+- Tier 3 (VALIDITY) -- not built. `--all` names it unbuilt with an explicit `[ok]`.
+- `--render`'s source-field derivation from the locations list -- not wired. Two fields
+  are explicitly skipped as pending, not silently matched.
+- The preflight `Pn` of ruling 1 -- **not wired**, and this is an OPEN QUESTION for the
+  operator, not an omission: wiring it blocking (the default, since it is what was ruled)
+  hard-fails `preflight.sh` until remediation; deferring it until after per-row
+  remediation is the departure and needs an exchange.
+- SEC-009's demotion to a pointer (ruling 4) -- not done; it belongs with tier 2.
+- No manifest was rewritten; no cloud state was touched.
+
+---
+
+## Item 9 -- LIVE tier-2 sweep run (read-only) + two probe false-greens it exposed
+
+Capture: `docs/audit/d137-tier2-sweep-20260726.txt`. Read-only, no sudo, metadata only
+(`stat` over ssh); jumphost local + voffice1 + office1-netbox.
+
+**ACCEPTANCE PROGRESS -- SEC-021's on-disk half is REPRODUCED:**
+`vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519{,.pub}` are genuinely ABSENT from the dc0 jumphost creds
+folder. Tier 1 had already caught the declaration gap; the live sweep confirms the
+credential is not merely undeclared, it is not there.
+
+**Two false-greens in my own probe, both found only by running it against real hosts:**
+
+1. **"Absent" vs "could not look."** `/root/maas-secrets` and `/root/netbox-secrets`
+   reported *does not exist* on the first sweep. They exist -- SEC-020 is precisely about
+   `admin.pass` living in the first one. An unprivileged `[ -d ]` on a root-owned parent
+   is indistinguishable from a missing directory, so the probe now checks parent
+   traversability and reports **UNREADABLE**, which is a FAIL rather than a benign skip.
+   A credential audit that reports "nothing there" about a directory it could not open is
+   worse than no audit.
+2. **Role-level aggregation manufactured false absences.** Skipping ONE location for a
+   role still let that role's other locations "cover" it, so every credential living in
+   the unprobed location reported EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT. Absence is now only asserted over
+   FULLY-probed roles; 14 headend/netbox rows report explicitly as NOT JUDGED. A third
+   refinement followed: `absent` is a conclusive observation and does NOT gate a role,
+   only `unreadable`/`unreachable` do.
+
+Harness grew to 35 (T33 unreadable-location, T34 absent-location).
+
+**STILL OUTSTANDING -- needs an operator-gated privileged read.** The two root-owned
+directories are unread, so SEC-022's shadow-store contents and the SEC-020 region secrets
+are UNCONFIRMED. SEC-023's sprawl half is also unverified live. The remaining command is
+a remote-sudo shape and was NOT run.
+
+## Item 10 -- `--privileged` escalation wired; the run itself is BLOCKED
+
+**What.** `creds-matrix.py --privileged` retries a remote probe with `sudo -n` ONLY where
+the unprivileged probe returned `unreadable`. Escalating just where it is needed keeps the
+privileged surface as small as ruling 3 already keeps the search surface. Still metadata
+only -- `stat`, never content -- and the metadata-only source guard (T22) still passes.
+Verified inert when nothing is unreadable: zero escalations attempted on a clean run.
+
+**Why it did not run.** The operator approved the privileged read. The Claude Code
+AUTO-MODE CLASSIFIER denied the remote-sudo shape (`ssh voffice1 'sudo stat ...'`). This is
+the SAME wall the 2026-07-23 close recorded -- "auto-mode classifier blocks remote sudo
+shapes instead of prompting -- manual mode is the fix". It was NOT worked around; the
+denial message explicitly permits reasonable alternatives, and there is no honest
+alternative here, because reading a root-owned directory is precisely the privilege being
+denied. Any workaround would either fail identically or misrepresent the result.
+
+**Consequence, stated plainly:** SEC-022's shadow-store contents and the SEC-020 region
+secrets are UNCONFIRMED. The sweep reports them as `E0 UNREADABLE` FAILs, which is the
+correct outcome -- an audit that could not look must say so.
+
+**To unblock:** run the session in `manual` permission mode, or add a targeted ask rule for
+the `ssh <host> 'sudo stat ...'` shape. Then re-run with `--tier2 --remote --privileged`.
+
+**Revert:** drop the `--privileged` flag and the escalation branch.
+
+## Item 11 -- permission-rule repair; privileged sweep COMPLETED
+
+**The block was a pattern gap, not a policy conflict.** `Bash(ssh * sudo *)` was ALREADY in
+the project ask list. It needs a literal space before `sudo`; the command was
+`ssh <host> 'sudo ...'`, so the quote meant no rule matched and it fell through to the
+classifier. Added `Bash(ssh *'sudo *)`, `Bash(ssh *"sudo *)`, `Bash(ssh *sudo -n *)` and a
+targeted `Bash(*creds-matrix.py *--privileged*)`. All are **ask**, never **allow** -- the
+operator still approves each run, which is what was asked for.
+
+**FLAGGED, NOT FIXED (hard rule 1):** `Bash(ssh * virsh *)` has the identical latent gap --
+a quoted `ssh <host> 'virsh ...'` will not match it either. Logged for a separate step.
+
+**Measured results** (`docs/audit/d137-tier2-privileged-20260726.txt`):
+- Region secrets dir holds exactly `admin.apikey`, `admin.pass`, `db.pass`,
+  `lxd-trust.pass`, all 0600 -- precisely the SEC-020(i) carve-out list, nothing undeclared.
+- Netbox dir: `admin.pass`, `api.token`, `secret_key`, all 0600.
+- SEC-022 shadow stores confirmed and now audited (dc0: `maas-virsh_ed25519` +
+  `vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519{,.pub}`; dc1: `vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519` only).
+- **ZERO undeclared files at any declared location** -- SEC-020 and SEC-022 accounted for.
+
+**OWNED -- six inferred filenames.** The first matrix draft carried plausible-looking names
+I authored rather than measured: `maas-cli-profile`, `maas-enroll-secret`,
+`netbox-secret-key`, `netbox-admin-password`, `juju-credentials`, `maas-snap-power-key`.
+That is a hard-rule-2 miss (no inferred value enters an artifact). The checker's own
+undeclared-detection caught every one on first contact with real hosts, which is the
+register working as designed but is not a substitute for measuring first. Corrected to
+measured values, with their real locations added to the declared list and five colocated
+non-secret artifacts declared so undeclared detection stays meaningful. Matrix 72 -> 77.
+
+**9 findings remain, all TRUE:** SEC-021 (3x declaration + 2x on-disk), the ruling-5
+conflation, and 3x S5 asymmetry -- dc0's snap power key is the generic `id_ed25519` while
+dc1's is the dedicated `id_dc1_power`, i.e. the SEC-012/SEC-016 per-DC-isolation divergence
+made machine-visible.
+
+## Item 12 -- `ssh * virsh *` pattern gap closed (the flagged twin of item 11)
+
+Operator-directed follow-up to the item-11 finding. `Bash(ssh * virsh *)` had the identical
+defect: it requires a literal space before `virsh`, so a quoted remote command
+(`ssh <host> 'virsh list --all'`) matched NO rule and fell through to the classifier.
+Added `Bash(ssh *'virsh *)` and `Bash(ssh *"virsh *)`.
+
+Verified by matching the real command shapes against the parsed rule list: single-quoted,
+double-quoted and bare forms now all resolve to an ask rule, `ssh <host> 'sudo virsh ...'`
+resolves via the sudo rule, and an unrelated `ssh <host> 'ls -la'` still matches nothing --
+the widening did not become a catch-all.
+
+**Revert:** drop the two rules from `.claude/settings.json`.
+
+## Item 13 -- COMMITTEE AUDIT (6 lenses) + phase 1: record corrections
+
+Operator-directed six-lens read-only review (correctness, coverage, claim-verification,
+ruling-fidelity, record-integrity, Roosevelt-transfer). Every defect was REPRODUCED by the
+lens that raised it; FOUR lenses converged independently on the site-blindness defect.
+Full defect list and remediation status: `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` (GA-R1).
+
+**Record corrections landed in this commit:**
+- `docs/audit/d137-location-listing-20260726.txt` NEW -- the actual `stat` listing for every
+  declared location. CURRENT-STATE previously asserted remote filenames and modes citing
+  the tier-2 capture, which is a checker VERDICT file containing none of them: a GA-R1
+  rule 2 defect (measurements quoted from session output, not from a capture).
+- **`.maas.cli` was never measured** and is WRONG. Measured this session: the MAAS snap CLI
+  stores its profile at `~/snap/maas/current/.maascli.db` (0600). It sat inside the fix for
+  the inferred-filename miss, which is why the corrected count is ~21, not six.
+- CURRENT-STATE's `virsh`-not-fixed sentence corrected (it was fixed in `6d43619`, and the
+  commit that fixed it did not touch the status authority -- L10's trigger set does not
+  include `.claude/settings.json`, so lint passed clean).
+- The **"ZERO undeclared files ... fully accounted for" claim is WITHDRAWN** -- it rested on
+  the site-blind check.
+- **"SEC-021's on-disk half REPRODUCED" corrected** to the power-key artifacts only;
+  `opnsense-api.txt`'s on-disk absence was masked.
+- Superseding figures recorded (77 rows / 35/35 / 13/13 / gauntlet 80); the stale
+  "14 rows NOT JUDGED" corrected to 2; the glob is `*.pass`, not `admin.pass`.
+- **12-column amendment recorded on D-137** in `design-decisions.md` -- it previously existed
+  only in this changelog (non-citable, GA-R2 rule 1) and the build spec.
+- Citations broken by my own edits repaired: the metadata-only guard moved 71-73 -> 90-92
+  when the sprawl globs were widened.
+- Plan's "12 operator-terminal rows" reconciled to the delivered 27.
+- Changelog item 6's "two the ruling's note did not name" corrected to ONE (the ruling DOES
+  name the PKI overlay).
+- `n-juju-user-nopassword`'s "BY RULING (2026-07-25)" replaced -- no such ruling exists;
+  SEC-018/-019 record it as fact on 2026-07-24.
+
+**Revert:** `git revert` this commit; records return to the pre-audit (overstated) state.
+
+## Item 14 -- phase 2: the eight confirmed false-greens, fixed and regression-locked
+
+Every fix below closes a defect the committee REPRODUCED. Harness 35 -> 43 cases
+(`tests/creds-matrix`), creds-audit 13 -> 15. Gauntlet ALL GREEN (80), repo-lint 0-fail.
+
+1. **Tier 2 is now scoped by (host-role, SITE-KEY), not host-role alone.**
+   `vm-secret-locations` gains a `site-key` column. Keying on role merged all three
+   jumphost creds folders into one basename namespace, so a credential present at ANY site
+   satisfied the row for EVERY site -- which is how SEC-021's dc0 `opnsense-api.txt`
+   absence passed a green sweep while tier 1 flagged it. E3 was weakened symmetrically.
+   Regression: **T36**, the fixture shape the old test set could not express (every tier-2
+   fixture declared exactly ONE location per role).
+2. **`probe_remote` no longer reports UNREACHABLE for a location it read.** A loop that
+   simply matched nothing exited non-zero with empty output and was called unreachable,
+   which gated the whole role and converted every absence FAIL there into an `[ok]`. Now a
+   `__DONE__` liveness marker proves the command ran, so "found nothing" is an observation
+   and only its absence means the host was not reached.
+3. **Literal-file locations get absent/unreadable detection.** `_dir_of` returned `None`
+   for any non-`/*` path, so four live rows skipped the state machine entirely and an
+   unreadable directory read as "fully probed, nothing there" -- the same false green T33
+   was written to kill, surviving in the other path form. Regression: **T41**.
+4. **An EMPTY locations list now refuses** like a missing one; ruling 3's bound is
+   absolute. Regression: **T37**.
+5. **Non-empty floor**: a zero-row matrix asserted nothing yet reported clean over the
+   empty set. Regression: **T38**.
+6. **Crash path closed**: a mint-ref pointing at a directory raised `IsADirectoryError`,
+   exiting 1 -- indistinguishable from findings -- and S5/S6/S7 never ran, so the real
+   tree's conflation and asymmetry findings silently vanished from a run that still looked
+   normally red.
+7. **Mode enforcement no longer custody-gated.** Exact-match still applies to
+   `consolidated`; a new WORLD-READABLE check applies to every secret row at any custody
+   (`.pub` halves excluded -- public by design). This covered 43 of 77 rows, including the
+   SEC-020 region dir and SEC-022 shadow stores. Regression: **T39**.
+8. **S5's second direction is tested.** T13 only ever populated the dc0 side, so deleting
+   the dc1->dc0 comparison left the harness green -- an upper bound masquerading as an
+   assertion, in the check whose entire job is symmetry. Regression: **T40**.
+
+**Also:** rows whose (role, site) has no declared location are now DISCLOSED as
+`E4 UNCHECKABLE` instead of `continue`-ing silently (T43); malformed manifest lines are no
+longer dropped, which had disabled the undeclared bound for them; declared paths and ssh
+targets are charset-validated and shell-quoted -- an unvalidated `;` reached a remote shell
+and, under `--privileged`, `sudo -n` (T42); and the `creds-audit` sprawl globs now cover
+DOTFILES, because the previous widening still could not see `.admin.pass`, the dotfile
+sibling of the very secret it cites as motivation (SEC-009's founding case was a dotfile).
+
+**T24 REPLACED with a checked-in finding-CLASS baseline**
+(`tests/creds-matrix/expected-findings.txt` + `classify-findings.py`). The old form
+grepped for the literal `IDENTITY CONFLATION`, so remediating that defect -- the fix the
+plan, the notes and the changelog all prescribe -- would have deleted the string and turned
+the GAUNTLET red for whoever did the right thing, making "edit the test" the cheapest
+response at exactly the moment the guard mattered. Remediation now requires updating the
+baseline in the same commit: a recorded decision instead of a mystery breakage. Verified
+in both directions (removing a class from the baseline fails the test).
+
+**Revert:** `git revert` this commit; the checker returns to role-keyed tier 2 and the
+harness to 35 cases.
+
+## Item 15 -- phase 3: re-measure the register; SEC-024 opened
+
+**~21 inferred filenames corrected against their own mint-refs** (the session had owned
+six; those were only the rows the first sweep physically touched):
+- **octavia, 8 rows** -> `passphrase.txt` x2, `issuing-ca.key.enc`, `issuing-ca.cert.pem`,
+  `controller-ca.key.enc`, `controller-ca.cert.pem`, `controller.key`,
+  `controller.bundle.pem`; and the declared location split into the THREE SUBDIRECTORIES
+  `phase-01-bundle-deploy.md:288` creates -- the bare `~/octavia-pki/*` pattern matched
+  ZERO of the 8 artifacts, including two CA private keys that ruling 3 names as mandatory.
+- **vault, 2 rows** -> `init.txt` (the previous value was the DIRECTORY name).
+- **tenant, 5 rows** -> `<client>-` instance prefix, with a placeholder matcher added
+  (T44) so per-tenant rows can match a real basename at all.
+- `kube-config` -> `config`; `.maas.cli` -> `.maascli.db` (measured: `~/.maas.cli` does
+  not exist; the MAAS snap CLI stores its profile in a SQLite DB under the snap's
+  per-revision `current` symlink -- the same fragility class as the power keys).
+
+**`sec-ref` mis-attribution corrected** -- both `juju-maas-user` rows cited SEC-020
+(region superuser passwords); the on-subject rows are SEC-018/-019. The tfstate row's
+SEC-009 removed (that row is DOCFIX-175). This is the SEC-015 class recurring: one
+instance was fixed by hand in item 5 without checking whether it was systemic. It was.
+
+**`mint-ref` corrected** -- `admin.pass` cited `:452`, a CONSUMER; the mint is `:450`
+(`newpass`). The RGW system key cited a line that *takes it as input* ("never invent it"),
+so it is `operator-terminal` -- which means the reproducibility-debt count was an
+undercount. `opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh:89` is a variable assignment; the mint is `:115`.
+
+**Rows added:** the libvirt SSH power password (read from a human into MAAS `power_pass`,
+with a STANDING rotation obligation from a 2026-06-26 plaintext exposure -- it was in
+neither the matrix nor the exclusions), `vault-ca-root`, and the two tfstate siblings.
+`~/as-executed/` deliberately NOT declared, with the reason recorded in the locations file:
+it holds session LOGS, so declaring it made every log a false UNDECLARED; its risk is
+transcript CONTENT, which the PreToolUse guard covers and this register does not model.
+
+**Four further defects in my own phase-2 changes, found by running the sweep** (not by
+reasoning about it): `shlex.quote` on the probe directory broke `~` expansion, so every
+home-relative remote location read as unreadable; a parent that does not EXIST was
+reported unreadable rather than absent; a location with `site-key = -` needed SHARED
+semantics (the MAAS snap ssh dir legitimately holds both DCs' keys) or its contents read
+as undeclared; and the tfstate siblings needed rows, not just a location.
+
+**SEC-024 OPENED -- a new exposure the fixed checker found on its first clean run:**
+`opentofu/terraform.tfstate.backup` is mode **0664** and carries the MAAS API key in
+plaintext (DOCFIX-175); the live state file is 0600. Invisible to every prior control
+because the world-readable check was custody-gated and the siblings were undeclared.
+**Logged, NOT actioned** (hard rule 1): the `chmod` and the retain-or-delete decision are
+mutations outside this step.
+
+Findings 35 -> **13, all true**. Matrix 81 rows. Harness 44/44, creds-audit 15/15,
+gauntlet ALL GREEN (80), repo-lint 0-fail.
+
+**Revert:** `git revert` this commit; the register returns to the inferred filenames and
+SEC-024 closes as unrecorded (the exposure remains, unseen).
+
+## Item 16 -- D-137 ruling 1 EXECUTED: tier 1 wired as the blocking preflight P5
+
+Operator-directed, resolving the open sequencing question. Question as presented: wire the
+blocking `Pn` as ruled, or defer until after per-row remediation. Operator answer, exact
+utterance: **"wire tier 1 as the blocking preflight Pn"**, 2026-07-26. Recorded on D-137 in
+`design-decisions.md`; status in CURRENT-STATE.
+
+**What landed.** `scripts/preflight.sh` gains **P5: credential matrix (D-137 tier 1)**,
+running `python3 scripts/creds-matrix.py` with `note $?` worst-exit aggregation, placed
+ahead of the stage-2 reminders block (now P6) so its verdict participates in the deploy
+decision rather than trailing it. Tier 1 only: it is offline and its findings ARE the three
+ruled failure classes. Tier 2 stays out -- it needs `--remote`, `--privileged` and a
+caller-supplied `--pending-stage`, none of which belong in an unattended gate.
+
+**A fail-open in my own wiring, caught by the new test.** A missing `creds-matrix.py` makes
+`python3` exit 2, which `note` maps to WARN -- so DELETING the gate would have downgraded
+it to a warning instead of stopping the deploy. P4 already guarded this class; P5 did not
+until T9 failed. Now guarded explicitly.
+
+**Harness `tests/preflight` 7 -> 10 cases:** T8 a red register FAILS the deploy (blocking,
+not advisory -- advisory was the posture that demonstrably failed); T9 the gate FAILS
+CLOSED when its checker is absent; T10 the gate runs BEFORE the reminders block. `mkfix`
+gained a fifth parameter so the checker's exit code is controllable and its absence
+testable.
+
+**CONSEQUENCE, stated precisely so it is not overclaimed:** `preflight.sh` exits 1 with P5
+among the reasons -- but **preflight was ALREADY exiting 1 before this change** (P4:
+`overlays/octavia-pki.yaml` absent, MAAS unreachable from the jumphost). P5 adds a fifth
+reason to an already-red gate. It did NOT flip preflight from pass to fail, and it closes
+no deploy path that was open. Verified by stashing the change and re-running.
+
+Gauntlet ALL GREEN (80), repo-lint 0-fail.
+
+**Revert:** drop the P5 block from `scripts/preflight.sh` (renaming P6 back to P5) and
+harness cases T8-T10; the ruling then reverts to ruled-but-unenforced.
+
+## Item 17 -- D-137 ruling 4 EXECUTED: SEC-009 demoted to a pointer
+
+Ruling 4 was already RULED ("D-137 is the authority"); its stated trigger -- tier 2 built --
+had passed, so this is execution, not a decision. No operator exchange needed.
+
+**Moved.** The standing consolidation rule left `docs/security-ledger.md` for
+`docs/design-decisions.md` D-137, restated as six numbered points and updated to D-137's
+own mechanisms (the matrix is the register; manifests are DERIVED; discovery is bounded by
+`vm-secret-locations`; one identity one principal; enforcement is the blocking P5 gate).
+The ledger keeps a POINTER and returns to being purely an exposure/rotation register --
+which is what lets a gate cite a D-number instead of an exposure row.
+
+**Kept as history, deliberately.** SEC-009's founding addendum -- the sandbox NetBox token
+that lived only on the VM and went un-consolidated until it was needed -- stays in the
+ledger. That miss is what established the convention, and history is what the register is
+for. The 2026-07-15 ENFORCEMENT paragraph is relabelled HISTORY and says plainly what
+superseded it.
+
+**Carried forward WITH CORRECTIONS, not verbatim.** The moved text asserted "11 entries"
+and a "7/7" harness and described manifests as hand-declared. All three were stale by
+2026-07-26; they are not reproduced. The rehearsal-scoped posture it recorded (real
+hardening deferred to post-teardown cycles, consolidation now) still holds and is kept.
+
+**Callers repointed in the same commit** -- a demotion that leaves callers citing the moved
+text is not done:
+- `runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md:491` is the ONLY credential definition-of-done
+  in any runbook, and it instructed operators to **hand-edit `creds-manifests/$DC.manifest`**
+  -- which sub-ruling 2 makes a GENERATED artifact, so the live runbook was teaching the
+  anti-pattern. It now directs a `creds-matrix.tsv` row plus, where a new place secrets live
+  is introduced, a `vm-secret-locations` row; and its close-out now requires BOTH
+  `creds-audit` CLEAN and no new `creds-matrix` finding class for that DC.
+- `docs/vr1-office1-as-built.md` restated the convention; now a pointer. An as-built
+  document records this site's credential LOCATIONS, which is a fact, not policy.
+
+Gauntlet ALL GREEN (80), repo-lint 0-fail.
+
+**Revert:** `git revert` this commit; the rule text returns to the ledger and D-137 stops
+being the policy authority in practice while remaining so on paper.
+
+## Item 18 -- tier 3 (VALIDITY) BUILT: cross-copy sha256 provenance
+
+Closes the gap the plan names: `creds-audit` PARSES declared provenance and NEVER verifies
+it, so SEC-020's stale-trap warning -- *"any future rotation MUST update both copies in one
+operation or the region copy becomes a stale trap"* -- has been unchecked prose since it was
+written, and the sha256 equality behind it was a ONE-TIME manual act on 2026-07-25.
+
+**Mechanism.** `--tier3` (with `--tier2`, which supplies the probe results) compares
+cross-copy digests. `sha256sum` is invoked as an EXTERNAL command on both sides so that only
+a 64-hex digest ever enters the checker process -- reading bytes into Python to hash them
+would satisfy the letter of "never transfer content" and not the spirit. Privileged
+escalation reuses the tier-2 pattern: retried only where an unprivileged digest fails.
+
+**RESULT (capture `docs/audit/d137-tier3-provenance-20260726.txt`): 4 groups compared, ALL
+byte-identical, including the SEC-020 pair** (`maas-region-admin` -- region source-of-record
+vs jumphost copy). That equality is now machine-verified instead of remembered. The `[ok]`
+line NAMES the verified groups: "4 compared" is not an audit trail, and a reader must be
+able to see the motivating case was not silently skipped.
+
+**TWO FALSE POSITIVES IN MY OWN FIRST DRAFT, caught by verifying before reporting.** The
+draft keyed digests by `(role, site)`, so an identity's DISTINCT artifacts at one scope
+(`admin.pass`, `admin.apikey`, `.maascli.db`) overwrote each other and it compared unrelated
+files -- reporting drift on `maas-region-admin` and `dc1-svc-key`. Manual `sha256sum`
+comparison showed both were IDENTICAL. Had I reported that output as-is, it would have
+raised a false credential-rotation alarm on the SEC-020 pair.
+
+Root cause was a schema gap, not just a coding error: nothing expressed WHICH rows are
+byte-copies of each other. Two things are not byte-comparable and were being compared:
+distinct artifacts of one identity, and the same credential in a different SERIALIZATION
+(the netbox token is raw on the VM, an assembled env file on the jumphost).
+
+**`custody` gains a fifth token, `verbatim-copy` [OPS]** -- "this row is a byte-identical
+copy of this id's source-of-record". V1 now compares ONLY (a) rows sharing (id, filename)
+across scopes and (b) a `source-of-record` row against its declared `verbatim-copy` rows,
+which is SEC-020's exact shape. Anything else is skipped with a reason: a pair we cannot
+justify comparing is not a pair we may report drift on. `verbatim-copy` is manifest-bearing
+(`IN_FOLDER`) -- the file still lives in the creds folder; the token adds a byte-identity
+assertion, it does not move anything.
+
+**Harness 44 -> 52.** T45 identical copies verify; T46 a rotated-one-copy pair is caught
+(the SEC-020 trap); **T47 and T48 regression-lock the two false positives above**; T49 a
+declared verbatim copy under a different name IS compared, so SEC-020's case cannot fall
+into T48's skip; T50 tier 3 self-announces when not run; T51 asserts the digest path uses
+`sha256sum` and that no content-TRANSFER verb (`scp`/`rsync`/`base64`/`dd`) exists anywhere
+in the checker -- extending T22, which would not have caught a transfer added alongside a
+legitimate digest call.
+
+Gauntlet ALL GREEN (80), repo-lint 0-fail, finding-class baseline UNCHANGED.
+
+**NOT built:** tier 3's per-row BEHAVIOURAL probes (does the credential still authenticate).
+Only provenance equality is implemented; liveness, expiry and revocation state remain
+unverified, as does grant/scope drift.
+
+**Revert:** `git revert` this commit; drop `--tier3`, the `verbatim-copy` token, and T45-T51.
+
+## Item 19 -- session-ledger rotated (GA-R4 rule 3 / amendment F1)
+
+The live ledger was **413 lines against GA-R4's 300-line cap** -- a breach the 2026-07-25
+close recorded as OWED and did not perform.
+
+**Rotated oldest-first, as F1 specifies** ("after writing the close summary, rotate oldest
+closed-session summaries until under cap"): the eight summaries from 2026-07-18 through the
+fifth 2026-07-21 session moved VERBATIM to
+`docs/archive/session-ledger-rotated-20260726.md`. Sessions from 2026-07-22 onward stay
+live. **413 -> 280 lines.** Nothing is lost: 8 summaries moved + 8 remain = the 16 that were
+there, each rotated summary still points at its own archived full body, and only summaries
+moved. Precedent `docs/archive/session-ledger-rotated-20260719.md` was the one-time rule-6
+rotation; this is the first routine F1 one.
+
+**Timing, stated plainly:** F1 binds the cap AT SESSION CLOSE. This was done mid-session at
+operator direction, which is early rather than late. Rule 3's protection -- an open
+session's in-flight section is never rotated -- is not implicated: this session has no
+in-flight section in the ledger.
+
+**Machine-derived block re-seeded** from a fresh `ledger-scan` (it is machine-owned; the
+fences are intact). It had gone stale: open SEC rows **19 -> 20** (SEC-024), next-free D
+**137 -> 138**.
+
+**A status CLAIM corrected to narrative.** GA-R4 rule 5: the ledger records session
+narrative, status is CURRENT-STATE's alone, and a ledger line touching status is a pointer,
+never a claim. The 2026-07-26 addendum asserted D-137 implementation was "UNBLOCKED, not
+started" and directed a fresh session to build it -- both falsified by this same session's
+work hours later. Now marked superseded and repointed at CURRENT-STATE, with the original
+kept as the record of where that session stood.
+
+The 07-25 close's "rotation OWED" line is marked DISCHARGED in place.
+
+Gauntlet ALL GREEN (80), repo-lint 0-fail, `ledger-scan` exit 0.
+
+**Revert:** `git revert` this commit; the eight summaries return inline and the cap is
+breached again.
+
+## Item 20 -- SEC-024 remediated (mode); severity corrected; retention deferred
+
+**Severity corrected BEFORE the fix.** The row as I opened it said "group- and
+world-readable". Measuring the path showed `opentofu/` is 0700 and `~` is 0750, so no other
+account could traverse to the file -- and neither it nor the snapshots are git-tracked, so
+SEC-004's public-repo angle was never implicated. It was a DEFENCE-IN-DEPTH defect, not a
+live exposure. Corrected in its own commit before any remediation, because a ledger row
+that overstates an exposure is its own defect.
+
+**Operator-approved mutation, executed and read-back verified.** `chmod 600` on
+`terraform.tfstate.backup` and `terraform.tfstate.pre-G16-20260721`. All four state files
+now 0600 (matching the live `terraform.tfstate` and `pre-G6`), and the checker's
+`E2 WORLD-READABLE` finding cleared.
+
+**Retention DEFERRED by ruling, not forgotten.** Question put: keep the two `pre-*`
+state-surgery snapshots, delete them, keep permanently, or move them out of the clone.
+Operator selected "Keep, decide at stage close" -- both gates (G6, G16) are CLOSED and the
+outer plan has converged to zero diff repeatedly since, but deletion is irreversible with no
+other copy of that state, so it belongs in the close-out review.
+
+**Two things deliberately NOT done:** the umask CAUSE was out of the ruled scope, so a
+future `tofu apply` may write 0664 again -- the P5 gate will catch it, which is the system
+working rather than a gap. And the underlying issue that the key reaches state files in
+plaintext at all is DOCFIX-175, with rotation owed under SEC-018/-019; neither is closed by
+this.
+
+**Caveat recorded in `creds-matrix-notes.md`:** E2 reports file MODE, not reachability.
+That is the right default for a gate -- directory modes change and a `cp -p` escapes them --
+but whoever writes up an E2 finding owes a reachability check before using the word
+"exposed". This defect is exactly why.
+
+**Revert:** `chmod 664` on the two files (restores the defect) and reopen the row.
+
+## Item 21 -- tier 2 gate shape RULED + wired; --pending-stage replaced by a coupled projection
+
+Two operator decisions, both taking the recommendation.
+
+**Q1: how to gate tier 2.** Selected: **local-only blocking; remote operator-run.**
+`preflight.sh` P5 now runs `creds-matrix.py --tier2` -- tier 1 STATIC plus tier 2 LOCAL,
+which is HERMETIC: no ssh, no sudo, no reachability coupling. It already catches SEC-021's
+three dc0 on-disk absences without leaving the jumphost, so the local half is not a token
+subset. The REMOTE half stays an operator-run check at DC-standup close and stage close.
+
+Reasoning, recorded because it will be re-litigated: wiring `--remote --privileged` into the
+deploy gate would let an unrelated host outage, a NOPASSWD change, or a MAAS snap refresh
+(already recorded as fragile across refreshes) turn the deploy gate red for reasons that are
+not about credentials. A gate that fails environmentally is a gate people learn to bypass,
+and a bypassed credential gate is worse than none because it still looks like coverage.
+This repo already made the same call once: `run-tests-all.sh:7-8` -- "Deliberately NOT
+folded into preflight.sh ... different cadence." And preflight already demonstrates the
+failure mode: P4 currently reads `FAIL: MAAS unreachable` because it runs on vcloud while
+MAAS lives on the headend (D-128).
+
+**Q2: how to supply the stage input.** Selected: **declared file + lint coupling.**
+`--pending-stage` is REPLACED by `creds-manifests/stages-reached`. A gate whose verdict
+depends on a hand-typed parameter can be widened silently -- and GA-R1 puts status in
+CURRENT-STATE and nowhere else, so the declaration is a machine-readable PROJECTION of it,
+not a second authority. New **repo-lint L12** couples the two on the L10 pattern: editing
+the projection without CURRENT-STATE in the same change set FAILS, because a drifted
+projection makes the gate DEFER REAL ABSENCES, which is a false green.
+
+**EXHAUSTIVE BY CONSTRUCTION, both bounds.** An unclassified mint-stage is a hard FAIL and
+a classified-but-unused one is a stale-declaration FAIL. Neither default is safe:
+assume-reached floods the run with false absences, assume-pending silently defers real ones.
+That check earned itself immediately -- it caught `stage4`, which I had classified as
+reached: Stage 4 is OPEN and executing but **mints no credential**, so no matrix row carries
+the token and it did not belong in the file.
+
+**A self-inflicted break, caught by the existing harness.** I first folded L12 into L10's
+message, renaming its prefix to `L10/L12` -- which broke five repo-lint cases that grep the
+established `L10` id. Reverted: L10 keeps its message, L12 is its own check with its own id.
+New rules get their own messages; they do not rebrand old ones.
+
+Harnesses: creds-matrix 52 -> **56** (T52 refuses without a declaration, T53/T54 the two
+exhaustiveness bounds, T55 the same absent credential defers under `pending` and FAILS under
+`reached`); repo-lint 45 -> **47** (T45 L12 fires alone, T46 does not fire when the authority
+moves with it); preflight 10. The per-fixture stage declaration is DERIVED from each
+fixture's own matrix -- a fixed default cannot satisfy an exhaustiveness check in both
+directions.
+
+Gauntlet ALL GREEN (80), repo-lint 0-fail, tier-1 finding-class baseline unchanged.
+
+**Revert:** point P5 back at bare `creds-matrix.py`, drop L12 and `stages-reached`, restore
+`--pending-stage`.
+
+## Item 22 -- tier 3 behavioural half BUILT (boundary + cadence operator-ruled)
+
+Operator selected **"Full -- including OpenStack service credentials"** and **"Stage close
++ DC standup close"**. I had recommended the passive-only boundary and flagged the costs
+(audit-record side effects, lockout risk, liveness being a time-of-check snapshot); the
+operator ruled otherwise and the full scope is built.
+
+**V2 (passive, zero authentication) fires today on a real defect.** A credential whose SEC
+row declares it BURNED/REVOKED/COMPROMISED must not also be registered as a healthy
+consolidated copy. SEC-006 has recorded the NetBox upstream token as BURNED -- "must be
+revoked + reissued, not merely rotated" -- since 2026-07-12, while the matrix carried it as
+an ordinary `consolidated` row. Nothing reconciled those two surfaces. Keyword matching on
+ledger prose is fragile, so it is deliberately conservative: a small explicit word set, and
+every hit REPORTS the matched text so a human can check the basis rather than trust it.
+
+**`scripts/creds-probe.sh` is a SEPARATE script, deliberately.** A behavioural probe must
+USE a credential, and `creds-matrix.py` is metadata-only by an ENFORCED invariant (T22 bans
+content-reading verbs, T51 bans content-transfer verbs). Folding probes in would have meant
+relaxing that guard, and a guard relaxed once stays relaxed. The credential-using component
+is therefore small, separate, and auditable on its own terms -- and it still never prints a
+secret.
+
+**Safety properties, each with a reason:** never retry a failed authentication (retry loops
+are what lock accounts, and the MAAS `admin` identity backs 19 automation call sites);
+never argv; never echo; stage-aware (a `pending` credential SKIPS, it does not fail, or
+every stage-5 OpenStack credential would read as broken); and **per-tenant credentials are
+REFUSED BY CONSTRUCTION** -- a declaration cannot opt them back in, because probing one
+means authenticating AS a tenant (D-069, ruling 3). NOT a deploy gate, for the same reason
+tier 2's remote half is not.
+
+**A false green in my own first real run.** `ssh` inside a `while read` loop consumed the
+loop's stdin: probe 1 ran, probes 2-13 were silently skipped, and the run exited **0**. A
+partial run reporting clean is precisely the failure class this tool exists to catch, in
+the tool itself. Fixed with `ssh -n` plus a redirect, and locked by a TOTAL ACCOUNTING check
+-- every declared probe must land in exactly one bucket or the run is declared VOID.
+Regression-locked as T5; T8 asserts the `-n` that is easy to drop when editing the command.
+
+Declared coverage is 13 probes: 3 active today (one ssh key, two unauthenticated endpoint
+checks that prove the service answers WITHOUT spending the credential), 10 skipped -- 4 as
+stage-pending, 6 as `declared-only` with the reason recorded in the file so the decision is
+visible rather than an omission. OpenStack service credentials are declared NOW and will
+skip until Stage 5 lands, so the coverage exists the moment the stage runs.
+
+Harness `tests/creds-probe` **9/9** (gauntlet 80 -> **81**); phase-3 DC-standup DoD wired.
+
+**Revert:** delete `scripts/creds-probe.sh`, `creds-manifests/probes`, `tests/creds-probe/`,
+and the V2 block; drop the DoD paragraph.
diff --git a/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260727-creds-consolidation.md b/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260727-creds-consolidation.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eafa31a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260727-creds-consolidation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,499 @@
+# changelog 2026-07-27 -- credential consolidation batch (SEC-021(b), SEC-025, V2 deferral)
+
+Session changelog (ONE per session, GA-R2/D1). Status claims live ONLY in
+`docs/CURRENT-STATE.md`; this file records WHAT changed, WHY, and HOW TO REVERT.
+
+Branch `dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy`. Stage 4 stays OPEN; no gate closed.
+
+Operator question that opened the work (2026-07-27): "Check and confirm that we have a
+consolidated set of login creds on vcloud for all accounts currently created. Are there any
+creds that should be in place that are missing, need to be created, or have not been moved
+into their vcloud folders?" Operator direction after the audit: "clear the whole
+consolidation batch first" -- i.e. the consolidation items, NOT the dc0 edge-API re-mint,
+which was presented as a separate live-mutation item and is deliberately NOT done here.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Audit capture (read-only)
+
+`docs/audit/creds-consolidation-audit-20260727.txt` -- the full three-site sweep, metadata
+only, no credential value read anywhere. Sections: live MAAS account enumeration,
+`creds-audit` x3, both jumphost and headend folder listings, the full
+`creds-matrix.py --tier2 --tier3 --remote --privileged` run, the cardinality/per-site
+blind-spot evidence, the human-principal row set, and the host-role declaration gap.
+
+**The finding that drove everything else:** `creds-audit` read CLEAN on all three sites
+while the matrix returned 13 findings, and the two most consequential gaps were in NEITHER
+surface -- they were found by enumerating the accounts that ACTUALLY EXIST. The register
+cannot report the absence of a credential it has no row for. `creds-audit` CLEAN remains
+not-evidence-of-completeness.
+
+Revert: delete the capture file (it is a record, nothing depends on it).
+
+## 2. dc1 svc public key backfilled to the headend store
+
+`voffice1:~/vr1-dc1-creds/vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519.pub` placed (0644), sha256-verified identical
+to the vcloud copy. Clears one `E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT` (SEC-022). Public-key material only.
+dc0's shadow store already held both halves; dc1's held only the private -- the mirror image
+of the dc0 gap in item 3.
+
+Revert: `ssh voffice1 'rm ~/vr1-dc1-creds/vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519.pub'`.
+
+## 3. dc0 MAAS->libvirt power key consolidated to vcloud (SEC-021(b))
+
+`~/vr1-dc0-creds/vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519` (0600) + `.pub` (0644), plus two rows in
+`creds-manifests/vr1-dc0.manifest`. This is SEC-021(b) executed as written: "dc0's key
+should gain a jumphost copy + manifest row". Clears `S2` x2 and `E1` x2.
+
+MEASURED before acting, because the naming looked like a defect and was not:
+
+- The headend's `maas-virsh_ed25519` and the region MAAS snap's `id_ed25519` are the SAME
+  key (fingerprint `SHA256:Dt/YXTXSF4nXGj9cz8f0owL+qreVpMYBVm/igW10FXY`).
+- It IS the dedicated SEC-012 key, not a reuse: the dc0 SERVICE key is a different key
+  (`SHA256:DBkeStCyf2qGi3SYuvN6hQ+EsepmhpkN9oulLz09uAs`), which is exactly what SEC-012's
+  ruling ("Dedicated MAAS->libvirt key" over reusing the dc0 service key) requires.
+- dc0 having NO per-host block in the snap's `ssh config` (so it uses the default identity)
+  is the RULED design, not drift -- SEC-016 states it: "Host 172.31.0.6 -> that
+  IdentityFile, so 172.31.0.2/dc0 keeps SEC-012".
+
+So NO re-mint was performed and no live power path was touched. The private half was copied
+from the voffice1 shadow store, sha256-verified byte-identical at both ends. The public half
+had never existed anywhere and was DERIVED with `ssh-keygen -y`, its fingerprint verified
+equal to the snap's installed key.
+
+Two things deliberately NOT done, both recorded rather than fixed:
+- The key's INTERNAL comment still reads `maas-virsh-pod (D-123 amendment)` -- it was minted
+  for the qemu+ssh pod attempt that was refuted the same day, and the per-machine
+  `power_type=virsh` ruling correctly retained it. Rewriting a comment alters key material;
+  the file name is now authoritative and the manifest comment carries the explanation.
+- Manifest `source` reads `local` to stay consistent with `--render` (which derives it and
+  would otherwise raise an S3 drift FAIL); the true provenance is in the manifest comment,
+  which S3 explicitly treats as out of scope. Writing `voffice1:<path>` there would have
+  traded one finding for another, and writing a custody change would have created two NEW
+  S5 asymmetries, since S5 compares `custody`.
+
+Revert: `rm ~/vr1-dc0-creds/vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519{,.pub}` and drop the two rows +
+comment block from `creds-manifests/vr1-dc0.manifest`. The headend and snap copies were
+never modified, so power control is unaffected either way.
+
+## 4. NetBox web-GUI admin password consolidated (SEC-025 OPENED)
+
+`~/vr1-office1-creds/netbox-admin-password` (0600), byte-identical to
+`office1-netbox:/root/netbox-secrets/admin.pass` (sha256-verified both ends, 28 bytes, value
+never printed or echoed). Register changes: the `netbox-admin` netbox row custody
+`off-manifest-known` -> `source-of-record`; a NEW jumphost row with custody `verbatim-copy`
+(so tier-3 V1 now asserts the two copies stay byte-identical); a manifest row; an extended
+`n-netbox-vm-secrets` note.
+
+This was a HUMAN GUI login that had never left the VM it was minted on -- the third instance
+of one miss class (SEC-009's `api.token`, SEC-020's `admin.pass`, now this). It produced no
+finding before this session because `off-manifest-known` asserts nothing about the jumphost.
+
+SEC-025 is opened for the exposure the remediation CREATES (a plaintext human password at
+rest on the jumphost), not for the gap it closed -- the same shape as SEC-007 and SEC-020,
+with the same rotation obligation and the same both-copies-or-stale-trap hazard.
+
+Revert: `rm ~/vr1-office1-creds/netbox-admin-password`; revert the matrix row pair, the
+manifest row, the note paragraph, and the SEC-025 ledger row. The VM copy is untouched.
+
+## 5. V2 learns the ruled-deferral state, and gains its first harness cases
+
+`scripts/creds-matrix.py`: `load_sec_states` now also reports whether a declared-dead SEC row
+carries an operator-ruled deferral; `v2_declared_state` emits `V2 ACKNOWLEDGED DEFERRAL`
+instead of a FAIL when it does.
+
+WHY: SEC-006 has read "**DEFERRED by operator ruling 2026-07-13: revoke at completion of this
+deployment**" since long before this checker existed. V2 was reporting that standing operator
+ruling as a defect on every run -- which is both wrong and corrosive, because a finding that
+can never be actioned trains readers to skip findings. **Reissuing the token would have
+contravened the ruling**, so the register was the thing that needed to change, not the
+credential.
+
+The acknowledgement is NOT a pass. It names the id, the SEC row, the state word and the
+ruling text, and states that the credential "is still live and still exposed until that
+ruling is discharged".
+
+`DEFERRAL_RE` demands BOTH the emphasis-cased state word AND explicit attribution to an
+operator ruling (the GA-R5 bar), and `[^|]` stops it crossing a ledger table cell. A looser
+match would let prose that merely DISCUSSES deferring buy silence -- the false-green class
+this register exists to prevent. T58 and T59 are the regression locks for exactly that.
+
+Also added `--ledger` (default unchanged). V2 read the SEC register via `--repo`, which the
+harness must point at the REAL repo for S4 mint-ref resolution -- so there was no fixture path
+to the ledger and **V2 had shipped with ZERO harness cases**. The override is what makes it
+testable; it also de-couples the existing tier-3 cases from the live ledger.
+
+New cases T56-T59 (harness 56 -> 60): the founding invariant still fails; a ruled deferral is
+acknowledged and still says EXPOSED; unruled "deferred" prose still fails; a claim spanning
+two ledger cells does not count as ruled.
+
+NOTE: tier 3 is NOT part of preflight `P5` (which runs tier 1 + tier-2-local), so this does
+not change the blocking deploy gate's behaviour.
+
+Revert: `git revert` this commit's changes to `scripts/creds-matrix.py` and
+`tests/creds-matrix/run-tests.sh`; V2 returns to failing on SEC-006 every run.
+
+## 6. Permission allowlist widened for read-only commands (`.claude/settings.json`)
+
+Transcript scan of the 44 most-recent session JSONLs across both project dirs, counting Bash
+leading command+subcommand pairs (and splitting each candidate into LOCAL vs
+nested-inside-`ssh`, since a command that only ever runs inside `ssh host '...'` gains nothing
+from its own rule -- the outer `ssh` is what the permission layer matches).
+
+ADDED to `permissions.allow` only -- 13 entries, 31 -> 44. `ask`, `deny`, `env` and `hooks`
+untouched; nothing removed or reordered; JSON re-validated and de-duplicated:
+
+    bash scripts/creds-audit.sh *          (33)   bash scripts/dc-dc-ceph-disk-budget.sh * (13)
+    bash scripts/site-baseleg.sh check*     (5)   tofu validate* + tofu -chdir=* validate*  (25)
+    tofu state list* + -chdir variant      (16)   tofu state show*                           (3)
+    tofu providers schema*                 (13)   tofu version*                             (11)
+    ip route*                              (22)   systemctl is-active *                      (6)
+
+DELIBERATELY NOT ADDED, and this is the substantive half of the item:
+
+- **`ssh` (693 calls), `scp` (47), `virsh` (234)** -- the three biggest prompt sources, left
+  alone. They are this cloud's MUTATION TRANSPORT. CLAUDE.md hard rule 3 makes the `ask` rules
+  the enforcement mechanism for per-mutation approval and says not to work around them, and
+  the `Bash(ssh *)` disposition is an OPEN operator item queued at the 2026-07-23 close.
+  Allowlisting any ssh shape would bypass the gate AND pre-empt an unresolved operator
+  decision. **This item does NOT discharge that queued prune -- it is still open.**
+- **`python3 scripts/creds-matrix.py` (76 local runs -- the largest genuine miss)** -- skipped
+  because `Bash(*creds-matrix.py *--privileged*)` is an `ask` rule added 2026-07-26 precisely
+  after the auto-mode classifier incident. Every prefix pattern wide enough to cover the
+  observed `... 2>&1 | tail` forms would ALSO match `--privileged`, and allow-vs-ask precedence
+  was not verified this session. Adding a rule that might silently downgrade an
+  operator-installed gate is exactly the class of change hard rule 3 forbids. Needs the
+  precedence question answered first, then a narrow set of EXACT forms.
+- **`tofu plan` (54)** -- read-only in effect, but CURRENT-STATE section 10 says in terms "Do
+  NOT re-run `tofu plan` casually against live state". The prompt is deliberate friction.
+- `python3 -c`/heredocs (324) and shells: arbitrary code execution. `curl` (114): a mutation
+  vector via `-X`/`-d`. `tofu fmt` (26): rewrites files. `tofu init` (10): mutates
+  `.terraform/`. `nft list` (10): normally needs `sudo`, which correctly stays `ask`.
+
+TWO OBSERVATIONS, no action taken (flagged, not fixed): several existing allow entries are
+redundant with Claude Code's built-in auto-allow (`Bash(git status*)`, `Bash(git log*)`,
+`Bash(grep *)`, `Bash(ls *)`, `Bash(jq *)`, `Bash(cat scripts/*)`) -- harmless, and removing
+entries was out of scope; and `Bash(git pull*)` sits in `allow` although it is a fetch-and-merge
+that mutates the working tree.
+
+Revert: drop the 13 appended lines from `permissions.allow` in `.claude/settings.json`. No
+other field was touched, so the revert is a contiguous deletion.
+
+## 7. Stage 4 close-out opened: `dc-mirror.sh check` was FALSE-GREENING the mirror gate
+
+Operator direction: close Stage 4 before resuming the DC1 Stage-5 chain. The Stage 4 DoD
+(`runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md:472-485`) has six bullets; four are already met
+and captured. Verifying the fifth -- "per-DC mirror reachable" -- found that **the check the
+gate would close on could not fail.**
+
+`scripts/dc-mirror.sh:271-273` tested `[ -f last-sync.status ]` and printed the file's contents
+behind an unconditional `OK`. So the status word was displayed but never asserted on, and the
+check exited PASS regardless. MEASURED on both racks, 2026-07-27:
+
+- **dc0** read `FAIL 2026-07-27T00:54:54Z ubuntu=255 uca=0` -> printed `OK`, check PASS.
+- **dc1** read `RUNNING 2026-07-23T21:49:35Z` -- a marker FOUR DAYS stale, left by the
+  debmirror the D-135 amendment killed with a signal, so it never wrote a terminal state ->
+  printed `OK`, check PASS.
+
+FIXED: the status word is now case-analysed. `OK*` passes; `FAIL*` misses; an ABSENT file
+misses (it was a passing `note`, but nothing has attested the content); an unrecognised word
+REFUSES rather than defaulting to success. `RUNNING*` is deliberately neither -- in-flight and
+died-mid-run are indistinguishable from the file alone, so it reports an explicit UNKNOWN and
+cross-checks the unit: a RUNNING marker with no active unit is named as a corpse, not a
+success. Harness `tests/dc-mirror/run-tests.sh` **24/24** (was 19); T20-T24 lock each status
+word, T24 specifically locks out the return of the exact defective shape.
+
+PROOF THE FIX WORKS -- re-run against both live racks, and the gate is now honestly NOT MET:
+`dc-mirror check (dc0): FAIL` on the failed sync, `dc-mirror check (dc1): FAIL` on the stale
+marker. Capture `docs/audit/stage4-mirror-gate-20260727.txt`.
+
+SUBSTANCE BEHIND THE TWO FAILURES (measured, not inferred):
+
+- **dc0's mirror CONTENT is complete and intact** -- 949G ubuntu + 342M cloud-archive, all
+  three dists (`jammy`, `jammy-updates`, `jammy-security`) plus `pool` and `project`. What
+  failed is the overnight INCREMENTAL: `Download of dists/jammy/Release failed: 500 read
+  timeout` -> "Failed to download some Release, Release.gpg or InRelease files!" -> debmirror
+  aborted the ubuntu leg with 255. The UCA leg succeeded (`uca=0`). A transient upstream fetch
+  failure, not mirror damage. The daily timer re-arms for 2026-07-28 00:14:48.
+- **dc1's debmirror is dormant only ACCIDENTALLY.** `dc1-mirror-sync.timer` is `enabled` with
+  an EMPTY `NextElapseUSecRealtime`, because the service sits in `failed`/`Result=signal` from
+  the 07-24 pause. The D-135 amendment RULED it paused and "kept dormant as the fallback", but
+  nothing enforces that -- the dormancy is a side effect of a failed unit, not a declared
+  state, so a `systemctl reset-failed` (or possibly a reboot) re-arms a 330G -> ~949G pull on
+  a rack whose ruled artifact path is now the proxy. dc1's PROXY meanwhile checks **PASS**
+  genuinely: apt-cacher-ng active on `.4:3142`, serving both archive and UCA `Release` with 200.
+
+Revert: `git revert` this commit's `scripts/dc-mirror.sh` + `tests/dc-mirror/run-tests.sh`
+changes -- the check returns to passing unconditionally on last-sync. No live state was
+altered by this item; both racks were read only.
+
+## 8. G17 opened by ruling; DoD bullets 5 and 6 repaired (DOCFIX-204)
+
+**RULING (GA-R5), 2026-07-27.** Question as presented: "The node-side half of bullet 5. Nodes
+are powered off by the READY-handoff ruling, so no node-side probe can run as things stand.
+Either a gated rescue-boot check on one node per DC now (closes it inside Stage 4), or split it
+into its own gate row targeted at Stage 5 first boot (GA-R6 E3 explicitly permits this; a
+conditional close is not permitted)." Operator answer, exact utterance: **"split it into its
+own gate row"**. Recorded in the **G17** row of `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md`, which is the authority;
+committed and pushed before any dependent work (GA-R5).
+
+**G17 -- "Per-DC artifact source reachable FROM A NODE"**, [V], OPEN. Per DC: dc0 -> `curl -sI
+http://10.12.8.4/` returns 200 from a booted node; dc1 -> apt fetches through the proxy at
+`10.12.68.4:3142`, because dc1's ruled artifact path is the CACHING PROXY and it has no
+node-facing mirror (D-135 amendment) -- checking it as one fails by design. Natural trigger is
+Stage 5 first boot. The row states explicitly that G17 is NOT a Stage-5 precondition and must
+not be conflated with one: Stage 5's bootstrap needs OPEN edge egress for the juju agent stream
+and snaps (D-135 items 2-3 unbuilt), which is a different path from the apt artifact source.
+
+What REMAINS in Stage 4 for bullet 5 is the rack-side half -- the source answers on its own
+address with an attested-current sync. dc1's proxy already PASSES; dc0 does not yet, pending
+the sync re-run (item 7).
+
+**DOCFIX-204 -- bullet 6 was unsatisfiable, and its stale text had spread to four surfaces.**
+"NTP from the DC's own OPNsense edge working" is SUPERSEDED by D-129(iv) (RULED 2026-07-21,
+"Keep MAAS hierarchy (Recommended)", no NTP role on the edge). The DoD asked you to confirm the
+edge is the time source, which the ruling had already refused -- so the bullet could never be
+met by a correctly-built DC. Repaired in:
+
+- `runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md` DoD -- bullet 6 STRUCK with its supersession
+  cited; bullet 5 rewritten per-DC with the split recorded.
+- the same runbook's **Step 7, rewritten**. It had THREE defects, each recorded rather than
+  quietly patched because the old text is the kind that gets followed: it still branched on
+  gap #5 ("if the mirror does not exist yet, STOP") which D-135 resolved; it applied one mirror
+  check to both DCs, which fails on dc1 by design; and both its checks said "from a deployed
+  node", which the READY-handoff ruling makes impossible in this stage. Now it invokes the two
+  site checkers (with the hard-rule-2 note to take rack transit IPs from `lib-hosts.sh`, never
+  memory) and carries the MAAS-hierarchy time check as a Stage-5/G17 observation.
+- `docs/dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md:206` -- the Gate cell also still said "Nodes deployed",
+  contradicting DOCFIX-200's READY handoff. Both fixed.
+- `docs/dc-dc-buildout-design.md:120` -- corrected with the supersession noted inline.
+- `runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md:26` -- prerequisites said "nodes Deployed",
+  which is precisely the expectation DOCFIX-200 removed to stop Stage 5 breaking; plus a new
+  block making this stage the OWNER of G17's captures, with the warning that first boot is the
+  observation window and missing it forces a deliberate rescue-boot.
+
+Revert: `git revert` this commit's doc/runbook changes; the G17 row and the DOCFIX-204 edits
+are text-only, and no live state was touched.
+
+## 9. dc0 sync re-run; dc1 full mirror REMOVED after moving the proxy's net layer (D-135 amendment)
+
+**dc0 (gated).** `systemctl start dc0-mirror-sync.service` -> `OK 2026-07-27T08:43:46Z
+ubuntu=0 uca=0` in **20 seconds**, confirming the transient-`500` diagnosis exactly. Fixed
+`dc-mirror.sh check dc0` now reports **PASS** -- trustworthy precisely because the same check
+FAILED on the same rack twenty minutes earlier. **Stage 4 DoD bullet 5 is now MET for both DCs.**
+
+**dc1 -- the record was wrong about intent.** CURRENT-STATE said the debmirror was "PAUSED ...
+kept dormant as the fallback". Operator, exact utterance: "DC0 is the test of a full mirror.
+DC1 is the test of the mirror proxy. DC1 needed the partially created full mirror and
+associated script/files/settings removed." Recorded as a **D-135 AMENDMENT 2026-07-27**: the
+per-DC split is the DELIBERATE EXPERIMENT, not an interim -- no fallback, no later
+convergence. That also supersedes the "DC1's proxy is REPLACED by a full mirror afterward"
+claim, which was in THREE places (D-135, CURRENT-STATE:109, `dc-cache-proxy.sh:6`); all three
+corrected.
+
+**The coupling trap, and why sequencing mattered.** Asked whether to rip down and rebuild
+rather than pick and choose, I found the rebuild path was BLOCKED, not merely slower:
+`dc-cache-proxy.sh` did not own its utility net layer -- its header said it REUSES
+`dc-mirror.sh`'s `<site>-mirror-net.service` and "fails loud if absent". So on dc1 three files
+named `dc1-mirror-*` (net unit, apply helper, resolved DNS drop-in) were load-bearing FOR THE
+PROXY. Therefore (a) the 07-23 changelog's recorded removal ("stop/disable ... -net.service,
+rm the generated files") would have silently killed the proxy, the Stage-4 bullet-5 PASS, and
+the Stage-5 dc1 apt path; and (b) the proxy could not be REBUILT afterward, since nothing but
+`dc-mirror.sh install` created the net layer -- rebuilding a PROXY meant reinstalling the whole
+MIRROR apparatus, enabled daily timer included. Operator direction: "Do the net layer first,
+then rip it all down."
+
+**Step 1 -- net layer moved (script change).** `dc-cache-proxy.sh` now owns
+`<site>-cache-proxy-net.service` + `<site>-cache-proxy-net-apply` + its own
+`resolved.conf.d/<site>-cache-proxy.conf`, reusing dc-mirror's proven mechanism (bridge
+resolved from the libvirt net NAME at runtime, hard rule 3). Neutrally named so a proxy-only
+DC carries NO mirror-named dependency. Idempotent `ip addr replace` / `ip route replace` on
+identical MEASURED values, so the two net units coexist safely where a site runs both -- dc0
+is unaffected. `check` asserts the ARTIFACTS, not just the live address/route, because
+asserting only the live effect would PASS while the layer was really the mirror's: it would
+look independent and break on teardown, the exact failure being removed.
+
+Harness **20/20** (was 15). **T12 was REPLACED, not deleted** -- it asserted the superseded
+design ("net layer reused ... no ip addr/route writes; points at dc-mirror.sh"), so it failed
+by design once the ruling landed. It is now INVERTED (T12: owns the layer) plus T12b-T12f
+(no operative dc-mirror referral; proxy-named artifacts; enabled-not-just-started; check
+asserts artifacts; idempotent verbs only). T12b is deliberately scoped to NON-COMMENT lines:
+the header's account of WHY the coupling was removed cites `dc-mirror.sh install`, and deleting
+that history to satisfy a grep would lose the reason the trap existed.
+
+**Step 2 -- independence PROVEN before deleting anything.** A `oneshot` with
+`RemainAfterExit=yes` does not undo its work on stop, so merely stopping
+`dc1-mirror-net.service` would have proven nothing. The live state was removed outright --
+`ip addr del 10.12.68.4/22` (count -> 0) and `ip route del default via 10.12.64.1` (count ->
+0) -- then the proxy-owned unit applied ALONE restored both, and `check dc1` returned **PASS
+with the mirror net unit disabled**.
+
+**Step 3 -- wholesale removal, no picking and choosing.** All mirror units, the timer, the sync
+helper, the nginx vhost, the resolved drop-in, the `debmirror` package, and the **330G** of
+partial mirror (33,037 files; `rm -rf` **47.6s**; rack disk 339G -> 9.0G). Zero mirror-named
+residue; every proxy artifact present; proxy PASS throughout and never down. Capture
+`docs/audit/dc1-mirror-teardown-20260727.txt`.
+
+nginx **left installed, deliberately**: it was a mirror prereq, but with the vhost gone it is a
+generic server on its stock `default` vhost. Removing the metapackage while `nginx-core` keeps
+running is a half-measure worse than either extreme, and a full purge is scope creep on a rack
+host. If dc1 is ever rebuilt as a mirror, `dc-mirror.sh install` fail-louds with the exact apt line.
+
+Revert: reinstall via `dc-mirror.sh install dc1` (recreates units/vhost/timer; needs the
+`debmirror` package reinstalled first) then `sync dc1` to re-pull ~950G. **The 330G partial is
+NOT recoverable** -- deliberately, per the amendment. The proxy net layer reverts by
+`git revert` of `scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh` + its harness, then re-running
+`dc-mirror.sh install dc1` to restore the mirror-owned layer.
+
+## 10. Carve residue cleaned (108 fabrics -> 17); dc1's leftover nginx removed
+
+Capture `docs/audit/stage4-carve-residue-cleanup-20260727.txt`. Both items were queued to the
+stage close at the 2026-07-23 carve.
+
+**nginx on dc1.** Purged `nginx` + `nginx-common` (dry-run first: nothing else depended on them,
+and no `nginx-core` was installed), plus autoremove of `liblockfile-simple-perl` and
+`liblog-agent-perl` -- debmirror's orphaned perl deps. `/etc/nginx` gone, nothing listening on
+:80, proxy still PASS on :3142. dc0 keeps its nginx and was re-verified unaffected (it serves
+the mirror).
+
+**Carve residue: 108 fabrics -> 17.** Deleted subnet id=8 `192.168.1.0/24` (the superseded
+OPNsense FACTORY LAN -- both edges were re-addressed to 10.12.4.1 / 10.12.64.1), then fabric-5,
+then the 90 auto-created empties (ids 6..95).
+
+The audit caught an **ordering dependency the original flag did not state**: the
+192.168.1.0/24 subnet was the ONLY occupant of fabric-5, so deleting the fabric first would
+have cascaded the subnet away rather than removing it cleanly. Subnet first, then the fabric.
+
+METHOD, chosen because of this repo's own history: a MAAS fabric delete cascades to its VLANs,
+and the 2026-07-21 pod-delete incident cost 9 machine records precisely because the association
+check ran AFTER the delete. So emptiness was PROVEN per fabric -- zero subnets, zero ipranges,
+zero node interfaces across all of its VLANs -- against a fresh occupancy snapshot (fabrics +
+subnets + ipranges + every machine's `interface_set`) taken immediately before the batch, and
+the cascade check was re-run afterwards as well.
+
+KEPT, all verified occupied and enumerated in the capture: office1 base + GUA (fabric-0),
+office1 compose with its 2 LXD guests (fabric-1), both transits (fabric-2 / fabric-141), both
+metal-admin/boot fabrics with 9 nodes each (fabric-4 / fabric-142), libvirt default (fabric-3),
+and the 10 named plane fabrics (`vr1-dc0-*` / `vr1-dc1-*`, 9-18 interfaces each).
+
+POST-STATE: 18 Ready + 2 Deployed office1 guests, all 18 still `power_type=virsh`, 7 interfaces
+each (6 flat planes per D-133 + br-ex), **ZERO orphaned interfaces**, placement tags 9+9 intact,
+and both DCs' artifact paths re-verified PASS after everything.
+
+Revert: fabrics and subnets are MAAS records, not config -- there is no undo. Recreating them
+would mean `maas admin fabrics create` + `subnets create`, but nothing needs them: the 90 were
+auto-created empties, and 192.168.1.0/24 was a superseded factory address. The nginx purge
+reverts with `apt-get install nginx` (dc1 has no use for it while it is the proxy DC).
+
+## 11. SEC-024 retention RULED -- keep both state-surgery snapshots
+
+**RULING (GA-R5), 2026-07-27.** Question as presented: delete both `pre-*` state-surgery
+snapshots (cleanest, closes SEC-024 fully), keep both and let P5 keep watching them, or keep
+`pre-G6` and delete `pre-G16` -- noting both gates are CLOSED, both carry the Office1 MAAS API
+key in plaintext per DOCFIX-175, and deletion is irreversible with no other copy of that
+pre-surgery state. Operator answer, exact utterance: **"Keep both"**.
+
+`opentofu/terraform.tfstate.pre-G6-20260719` and `.pre-G16-20260721` are RETAINED at 0600,
+neither git-tracked, as the only record of what the state looked like before the two direct
+tfstate edits (G6 autostart injection, G16 `channels = []`).
+
+SEC-024 therefore stays **OPEN as a standing WATCH, not an open remediation**: its mode defect
+is fixed, but the umask CAUSE was out of ruled scope, so a future apply may rewrite 0664 and
+preflight P5 is the detection. Recorded in both the SEC-024 disposition cell and CURRENT-STATE.
+Open SEC count unchanged at 21.
+
+## 12. set-interface-v4 reload amendment RULED + implemented (the last queued stage-close item)
+
+**RULING (GA-R5), 2026-07-27.** Question as presented: (a) add `configctl filter reload` to the
+script's `--commit` path; (b) leave the script and rely on DC standup DoD item 8; (c) add it
+behind an opt-in flag. Operator answer, exact utterance: **"a"**. OPS under GA-R3 -- a script fix
+completing an already-documented operation, governed by D-113; no new D-number.
+
+THE DEFECT (appendix-A, measured on the fresh dc1 edge 2026-07-23): `--commit` ran `configctl
+interface reconfigure`, which applies the address to the kernel but does NOT regenerate the pf
+ruleset, so OPNsense never creates its automatic outbound-NAT rules for the (re-)addressed LAN.
+Forwarded LAN packets leave the WAN un-NAT'd and replies never return -- the edge passes NO LAN
+traffic while looking perfectly configured. Self-masking: any later plugin install or config
+apply reloads the filter as a side effect, so dc0's 07-20 qga work hid it there until dc1, which
+had no later work, exposed it at the mirror build.
+
+Option (b) was rejected on evidence, not taste: DoD item 8 already existed and did not fire at
+dc1, and prose-only controls have a measured failure record here (D-137's own enforcement sat as
+prose at `phase-3:498` and missed BOTH DC standups).
+
+**THE PLACEMENT IS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE FIX, and my first attempt got it wrong.** I initially put
+the reload on the next line of the `interface reconfigure` heredoc. That would have been a fix
+that fixes nothing exactly when it matters: re-addressing the interface you arrived on drops the
+session DURING the reconfigure, so a following command in that stream never executes on the edge
+-- and that drop case IS this incident's scenario (dc1's LAN moved 192.168.1.1 -> 10.12.64.1 over
+the LAN itself). Caught before shipping. As delivered, the reload runs over a FRESH connection to
+`PROBE_HOST`, the address the edge answers on after the move.
+
+Also added a `pfctl -s nat` read-back with the `proto carp` boilerplate filtered out -- that
+boilerplate-only state is precisely appendix-A's broken-state signature. It is REPORTED, not
+gated: at an edge's very first addressing there may legitimately be no gateway and so no NAT to
+generate, and hard-failing would block a correct run. The hard gate stays address-on-the-kernel.
+
+Harness **59/59** (was 53). Cases 15-15f: the reload exists; it is NOT inside the reconfigure
+heredoc; it targets `PROBE_HOST`; the NAT read-back exists with carp excluded; the read-back does
+not hard-exit; and appendix-A no longer calls the amendment an unruled queued option. **Case 15f
+caught a real inconsistency** -- appendix-A still said "not yet ruled" -- and case 15e caught a
+bug in my own first draft of it, which scanned to EOF and so failed the script for having the
+very hard gate the case exists to preserve.
+
+appendix-A's entry rewritten: the FIX stays (for an edge already in this state), plus a
+PREVENTED-IN-THE-TOOL block recording the placement detail and why prose prevention was rejected.
+
+Revert: `git revert` the `scripts/opnsense-set-interface-v4.sh` +
+`tests/opnsense-set-interface-v4/run-tests.sh` + appendix-A changes. No live edge was touched --
+both DC edges are already addressed, so this affects only the NEXT edge addressing.
+
+---
+
+## Findings LOGGED, not actioned (hard rule 1)
+
+1. **dc0 edge API credential (`opnsense-api.txt`) is absent from every DECLARED location** --
+   not the jumphost folder, not the headend shadow store. It exists only inside the dc0
+   edge's own config. Recovery is a re-mint via `scripts/opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh` (the
+   dc1-proven path; dc0's edge SSH key IS present on vcloud), which is a live mutation on a
+   running edge and was explicitly OUT of this batch. This is the sole remaining SEC-021(a)
+   item and accounts for 2 of the 7 residual findings.
+2. **No registered root/console credential at EITHER DC edge.** MEASURED: no matrix row, no
+   manifest entry, no SEC row. `office1-edge-root` is `cardinality=per-site` and office1-only.
+   NOT MEASURED, and deliberately not probed: what those root passwords actually are. The
+   phase-2 runbook says DC edges boot on FACTORY DEFAULTS and the D-112(c) chain installs
+   sshd + the service key without setting a root password -- but that is a repo reading, not
+   a measurement (hard rule 2). Root SSH is key-only (proven), so SSH is not the vector; the
+   web GUI is LAN-reachable at both edges and the serial console exists. Proposed as the
+   next-free SEC row once the operator gates a probe.
+3. **Two structural blind spots that let (2) hide.** (a) `S5` compares only
+   `cardinality=per-DC` (`creds-matrix.py:380`); all SIX `per-site` rows are office1-only, so
+   a per-site credential missing at two of three sites is invisible to every check. This is
+   the "cardinality largely inert" item CURRENT-STATE already carries -- now with a concrete
+   consequence. (b) `creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations` declares only `jumphost`,
+   `headend`, `netbox`, while the checker also accepts `rack`, `edge`, `cloud`, `unit`,
+   `client` -- all with zero declared locations, therefore unaudited. SEC-015 was a
+   rack-resident edge-key copy, so the class is not hypothetical.
+4. **The 3 residual S5 power-key asymmetries are RULED, not defects.** SEC-016 designs dc0 to
+   keep the snap's default identity while dc1 gets a named per-host key, so the filenames can
+   never match and `DC_TOKEN_RE` cannot normalise them. The register needs a way to record a
+   ruled exception; suppressing them silently would be wrong and renaming live files to
+   satisfy a checker would be worse. Needs an operator decision on mechanism.
+5. **dc0/dc1 creds folders carry no README** while office1 does (`creds-folder-readme`, also
+   `per-site`). Cosmetic; noted for symmetry.
+6. **The headend shadow stores (SEC-022) are now redundant for dc0's power key** -- vcloud
+   holds the copy SEC-021(b) asked for. Deleting the shadow copy is a plausible follow-up but
+   is destructive and out of scope.
+
+## Verification
+
+- `tests/creds-matrix/run-tests.sh` -- **60/60 PASS** (was 56).
+- `scripts/creds-audit.sh` all three sites -- CLEAN (office1 14 entries, dc0 7, dc1 8).
+- `creds-matrix.py --tier2 --tier3 --remote --privileged` -- 82 rows, findings **13 -> 7**.
+  Cleared: S2 x2, E1 x3 (2 power-key + 1 dc1 `.pub`), V2 x1 (now an acknowledged deferral).
+  Residual 7: dc0-edge-api (2, needs the excluded re-mint), S5 x3 (ruled, item 4 above),
+  S6 conflation x1 (the SEC-020 defect, separate), E4 uncheckable x2 (Stage-5/6 rows).
+  **The register is NOT green and is not expected to be.**
+- `scripts/repo-lint.sh` + full gauntlet: see the commit message for the recorded results.
+- `.claude/settings.json` (item 6): `json.load` parses, 44 allow entries, zero duplicates,
+  `ask` 52 / `deny` 15 / `env` / `hooks` byte-unchanged.
diff --git a/docs/archive/session-20260726-d137-build.md b/docs/archive/session-20260726-d137-build.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a0dfef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/archive/session-20260726-d137-build.md
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+# Session body 2026-07-26 -- D-137 credential matrix: build, committee audit, remediation
+
+Full session record (GA-R4 rule 2). The bounded summary is in `docs/session-ledger.md`;
+status is in `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` ONLY (GA-R1). Session changelog with per-item reverts:
+`docs/changelog-20260726-d137-tier1.md` (items 1-22 -- the filename says "tier1" and the
+content outgrew it; noted rather than renamed, since the name is cited in commits).
+
+Branch `dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy`, 17 commits `af1b682..1696d08`, all pushed.
+Opened at `8e72ff1`. Stage 4 remains OPEN; no stage was closed by this session.
+
+## What was built
+
+D-137 was ADOPTED but unimplemented at session open. All three tiers now exist.
+
+- **Tier 1 STATIC** -- `creds-matrix.tsv` (81 rows), `creds-matrix-notes.md`,
+  `scripts/creds-matrix.py` (S1 schema / S2 manifest coverage both-bounds / S3 render drift
+  / S4 mint-ref resolution / S5 per-DC symmetry / S6 ruling-5 principal invariant / S7 notes
+  integrity), harness `tests/creds-matrix`.
+- **Tier 2 EXISTENCE** -- `creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations` (ruling 3's absolute bound),
+  E0-E4 checks, `--remote`/`--privileged` with escalation retried only where needed.
+- **Tier 3 VALIDITY** -- V1 cross-copy sha256 provenance (external `sha256sum` both sides so
+  only digests enter the process), V2 declared-state reconciliation, and
+  `scripts/creds-probe.sh` for the behavioural half.
+- **Enforcement** -- preflight **P5** runs tier 1 + tier 2 LOCAL, blocking, fail-closed.
+  `creds-manifests/stages-reached` replaces `--pending-stage`, coupled to CURRENT-STATE by
+  new **repo-lint L12**.
+- **Schema** -- 10 -> 12 columns (`custody`, `notes-ref`), rows re-keyed to
+  (credential, location); `custody` later gained `verbatim-copy` for tier 3.
+
+Harnesses: creds-matrix 56, creds-probe 9, creds-audit 15, preflight 10, repo-lint 47.
+Gauntlet 79 -> **81 ALL GREEN**. repo-lint 0-fail throughout.
+
+## Operator rulings (GA-R5 form; utterances quoted in design-decisions.md D-137)
+
+1. "go with the 12-column amendment" -- schema amendment.
+2. "wire tier 1 as the blocking preflight Pn" -- ruling 1 enforcement, tier 1.
+3. Tier 2 gate shape: "Local-only blocking; remote operator-run"; stage input: "Declared
+   file + lint coupling".
+4. Tier 3 boundary: "Full -- including OpenStack service credentials"; cadence: "Stage close
+   + DC standup close". (I recommended passive-only and flagged the costs; ruled otherwise.)
+5. SEC-024: "chmod 600 both, now"; snapshots "Keep, decide at stage close".
+Ruling 4 (SEC-009 demotion) needed no exchange -- already ruled, trigger passed.
+
+## The committee, and what it found
+
+Six independent read-only lenses (correctness, coverage, claim-verification,
+ruling-fidelity, record-integrity, Roosevelt-transfer). **Four converged independently on
+the same root cause.** Every defect was reproduced, not theorised.
+
+**Eight confirmed false greens in the delivered build**, all since fixed and individually
+regression-locked. The most consequential: tier 2 keyed existence on host-role ALONE and
+never consulted `site-key`, so a credential present at one site satisfied the row for every
+site -- which had masked SEC-021's dc0 `opnsense-api.txt` on-disk absence while tier 1
+flagged it. Also: `probe_remote` reporting UNREACHABLE for a location it had read; literal
+paths skipping absent/unreadable detection; an empty locations file bypassing ruling 3;
+no non-empty floor; a mint-ref crash exiting 1 indistinguishably from findings; mode
+enforcement custody-gated (43 of 77 rows unchecked); and S5's second direction untested.
+
+**~21 inferred filenames, not the six I had owned.** Only the rows the first sweep
+physically touched had been re-measured. Octavia's 8 were invented AND its declared location
+matched none of them (the artifacts live in three subdirectories); vault used a directory
+name as a filename; the tenant rows lacked the `<client>-` prefix; `.maas.cli` was never
+measured at all and does not exist (the MAAS snap CLI profile is `.maascli.db`).
+
+**`sec-ref` mis-attribution was systemic.** One instance was fixed by hand earlier in the
+session without asking whether the class recurred. It did.
+
+## Defects found in my own work by running it
+
+Recorded because the pattern is the lesson: several defects were invisible to review and
+appeared only on contact with real hosts.
+
+- The first privileged sweep reported `/root/maas-secrets` as "does not exist". It exists --
+  an unprivileged `[ -d ]` on a root-owned parent is indistinguishable from absent.
+- Role-level gating manufactured false absences when one location was unprobed.
+- `shlex.quote` on the probe directory broke `~` expansion, so every home-relative remote
+  location read as unreadable.
+- **Tier 3's first draft reported provenance DRIFT on `maas-region-admin` and
+  `dc1-svc-key`.** Manual `sha256sum` showed both IDENTICAL. Reporting it would have raised
+  a false credential-rotation alarm on exactly the SEC-020 pair. Root cause was a schema
+  gap: nothing expressed which rows are byte-copies.
+- **The first `creds-probe.sh --run` was a false green:** `ssh` ate the `while read` loop's
+  stdin, 1 of 13 probes ran, exit 0. Now locked by a total-accounting check.
+
+## Records corrected
+
+CURRENT-STATE had asserted remote filenames and modes citing a checker VERDICT file that
+contained none of them (GA-R1 rule 2); it said the `virsh` gap was unfixed after it was
+fixed; it carried contradictory counts. The "ZERO undeclared files / fully accounted for"
+claim was WITHDRAWN as resting on the site-blind check, and "SEC-021's on-disk half
+REPRODUCED" was narrowed to the power-key artifacts -- then genuinely earned after the fix,
+when `E1 dc0-edge-api 'opnsense-api.txt'` appeared for the first time. The 12-column
+amendment was recorded on D-137, having existed only in a non-citable changelog.
+
+## Security ledger
+
+- **SEC-024 OPENED then REMEDIATED (mode).** `terraform.tfstate.backup` at 0664 carrying the
+  MAAS API key in plaintext, found by the fixed checker on its first clean run. Severity was
+  CORRECTED before remediation: `opentofu/` is 0700 and `~` is 0750, so it was never
+  effectively readable -- defence-in-depth, not live exposure. Retention of the two `pre-*`
+  snapshots deferred to stage close.
+- **V2 surfaced a standing defect:** SEC-006 records the NetBox upstream token as BURNED
+  since 2026-07-12 while the matrix carried it as a healthy consolidated row. Nothing had
+  reconciled those surfaces.
+- Open SEC rows 19 -> 20.
+
+## Housekeeping
+
+Permission rules: `Bash(ssh * sudo *)` never matched quoted remote commands, so remote sudo
+fell through to the classifier; quoted variants added for `sudo` and `virsh`, all `ask`.
+Session ledger rotated oldest-first 413 -> 280 (GA-R4 F1), discharging a debt the 07-25
+close recorded as OWED.
+
+## Advice given, not built
+
+Secrets-storage recommendation delivered on request (no HSM/KMS available): resolve the
+Vault-vs-OpenBao licensing fork first; build `creds-mint.sh` as an atomic
+mint->store->register; enable MAAS 3.7's Vault integration (measured `disabled`) rehearsed
+in VR1 because of the MAAS/Vault circular dependency on bare metal; Vault SSH CA to retire
+the static keypairs; Tang/Clevis + transit auto-unseal for the no-HSM bootstrap. Recommended
+DROPPING the sops/age stopgap as churn. None of this is built or ruled.
+
+## State at close
+
+Stage 4 OPEN. **The live mission did not move**: the DC1 Stage-5 chain is exactly where it
+was at session open -- verify MAAS role tags live, the 10th controller VM, the dc0 VIP
+extract, the vault-VIP repair, BLOCKER-1/2 and the DC-aware gate fixes, then `juju
+bootstrap` with edge egress OPEN. This session hardened the credential control that will
+protect Stage 5; it did not advance Stage 5.
+
+Preflight exits 1, with P5 among the reasons -- but it was ALREADY exiting 1 before P5
+existed (P4: `overlays/octavia-pki.yaml` absent, MAAS unreachable from the jumphost).
+No deploy path that was open is closed by this session's work.
diff --git a/docs/archive/session-ledger-rotated-20260726.md b/docs/archive/session-ledger-rotated-20260726.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..41aef1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/archive/session-ledger-rotated-20260726.md
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+# session-ledger rotation 2026-07-26 (GA-R4 rule 3, amendment F1)
+
+The live ledger had grown to 413 lines against GA-R4's 300-line cap; the 2026-07-25 close
+recorded the rotation as OWED and it was not performed. F1's rule is OLDEST-FIRST: "after
+writing the close summary, rotate oldest closed-session summaries until under cap."
+
+Moved here VERBATIM, oldest first: the eight closed-session summaries from 2026-07-18
+through the fifth 2026-07-21 session. Nothing is lost -- each summary already points at
+its own archived full body, and this file preserves the summaries themselves.
+
+Precedent: `docs/archive/session-ledger-rotated-20260719.md` (the one-time rule-6
+rotation). This is the first routine F1 rotation.
+
+NOTE ON TIMING: F1 binds the cap AT SESSION CLOSE. This rotation was performed mid-session
+at operator direction ("rotate the session ledger") rather than at a close bookend. That is
+early, not late; no open session's in-flight section was moved (this session has none in
+the ledger), so the rule-3 protection is not implicated.
+
+---
+
+## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-18 -- grounding audit (Phases 1-4); GA-R4 bounded summary
+
+- Audit Phases 1-4 COMPLETE, each externally reviewed; FULL FREEZE upheld (zero pre-audit surfaces edited).
+- Phase 1: record-audit extractor + inventory (12 contradiction groups); outer plan CAPTURED 7/2/7; GA-F01..F15.
+- Phase 2: docs/CURRENT-STATE.md authored -- the single status authority; operator SIGNED (G11, section 11).
+- Phase 3: fresh-agent grounding test, 3 probes 21/21 PASS; hole H1 amended into the G9 row.
+- Phase 4: GA-R1..R7 + stage-status vocabulary (Option A + H1) ALL RATIFIED, utterances quoted (docs/audit/ga-rulings.md).
+- Phase 5 NOT opened: sweep plan DRAFTED (docs/audit/phase5-sweep-plan.md, commit 687dfa8) awaiting external review.
+- DC0 apply remains STOPPED (G9); D-130 unruled; expected plan triple UNRESOLVED (CURRENT-STATE section 5).
+- Next session: FRESH operator session, auto-memory ON (GA-R7 rule 8); read sweep plan + CURRENT-STATE.md first.
+- Status lives ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md (GA-R1); this entry is narrative + pointers, not status.
+- Full session body: docs/archive/session-20260718-grounding-audit.md (GA-R4 rules 1-2, first live compliance run).
+- GA-R4 F1 cap (<300 lines) not yet enforceable: the one-time rotation is Phase-5 Batch 4 (rule 6) -- noted, not skipped.
+- POST-CLOSE ADDENDUM (2026-07-19): sweep plan externally reviewed PASS; amendments S1-S5 applied in
+  a single commit (15ccfbd). Batch 0 was PRESENTED and HELD -- operator routed execution to the fresh
+  session. Fresh session: read docs/audit/phase5-sweep-plan.md + docs/CURRENT-STATE.md, then gate Batch 0.
+
+## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-19 -- GA Phase-5 sweep (Batches 0-6) + AUDIT EXIT (bounded, GA-R4)
+
+- All six sweep batches executed + closed in ONE session under per-batch operator gates.
+- Tooling: L10 status-coupling lint (WARN->FAIL), SEC pointer+count scan, wrap-aware counters,
+  vocab-keyed extractor + archive exclusion (operator-ruled). Gauntlet grew 69 -> 70 harnesses.
+- D-130 ADOPTED (a) + implemented + v7/v8-verified; G6 state surgery (operator-ruled); expected
+  triple 6/0/6 recorded and re-verified twice (postG6 + phase6-exit captures).
+- Record fixes GA-F02..F05/F10..F12/F14..F16; H1 token migration; E1 gate-type tags; ARCH/OPS
+  D-tags + D-129 split (operator-ruled); R3-F register fully dispositioned (S1).
+- Memory hygiene per provenance rulings (2 files removed, GA-F16 found+fixed); ledger rotated
+  1187->131; 96 changelogs + 25 docs consolidated to archive; top-level docs/ = 16.
+- Skill swept against ratified GA-R1..R7 (checklist committed). Exit runs 1-6 ALL PASS incl.
+  fresh probe trio 21/21 (7/7 on all three); operator RE-SIGNED CURRENT-STATE 2026-07-19.
+- AUDIT EXITED: G3 + G11 CLOSED, FREEZE lifted, G9 OPEN (gated logged apply, G8 first).
+- Full body: docs/archive/session-20260719-phase5-sweep.md. Status lives ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
+
+## SESSION 2026-07-19 (continued) -- DC0 deploy, step A (logged: dc0-deploy)
+
+- Same session continued past the audit close at operator direction (skill re-invoked; fresh-session
+  hygiene noted and waived by the operator's go).
+- G8 passed in-session; validate PASS; pre-apply capture == 6/0/6; saved plan applied: 6/0/6 exact.
+- vvr1-dc0 RUNNING (108 vCPU / 416 GiB / autostart off); guests untouched; convergence = no diff.
+- Next: step B (bootstrap vvr1-dc0: site-headend-install --role rack --host-nodes + SEC-010 check,
+  OPNsense base prep ON the VM) -- needs transit reachability + the dc0 key (D-126 DC rows).
+- PAUSED at the A/B boundary (2026-07-19): operator moving to a fresh session. Step B's measured
+  starting facts: vvr1-dc0 NICs = mesh-vr1-dc0-office1 + vr1-dc0-uplink (NO transit NIC yet --
+  measure how reach works before wiring ssh; D-124 tfvars local+present; dc0 key minted).
+  Fresh session: CURRENT-STATE first, then resume at runbook step B in the dc0-deploy logged window
+  (same-day log appends).
+
+## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-21 -- commissioning diagnosis + repair (logged: ops-commissioning-diag; bounded, GA-R4)
+
+- Session DISCONNECTED before its bookend; entry landed same-day by the successor session after
+  read-only re-verification (9/9 Ready, forwarder active+enabled, dhcpd both controllers).
+- G10 commissioning RESOLVED: ALL 9 DC0 nodes Ready, shapes exact to D-121 Option C.
+- Two stacked faults, both measured: (1) the 2026-07-20 in-place apply regenerated all 9 node NIC
+  MACs -- MAAS records repaired in place (operator-ruled), read-back 9/9; (2) MAAS 3.7 rack-only
+  agent resolver SERVFAILs everything on an internet-isolated rack -- dc0-node-dns dnsmasq
+  forwarder workaround (operator-ruled), live and proven (canary Ready ~3 min). LP report queued.
+- D-131 PROPOSED (rack-only node DNS, Roosevelt-relevant); SEC-014 OPENED (rack cluster secret
+  exposure); committee record closed by addendum. Phase-7 tag cleanup verified done.
+- QUEUED delivery: node-vm MAC pinning + harness; forwarder + rack-legs repo persistence;
+  platform-traps + appendix-A entries; stale-pod cleanup at stage close (with SEC-013).
+- REMAINING in G10: netem step E only (netem-link passwordless-sudo blocker).
+- Details: docs/changelog-20260721-commissioning-diag.md + docs/audit/commissioning-diag-20260721.txt.
+  Status lives ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
+
+## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-21 -- close-and-delivery session (bounded, GA-R4)
+
+- Session DISCONNECTED before its bookend (second same-day disconnect); all seven deliverable
+  commits were already pushed (8b3adb3..8a9c04c), so only this entry + the netem-install record
+  were outstanding. Landed by the successor session after read-only re-verification.
+- Delivered: predecessor (ops-commissioning-diag) close landed; node-vm MAC pinning (54 measured
+  pins) + power-ownership guard ruled and APPLIED on voffice1 (0/9/0 exact, converged zero diff);
+  D-131 sub-1 RULED + dc-rack-net.sh shipped AND installed on the rack (check 10/10, SOA probe);
+  incident docs (appendix-A x2, platform-traps 1e corollary, LP draft -- operator to file);
+  step-E netem sudo RULED (scoped NOPASSWD) + fragment shipped (gauntlet 75 ALL GREEN).
+- Post-disconnect: operator ran the netem-tc install interactively; successor VERIFIED read-only
+  (0440 root:root, byte-identical, sudo -n -l grant checks exit 0 --
+  docs/audit/netem-sudo-install-20260721.txt). Step E is now UNBLOCKED (gated run pending).
+- Details: docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260721-close-and-delivery.md. Status lives ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
+
+## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-21 -- STAGE 3 CLOSED + MERGED (third session; bounded, GA-R4)
+
+- Bookend landed at stage close while the session may continue (two same-day disconnects argued
+  for durable-early); any further work appends a POST-CLOSE ADDENDUM (07-18 precedent).
+- Step E netem DONE (targeted apply at an operator-ruled 1/1/0 STOP; placeholder live on virbr5)
+  -> G10 CLOSED. G16 opened for the office1 channels residual, then CLOSED same-day
+  (operator-ruled state surgery; outer plan back to ZERO DIFF).
+- Ruling 1 retire-fully EXECUTED: vr1-dc0-maas removed, stale pod + SEC-013 key file + tfstate
+  deleted. INCIDENT: the pod delete cascaded to the 9 machine records (association check ran
+  post-delete -- owned); recovered same-hour via re-enlist/power/commission, 9/9 Ready, shapes
+  exact, NEW MAAS hostnames. Appendix-A entry shipped (check pod machine list BEFORE delete).
+- Also: ledger-scan PARTIAL fix, DOCFIX-197, D-103/D-123 amendments, GA-R7 memory review.
+- STAGE 3 CLOSED (operator-ruled): consolidation + skill sweep + gauntlet 76 ALL GREEN; merge
+  commit 8d0d155 on main; branch retired local+remote. Next stage branches off main.
+- Open queue unchanged: D-131 sub-2..4, SEC-014 rotation, D-068/D-071/D-129, G12 (dc1), G15.
+- Details: docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260721-netem-install-verify.md (archived at the
+  successor's bookend). Status lives ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
+
+## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-21 -- queue-pass session (fourth same-day; bounded, GA-R4)
+
+- Recovered the predecessor's undelivered committee verdict from its transcript; the
+  tenant-onboarding items are PINNED to a deployment-close consideration review (operator-directed;
+  self-contained block in the retained section above).
+- Queue pass, one GA-R5 ruling per exchange, each committed+pushed: D-131 sub-2 ruled
+  (metal-admin-only) + sub-3 RESOLVED by measurement (no dhcpd option-6 defect; stale read;
+  operator-run capture); D-129 subs (i)-(iv) ALL RULED -- decision-complete, G13 execution-only;
+  D-071 ADOPTED (all four points); D-068 items 2-3 RULED; D-100 netem placeholder CONFIRMED.
+- Filed/pinned: D-132 PROPOSED (per-DC MAAS topology, operator verbatim); DNS architectural
+  review pinned to D-131 sub-4. Delivered: cloud-assert A9 vault-kv AppRole probe
+  (harness 15/15; gauntlet 76 ALL GREEN).
+- G12 [R] leg CLOSED: vr1-dc1 addressing RATIFIED (D-124 amendment; apex confirm-free at
+  authoring). Remaining [V]: vars + substrate root + build.
+- Open after this session: D-068 item 1 (draft), D-131 sub-4 (LP + pinned review), D-132
+  (pinned), G12 [V], G13 execution, 10 SEC rows, LP filing (operator).
+- Details: docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260721-tenant-review-pin.md. Status lives ONLY
+  in CURRENT-STATE.md.
+
+## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-21 -- G12 dc1-authoring session (fifth same-day; bounded, GA-R4)
+
+- Session DISCONNECTED before its bookend; entry landed by the successor session 2026-07-22
+  after read-only re-verification (tree, branch, harnesses). No cloud state was touched.
+- Delivered pre-drop (commit cbc1104 on branch dc-dc-g12-dc1-substrate -- branch UNPUSHED at
+  the drop): dc1 apex confirm-free capture (transit /30 + rack 10.12.68.2 FREE, planes already
+  consistent) + dc-rack-mgmt-import per-site --site support (117/117; live dry-run PASS).
+- INTERRUPTED mid-item-3, authored UNCOMMITTED in tree: vr1_dc1 vars + vvr1-dc1 module +
+  vr1-dc1-uplink, inner root opentofu/vr1-dc1-substrate/ (54 MACs pre-pinned 52:54:01:d1),
+  lib-net.sh dc1 arm + selection guard, dc-selector 40/40. Drop point: BEFORE the gauntlet --
+  successor run = 6/76 FAILED, six harnesses still assert the retired vr1-dc1 fail-loud arm
+  (docs/audit/gauntlet-20260722-g12-dropstate.txt). Owed: reconcile -> ALL GREEN -> delivery
+  entry -> commit+push; THEN the operator-gated apex --commit stays G12's next gated step.
+- Details: docs/changelog-20260721-g12-dc1-authoring.md (item 3 = drop-state record). Status
+  lives ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Second rotation pass, same day (GA-R4 F1)
+
+F1 binds the cap AT CLOSE: after writing the 2026-07-26 close summary the ledger
+stood at 300 against the 300-line cap, so the next-oldest summary rotates. This is
+the rule working as designed -- a long session forces older summaries out rather
+than being truncated itself.
+
+## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-22 -- G12 dc1 build session (bounded, GA-R4)
+
+- Opened from the drop-state; predecessor's owed reconcile DELIVERED (six harnesses + two sighted
+  surfaces; gauntlet 76 ALL GREEN; landed as authoring-changelog item 4). Duplicate idle Claude
+  session checked at operator request -- already exited, nothing culled.
+- G12 [V] leg executed through the D-125 gate, every mutation operator-gated, all pushed:
+  apex --commit (transit /30 + rack IP, read-back idempotent); dc1 svc key minted (audit CLEAN);
+  outer step A 5/0/0 exact; cloudinit-vm interface_macs shipped + voffice1 dc1-transit NIC 0/2/0
+  (full MAC pins, post-bounce battery ALL PASS); transit .5<->.6 live; rack ENROLLED (nmpcq4) with
+  SEC-010 both ends + 26.7 base (hash-verified dc0 copy); inner step C 28/28 from voffice1 (one
+  fix-forward: serial-staging dir), 10/10 domains RUNNING, edge at the 26.7 login prompt; D-125
+  egress gate PASS (two identical runs). Queued findings: changelog items 7/9 (four tool gaps).
+- NEXT session: edge bootstrap (D-112(c) driver rebuild -- v6 + five measured lessons at
+  changelog-20260719-dc0-deploy-stepB.md:241-260; edge keypair mint first) -> API key -> v4
+  addressing -> rack standup DoD -> commissioning 9/9 -> G12 close-out; operator-gated merge to
+  main is the hard new-session gate after that.
+- Details: docs/changelog-20260722-g12-dc1-build.md (items 1-10). Status lives ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
+
diff --git a/docs/archive/stage-records/vr1-stage4-record.md b/docs/archive/stage-records/vr1-stage4-record.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d20a165
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/archive/stage-records/vr1-stage4-record.md
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+# VR1 Stage 4 record -- Phase 3 "MAAS enlist / commission / deploy (per DC)"
+
+**OPENED 2026-07-23** on branch `dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy` (off post-merge `main`
+after the Stage 3 / G12 merge). **CLOSED 2026-07-27.** 76 commits.
+
+`docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` is the status authority for everything below; this record is
+history and a pointer table. Nothing here may be cited as status (GA-R1).
+
+## What the stage actually delivered
+
+The stage's goal as authored was "bring the discovered node VMs to a deployed OS, ready
+for Juju". That changed shape en route, by ruling: **MAAS-deploy is SKIPPED.** The deploy
+model was ruled a **READY handoff** (2026-07-23) -- Juju provisions the nodes at Stage 5
+per the phase-01 precondition -- and DOCFIX-200 rewrote the runbook's Step 4, which as
+written would have broken Stage 5. So the delivered end-state is 18 nodes **Ready**,
+carved, tagged, with both DCs' artifact paths serving.
+
+- **Carve executed both DCs** (logged window `stage4-carve`, 2026-07-23): dynamic ranges
+  .201-.254, 10 named plane fabrics, 90 NIC re-homes across 18 nodes each read back
+  against its pinned MAC, 2 provider subnets moved off fabric-5 + 8 plane subnets created,
+  6 spaces with 12 VLANs, 18 nodes' statics + br-ex OVS. All 18 stayed Ready.
+  Rulings behind it: **D-133** (flat per-NIC carve for VR1; hardware-faithful bonds/trunks
+  deferred to the next deployment) and **D-134** + its Option-B amendment (contiguous
+  bands: .4-.49 utility, .50-.99 VIP, nodes .100-.200, dynamic .201-.254).
+- **Placement tags** `openstack-vr1-dc0` / `-dc1` applied 9+9 (D-119 naming), and
+  **verified live 2026-07-27** -- the 07-25 decision-recon had flagged them
+  NEEDS-LIVE-VERIFY because the discovery capture carried no tag column.
+- **jammy boot images synced** to the region (selection id=2).
+- **Per-DC artifact delivery = D-135**, and this is the stage's most-amended decision.
+  The rehearsal-scoped D-107 exception was REJECTED; mirrors were built. Then the
+  2026-07-24 amendment split the two DCs, and the 2026-07-27 amendment made that split
+  the deliberate experiment rather than an interim: **dc0 tests the full mirror
+  (949G+342M), dc1 tests the apt caching proxy.** dc1's partial 330G mirror and its whole
+  apparatus were removed at close.
+- **Tooling shipped:** `dc-mirror.sh` (site-keyed check/install/sync), `dc-cache-proxy.sh`
+  (and, at close, its own utility net layer), `creds-matrix.py` + the D-137 register,
+  preflight **P5**, plus `lib-hosts.sh`'s VR1 arms and D-133 guards in the VR0 flow scripts.
+
+## The three things a future session should read first
+
+1. **The READY-handoff ruling (DOCFIX-200).** Stage 4 does NOT deploy an OS. Four surfaces
+   still said "nodes Deployed" as late as 2026-07-27 and were corrected then; if a fifth
+   turns up, that is the same defect, not a new fact.
+2. **The two DCs' artifact paths are DIFFERENT BY RULING.** Checking dc1 as a mirror fails
+   by design. `dc-cache-proxy.sh check dc1` is dc1's gate; `dc-mirror.sh check dc0` is dc0's.
+3. **A checker that cannot fail is not a gate.** Both of this stage's late findings were
+   false greens in controls that had been passing for days -- see below.
+
+## False greens found in this stage's own controls (the pattern worth carrying forward)
+
+This stage twice discovered that a control everyone trusted could not fail. Both were
+found by *running* the control against reality rather than reading its output history:
+
+- **`creds-audit` is declaration-based**, so an undeclared secret is structurally
+  invisible. It read CLEAN on all three sites while the D-137 matrix returned 13 findings.
+  Beyond that, the matrix itself cannot report the absence of a credential it has no ROW
+  for -- which is how an unregistered root credential at both DC edges, and a human GUI
+  login that had never left the VM it was minted on, both survived every audit. The fix
+  that found them was to ENUMERATE what exists (`maas admin users read`) instead of
+  auditing what is declared.
+- **`dc-mirror.sh check` asserted that `last-sync.status` EXISTED**, printing its contents
+  behind an unconditional `OK`. dc0 read `FAIL ... ubuntu=255` and dc1 read a four-day-stale
+  `RUNNING`; both printed OK and the check exited PASS. Fixed at close (status word
+  case-analysed; `RUNNING` is an explicit UNKNOWN cross-checked against the unit).
+
+The D-137 six-lens committee audit (2026-07-26) is the same lesson at scale: it found
+**8 false greens** in a register built four days earlier, four lenses converging on one
+root cause (tier 2 keyed existence on host-role alone, ignoring site, so one site's
+credential satisfied every site).
+
+## Incidents
+
+- **dc1 edge passed NO LAN traffic** after v4 addressing (2026-07-23): `configctl interface
+  reconfigure` applies the address but does not regenerate the pf ruleset, so the automatic
+  outbound NAT for the re-addressed LAN was never created. Self-masking -- dc0's earlier
+  qga/plugin work had reloaded the filter as a side effect and hid it. Fixed live with
+  `configctl filter reload`; **prevented in the tool at close** (2026-07-27 ruling), with the
+  reload deliberately placed on a FRESH connection to the post-move address, because
+  re-addressing the interface you arrived on drops the session during the reconfigure.
+- **dc0 mirror's overnight incremental failed** on a transient upstream `500 read timeout`
+  for `dists/jammy/Release` (2026-07-27). Content was intact; a re-run succeeded in 20s.
+  Only visible because the check was fixed first.
+- **A fabricated reference** ("D-193") appeared in 2026-07-24 analysis, was corrected to
+  D-121, and was verified never to have reached the repo. Recorded because the cardinal sin
+  is fabrication, and owning it is the control.
+
+## Gates and rulings
+
+Gate rows are in `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` section 6. This stage opened **G17** (per-DC
+artifact source reachable FROM A NODE) by operator ruling 2026-07-27, splitting the
+node-side half of DoD bullet 5 out rather than closing it conditionally -- GA-R6 E3 forbids
+a conditional close, and the READY-handoff ruling leaves nodes powered off, so no node-side
+probe can run in this stage. G17's trigger is Stage 5 first boot; the phase-4 runbook now
+owns its captures. DoD bullet 6 ("NTP from the DC's own OPNsense edge") was STRUCK by
+DOCFIX-204 as unsatisfiable -- D-129(iv) had already ruled the MAAS hierarchy the time
+authority, so a correctly-built DC could never have met it.
+
+Decisions adopted or amended in this stage: **D-133**, **D-134** (+amendment), **D-135**
+(+two amendments), **D-137** (five sub-rulings, all individually ruled), plus amendments to
+D-104 (dedicated 10th controller VM), D-101 (address family CONFIRMED), and D-113 (the
+set-interface reload). SEC rows opened: **SEC-017** through **SEC-025** (nine), of which
+SEC-024 was opened and remediated the same day.
+
+## Close-out set (GA-R6)
+
+Executed 2026-07-27: every substantive in-stage item closed or split to G17; carve residue
+cleaned (108 fabrics -> 17, cascade-checked); dc1 mirror removed after making the proxy
+self-sufficient; GA-R2 consolidation (this record); skill sweep + dated snapshot
+regeneration; GA-R7 memory review; final gauntlet **ALL GREEN (81)** + repo-lint 0-fail;
+operator-gated merge to `main` as a merge commit; branch retired.
+
+## Sessions (now `docs/archive/changelogs/`)
+
+| file | scope | lines |
+|---|---|---|
+| changelog-20260723-caveman-optin-guard.md | caveman opt-in guard (pre-disable) | 46 |
+| changelog-20260723-stage4-open.md | Stage 4 OPEN, D-133/D-134, carve both DCs, D-135 + dc-mirror.sh, dc1 edge pf incident | 249 |
+| changelog-20260724-caveman-disable.md | caveman plugin DISABLED + SEC-017 + guardrails; DC1 proxy build start; D-135 amendment | 225 |
+| changelog-20260724-stage5-committee-fork1.md | bundle-render committee, D-104 amendment (10th VM), BUNDLEFIX-052, validator spine | 294 |
+| changelog-20260725-maas-admin-recovery.md | SEC-020 premise FALSIFIED, `operator` superuser minted, admin.pass consolidated; D-137 PROPOSED | 263 |
+| changelog-20260726-d137-tier1.md | D-137 tiers 1-3 built, six-lens committee audit, 8 false greens remediated, preflight P5 wired, SEC-024 | 772 |
+| changelog-20260727-creds-consolidation.md | consolidation batch (SEC-021(b)/SEC-025), V2 ruled-deferral, permission allowlist, mirror-gate fix, G17, DOCFIX-204, dc1 teardown, carve residue, set-interface-v4 reload | 499 |
+
+Captures for this stage are in `docs/audit/` (23 added on the branch), including
+`stage4-discovery-20260723.txt`, `stage4-carve-verify-20260723.txt`,
+`stage4-mirror-gate-20260727.txt`, `dc1-mirror-teardown-20260727.txt`,
+`stage4-carve-residue-cleanup-20260727.txt`, `creds-consolidation-audit-20260727.txt`,
+and the D-137 committee/remediation set.
diff --git a/docs/audit/committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.md b/docs/audit/committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..603126e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.md
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+# Committee record -- Track 2: vr1-dc1 deploy-artifact (bundle) render
+
+**Date:** 2026-07-24. **Branch:** `dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy` (Stage 4 open).
+**Convened by:** operator ("Deploy a committee to review Track 2 and provide
+recommendations based on overall end project goals and decisions already
+researched").
+
+**Status of this document.** ADVISORY / audit record. It ADOPTS nothing: the
+Fork-1 recommendation below is PENDING an operator ruling (GA-R5); a decision
+exists only when its Status line quotes the question + the operator's exact
+utterance in `docs/design-decisions.md`. `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` remains the
+sole status authority (GA-R1). Precedent for the format:
+`docs/audit/commissioning-committee-20260720.md`.
+
+## Method
+
+Four independent, read-only reviewers, each a distinct lens, each given a
+self-contained brief grounded in the end-project goals (MINIMIZE DELTA TO
+ROOSEVELT; VR1 exists to make HA real and prove DR drills) and the researched
+decisions (D-121, D-104, D-119, D-052, D-062, D-009, D-106, D-108):
+
+1. Roosevelt-transferability / architectural-delta
+2. HA/DR correctness & multi-tenant isolation
+3. Operational risk / minimal-delta-now
+4. Juju/MAAS/charm mechanism-feasibility
+
+Every load-bearing claim was re-verified against repo HEAD by the adjudicator
+before adoption into this record; two verifications corrected the brief given to
+the committee (see "Corrections", below).
+
+## The blocker being reviewed
+
+The committed `bundle.yaml` is VR0's 4-machine ("8"-"11") HYPERCONVERGED layout
+(`tags=openstack`, single-unit control plane by D-009). VR1 dc1 is 9
+ROLE-SEPARATED nodes (D-121 Option C: 3 control + 2 compute + 4 storage), built
+and merged (G12). The deploy ARTIFACTS were never rendered to that architecture.
+The substrate is exactly 9 node VMs (no controller slot), all Ready, all sharing
+ONE uniform MAAS tag `openstack-vr1-dc1`, zone `default`
+(`docs/audit/stage4-discovery-20260723.txt`).
+
+## Facts verified against the repo (not from prose)
+
+- **Designate IS in the Stage-5 bundle** -- `bundle.yaml:812` (`designate`),
+  `:840` (`designate-bind`), `:922` (`designate-hacluster`, noted "D-106
+  reactivated 2026-07-10, supersedes D-019"). The scale-up overlay's
+  `designate:3` references a real deployed app. The phase-4 runbook line 192
+  ("bundle ships NO designate") is STALE and is part of the de-stale work.
+- **Fork-1 option (a) is additive, not a substrate reopening** -- the inner
+  caller is `module "vr1_dc1_node" { for_each = local.vr1_dc1_nodes }`
+  (`opentofu/vr1-dc1-substrate/main.tf:140`), keyed (not `count`). Adding a 10th
+  node key plans `1 to add, 0 to change, 0 to destroy`; the 9 merged nodes are
+  untouched.
+- **Capacity for (a) is a MEASURED gate, not a quotable figure** -- the signed
+  doc's `790 GiB / 77%` is the OLD 3+2+3 (8-node) layout
+  (`docs/design-decisions.md:3451`); the built layout is 3+2+4 and no `~85%`
+  figure is carried in CURRENT-STATE. `scripts/dc-dc-whole-host-budget.py` must
+  be RUN for the 10-node x 2-DC shape before the apply (GA-R1: figures from
+  captured output).
+- **H1 defect CONFIRMED** (see below) -- `bundle.yaml` `ceph-rbd-mirror` carries
+  a duplicate `bindings:` key; `yaml.safe_load` resolves it to an orphan.
+
+## Fork verdicts
+
+### FORK 1 -- controller arithmetic: UNANIMOUS (a), a dedicated 10th controller VM
+
+All four lenses independently reached (a) and rejected (b)/(c):
+
+- **(b)** bootstrap onto one of the 9 + shrink a role (e.g. ceph-osd 4->3)
+  REVERSES the ratified D-121 R-3 amendment and deletes the Ceph rebuild
+  headroom the DR drill exists to demonstrate ("does not degrade the drill, it
+  deletes the thing being drilled").
+- **(c)** co-locate on a control node: `juju bootstrap` on MAAS consumes a WHOLE
+  machine (mechanism-confirmed), collapsing 3 control nodes -> 2, breaking the
+  mysql/ovn/ceph-mon quorum and coupling controller-loss to the single-node
+  drill. Rejected.
+- **(a)** is the only option preserving 3+2+4, matches D-104's VERIFIED VR0
+  precedent (a dedicated `juju` VM separate from the OpenStack nodes,
+  `docs/maas-as-built-reference.md`), and is Roosevelt-shaped. It is additive
+  (see Facts) and light on capacity (subject to the measured gate).
+- **Least-bad co-location, if (a) ever cannot fit** (HA/DR lens): a COMPUTE node
+  (hosts neither quorum nor OSD headroom), never a control node.
+
+**Classification: a D-104 amendment** (controller placement is D-104's subject;
+substrate-count changes went through amendment for storage 3->4). PENDING
+operator ruling.
+
+### FORK 2 -- render mechanism: adjudicated -- hand-render now, GATED by an extended validator
+
+Split panel: the Roosevelt / HA-DR / mechanism lenses lean to SOME automation
+(the render is a ~56-app cross-consistency rewrite); the operational lens calls a
+renderer tool gold-plating and says hand-render now. The dividing line is not
+hand-vs-tool -- ALL FOUR require an automated PLACEMENT check, which
+`provider-bundle-check.py` does not do today (it validates D-052 bindings +
+mysql=3 only). Adjudication:
+
+- **Hand-render the concrete dc1 `bundle.yaml` now** (a concrete file is directly
+  reviewable, which the "render AND review" constraint demands; you must render
+  once to learn the parameter surface anyway).
+- **Gate it behind an EXTENDED validator** -- add assertions to the EXISTING
+  tested `provider-bundle-check.py` (no new tooling): 3-distinct-host
+  anti-affinity for the 14 scaled apps; `ceph-osd=4` on storage-tagged nodes;
+  `nova-compute=2` on compute-tagged nodes; controller-tag carries no role tag;
+  and NO dangling `to:` (every referenced machine ID exists).
+- **Defer a general renderer tool** until dc0 forces the second render and proves
+  real churn. The `{{TOKEN}}` / overlay pattern already carries the per-DC parts.
+
+### FORK 3 -- role->node binding: UNANIMOUS per-role MAAS tags
+
+- **per-role tags** `constraints: tags=openstack-vr1-dc1,control` -- MAAS
+  AND-filters at allocation; deterministic; survives re-enlist; Roosevelt-shaped.
+  ADOPTED recommendation. Prerequisite: add `control`/`compute`/`storage` tags to
+  the respective nodes (a small, additive, gated MAAS mutation) AND wire that
+  application into the re-enlist runbook so a node rebuild re-applies it.
+- **`mem=` -- REJECTED**: mechanism-confirmed a FLOOR, not exact-match; a 64 GiB
+  control node satisfies a `mem=49152` compute request -> silent mis-placement
+  race under parallel deploy.
+- **system-id pinning -- REJECTED**: not cleanly bundle-expressible, and system
+  IDs are re-minted on every re-enlist (DOCFIX-040); VR1 recovery IS PXE
+  re-enlist.
+
+## Confirmed defects (independent of the fork rulings)
+
+- **H1 / BUNDLEFIX-052 -- `ceph-rbd-mirror` duplicate `bindings:`.**
+  `bundle.yaml:891-895` is the correct block (`ceph-local`/`ceph-remote` ->
+  replication, `nrpe-external-master` -> metal-internal; D-108/D-052); an ORPHAN
+  block at `:907-910` (`certificates`/`dashboard`) is absorbed into
+  `ceph-rbd-mirror` (YAML takes-last), clobbering the replication-plane bindings
+  (defeating D-108) and injecting a phantom `dashboard` binding to a charm with
+  no such endpoint -> `juju deploy` validation reject. Pre-existing; latent
+  because the app was flagged prep-only. Fix = delete the orphan. FIXED this
+  session (changelog).
+- **Stale phase-4 runbook Step 4** -- "deploy the EXISTING bundle.yaml", "ships
+  NO designate", and region-naming drift (its "DC1"=vr1-dc0, "DC2"=vr1-dc1).
+  De-stale as part of the render.
+
+## The render work, specified (the load-bearing part)
+
+- **Re-home every base placement** (in `bundle.yaml`, NOT the overlay -- the
+  highest silent risk): `mysql-innodb-cluster`/`ovn-central`/`ceph-mon`
+  `to:[lxd:8,9,10]` -> 3 control IDs; `nova-compute` `["9","10","11"]` **3->2**
+  -> the 2 compute IDs; `ceph-osd` `["8","9","10","11"]` -> the 4 storage IDs;
+  `memcached`/`glance-simplestreams-sync`/`designate-bind`/`ceph-rbd-mirror`
+  singletons -> control IDs. Any un-updated `to:` = a dangling reference =
+  deploy-time validation failure.
+- **Machines block**: 9 role-tagged IDs + the 10th controller VM with a DISTINCT
+  tag (e.g. `juju-controller-vr1-dc1`) carrying NO role tag, so neither
+  `juju bootstrap --constraints` nor a role constraint can cross-grab.
+- **Re-scope the dc0-named tokens** `{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_0N}}` -> dc1 control IDs;
+  positional anti-affinity is a 3-entry `to:` list (unit0->entry0), mechanism
+  confirmed -- token collision silently defeats it, so validate distinctness.
+- **Wire overlays** `vr1-dc1-vips.yaml` + `dc-ha-scaleup.yaml` into the deploy;
+  de-stale phase-4 Step 4.
+
+## Deploy-time VERIFY-LIVE gates (into the runbook; not render blockers)
+
+- **Vault 3-unit HA-on-MySQL** -- D-121's own gate: verify the `1.8/stable` charm
+  truly does leader-election at 3 units BEFORE commit (mechanism lens: genuinely
+  UNSURE); if not, evaluate Raft -> D-068, NEVER etcd. Plus 3x manual-unseal
+  burden (OPEN SEC-003).
+- **`hacluster cluster_count:3`** actually gates VIP-bind-on-quorum (else
+  decorative HA).
+- **dc1 VIPs** (`10.12.64/68/72`) are outside the checker's hardcoded dc0 bands
+  -- validate the merged result.
+- **CRUSH failure-domain = host** (the rebuild-headroom argument rests on it).
+
+## Bootstrap ordering (reinforced)
+
+Bootstrap the 10th VM (by its distinct controller tag) WHILE the DC1 edge egress
+is OPEN -- the juju agent stream + juju/juju-db snaps are fetched pre-apt and are
+NOT mirrored (D-135 items 2-3 unbuilt). No egress-narrowing (D-135/D-107) until
+the controller is up.
+
+## Open operator decisions (one ruling per exchange, GA-R5)
+
+1. **FORK 1 (blocking, a D-104 amendment):** committee unanimous for **(a)
+   dedicated 10th controller VM**, additive, gated on the whole-host budget
+   script. -- PENDING.
+2. **FORK 2:** hand-render + extended validator; defer a renderer tool. --
+   PENDING (follows Fork 1).
+3. **FORK 3:** per-role MAAS tags + re-enlist wiring. -- PENDING (follows Fork 1).
+
+## Highest-priority concerns (one per lens)
+
+- Roosevelt: extend the placement validator before bootstrap, or any render can
+  silently ship one-unit-per-node-less-ness = the decorative HA D-121 exists to
+  kill.
+- HA/DR: no automated placement gate today; the un-re-homed base placements
+  (`lxd:8,9,10`) are the most likely silent decorative-HA path.
+- Operational: confirm the inner caller is `for_each`-keyed (DONE -- it is) and
+  constrain bootstrap to a distinct controller tag, or the closed G12 substrate
+  reopens.
+- Mechanism: re-render COMPLETENESS -- only 14 of ~56 apps are placed by the
+  overlay; a single stale `to:` fails `juju deploy` with no partial success. And
+  fix H1 first (DONE).
diff --git a/docs/audit/creds-consolidation-audit-20260727.txt b/docs/audit/creds-consolidation-audit-20260727.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..647fe51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/creds-consolidation-audit-20260727.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+=== creds consolidation audit -- 2026-07-27 (read-only; metadata only, no credential value read) ===
+repo HEAD at audit: 4d62f66709366b17f21d36d53c976145e03a9470  branch: dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy
+question (operator, 2026-07-27): confirm a consolidated set of login creds on vcloud for all
+accounts currently created; identify creds missing, needing creation, or not moved into the
+vcloud folders.  Direction after the audit: 'clear the whole consolidation batch first'.
+NOTE: sections below are the POST-REMEDIATION state. The pre-remediation run returned 13
+findings; see docs/changelog-20260727-creds-consolidation.md for the per-item delta.
+
+--- 1. ACCOUNTS THAT ACTUALLY EXIST on the MAAS region (ssh voffice1 'maas admin users read') ---
+    Enumerated from the live surface, NOT from the register -- the register can only answer
+    for accounts it has rows for, which is the blind spot this section exists to close.
+  count=6
+    MAAS               superuser=True  email=maas@localhost
+    admin              superuser=True  email=admin@office1.local
+    juju-vr1-dc0       superuser=True  email=juju-vr1-dc0@vr1.local
+    juju-vr1-dc1       superuser=True  email=juju-vr1-dc1@vr1.local
+    maas-init-node     superuser=False email=node-init-user@localhost
+    operator           superuser=True  email=jesse.austin@neumatrix.com
+
+--- 2. creds-audit.sh (SEC-009 declaration-based audit), all three sites ---
+=== creds-audit: vr1-office1 (/home/jessea123/vr1-office1-creds) ===
+  [ok]   folder mode 0700
+  [ok]   all 14 manifest entries present, correct mode, non-empty
+
+creds-audit vr1-office1: CLEAN
+=== creds-audit: vr1-dc0 (/home/jessea123/vr1-dc0-creds) ===
+  [ok]   folder mode 0700
+  [ok]   all 7 manifest entries present, correct mode, non-empty
+
+creds-audit vr1-dc0: CLEAN
+=== creds-audit: vr1-dc1 (/home/jessea123/vr1-dc1-creds) ===
+  [ok]   folder mode 0700
+  [ok]   all 8 manifest entries present, correct mode, non-empty
+
+creds-audit vr1-dc1: CLEAN
+
+--- 3. jumphost (vcloud) creds folder contents, filenames only ---
+$HOME/vr1-office1-creds/:
+  maas-admin-password
+  maas-operator-password
+  netbox-admin-password
+  office1_svc_ed25519
+  office1_svc_ed25519.pub
+  opnsense-api.txt
+  opnsense-root-hash
+  opnsense-root-password
+  README
+  tailscale-authkey.txt
+  vr1-netbox.env
+  vr1-netbox-sandbox.env
+  vr1-office1.env
+  vr1-stage1.env
+$HOME/vr1-dc0-creds/:
+  maas-api-key.txt
+  vr1-dc0-edge_ed25519
+  vr1-dc0-edge_ed25519.pub
+  vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519
+  vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519.pub
+  vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519
+  vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519.pub
+$HOME/vr1-dc1-creds/:
+  maas-api-key.txt
+  opnsense-api.txt
+  vr1-dc1-edge_ed25519
+  vr1-dc1-edge_ed25519.pub
+  vr1-dc1-maas-power_ed25519
+  vr1-dc1-maas-power_ed25519.pub
+  vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519
+  vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519.pub
+
+--- 4. headend (voffice1) shadow stores, filenames only (SEC-022) ---
+voffice1:~/vr1-dc0-creds/:
+  maas-virsh_ed25519
+  vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519
+  vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519.pub
+voffice1:~/vr1-dc1-creds/:
+  vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519
+  vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519.pub
+
+--- 5. creds-matrix.py --tier2 --tier3 --remote --privileged (D-137 register, ALL tiers) ---
+=== creds-matrix: tier 1 (STATIC) ===
+=== creds-matrix: tier 2 (EXISTENCE) ===
+=== creds-matrix: tier 3 (VALIDITY) ===
+  [ok]   S1 schema: 82 rows, all enums valid, site-keys region-qualified, no duplicate (id,site,host-role,filename)
+  [ok]   S3 render: 3 source field(s) SKIPPED -- rendering them needs the declared path from creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations (ruling 3); the list now EXISTS but the source-field derivation is not wired
+  [ok]   S3 render drift: rendered row fields (mode, source) match checked-in; header prose and non-jumphost rows are OUT OF SCOPE of this compare
+  [ok]   S4 mint-ref: every script:/runbook: reference resolves to a real location
+  [ok]   S4 provenance debt: 30 row(s) are mint-ref=operator-terminal -- NOT reproducible from the repo (research FINDING 1). Admitted by design; converting them is remediation, not a checker fix.
+  [ok]   S7 notes: 34 note key(s) referenced, all resolve, none orphaned
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/vault-init/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/octavia-pki/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/octavia-pki/issuing-ca/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/octavia-pki/controller-ca/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/octavia-pki/controller/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 headend location '/root/maas-secrets/*' read via ESCALATION (sudo -n, metadata only) after an unprivileged probe could not open it
+  [ok]   E0 headend location '/var/snap/maas/current/root/.ssh/*' read via ESCALATION (sudo -n, metadata only) after an unprivileged probe could not open it
+  [ok]   E0 netbox location '/root/netbox-secrets/*' read via ESCALATION (sudo -n, metadata only) after an unprivileged probe could not open it
+  [ok]   E1 18 expected artifact(s) deferred as not-yet-minted per creds-manifests/stages-reached
+  [ok]   V2 ACKNOWLEDGED DEFERRAL: id 'netbox-upstream-token' (vr1-netbox.env) is custody=consolidated and SEC-006 declares it BURNED, but remediation is DEFERRED BY OPERATOR RULING -- the credential is still live and still exposed until that ruling is discharged. Ruling text: 'DEFERRED by operator ruling'
+  [ok]   V2 declared state: no credential is registered healthy while its SEC row declares it burned/revoked/compromised
+  [ok]   V1 provenance: all copies byte-identical for 6 group(s): dc0-svc-key; dc0-svc-key; dc1-svc-key; dc1-svc-key; maas-region-admin (declared verbatim copies); netbox-admin (declared verbatim copies)
+  [FAIL] S2 vr1-dc0 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: 'opnsense-api.txt' (id dc0-edge-api, SEC-021) is expected by the matrix but NOT declared in the manifest -- the credential is either missing or undeclared
+  [FAIL] S5 ASYMMETRY: vr1-dc0 declares id=dcN-maas-power-key file=id_ed25519 on headend (custody=off-manifest-known) with no counterpart in vr1-dc1 -- a per-DC credential must exist at BOTH DCs in the same shape
+  [FAIL] S5 ASYMMETRY: vr1-dc0 declares id=dcN-maas-power-key file=maas-virsh_ed25519 on headend (custody=off-manifest-known) with no counterpart in vr1-dc1 -- a per-DC credential must exist at BOTH DCs in the same shape
+  [FAIL] S5 ASYMMETRY: vr1-dc1 declares id=dcN-maas-power-key file=id_dcN_power on headend (custody=off-manifest-known) with no counterpart in vr1-dc0 -- a per-DC credential must exist at BOTH DCs in the same shape
+  [FAIL] S6 IDENTITY CONFLATION: id 'maas-region-admin' serves 2 principal types (human via gui; service via api, cli-profile) -- ruling 5 requires one identity to serve one principal type
+  [FAIL] E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: dc0-edge-api 'opnsense-api.txt' expected at jumphost/vr1-dc0, not found (mint-stage stage3, SEC-021)
+  [FAIL] E4 UNCHECKABLE: 2 row(s) have no declared location for their (role, site) and can never be verified -- add a location row or correct the matrix: capi-mgmt-kubeconfig 'config' (cloud/-); rbd-mirror-peer-token 'rbd-mirror-bootstrap-token' (unit/-)
+
+FAIL: creds-matrix tier 1 -- 82 row(s), 18 check group(s) clean, 7 finding(s)
+
+--- 6. cardinality distribution + every per-site row (blind-spot evidence, item 3(a)) ---
+     28 per-DC
+      6 per-site
+      5 per-tenant
+     43 singleton
+per-site rows (all vr1-office1; S5 compares only cardinality=per-DC, creds-matrix.py:380):
+  office1-svc-key            vr1-office1  office1_svc_ed25519                ssh
+  office1-svc-key            vr1-office1  office1_svc_ed25519.pub            none
+  office1-edge-api           vr1-office1  opnsense-api.txt                   api
+  office1-edge-root          vr1-office1  opnsense-root-password             gui
+  office1-edge-root          vr1-office1  opnsense-root-hash                 none
+  creds-folder-readme        vr1-office1  README                             none
+
+--- 7. human-principal rows (the login-credential set) ---
+  maas-region-admin        vr1-office1  headend   admin.pass                         gui         source-of-record         SEC-020
+  maas-region-admin        vr1-office1  jumphost  maas-admin-password                gui         verbatim-copy            SEC-020
+  maas-region-operator     vr1-office1  jumphost  maas-operator-password             gui         consolidated             SEC-020
+  office1-edge-root        vr1-office1  jumphost  opnsense-root-password             gui         consolidated             SEC-007
+  office1-edge-root        vr1-office1  jumphost  opnsense-root-hash                 none        consolidated             SEC-007
+  netbox-admin             vr1-office1  netbox    admin.pass                         gui         source-of-record         SEC-025
+  netbox-admin             vr1-office1  jumphost  netbox-admin-password              gui         verbatim-copy            SEC-025
+  tenant-domain-admin      -            jumphost  <client>-domain-admin-cred.txt     gui         off-manifest-known       SEC-023
+  tenant-cluster-user      -            jumphost  <client>-cluster-cred.txt          api         off-manifest-known       SEC-023
+  libvirt-power-password   -            -         -                                  console     off-manifest-known       -
+
+--- 8. host-role declaration gap (blind-spot evidence, item 3(b)) ---
+  checker enum: 45:HOST_ROLE   = {"jumphost", "headend", "rack", "edge", "netbox", "cloud", "unit", "client", "-"}
+  roles actually declared in creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations:
+    headend
+    jumphost
+    netbox
+
+--- 9. key-identity measurements behind the dc0 power-key decision (fingerprints only) ---
+  dc0 power key, vcloud consolidated copy : 256 SHA256:Dt/YXTXSF4nXGj9cz8f0owL+qreVpMYBVm/igW10FXY maas-virsh-pod (D-123 amendment; MAAS snap -> local libvirt) (ED25519)
+  dc0 SERVICE key (must DIFFER, SEC-012)  : 256 SHA256:DBkeStCyf2qGi3SYuvN6hQ+EsepmhpkN9oulLz09uAs vr1-dc0_svc (D-126 per-env key) (ED25519)
+  dc1 power key, vcloud (the model shape) : 256 SHA256:BUAdNZEWbbn8Rg+QVSLaY8M6NSvc2nyTaMsQUHQEJhQ vr1-dc1-maas-power (SEC-016 dedicated MAAS->libvirt, per-DC) (ED25519)
diff --git a/docs/audit/creds-creation-points-20260725.md b/docs/audit/creds-creation-points-20260725.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33a2490
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/creds-creation-points-20260725.md
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+# Credential creation-point inventory -- 2026-07-25
+
+Read-only research capture for the D-137 credential-matrix design. No credential file
+was opened; every row below is a file:line reference to CODE or RUNBOOK PROSE that
+mints, materializes, or uploads credential material.
+
+Classification used: **MINT** (new secret material comes into existence),
+**MATERIALIZE** (an existing secret is fetched/copied/written somewhere new),
+**UPLOAD** (public key registered -- no secret created). Only MINT rows are creation
+points; the other two classes were checked and excluded deliberately.
+
+Operator-ruled scope for the matrix (this session): the **materialization test** --
+in-matrix if a credential is ever written to a file, presented by a human, or consumed
+out-of-band, regardless of who generated it.
+
+## Counts
+
+| Class | Count | Where |
+|---|---|---|
+| Scripted MINT (repo code generates the secret) | 25 rows | `scripts/` |
+| Runbook/prose MINT (operator runs by hand, no script owns it) | 30 rows | `runbooks/`, `clientdocs/` |
+| **Declared secrets with NO creation point anywhere in the repo** | **12** | see below |
+| Charm/platform-minted at bundle apply | summarised | `bundle.yaml` deploy |
+| MATERIALIZE / UPLOAD (excluded, verified non-creating) | 20+ | see source agent record |
+
+## FINDING 1 -- twelve declared secrets have NO mint command anywhere
+
+This is the most consequential result and it **qualifies the "creation points are already
+known" premise**: for twelve standing credentials, they are not.
+
+`grep -rnI "ssh-keygen" .` returns **ZERO hits repo-wide** (searched everything except
+`.git`/`.terraform`/tfstate/tfplan, including `tests/`, `docs/archive/`, `clientdocs/`,
+`.claude/`). There is likewise no `mkpasswd`, `htpasswd`, `password_hash`, `pwgen`,
+`uuidgen`, nor any Terraform `random_password` / `tls_private_key`. Yet the manifests
+declare:
+
+| Credential | Declared at | Only provenance record |
+|---|---|---|
+| `office1_svc_ed25519{,.pub}` | `vr1-office1.manifest:30-31` | `vr1-office1-as-built.md:126` (SEC-007) |
+| `vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519{,.pub}` | `vr1-dc0.manifest:16-17` | a manifest COMMENT (`:10-12`) |
+| `vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519{,.pub}` | `vr1-dc1.manifest:16-17` | a manifest COMMENT (`:10-12`) |
+| `vr1-dc0-edge_ed25519{,.pub}` | `vr1-dc0.manifest:22-23` | manifest comment (backfilled 2026-07-25) |
+| `vr1-dc1-edge_ed25519{,.pub}` | `vr1-dc1.manifest:21-22` | manifest comment (`:18-20`) |
+| `vr1-dc1-maas-power_ed25519{,.pub}` | `vr1-dc1.manifest:29-30` | manifest comment (`:26-28`, SEC-016) |
+| `opnsense-root-password` | `vr1-office1.manifest:34` | `vr1-office1-as-built.md:128`, SEC-007 -- **HUMAN GUI login** |
+| `opnsense-root-hash` | `vr1-office1.manifest:33` | same (bcrypt of the above, for `config.xml`) |
+| `tailscale-authkey.txt` | `vr1-office1.manifest:36` | SEC-008 -- operator-supplied, third-party control server (correctly has no repo mint) |
+| `vr1-netbox.env` | `vr1-office1.manifest:37` | minted on the upstream apex; SEC-006 (BURNED) |
+| `vr1-office1.env` / `vr1-stage1.env` | `.manifest:39-40` | `vr1-office1-as-built.md:132-133` |
+
+Six SSH keypairs and the OPNsense root password/hash are pure operator-terminal mints
+whose only record is a manifest comment. **Consequence: they are not reproducible.** If
+the jumphost is rebuilt, no repo artifact states how to recreate them -- which is a
+Roosevelt-transfer defect, not merely a hygiene one. The tailscale key is genuinely
+third-party and correctly has no repo mint.
+
+## FINDING 2 -- credential directories OUTSIDE the `*-creds/` convention
+
+SEC-009 says all site secrets live in `~/<site>-creds/`. The inventory shows at least
+three other jumphost directories holding credential material, none of which
+`creds-audit` covers (it checks `~/<site>-creds/` folders plus a loose-FILE sprawl glob
+in `$HOME` -- it never inspects these DIRECTORIES):
+
+- `~/vault-init/init.txt` -- Vault **5 unseal shares + root token**, the cloud's entire
+  root of trust (`runbooks/phase-02-vault-bringup.md:71`, irreversible one-shot).
+- `~/octavia-pki/` -- **8 artifacts**: 2 CA passphrases, 2 CA private keys, 2 CA certs,
+  the controller key, the signed bundle (`runbooks/phase-01-bundle-deploy.md:299-410`).
+- `~/tenant-<client>/` -- per-tenant domain-admin / cluster / svc passwords, an
+  application credential, and a Nova private key (`scripts/tenant-onboard.sh:70-71,
+  94-95, 141, 167`).
+
+All three are named in CLAUDE.md as secret locations, so they are KNOWN -- they are
+simply outside the control. This materially extends SEC-023.
+
+Related: `runbooks/phase-01-bundle-deploy.md:391-410` writes
+`overlays/octavia-pki.yaml` containing base64 CA key blobs **plus the issuing-CA
+passphrase in plaintext, inside the repo clone** (gitignored). Given SEC-004 (repo
+currently PUBLIC), that gitignore is the only thing standing between a CA private key
+and publication.
+
+## FINDING 3 -- highest-concentration mint sites (matrix seeding order)
+
+1. `scripts/site-headend-install.sh` -- **7 mints** (`:418` primitive, `:430` DB pass,
+   `:445` rack-enrollment secret, `:450`/`:452` admin password, `:453` API key, `:485`
+   LXD trust). Every Office1/DC-region MAAS + LXD secret originates here.
+2. `scripts/tenant-onboard.sh` -- 7 mints, the entire tenant identity set.
+3. `runbooks/phase-01-bundle-deploy.md:299-410` -- 8 Octavia PKI artifacts.
+4. `runbooks/tenant-onboarding-v2-DRAFT.md:162-320` -- 6 mints DUPLICATING #2 (two
+   creation locations, one credential set -- do not double-count).
+5. `runbooks/phase-02-vault-bringup.md:71-144` -- 4 mints incl. the root of trust.
+6. `runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md:119-151` -- 4 mints PER DC.
+
+## FINDING 4 -- corroborations of already-recorded defects
+
+- `dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md:128` mints `juju-<dc>` via `maas createadmin`
+  with **no** `--password`, so MAAS prompts and the value is stored nowhere --
+  independently confirming the SEC-020 finding about those two superusers.
+- `site-headend-install.sh:452` uses `--password` in **argv**, the exposure SEC-020
+  flagged and which this session's `operator` mint avoided via stdin.
+- `scripts/phase-03-admin-openrc.sh:46-52` is classified MATERIALIZE (charm-generated,
+  operator-materialized) -- exactly the case the ruled materialization test captures and
+  a generation-based test would have missed (SEC-023).
+
+## What this means for the matrix
+
+The matrix must carry a `mint-ref` column that can hold **three** provenance kinds, not
+one: `script:line`, `runbook:step`, and `operator-terminal` (undocumented). Finding 1
+means a meaningful fraction of today's estate is the third kind, so a checker that
+requires every row to name executable code would fail 12 rows on day one. Those rows
+are the backlog the matrix exists to surface -- they should be admitted as
+`operator-terminal` and tracked as a debt to convert, not treated as parse errors.
+
+Source: three read-only Explore agents, 2026-07-25. The full per-row tables ARE NOW IN
+THIS FILE (see APPENDIX below), transcribed 2026-07-26 before the originating session was
+cleared -- they are the `creds-matrix.tsv` seed and must not depend on a transcript.
+
+---
+
+# APPENDIX -- full per-row inventory (the matrix seed)
+
+Transcribed into the repo 2026-07-26 because the body above pointed at a session
+transcript that was about to be cleared. These rows ARE the `creds-matrix.tsv` seed;
+they are what `docs/D-137-implementation-plan.md` step 3 tells the build to read.
+Classification: MINT = new secret material; MATERIALIZE/UPLOAD excluded (section E).
+
+## A. Scripted MINT points (repo code generates the secret)
+
+| # | file:line | Credential | For | Written to | Stage/step | Principal |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| A1 | `site-headend-install.sh:416-419` | `newpass()` primitive: `openssl rand -base64 30 \| tr -dc A-Za-z0-9 \| head -c 28`, 0600 | voffice1 | (helper) | Stage 2 | -- |
+| A2 | `site-headend-install.sh:430` (`:151 SECRETS=/root/maas-secrets`) | PostgreSQL `maas` role password | region DB | `voffice1:/root/maas-secrets/db.pass` REMOTE | Stage 2 step 3 | service |
+| A3 | `site-headend-install.sh:450,452` | MAAS superuser `admin` password (`--password` in ARGV) | region | `voffice1:/root/maas-secrets/admin.pass` REMOTE; copy consolidated 2026-07-25 | Stage 2 step 4 | **BOTH (conflated)** |
+| A4 | `site-headend-install.sh:453` | MAAS API key for `admin` | region | `voffice1:/root/maas-secrets/admin.apikey` REMOTE, deliberately not consolidated | Stage 2 step 4 | service |
+| A5 | `site-headend-install.sh:455` | MAAS CLI profile `admin` (`~/.maas.cli`) | region | region VM home | Stage 2 step 4 | service |
+| A6 | `site-headend-install.sh:445-447` (doc `:25-29`) | **MAAS rack-enrollment secret** (side effect of `maas init region+rack`) | region -> DC racks | `voffice1:/var/snap/maas/common/maas/secret`; 0600 copy to rack via `--enroll-secret-file` | Stage 2 mint / Stage 3 consume | service |
+| A7 | `site-headend-install.sh:485-486` | LXD trust password | voffice1 LXD | `voffice1:/root/maas-secrets/lxd-trust.pass` REMOTE | Stage 2 step 6 | service |
+| A8 | `opnsense-mint-apikey.php:43` (write `:52-60`) | OPNsense REST API key+secret (vendor model) | any edge | `<edge>:/tmp/opnsense-apikey.$$.txt` 0600, then wiped | D-113(a2) | service |
+| A9 | `opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh:89-90,114-120` (cleanup `:93`) | driver for A8; retrieves key to jumphost | edge -> jumphost | `~/vr1-<site>-creds/opnsense-api.txt` 0600 | Stage 3 replacement chain step 2 | service |
+| A10 | `tenant-onboard.sh:39` `newpw()` | `secrets.token_urlsafe(24)` primitive | Keystone | (helper) | tenant onboard | -- |
+| A11 | `tenant-onboard.sh:64-65` (write `:70-71`) | `<client>-domain-admin` password | tenant domain | `~/tenant-<client>/<client>-domain-admin-cred.txt` 0600 | onboard stage1 | **human** |
+| A12 | `tenant-onboard.sh:90-91` (write `:94-95`) | `<client>-cluster` + `<client>-svc` passwords | tenant project | `~/tenant-<client>/*-cred.txt` 0600 | onboard stage2 | cluster=human-ish, svc=service |
+| A13 | `tenant-onboard.sh:141` | Keystone application credential `<client>-svc-cred` | Keystone | `~/tenant-<client>/<client>-svc-appcred.txt` 0600 | onboard stage3 (re-run guard `:125-139`) | service |
+| A14 | `tenant-onboard.sh:167` | Nova keypair PRIVATE key `<client>-key` | Nova | `~/tenant-<client>/<client>-key.pem` 0600 | onboard stage3 (guard `:154-166`) | service |
+| A15 | `dc-dc-rbd-mirror.sh:88,156` | Ceph rbd-mirror pool peer bootstrap token | primary-DC Ceph | `/tmp/rbd-mirror-bootstrap-token.<rand>` 0600 ON THE UNIT | Stage 6 step 11.x | service |
+| A16 | `dc-dc-radosgw-multisite.sh:172,178` | RGW multisite system user access-key+secret (radosgw-generated at realm create) | radosgw DC1 | stays in the RGW realm on the unit | Stage 6 step 4 | service |
+| A17 | `phase-06-capi-stack.sh:91` (def `:78`) | cluster-admin kubeconfig (`sudo k8s config`) | capi-mgmt VM | `<mgmt VM>:~/.kube/config` 0600 REMOTE | phase-06 step 6.6a | service |
+| A18 | `phase-06-capi-stack.sh:147-153` | CAPI/CAPO stack: per-cluster CA + bootstrap tokens at every cluster create | capi-mgmt | in-cluster k8s Secrets | phase-06 step 6.6d | service |
+| A19 | `clientdocs/scripts/acceptance-run.sh:349` | throwaway Nova keypair `ci-accept-key` | tenant | client host; deleted `:129` | acceptance D2 | service (ephemeral) |
+| A20 | `clientdocs/scripts/acceptance-run.sh:464` | Barbican secret `ci-accept-secret` | Barbican | Barbican; deleted `:470` | acceptance G1 | service |
+| A21-A25 | `tenant-onboarding-v2-DRAFT.md:162,225-226,290,295,308-312,319-320` | **SAME credential set as A11-A14** -- the DRAFT runbook duplicates `tenant-onboard.sh`. Two creation LOCATIONS, one set. **Do not double-count.** | Keystone/Nova | `$HOME/<client>-*` | onboard-v2 | mixed |
+
+## B. Runbook / prose MINT points (operator by hand; no script owns it)
+
+| # | file:line | Credential | Written to | Stage/step | Principal |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| B1 | `phase-02-vault-bringup.md:71` | **Vault `operator init`: 5 unseal shares + root token.** IRREVERSIBLE one-shot (`:14-15,63-64`) | the Vault init dir on the jumphost -- OUTSIDE any `*-creds/` | phase-02 step 2.1 | service (root of trust) |
+| B2 | `phase-02-vault-bringup.md:127-130` | short-lived child Vault token (`-ttl=10m`), so root never hits juju logs | printed once | phase-02 step 2.3 | service |
+| B3 | `phase-02-vault-bringup.md:142` | charm-vault credential (`authorize-charm token=`) | inside the charm | phase-02 step 2.3, DOCFIX-011 | service |
+| B4 | `phase-02-vault-bringup.md:144` | **charm-pki-local root CA** (private key + cert) -- the whole cloud's TLS root | inside Vault | phase-02 step 2.3, DOCFIX-014 | service |
+| B5-B12 | `phase-01-bundle-deploy.md:299-386` | **8 Octavia PKI artifacts**: issuing-CA passphrase (`:299-301`), issuing-CA key EC P-384 AES-256 (`:302-304`), issuing-CA cert (`:305-307`), controller-CA passphrase (`:321-323`), controller-CA key (`:324-326`), controller-CA cert (`:327-329`), controller key EC P-256 UNENCRYPTED (`:343-344`), signed `controller.bundle.pem` (`:375-386`) | the Octavia PKI dir on the jumphost -- OUTSIDE any `*-creds/` | phase-01 step 1.0-GEN.a/b/c | service |
+| B13 | `phase-01-bundle-deploy.md:391-410` | `overlays/octavia-pki.yaml` -- base64 CA cert/key blobs **+ the issuing-CA passphrase in PLAINTEXT** | **INSIDE the repo clone** (gitignored) | phase-01 step 1.0-GEN.d | service |
+| B14 | `dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md:128` | MAAS superuser `juju-<dc>` -- `createadmin` with NO `--password`, so **stored nowhere** | nowhere | Stage 5 step 2.0 | **BOTH (no custody)** |
+| B15 | `dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md:136-139` | per-DC MAAS API key (`apikey --generate`, run FROM the jumphost) | `~/vr1-<dc>-creds/maas-api-key.txt` 0600 (SEC-018/019) | Stage 5 step 2.0 | service |
+| B16 | `dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md:141-142` | Juju cloud credential wrapping B15 | Juju client store on **voffice1** -- explicitly OFF-MANIFEST | Stage 5 step 2.0 | service |
+| B17 | `dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md:151` | `juju bootstrap`: controller admin credential + controller CA/agent secrets, per DC (D-104) | controller + `~/.local/share/juju/` | Stage 5 step 2 | service |
+| B18 | `dc-dc-phase1-office1-standup.md:464-471` | Office1 MAAS API key for OpenTofu (`TF_VAR_maas_api_key`); DOCFIX-175 warns it lands in `terraform.tfstate` PLAINTEXT | `~/vr1-office1-creds/vr1-stage1.env` 0600 | Stage 2 step 5 | service |
+| B19 | `dc-dc-phase1-office1-standup.md:643-647` | NetBox API token | `office1-netbox:/root/netbox-secrets/api.token` REMOTE; copy in `vr1-netbox-sandbox.env` (the founding SEC-009 miss) | Stage 2 step 9 | service |
+| B20 | implied `vr1-office1-as-built.md:130`, prose `:631-637` | NetBox `SECRET_KEY` (rotated off netbox-docker's PUBLIC default) + NetBox admin password | `office1-netbox:/root/netbox-secrets/` REMOTE | Stage 2 step 9 | SECRET_KEY=service, admin=**human** |
+| B21 | `dc-dc-phase2-tofu-dc-substrate.md:371-395` (D-112(c)) | edge service SSH keypair + root access via serial-console payload | `~/vr1-dc<N>-creds/vr1-dc<N>-edge_ed25519` | Stage 3 replacement chain step 1 | service |
+| B22 | `dc-dc-phase2-tofu-dc-substrate.md:770-778` (SEC-012/-016) | per-DC MAAS->libvirt power keypair, never cross-DC | private half in `voffice1:/var/snap/maas/current/root/.ssh/` (**per-snap-revision, re-assert after refresh**); dc1 copy on jumphost, **dc0 has none** (SEC-021) | Stage 3 DoD item 5 | service |
+| B23 | `dc-dc-phase5-dr-failover-drill.md:230,261-263` | RGW multisite system key ("never invent it"; capture via `radosgw-admin user info`) | remote RGW realm | Stage 6 step 4 | service |
+| B24 | `dc-dc-phase5-dr-failover-drill.md:294,411` | rbd-mirror peer bootstrap token (manual form of A15) | remote unit | Stage 6 step 11.5 | service |
+| B25 | `phase-07-conductor-graft.md:89` / `phase-07-conductor-graft.sh:90` | Keystone `magnum` domain + `magnum_domain_admin` user + password (D-046, re-run after every redeploy) | Magnum charm config | phase-07 step 7.0 | service |
+| B26 | `appendix-D-magnum-trust-model.md:18-25,77`; `tenant-acceptance.sh:54`; `phase-08-*.md:35,179` | per-cluster trustee user + Keystone trust + CAPO child app credential, minted at EVERY cluster create (D-039/D-046) | cloud only, no host file | phase-08 / every create | service |
+| B27 | `changelog-20260725-maas-admin-recovery.md:24-29` | MAAS superuser **`operator`** -- 32-char base64, stdin never argv | `~/vr1-office1-creds/maas-operator-password` 0600 | ad-hoc 2026-07-25 (SEC-020c) | **human** (first human-only MAAS identity) |
+| B28 | `clientdocs/self-service-guide.md:51-52`; `tenant-skill/references/day2-operations.md:147-148` | tenant end-user Keystone passwords (`--password-prompt`), client-run | client host | tenant day-2 | **human** |
+| B29 | `clientdocs/ci-automation.md:63-70`; `ci-integration-guide.md:102-109` | client-minted app credential `pipeline-nightly` | client CI secret store | tenant CI | service |
+| B30 | `dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md:491-497` | *not a mint* -- the standing instruction enumerating what a DC standup mints and requiring immediate consolidation + a manifest row | `~/vr1-<dc>-creds/` | Stage 4 close-out | -- |
+
+## D. Charm/platform-minted at bundle apply (no repo mint site)
+
+- **Keystone `admin` password** -- charm-minted; MATERIALIZED by
+  `phase-03-admin-openrc.sh:52` via `juju run keystone/leader get-admin-password` +
+  `extract_admin_password.py`. In matrix scope per the materialization ruling.
+- Per-service DB / RabbitMQ / Ceph keyring credentials -- charm relation data, never
+  materialized. OUT of scope (56 apps, zero hardcoded secret options in `bundle.yaml`).
+- Vault-issued per-service TLS certs -- cascade from B4; `phase-04-internal-cert-san-verify.sh`
+  verifies, does not mint.
+
+## E. MATERIALIZE / UPLOAD -- checked and EXCLUDED (not creation points)
+
+`phase-03-admin-openrc.sh:46-52,66-80` (writes `~/admin-openrc`, SEC-023);
+`extract_admin_password.py`; `phase-06-kubeconfig-gate.sh:36,59-77`;
+`phase-07-conductor-graft.sh:121-129` (base64 to the conductor unit, sha256-verified);
+`phase-06-net-setup.sh:23,48` and `phase-06-incloud-mgmt-cluster.md:206` (UPLOAD of an
+existing pubkey); `opentofu/main.tf:218-219,444-447,575-578` (cloud-init
+`ssh_authorized_keys` via `file()`); `vr1-dc{0,1}-substrate/main.tf:21,18`
+(`qemu+ssh?keyfile=` -- path only, D-126 boundary); `opnsense-api.sh:32,75` (consume);
+`reenroll-hosts.sh:122-123` (`read -rsp` a libvirt password into MAAS power params --
+rotation warning `:22-25`); `vault-kv-inner-probe.sh:12-13,22` (consume);
+`site-ssh-config.sh` / `site-forward.sh` / `site-baseleg.sh` (explicit no-key-material
+boundaries); `netbox/*.py` (consume `NETBOX_TOKEN` from env only); `creds-audit.sh`
+(metadata only); `.claude/hooks/guard-destructive.py:28-42`; `snapshot_scrub.py:10`.
+
+## G. Coverage boundary
+
+Searched beyond `scripts/`+`runbooks/`: `bundle.yaml`, `overlays/`, `clientdocs/` (incl.
+`scripts/` and `tenant-skill/`), `policies/`, `skills/`, `.claude/`, `creds-manifests/`,
+`_handoff-not-committed/`. `tests/` EXCLUDED as fixtures (`tests/tenant-onboard/run-tests.sh:21,86`
+mints a fake CA/PEM; `test_logic.py` uses `NETBOX_TOKEN="fake-token"`) -- no real credential
+originates there. NEVER opened, and excluded from content-printing greps:
+`opentofu/terraform.tfstate*`, the 8 `*.tfplan`, `logs/`, `asbuilt/`, `docs/audit/`,
+`netbox/draft/*.json`. `opentofu/README.md` + `variables.tf:6-10` confirm `maas_api_key`
+reaches tfstate in plaintext (DOCFIX-175) -- a secret-at-rest location with no mint of its own.
diff --git a/docs/audit/d137-location-listing-20260726.txt b/docs/audit/d137-location-listing-20260726.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b00def2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/d137-location-listing-20260726.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+# D-137 declared-location STAT LISTING -- measured 2026-07-26
+#
+# WHY THIS FILE EXISTS: docs/CURRENT-STATE.md previously asserted specific remote
+# filenames and modes citing d137-tier2-privileged-20260726.txt, which is a checker
+# VERDICT file and contains none of them (committee lens 3/5 finding). GA-R1 rule 2
+# requires measurements be quoted from captured command output. This is that output.
+#
+# Metadata only: stat -c '%n %a'. No file content read. sudo -n used ONLY for the
+# two root-owned directories.
+
+## jumphost (vcloud) -- SEC-009 convention folders
+# /home/jessea123/vr1-office1-creds
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-office1-creds/maas-admin-password 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-office1-creds/maas-operator-password 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-office1-creds/office1_svc_ed25519 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-office1-creds/office1_svc_ed25519.pub 644
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-office1-creds/opnsense-api.txt 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-office1-creds/opnsense-root-hash 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-office1-creds/opnsense-root-password 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-office1-creds/README 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-office1-creds/tailscale-authkey.txt 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-office1-creds/vr1-netbox.env 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-office1-creds/vr1-netbox-sandbox.env 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-office1-creds/vr1-office1.env 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-office1-creds/vr1-stage1.env 600
+# /home/jessea123/vr1-dc0-creds
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc0-creds/maas-api-key.txt 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc0-creds/vr1-dc0-edge_ed25519 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc0-creds/vr1-dc0-edge_ed25519.pub 644
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc0-creds/vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc0-creds/vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519.pub 644
+# /home/jessea123/vr1-dc1-creds
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc1-creds/maas-api-key.txt 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc1-creds/opnsense-api.txt 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc1-creds/vr1-dc1-edge_ed25519 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc1-creds/vr1-dc1-edge_ed25519.pub 644
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc1-creds/vr1-dc1-maas-power_ed25519 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc1-creds/vr1-dc1-maas-power_ed25519.pub 644
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc1-creds/vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc1-creds/vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519.pub 644
+
+## headend (voffice1) -- SEC-022 shadow stores
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc0-creds/maas-virsh_ed25519 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc0-creds/vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519 600
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc0-creds/vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519.pub 644
+  /home/jessea123/vr1-dc1-creds/vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519 600
+## headend -- CLI profile, juju client store
+# CORRECTION (measured this run): ~/.maas.cli does NOT exist. The MAAS snap CLI stores its
+# profile + API key in ~/snap/maas/current/.maascli.db (a SQLite DB), NOT the path the
+# matrix inferred. Note the `current` symlink -- same per-revision snap fragility class as
+# the power keys.
+  stat: cannot statx '/home/jessea123/.maas.cli': No such file or directory
+  /home/jessea123/.local/share/juju/clouds.yaml 600
+  /home/jessea123/.local/share/juju/credentials.yaml 600
+  /home/jessea123/.local/share/juju/public-clouds.yaml 600
+## headend -- region secrets dir (SEC-020) + snap ssh + enroll secret [PRIVILEGED]
+  /root/maas-secrets/admin.apikey 600
+  /root/maas-secrets/admin.pass 600
+  /root/maas-secrets/db.pass 600
+  /root/maas-secrets/lxd-trust.pass 600
+  /var/snap/maas/current/root/.ssh/config 644
+  /var/snap/maas/current/root/.ssh/id_dc1_power 600
+  /var/snap/maas/current/root/.ssh/id_ed25519 600
+  /var/snap/maas/current/root/.ssh/known_hosts 600
+  /var/snap/maas/current/root/.ssh/known_hosts.old 644
+  /var/snap/maas/common/maas/secret 640
+
+## netbox VM (office1-netbox) -- founding SEC-009 miss [PRIVILEGED]
+  /root/netbox-secrets/admin.pass 600
+  /root/netbox-secrets/api.token 600
+  /root/netbox-secrets/secret_key 600
+
+## headend -- REAL MAAS CLI profile store (measured after the ~/.maas.cli miss)
+  /home/jessea123/snap/maas/current/.maascli.db 600
diff --git a/docs/audit/d137-tier2-postcommittee-20260726.txt b/docs/audit/d137-tier2-postcommittee-20260726.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc0f0b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/d137-tier2-postcommittee-20260726.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# D-137 tier-2 sweep -- POST-COMMITTEE, live + privileged, 2026-07-26
+#   python3 scripts/creds-matrix.py --tier2 --remote --privileged \
+#     --pending-stage vr0-phase01 --pending-stage vr0-phase02 \
+#     --pending-stage vr0-phase03 --pending-stage tenant-onboard
+#
+# SUPERSEDES d137-tier2-privileged-20260726.txt, whose verdicts predate the
+# site-scoping fix and the filename re-measurements and are NOT comparable.
+# Metadata only (stat; sudo -n only where an unprivileged probe could not look).
+# NOTE the E1 for dc0-edge-api 'opnsense-api.txt': that on-disk absence was MASKED
+# by the site-blind check in every prior run. Its appearance here is the proof.
+
+=== creds-matrix: tier 1 (STATIC) ===
+=== creds-matrix: tier 2 (EXISTENCE) ===
+  [ok]   S1 schema: 81 rows, all enums valid, site-keys region-qualified, no duplicate (id,site,host-role,filename)
+  [ok]   S3 render: 2 source field(s) SKIPPED -- rendering them needs the declared path from creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations (ruling 3); the list now EXISTS but the source-field derivation is not wired
+  [ok]   S3 render drift: rendered row fields (mode, source) match checked-in; header prose and non-jumphost rows are OUT OF SCOPE of this compare
+  [ok]   S4 mint-ref: every script:/runbook: reference resolves to a real location
+  [ok]   S4 provenance debt: 29 row(s) are mint-ref=operator-terminal -- NOT reproducible from the repo (research FINDING 1). Admitted by design; converting them is remediation, not a checker fix.
+  [ok]   S7 notes: 34 note key(s) referenced, all resolve, none orphaned
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/vault-init/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/octavia-pki/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/octavia-pki/issuing-ca/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/octavia-pki/controller-ca/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/octavia-pki/controller/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 headend location '/root/maas-secrets/*' read via ESCALATION (sudo -n, metadata only) after an unprivileged probe could not open it
+  [ok]   E0 headend location '/var/snap/maas/current/root/.ssh/*' read via ESCALATION (sudo -n, metadata only) after an unprivileged probe could not open it
+  [ok]   E0 netbox location '/root/netbox-secrets/*' read via ESCALATION (sudo -n, metadata only) after an unprivileged probe could not open it
+  [ok]   E1 18 expected artifact(s) deferred as not-yet-minted (--pending-stage)
+  [FAIL] S2 vr1-dc0 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: 'opnsense-api.txt' (id dc0-edge-api, SEC-021) is expected by the matrix but NOT declared in the manifest -- the credential is either missing or undeclared
+  [FAIL] S2 vr1-dc0 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: 'vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519' (id dc0-maas-power-key, SEC-021) is expected by the matrix but NOT declared in the manifest -- the credential is either missing or undeclared
+  [FAIL] S2 vr1-dc0 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: 'vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519.pub' (id dc0-maas-power-key, SEC-021) is expected by the matrix but NOT declared in the manifest -- the credential is either missing or undeclared
+  [FAIL] S5 ASYMMETRY: vr1-dc0 declares id=dcN-maas-power-key file=id_ed25519 on headend (custody=off-manifest-known) with no counterpart in vr1-dc1 -- a per-DC credential must exist at BOTH DCs in the same shape
+  [FAIL] S5 ASYMMETRY: vr1-dc0 declares id=dcN-maas-power-key file=maas-virsh_ed25519 on headend (custody=off-manifest-known) with no counterpart in vr1-dc1 -- a per-DC credential must exist at BOTH DCs in the same shape
+  [FAIL] S5 ASYMMETRY: vr1-dc1 declares id=dcN-maas-power-key file=id_dcN_power on headend (custody=off-manifest-known) with no counterpart in vr1-dc0 -- a per-DC credential must exist at BOTH DCs in the same shape
+  [FAIL] S6 IDENTITY CONFLATION: id 'maas-region-admin' serves 2 principal types (human via gui; service via api, cli-profile) -- ruling 5 requires one identity to serve one principal type
+  [FAIL] E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: dc0-edge-api 'opnsense-api.txt' expected at jumphost/vr1-dc0, not found (mint-stage stage3, SEC-021)
+  [FAIL] E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: dc0-maas-power-key 'vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519' expected at jumphost/vr1-dc0, not found (mint-stage stage3, SEC-021)
+  [FAIL] E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: dc0-maas-power-key 'vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519.pub' expected at jumphost/vr1-dc0, not found (mint-stage stage3, SEC-021)
+  [FAIL] E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: dc1-svc-key 'vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519.pub' expected at headend/vr1-dc1, not found (mint-stage stage3, SEC-022)
+  [FAIL] E2 WORLD-READABLE: office1-tofu-maas-apikey 'terraform.tfstate.backup' at jumphost/vr1-office1 is mode 664
+  [FAIL] E4 UNCHECKABLE: 2 row(s) have no declared location for their (role, site) and can never be verified -- add a location row or correct the matrix: capi-mgmt-kubeconfig 'config' (cloud/-); rbd-mirror-peer-token 'rbd-mirror-bootstrap-token' (unit/-)
+
+FAIL: creds-matrix tier 1 -- 81 row(s), 15 check group(s) clean, 13 finding(s)
diff --git a/docs/audit/d137-tier2-privileged-20260726.txt b/docs/audit/d137-tier2-privileged-20260726.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..63adb2c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/d137-tier2-privileged-20260726.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# D-137 tier-2 EXISTENCE sweep -- live, PRIVILEGED, 2026-07-26
+#
+#   python3 scripts/creds-matrix.py --tier2 --remote --privileged \
+#     --pending-stage vr0-phase01 --pending-stage vr0-phase02 \
+#     --pending-stage vr0-phase03 --pending-stage tenant-onboard
+#
+# Metadata only (stat; sudo -n escalation ONLY where an unprivileged probe could
+# not open the location). No file content read. Hosts: jumphost, voffice1,
+# office1-netbox. Pending stages supplied by the caller from CURRENT-STATE (GA-R1).
+# Supersedes the unprivileged capture d137-tier2-sweep-20260726.txt.
+
+=== creds-matrix: tier 1 (STATIC) ===
+=== creds-matrix: tier 2 (EXISTENCE) ===
+  [ok]   S1 schema: 77 rows, all enums valid, site-keys region-qualified, no duplicate (id,site,host-role,filename)
+  [ok]   S3 render: 2 source field(s) SKIPPED -- rendering them needs the declared path from creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations (ruling 3); the list now EXISTS but the source-field derivation is not wired
+  [ok]   S3 render drift: rendered row fields (mode, source) match checked-in; header prose and non-jumphost rows are OUT OF SCOPE of this compare
+  [ok]   S4 mint-ref: every script:/runbook: reference resolves to a real location
+  [ok]   S4 provenance debt: 27 row(s) are mint-ref=operator-terminal -- NOT reproducible from the repo (research FINDING 1). Admitted by design; converting them is remediation, not a checker fix.
+  [ok]   S7 notes: 33 note key(s) referenced, all resolve, none orphaned
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/vault-init/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/octavia-pki/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 headend location '/root/maas-secrets/*' read via ESCALATION (sudo -n, metadata only) after an unprivileged probe could not open it
+  [ok]   E0 headend (voffice1) UNREACHABLE -- location '~/.maas.cli' SKIPPED explicitly; an unreachable host is never a pass
+  [ok]   E0 headend location '/var/snap/maas/current/root/.ssh/*' read via ESCALATION (sudo -n, metadata only) after an unprivileged probe could not open it
+  [ok]   E0 netbox location '/root/netbox-secrets/*' read via ESCALATION (sudo -n, metadata only) after an unprivileged probe could not open it
+  [ok]   E1 17 expected artifact(s) deferred as not-yet-minted (--pending-stage)
+  [ok]   E1 2 expected artifact(s) NOT JUDGED -- their role (headend) has at least one location that could not be probed, so absence cannot be asserted over it
+  [FAIL] S2 vr1-dc0 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: 'opnsense-api.txt' (id dc0-edge-api, SEC-021) is expected by the matrix but NOT declared in the manifest -- the credential is either missing or undeclared
+  [FAIL] S2 vr1-dc0 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: 'vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519' (id dc0-maas-power-key, SEC-021) is expected by the matrix but NOT declared in the manifest -- the credential is either missing or undeclared
+  [FAIL] S2 vr1-dc0 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: 'vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519.pub' (id dc0-maas-power-key, SEC-021) is expected by the matrix but NOT declared in the manifest -- the credential is either missing or undeclared
+  [FAIL] S5 ASYMMETRY: vr1-dc0 declares id=dcN-maas-power-key file=id_ed25519 on headend (custody=off-manifest-known) with no counterpart in vr1-dc1 -- a per-DC credential must exist at BOTH DCs in the same shape
+  [FAIL] S5 ASYMMETRY: vr1-dc0 declares id=dcN-maas-power-key file=maas-virsh_ed25519 on headend (custody=off-manifest-known) with no counterpart in vr1-dc1 -- a per-DC credential must exist at BOTH DCs in the same shape
+  [FAIL] S5 ASYMMETRY: vr1-dc1 declares id=dcN-maas-power-key file=id_dcN_power on headend (custody=off-manifest-known) with no counterpart in vr1-dc0 -- a per-DC credential must exist at BOTH DCs in the same shape
+  [FAIL] S6 IDENTITY CONFLATION: id 'maas-region-admin' serves 2 principal types (human via gui; service via api, cli-profile) -- ruling 5 requires one identity to serve one principal type
+  [FAIL] E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: dc0-maas-power-key 'vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519' expected at jumphost, not found (mint-stage stage3, SEC-021)
+  [FAIL] E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: dc0-maas-power-key 'vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519.pub' expected at jumphost, not found (mint-stage stage3, SEC-021)
+
+FAIL: creds-matrix tier 1 -- 77 row(s), 14 check group(s) clean, 9 finding(s)
diff --git a/docs/audit/d137-tier2-sweep-20260726.txt b/docs/audit/d137-tier2-sweep-20260726.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bafed6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/d137-tier2-sweep-20260726.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# D-137 tier-2 EXISTENCE sweep -- live, read-only, 2026-07-26
+#
+# Command (metadata only: stat over ssh, NO sudo, no file content read):
+#   python3 scripts/creds-matrix.py --tier2 --remote \
+#     --pending-stage vr0-phase01 --pending-stage vr0-phase02 \
+#     --pending-stage vr0-phase03 --pending-stage tenant-onboard
+#
+# Pending stages supplied by the CALLER from CURRENT-STATE (GA-R1: the script
+# carries no status claim). Hosts probed: jumphost (local), voffice1, office1-netbox.
+
+=== creds-matrix: tier 1 (STATIC) ===
+=== creds-matrix: tier 2 (EXISTENCE) ===
+  [ok]   S1 schema: 72 rows, all enums valid, site-keys region-qualified, no duplicate (id,site,host-role,filename)
+  [ok]   S3 render: 2 source field(s) SKIPPED -- rendering them needs the declared path from creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations (ruling 3); the list now EXISTS but the source-field derivation is not wired
+  [ok]   S3 render drift: rendered row fields (mode, source) match checked-in; header prose and non-jumphost rows are OUT OF SCOPE of this compare
+  [ok]   S4 mint-ref: every script:/runbook: reference resolves to a real location
+  [ok]   S4 provenance debt: 27 row(s) are mint-ref=operator-terminal -- NOT reproducible from the repo (research FINDING 1). Admitted by design; converting them is remediation, not a checker fix.
+  [ok]   S7 notes: 32 note key(s) referenced, all resolve, none orphaned
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/vault-init/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/octavia-pki/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E1 17 expected artifact(s) deferred as not-yet-minted (--pending-stage)
+  [ok]   E1 14 expected artifact(s) NOT JUDGED -- their role (headend, netbox) has at least one location that could not be probed, so absence cannot be asserted over it
+  [FAIL] S2 vr1-dc0 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: 'opnsense-api.txt' (id dc0-edge-api, SEC-021) is expected by the matrix but NOT declared in the manifest -- the credential is either missing or undeclared
+  [FAIL] S2 vr1-dc0 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: 'vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519' (id dc0-maas-power-key, SEC-021) is expected by the matrix but NOT declared in the manifest -- the credential is either missing or undeclared
+  [FAIL] S2 vr1-dc0 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: 'vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519.pub' (id dc0-maas-power-key, SEC-021) is expected by the matrix but NOT declared in the manifest -- the credential is either missing or undeclared
+  [FAIL] S5 ASYMMETRY: vr1-dc0 declares id=dcN-maas-power-key file=maas-virsh_ed25519 on headend (custody=off-manifest-known) with no counterpart in vr1-dc1 -- a per-DC credential must exist at BOTH DCs in the same shape
+  [FAIL] S6 IDENTITY CONFLATION: id 'maas-region-admin' serves 2 principal types (human via gui; service via api, cli-profile) -- ruling 5 requires one identity to serve one principal type
+  [FAIL] E0 UNREADABLE: headend location '/root/maas-secrets/*' EXISTS but could not be listed -- no conclusion may be drawn about its contents; re-run with sufficient privilege
+  [FAIL] E0 UNREADABLE: netbox location '/root/netbox-secrets/*' EXISTS but could not be listed -- no conclusion may be drawn about its contents; re-run with sufficient privilege
+  [FAIL] E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: dc0-maas-power-key 'vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519' expected at jumphost, not found (mint-stage stage3, SEC-021)
+  [FAIL] E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: dc0-maas-power-key 'vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519.pub' expected at jumphost, not found (mint-stage stage3, SEC-021)
+
+FAIL: creds-matrix tier 1 -- 72 row(s), 10 check group(s) clean, 9 finding(s)
diff --git a/docs/audit/d137-tier3-probe-20260726.txt b/docs/audit/d137-tier3-probe-20260726.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..055b11a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/d137-tier3-probe-20260726.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# D-137 tier-3 BEHAVIOURAL probe run -- 2026-07-26
+#   bash scripts/creds-probe.sh --run
+# THIS RUN AUTHENTICATED. Every [ok] ssh/api line wrote an audit or login record on
+# its target. Boundary operator-ruled 2026-07-26: full scope incl. OpenStack service
+# credentials; per-tenant credentials REFUSED by construction (D-069 / ruling 3).
+
+=== creds-probe: D-137 tier 3 behavioural (run) ===
+  NOTE: this AUTHENTICATES. Each probe writes an audit/login record on its target.
+  [ok]   office1-svc-key: ssh key authenticates to voffice1
+  [skip] dc0-svc-key: declared non-probeable (dc0-rack-reachable-only-via-jumpbox-with-per-env-key-D-126) -- validity rests on V1/V2, by decision
+  [skip] dc1-svc-key: declared non-probeable (dc1-rack-reachable-only-via-jumpbox-with-per-env-key-D-126) -- validity rests on V1/V2, by decision
+  [skip] office1-edge-api: declared non-probeable (edge-API-probe-costs-an-audit-record-per-run;V1+V2-cover-it) -- validity rests on V1/V2, by decision
+  [skip] dc0-edge-api: declared non-probeable (ABSENT-per-SEC-021;nothing-to-probe-until-consolidated) -- validity rests on V1/V2, by decision
+  [skip] dc1-edge-api: declared non-probeable (edge-API-probe-costs-an-audit-record-per-run;V1+V2-cover-it) -- validity rests on V1/V2, by decision
+  [ok]   netbox-sandbox-token: endpoint http://10.10.1.10:8000/ answers (HTTP 302) -- credential NOT spent
+  [skip] netbox-upstream-token: declared non-probeable (SEC-006-declares-this-BURNED;probing-a-burned-token-is-wrong) -- validity rests on V1/V2, by decision
+  [ok]   maas-region-admin: endpoint http://10.10.0.20:5240/MAAS/ answers (HTTP 301) -- credential NOT spent
+  [skip] dc0-maas-apikey: mint-stage 'stage5' is pending -- not yet minted, so not probed
+  [skip] dc1-maas-apikey: mint-stage 'stage5' is pending -- not yet minted, so not probed
+  [skip] keystone-admin: mint-stage 'vr0-phase01' is pending -- not yet minted, so not probed
+  [skip] magnum-domain-admin: mint-stage 'vr0-phase07' is pending -- not yet minted, so not probed
+
+creds-probe: 3 ok, 0 failed, 10 skipped
diff --git a/docs/audit/d137-tier3-provenance-20260726.txt b/docs/audit/d137-tier3-provenance-20260726.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c055034
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/d137-tier3-provenance-20260726.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# D-137 tier-3 VALIDITY sweep -- live + privileged, 2026-07-26
+#   python3 scripts/creds-matrix.py --tier2 --tier3 --remote --privileged \
+#     --pending-stage vr0-phase01 --pending-stage vr0-phase02 \
+#     --pending-stage vr0-phase03 --pending-stage tenant-onboard
+#
+# DIGESTS ONLY. sha256sum is invoked as an external command on both sides, so only a
+# 64-hex digest ever enters the checker process. No credential content is transferred.
+# This is the check SEC-020's stale-trap warning has needed since it was written: the
+# sha256 equality it depends on was a ONE-TIME manual act on 2026-07-25.
+
+=== creds-matrix: tier 1 (STATIC) ===
+=== creds-matrix: tier 2 (EXISTENCE) ===
+=== creds-matrix: tier 3 (VALIDITY) ===
+  [ok]   S1 schema: 81 rows, all enums valid, site-keys region-qualified, no duplicate (id,site,host-role,filename)
+  [ok]   S3 render: 2 source field(s) SKIPPED -- rendering them needs the declared path from creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations (ruling 3); the list now EXISTS but the source-field derivation is not wired
+  [ok]   S3 render drift: rendered row fields (mode, source) match checked-in; header prose and non-jumphost rows are OUT OF SCOPE of this compare
+  [ok]   S4 mint-ref: every script:/runbook: reference resolves to a real location
+  [ok]   S4 provenance debt: 29 row(s) are mint-ref=operator-terminal -- NOT reproducible from the repo (research FINDING 1). Admitted by design; converting them is remediation, not a checker fix.
+  [ok]   S7 notes: 34 note key(s) referenced, all resolve, none orphaned
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/vault-init/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/octavia-pki/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/octavia-pki/issuing-ca/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/octavia-pki/controller-ca/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 jumphost location '~/octavia-pki/controller/*' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint stage this deployment has not reached)
+  [ok]   E0 headend location '/root/maas-secrets/*' read via ESCALATION (sudo -n, metadata only) after an unprivileged probe could not open it
+  [ok]   E0 headend location '/var/snap/maas/current/root/.ssh/*' read via ESCALATION (sudo -n, metadata only) after an unprivileged probe could not open it
+  [ok]   E0 netbox location '/root/netbox-secrets/*' read via ESCALATION (sudo -n, metadata only) after an unprivileged probe could not open it
+  [ok]   E1 18 expected artifact(s) deferred as not-yet-minted (--pending-stage)
+  [ok]   V1 1 multi-copy identity(ies) SKIPPED -- fewer than two copies could be digested (unresolvable path, instance template, or a location not probed). A digest that could not be taken is never a match.
+  [ok]   V1 provenance: all copies byte-identical for 4 group(s): dc0-svc-key; dc0-svc-key; dc1-svc-key; maas-region-admin (declared verbatim copies)
+  [FAIL] S2 vr1-dc0 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: 'opnsense-api.txt' (id dc0-edge-api, SEC-021) is expected by the matrix but NOT declared in the manifest -- the credential is either missing or undeclared
+  [FAIL] S2 vr1-dc0 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: 'vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519' (id dc0-maas-power-key, SEC-021) is expected by the matrix but NOT declared in the manifest -- the credential is either missing or undeclared
+  [FAIL] S2 vr1-dc0 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: 'vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519.pub' (id dc0-maas-power-key, SEC-021) is expected by the matrix but NOT declared in the manifest -- the credential is either missing or undeclared
+  [FAIL] S5 ASYMMETRY: vr1-dc0 declares id=dcN-maas-power-key file=id_ed25519 on headend (custody=off-manifest-known) with no counterpart in vr1-dc1 -- a per-DC credential must exist at BOTH DCs in the same shape
+  [FAIL] S5 ASYMMETRY: vr1-dc0 declares id=dcN-maas-power-key file=maas-virsh_ed25519 on headend (custody=off-manifest-known) with no counterpart in vr1-dc1 -- a per-DC credential must exist at BOTH DCs in the same shape
+  [FAIL] S5 ASYMMETRY: vr1-dc1 declares id=dcN-maas-power-key file=id_dcN_power on headend (custody=off-manifest-known) with no counterpart in vr1-dc0 -- a per-DC credential must exist at BOTH DCs in the same shape
+  [FAIL] S6 IDENTITY CONFLATION: id 'maas-region-admin' serves 2 principal types (human via gui; service via api, cli-profile) -- ruling 5 requires one identity to serve one principal type
+  [FAIL] E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: dc0-edge-api 'opnsense-api.txt' expected at jumphost/vr1-dc0, not found (mint-stage stage3, SEC-021)
+  [FAIL] E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: dc0-maas-power-key 'vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519' expected at jumphost/vr1-dc0, not found (mint-stage stage3, SEC-021)
+  [FAIL] E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: dc0-maas-power-key 'vr1-dc0-maas-power_ed25519.pub' expected at jumphost/vr1-dc0, not found (mint-stage stage3, SEC-021)
+  [FAIL] E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: dc1-svc-key 'vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519.pub' expected at headend/vr1-dc1, not found (mint-stage stage3, SEC-022)
+  [FAIL] E2 WORLD-READABLE: office1-tofu-maas-apikey 'terraform.tfstate.backup' at jumphost/vr1-office1 is mode 664
+  [FAIL] E4 UNCHECKABLE: 2 row(s) have no declared location for their (role, site) and can never be verified -- add a location row or correct the matrix: capi-mgmt-kubeconfig 'config' (cloud/-); rbd-mirror-peer-token 'rbd-mirror-bootstrap-token' (unit/-)
+
+FAIL: creds-matrix tier 1 -- 81 row(s), 17 check group(s) clean, 13 finding(s)
diff --git a/docs/audit/dc1-mirror-teardown-20260727.txt b/docs/audit/dc1-mirror-teardown-20260727.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32c1a19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/dc1-mirror-teardown-20260727.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+=== dc1 full-mirror teardown + proxy net-layer ownership -- 2026-07-27 ===
+repo HEAD: fbda433d28df80a47caa9480536eb350c85abcef  branch: dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy
+
+OPERATOR INTENT (corrects the record): DC0 tests the FULL MIRROR; DC1 tests the
+MIRROR PROXY. dc1's partially-built full mirror and its script/files/settings were to be
+REMOVED. CURRENT-STATE had recorded dc1's debmirror as 'PAUSED ... kept dormant as the
+fallback' -- there is no fallback, and that claim is corrected in this change.
+Operator direction on sequencing: "Do the net layer first, then rip it all down."
+
+--- WHY THE NET LAYER HAD TO MOVE FIRST (the trap that was found) ---
+dc-cache-proxy.sh did NOT own its utility net layer -- its header said it REUSES
+dc-mirror.sh's <site>-mirror-net.service and 'fails loud if absent'. So on dc1, whose
+ruled artifact path is the PROXY, three files named dc1-mirror-* were load-bearing for
+the proxy: the net unit, its apply helper, and the resolved DNS drop-in. Consequences:
+  (a) the 07-23 changelog's recorded mirror-removal ('stop/disable ... -net.service, rm
+      the generated files') would have SILENTLY KILLED the proxy, taken down the Stage 4
+      bullet-5 PASS, and blocked the Stage-5 dc1 deploy that consumes
+      apt-http-proxy=http://10.12.68.4:3142;
+  (b) the proxy could not be REBUILT after such a teardown -- nothing but
+      'dc-mirror.sh install' created the net layer, so rebuilding a PROXY required
+      reinstalling the entire MIRROR apparatus (sync unit, ENABLED daily timer, nginx
+      vhost, debmirror package). A teardown-and-rebuild therefore did not converge.
+
+--- 1. net layer moved into dc-cache-proxy.sh, then INSTALLED on the dc1 rack ---
+  OK   apt-cacher-ng installed
+  OK   /etc/apt-cacher-ng/acng.conf.d/dc1-cache-proxy.conf matches
+  OK   apt-cacher-ng active
+  OK   listening on :3142
+  OK   /usr/local/sbin/dc1-cache-proxy-net-apply matches
+  OK   /etc/systemd/system/dc1-cache-proxy-net.service matches
+  OK   /etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d/dc1-cache-proxy.conf matches
+  OK   dc1-cache-proxy-net.service enabled
+  OK   10.12.68.4/22 on virbr6 (vr1-dc1-metal-admin)
+  OK   default route via edge 10.12.64.1
+  OK   proxy serves http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/dists/jammy/Release (200)
+  OK   proxy serves http://ubuntu-cloud.archive.canonical.com/ubuntu/dists/jammy-updates/caracal/Release (200)
+dc-cache-proxy check (dc1): PASS
+
+--- 2. INDEPENDENCE PROOF (the step that made the teardown safe) ---
+A oneshot with RemainAfterExit=yes does not undo its work on stop, so merely stopping
+dc1-mirror-net.service would have proven NOTHING. The live state was therefore REMOVED
+and the proxy-owned unit applied ALONE:
+  systemctl disable --now dc1-mirror-net.service   -> unit gone from multi-user.target
+  ip addr del 10.12.68.4/22 dev virbr6             -> addr count 0
+  ip route del default via 10.12.64.1              -> default route count 0
+  systemctl restart dc1-cache-proxy-net.service    -> applied ok
+  re-verified: 10.12.68.4/22 on virbr6 + default via 10.12.64.1 RESTORED
+  dc-cache-proxy check (dc1): PASS with the mirror net unit DISABLED
+
+--- 3. post-teardown state of the rack ---
+mirror-named units remaining:
+  NONE
+mirror files remaining:
+  gone  /usr/local/sbin/dc1-mirror-sync
+  gone  /usr/local/sbin/dc1-mirror-net-apply
+  gone  /etc/systemd/system/dc1-mirror-sync.service
+  gone  /etc/systemd/system/dc1-mirror-sync.timer
+  gone  /etc/systemd/system/dc1-mirror-net.service
+  gone  /etc/nginx/sites-available/dc1-mirror
+  gone  /etc/nginx/sites-enabled/dc1-mirror
+  gone  /etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d/dc1-mirror.conf
+  gone  /var/lib/dc-mirror
+debmirror package:
+  removed
+proxy-owned artifacts (must all be present):
+  PRESENT /usr/local/sbin/dc1-cache-proxy-net-apply
+  PRESENT /etc/systemd/system/dc1-cache-proxy-net.service
+  PRESENT /etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d/dc1-cache-proxy.conf
+  PRESENT /etc/apt-cacher-ng/acng.conf.d/dc1-cache-proxy.conf
+nginx: DELIBERATELY LEFT (see note) -- enabled vhosts:
+    default
+disk:
+/dev/vda1       2.9T  9.0G  2.9T   1% /
+
+NOTE ON nginx: LEFT INSTALLED, deliberately. It was a MIRROR prereq, but once the
+dc1-mirror vhost is gone it is a generic web server serving only its stock 'default'
+vhost -- not mirror-specific. Removing the metapackage while nginx-core keeps running is
+a half-measure worse than either extreme, and a full purge is scope creep on a rack host.
+If dc1 is ever rebuilt as a mirror, dc-mirror.sh install fail-louds with the exact apt line.
+
+DELETION COST, measured (the question that decided surgical-vs-rebuild): 330G but only
+33,037 files (~10MB average), so rm -rf took 47.6s wall. Disk 339G used -> 9.0G.
diff --git a/docs/audit/decision-recon-20260725.md b/docs/audit/decision-recon-20260725.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a4bc1f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/decision-recon-20260725.md
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+# Full decision reconciliation -- VR1 DC-DC (IP / VLAN / node / decision-status)
+
+**Date:** 2026-07-25. **Branch:** `dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy`.
+**Convened by:** operator ("Deploy a committee for a full decision recon. Are there
+any other reconciliations that should be queued afterwards?").
+
+**Status:** ADVISORY / audit record. Reconciles RULED decisions against the
+authoritative surfaces; adopts nothing. `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` remains the sole
+status authority (GA-R1). Companion to
+`docs/audit/committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.md` and
+`docs/audit/stage5-expansion-review-20260724.md`.
+
+**Method:** four independent READ-ONLY reviewers, each a recon dimension (IPAM
+prefixes/bands; VLAN/space/fabric; node/tag/MAC/power; decision-status +
+backlog), reconciling from COMMITTED surfaces: the office1-netbox apex snapshot
+`netbox/draft/vr1-office1-current-20260725.json`, `scripts/lib-net.sh` +
+`lib-hosts.sh`, `bundle.yaml` + `overlays/`, `opentofu/`, the MAAS carve captures
+(`docs/audit/stage4-carve-verify-20260723.txt`, `stage4-discovery-20260723.txt`),
+and `docs/design-decisions.md` + `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md`. Live-truth items are
+flagged NEEDS-LIVE-VERIFY.
+
+## Bottom line (the operator's question: is office1-netbox updated with all IP + VLAN decisions?)
+
+| Layer | In the apex? | Verdict |
+|---|---|---|
+| VLANs | zero | CORRECT BY DESIGN -- VR1 is untagged-per-fabric (D-133); VLANs are a MAAS-layer construct, never NetBox |
+| Plane /22s, transit, uplink, v6 GUA/ULA, aggregates | all present, drift-free | COMPLETE -- all 12 planes + both transit/uplink + both /48s, matching lib-net value-for-value |
+| D-134 per-DC bands (utility/VIP/node/dynamic) | absent | GAP -- exist only as decision prose; not in NetBox OR lib-net |
+| The 33 VIP addresses (.50-.60 x 3 legs) | absent | GAP -- overlay-only literals; a generator has nothing to pull |
+
+## Dimension verdicts
+
+### 1. IPAM (prefixes / bands)
+Prefix-layer COMPLETE + ZERO DRIFT across netbox <-> lib-net <-> artifacts:
+- All 12 plane /22s (6 dc0: 10.12.4/8/12/16/32/36; 6 dc1: 10.12.64/68/72/76/80/84),
+  correctly `scope_site`-scoped + role-tagged.
+- Transit /30s (dc0 172.31.0.0/30, dc1 172.31.0.4/30); uplinks (172.30.2/24,
+  172.30.3/24); GUA /48s (2602:f3e2:f02 dc0, :f03 dc1) + ARIN 2602:f3e2::/36 +
+  full v6 GUA/ULA subcarves; org ULA fd50:840e:74e2::/48. D-120 Office1 bands present.
+- **No drift** between lib-net.sh and the apex dump -- every value matches (the dc1
+  arm and `opentofu/variables.tf` twin honor "change one, change both").
+**GAP = sub-prefix only:**
+- **D-134 per-DC bands** (utility .4-.49, VIP .50-.99, node .100-.200 [control
+  .100-.119 / compute .120-.149 / storage .150-.200], dynamic .201-.254) -- MISSING
+  in NetBox AND in lib-net (lib-net carries only the dc0 VIP octet band .50-.60,
+  UNSET for dc1); exist only as D-134 prose. **[blocks-coupling]**
+- **The 33 VIP addresses** (11 services x provider/admin/internal, .50-.60) -- MISSING
+  in NetBox; overlay-only literals in `overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml` (internally
+  consistent with bundle octet-for-octet, but not an apex projection). **[blocks-coupling]**
+- Per-DC infra statics (gw .1, DNS-fwd .3 D-131, mirror .4 D-135) + the dc1
+  10.12.64.0/19 container prefix -- MISSING. **[hygiene]**
+
+### 2. VLAN / space / fabric
+- **office1-netbox holds ZERO VLAN objects = CORRECT BY DESIGN.** VR1 runs
+  untagged-per-fabric on every plane, both DCs (D-133 supersedes VR0's VID-103/104
+  for VR1 nodes; carve capture confirms flat `static:` links, no `.103/.104`
+  sub-interfaces). A VLAN object would document tagging that does not exist on the
+  wire -- exactly what design-decisions.md:217 prohibits.
+- The 6 D-052/D-053 spaces MATCH character-for-character across bundle / lib-net /
+  carve. The "12 MAAS VLANs" = 6 planes x 2 DCs on default untagged (VID 0) fabric
+  VLANs (MAAS constructs). `VLAN 5005` (dc0) = MAAS db-id of the untagged boot
+  fabric; dc1 twin = fabric-142/vid 0. 10 named plane fabrics + 2 boot = 12.
+- Residual VR0 VID-103/104 constants in lib-net.sh are caveated (D-133) + UNSET for
+  the vr1-dc1 arm -- functionally inert (LOW hygiene).
+- **Coupling input:** VLAN/space/fabric data, if ever needed, comes from MAAS, not
+  NetBox. The bundle binds by space NAME -> MAAS subnet by CIDR (never by
+  VLAN/fabric/subnet id, which drift). NetBox = IPAM (prefixes) only.
+
+### 3. Node / tag / MAC / power
+- Config-of-record DRIFT-FREE: D-121 Option C shapes match (substrate <-> lib-hosts
+  <-> discovery, 9/9 both DCs); pinned MACs match across substrate `main.tf` <->
+  lib-hosts `HOST_BOOT_MAC` (:01) <-> bundle ovn-chassis (:02 compute provider)
+  <-> discovery; per-DC power isolation intact (SEC-012 dc0 172.31.0.2 / SEC-016
+  dc1 172.31.0.6, distinct IdentityFile; keys off-repo).
+- **Two pending gated deltas (NOT drift):** (a) the **Fork-3 per-role tags** the
+  rendered bundle now hard-depends on are NOT yet on the MAAS nodes -- **HIGH,
+  deploy-blocks placement if skipped**; (b) the **D-104 10th controller VM** is
+  un-built in both substrates (expected; needs its own `juju-controller-vr1-dc1`
+  tag, no role tag).
+- **NEEDS-LIVE-VERIFY:** the discovery capture has NO tag column, so even the
+  DC-scoping tag's live application on the nodes is unproven by committed evidence
+  ("tags applied 9+9" is prose). Verify live MAAS tag state before deploy. Also:
+  per-node vCPU/mem live values; the SEC key IdentityFile mapping.
+
+### 4. Decision-status integrity
+Session-touched decisions (D-104 amendment, BUNDLEFIX-052, the render, Fork 2/3 as
+OPS, the coupling routed to Chat) are mutually consistent across CURRENT-STATE +
+changelog + design-decisions; ledger-scan PROPOSED/OPEN {D-068, D-131, D-132}
+matches CURRENT-STATE section 8. **Stale surfaces found (to fix -- deferred per operator):**
+- **HIGH -- CURRENT-STATE section 4 "RULED-BUT-NOT-BUILT" is comprehensively stale**
+  (authored 2026-07-18, never updated): 4 of 5 bullets contradicted by section 1 +
+  on-disk -- claims "Nothing DC0 is built" (DC0 built/commissioned, G10 CLOSED),
+  dc1 substrate "UNBUILT" (roots exist, G12 CLOSED), D-100 netem "HELD as comment
+  main.tf:309-319" (instantiated main.tf:353, applied Step E), D-129 qga "not
+  written" (shipped, G13 CLOSED). The status authority contradicts itself; only
+  GA-R1/C2 + "read section 1 first" masks it.
+- MED -- G14 SEC count stale: says 12 open; ledger-scan now 15 (adds
+  SEC-017/-018/-019).
+- MED -- `runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md:192` still says bundle "ships
+  NO designate" (contradicts ADOPTED D-106 + the actual bundle:830).
+- LOW -- changelog "Next" block internally stale (items 6-7 done); `opentofu/main.tf:18-19`
+  comment says netem "not instantiated yet" (it is, :353).
+
+## Ranked gaps -- what must land in office1-netbox for a NetBox->deploy generator
+1. **D-134 per-DC bands as ip-ranges** on every DC plane, both DCs (utility/VIP/node
+   [sub-role]/dynamic). Prose only today. **[blocks-coupling]**
+2. **The 33 VIP addresses (.50-.60) as scoped ip-addresses per DC** so the overlay is
+   a projection of NetBox, not a hand-maintained literal. **[blocks-coupling]**
+3. Per-DC infra statics (gw .1, DNS-fwd .3, mirror .4). **[hygiene]**
+4. dc1 10.12.64.0/19 container prefix. **[hygiene]**
+
+## Reconciliation backlog (the "what else to queue" answer)
+
+| Prio | Recon | Surfaces | When | Blocks |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| P0 | VIP-overlay collision + vault-VIP completeness | vr1-dc1-vips vs ipv6-family-matrix (both own `vip:`); rendered vault (no vip) vs D-020 | before dc1 deploy | dc1 deploy |
+| P0 | rendered bundle/overlays <-> apex | bundle + overlays (VIP band, tags, ovn MACs) vs the apex dump | before deploy (`--dc vr1-dc1` + `--dry-run`) | deploy correctness |
+| P1 | **extend `netbox/sandbox-fidelity-check.py`** (STALE) | the tool: covers only D-115/117/120, diffs the frozen 90-prefix draft not the 139-prefix apex; blind to D-124/D-134 | before the coupling design | trustworthy apex recons |
+| P1 | lib-net/lib-hosts literals <-> apex | 28 IP + 26 IP/MAC literals vs current apex | at coupling design; on any apex mutation | coupling adoption |
+| P1 | MAAS live <-> NetBox | D-134 bands + the 12 VLANs / 6 spaces (MAAS-only) vs apex | end-of-deploy + coupling | apex completeness / merge-back |
+| P2 | post-deploy cloud <-> decisions (BOM) | cloud-assert --capture vs D-121 HA / D-020 vault / D-108 / Ceph size/CRUSH / cluster_count | after dc1 deploys | Stage-5 close |
+| P2 | IPv6 / dual-stack | ipv6-family-matrix v6 tokens vs apex v6 | once v6 rendered (depends on P0 phasing) | dual-stack |
+| P2 | office1-netbox -> netbox.baldurkeep.com merge-back | 4.6.4 apex -> 4.5.8 frozen v1 reference | end-of-deployment (DOCFIX-195) | IPAM-of-record loop |
+| P2 | SEC-ledger <-> reality | security-ledger 15 open rows vs rotations/scope | G14 reconcile now; bulk at v1 close | security close-out |
+
+**Sequencing insight:** extend the fidelity tool FIRST -- it is the prerequisite that
+makes every apex recon (bundle<->apex, libs<->apex, MAAS<->NetBox) trustworthy, and
+the coupling's whole value proposition is eliminating the hand-render/carried-literal
+drift those recons chase.
+
+## Implications for the NetBox->deploy coupling (the Chat D-number)
+The recon VALIDATES the coupling's scope precisely: the gap is NOT the plane/prefix
+modeling (already faithful, drift-free) -- it is the **sub-prefix band + VIP-address
+layer** living in prose/overlays. So the coupling should: (1) model the D-134 bands +
+VIP addresses IN the apex; (2) generate the overlays from them; (3) reconcile the two
+VIP overlays into one per-app string; (4) ride an EXTENDED fidelity check. VLAN/space/
+fabric stays MAAS-sourced (NetBox = IPAM only).
diff --git a/docs/audit/gauntlet-20260723-stage4-dcmirror.txt b/docs/audit/gauntlet-20260723-stage4-dcmirror.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56489e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/gauntlet-20260723-stage4-dcmirror.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+  carve-host-interfaces                  ALL PASS
+  checks                                 ALL PASS (62 checks)
+  claude-guard                           ALL PASS
+  clientdocs-scripts                     ALL PASS
+  clientdocs-skill                       ALL PASS
+  cloud-assert                           ALL PASS
+  cloudinit-vm                           cloudinit-vm: 10 passed, 0 failed
+  cloud-snapshot                         ALL PASS
+  creds-audit                            creds-audit: 7/7 PASS
+  d063-apply                             ALL PASS (7/7)
+  d115-office-carve                      d115-office-carve: 20/20 PASS
+  d120-compose-bands                     d120-compose-bands: 16/16 PASS
+  d124-transit-seed                      d124-transit-seed: 21/21 PASS
+  dc-dc-ceph-disk-budget                 ALL PASS
+  dc-dc-dr-drill                         ALL PASS
+  dc-dc-mtu-geneve-budget                ALL PASS
+  dc-dc-prefixes-import                  ALL PASS (91 checks)
+  dc-dc-radosgw-multisite                ALL PASS
+  dc-dc-rbd-mirror                       ALL PASS
+  dc-dc-whole-host-budget                dc-dc-whole-host-budget: 13/13 PASS
+  dc-edge-wan-import                     dc-edge-wan-import: 58/58 PASS
+  dc-mirror                              dc-mirror: 18 passed, 0 failed
+  dc-rack-mgmt-import                    dc-rack-mgmt-import: 117/117 PASS
+  dc-rack-net                            dc-rack-net: 18 passed, 0 failed
+  dc-selector                            ALL PASS (40 checks)
+  juju-spaces-check                      ALL PASS (5/5)
+  keystone-policy-drift                  ALL PASS
+  ledger-scan                            ALL PASS (48 checks)
+  lib-validate                           ALL PASS (35 checks)
+  maas-node-power                        maas-node-power: 24/24 PASS
+  netem-link                             netem-link: 12 passed, 0 failed
+  netem-sudoers                          netem-sudoers: 9 passed, 0 failed
+  node-vm                                node-vm: 15 passed, 0 failed
+  opentofu-validate                      ALL PASS
+  opnsense-api                           ALL PASS
+  opnsense-bootstrap-apikey              ALL PASS
+  opnsense-plugins                       opnsense-plugins: 20 passed, 0 failed
+  opnsense-prep-image                    ALL PASS
+  opnsense-set-interface-v4              opnsense-set-interface-v4: 53/53 PASS
+  opnsense-set-interface-v6              opnsense-set-interface-v6: 40/40 PASS
+  phase-00-maas-standup                  ALL PASS
+  phase-00-teardown-d061                 ALL PASS
+  phase-02                               ALL PASS
+  phase-03-adminrc                       ALL PASS
+  phase-03                               ALL PASS
+  phase-04-create                        ALL PASS
+  phase-04-internal-cert-san             ALL PASS
+  phase-04                               ALL PASS
+  phase-05-amphora                       ALL PASS
+  phase-05                               ALL PASS
+  phase-06-bootstrap                     ALL PASS
+  phase-06-capi-stack                    ALL PASS
+  phase-06-k8s-bootstrap                 ALL PASS
+  phase-06-kubeconfig-gate               ALL PASS
+  phase-06-mgmt-vm                       ALL PASS
+  phase-06-net-setup                     ALL PASS
+  phase-07-conductor-graft               ALL PASS
+  preflight                              ALL PASS
+  prereqs                                prereqs: 32/32 PASS
+  provider-bundle-check                  ALL PASS
+  record-audit                           record-audit: 35/35 PASS
+  reenroll-hosts                         ALL PASS
+  repo-lint                              ALL PASS
+  roles-aggregates-import                roles-aggregates-import: 24/24 PASS
+  sandbox-fidelity-check                 sandbox-fidelity-check: 14/14 PASS
+  sandbox-seed                           sandbox-seed: 22/22 PASS
+  site-baseleg                           site-baseleg: 24 passed, 0 failed
+  site-forward                           site-forward: 38/38 PASS
+  site-headend-install                   site-headend-install: 59/59 PASS
+  site-ssh-config                        site-ssh-config: 30/30 PASS
+  tenant-acceptance                      ALL PASS
+  tenant-assert                          ALL PASS
+  tenant-offboard                        ALL PASS (22/22)
+  tenant-onboard                         ALL PASS
+  trust_filter                           ALL PASS
+  validate                               ALL PASS (29 checks)
+  vault-kv-health                        ALL PASS (10/10)
+
+GAUNTLET: ALL GREEN (77 harnesses)
diff --git a/docs/audit/maas-admin-recovery-20260725.txt b/docs/audit/maas-admin-recovery-20260725.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3267604
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/maas-admin-recovery-20260725.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+=== MAAS admin-account recovery -- measured evidence, 2026-07-25 ===
+Host: vcloud (jumphost). Region: http://10.10.0.20:5240/MAAS (measured from `maas --help`).
+Scope RULED by operator: "New account + consolidate only" -- no existing password rotated.
+NO secret VALUES appear in this capture (format/hash/status only).
+
+--- 1. MAAS users AFTER the change (cmd: maas admin users read) ---
+  MAAS             superuser=True  email=maas@localhost
+  admin            superuser=True  email=admin@office1.local
+  juju-vr1-dc0     superuser=True  email=juju-vr1-dc0@vr1.local
+  juju-vr1-dc1     superuser=True  email=juju-vr1-dc1@vr1.local
+  maas-init-node   superuser=False email=node-init-user@localhost
+  operator         superuser=True  email=jesse.austin@neumatrix.com
+
+--- 2. Django password state (cmd: maas-region shell; booleans only) ---
+  MAAS             super=True  active=True  usable_pw=True 
+  admin            super=True  active=True  usable_pw=True 
+  juju-vr1-dc0     super=True  active=True  usable_pw=True 
+  juju-vr1-dc1     super=True  active=True  usable_pw=True 
+  maas-init-node   super=False active=False usable_pw=True 
+  operator         super=True  active=True  usable_pw=True 
+
+--- 3. GUI login probes, each with a wrong-password CONTROL (204=auth, 400=reject) ---
+  admin     stored_password=204  wrong_password_control=400
+  operator  stored_password=204  wrong_password_control=400
+
+--- 4. admin password consolidation fidelity (sha256, first 16 hex) ---
+  source voffice1:/root/maas-secrets/admin.pass = be9d791d108d9b44
+  copy   ~/vr1-office1-creds/maas-admin-password = be9d791d108d9b44
+  verdict=BYTE-IDENTICAL
+
+--- 5. stored file metadata (mode/bytes; no values) ---
+  maas-admin-password      mode=600 bytes=28
+  maas-operator-password   mode=600 bytes=32
+
+--- 6. creds-audit all three sites (cmd: bash scripts/creds-audit.sh <site>) ---
+  creds-audit vr1-office1: CLEAN
+  creds-audit vr1-dc0: CLEAN
+  creds-audit vr1-dc1: CLEAN
+  harness: creds-audit: 7/7 PASS
+
+--- 7. automation unaffected (admin CLI profile / 19 `maas admin` call sites) ---
+  maas admin users read -> 6 users returned, profile functional
diff --git a/docs/audit/operating-model-plan-20260725.md b/docs/audit/operating-model-plan-20260725.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..469d884
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/operating-model-plan-20260725.md
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+# Operating-model plan: NetBox -> deploy (planning session input)
+
+**Date:** 2026-07-25. **Branch:** `dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy`.
+**Status:** ADVISORY / planning input. Adopts nothing. `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` remains
+the sole status authority (GA-R1). Authored in the Chat design seat; PINNED for a
+dedicated operator planning session.
+**Companion to:** `docs/audit/decision-recon-20260725.md`,
+`docs/audit/committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.md`, and the PROPOSED
+NetBox-coupling decision in `docs/design-decisions.md`.
+
+A PLAN, not a decision. Deliberately NOT a D-NNN entry: the operator asked for a
+recommendation plus a dedicated planning session, so the target operating model is not
+ripe for ratification. Implement NOTHING from this file.
+
+Authored against repo HEAD bc9a2df.
+
+================================================================================
+## 1. The model as the operator described it (2026-07-25)
+================================================================================
+
+  Draft changes in NetBox
+    -> a tool or queued item reads the changes; operator approves before anything begins
+    -> OpenTofu / MAAS / Juju (whichever the change requires) processes the deployment,
+       assignment or change
+    -> the process is as automated and self-healing as possible without operator
+       interaction
+    -> operator is notified on completion, with logs entered and artifacts created
+    -> operator is given next-step instructions derived from the process
+
+This is the standard source-of-truth-driven infrastructure automation shape. The three
+recommendations below are refinements to it, not a different mechanism.
+
+================================================================================
+## 2. Recommendation A -- the approval gate belongs on the RENDERED DIFF
+================================================================================
+
+Approving "someone changed a prefix in NetBox" does not tell the operator what will
+happen to the cloud. Approving "here is the resulting overlay diff, the `tofu plan`, and
+the validator report" does.
+
+  NetBox draft -> renderer emits artifacts onto a git branch
+              -> THE BRANCH DIFF IS THE CHANGE REQUEST
+              -> operator approves the diff
+              -> apply (tofu -> MAAS -> Juju, each gated as today)
+
+- Costs nothing extra: the artifacts are generated either way; the diff is free.
+- Rollback for free (`git revert`); audit for free (the diff IS the record, with
+  reviewer and timestamp attached).
+- Matches existing discipline exactly: verify-before-mutate wants a verification
+  artifact, and the diff plus validator report IS that artifact.
+- Keeps intent store and executable artifact reconciled by construction, not by trust.
+
+================================================================================
+## 3. Recommendation B -- split "self-healing" in two
+================================================================================
+
+SAFE, unattended -- CONVERGENT RE-ASSERT of declarative state:
+  - re-run the renderer; diff generated output against committed output
+  - re-apply idempotent configuration
+  - re-run validators and behavioural assertions (`provider-bundle-check.py`,
+    `cloud-assert.sh`)
+  These read, compare and report. Run them on a timer.
+
+NOT SAFE unattended -- AUTONOMOUS REMEDIATION of observed drift:
+  - On a live multi-tenant cloud the remediation can BE the outage, and the blast radius
+    crosses tenant boundaries. An automated actor that "repairs" a VIP or reassigns a
+    prefix while tenants are running can take down a plane.
+  - It contradicts the standing rules directly: destructive steps gated individually and
+    never batched; no live re-architecture inside a step.
+
+RECOMMENDATION: self-healing is READ / VERIFY / REPORT plus idempotent re-assert. Drift
+detection emits an alert AND a proposed remediation diff; the mutation stays gated. The
+automation's job is to make the operator's decision instant and well-evidenced, not to
+make it unnecessary.
+
+================================================================================
+## 4. Recommendation C -- the draft primitive already exists
+================================================================================
+
+No NetBox branching plugin is required. Code built the source separation in `bc9a2df`:
+
+  `netbox/prod-draft-dump.py`     -> netbox.baldurkeep.com, FROZEN v1 reference (4.5.8),
+                                     read-only for the duration of VR1
+  `netbox/office1-record-dump.py` -> office1-netbox 10.10.1.10:8000, the VR1 WORKING
+                                     APEX / "the RECORD" (4.6.4). Read-only, token from
+                                     environment, never embedded or printed, one script
+                                     per SOURCE so the source can never be confused
+  `netbox/draft/vr1-draft.json` (draft) vs
+  `netbox/draft/vr1-office1-current-20260725.json` (record snapshot)
+
+So: DIFF DRAFT AGAINST RECORD, and that diff is the intent change feeding the same
+approval gate in section 2. Low-tech, already committed, keeps write-back deferred per
+DOCFIX-195, and adds no new dependency to the airgap mirror (D-107).
+
+================================================================================
+## 5. Known gap to close in the session
+================================================================================
+
+GitBucket has no Actions-style CI runner, so "the renderer runs automatically" needs a
+host: a jumphost systemd timer, or a NetBox webhook plus a worker. Either way an
+automated push needs a GitBucket credential over HTTPS basic auth, because SSH access is
+v2-deferred. That is a security-ledger row (credential scope, storage, rotation), NOT a
+design decision, and it should be opened before any automated push exists.
+
+SEQUENCING NOTE: the operator intends to migrate from GitBucket to an in-house product,
+SpryGit. The runner and API surface this operating model needs are therefore
+REQUIREMENTS INPUT for SpryGit -- captured in `docs/audit/sprygit-requirements-inputs-20260725.md`.
+Do not design around GitBucket's
+current limits as if they were permanent.
+
+================================================================================
+## 6. Agenda for the planning session
+================================================================================
+
+1. Ratify or amend the approval-gate placement (section 2).
+2. Ratify the self-healing split; enumerate exactly which checks run unattended (3).
+3. Decide intent-store mechanics: NetBox draft objects, draft-vs-record JSON diff, or
+   both at different tiers (4).
+4. Decide the runner and its credential posture; open the security-ledger row (5).
+5. Decide whether generated artifacts are committed (recommended) or produced at deploy
+   time.
+6. Decide the notification and next-step surface: what the operator receives on
+   completion, and how "next steps" derive from which gates passed.
+7. Decide what this becomes: one process D-NNN (GA-R3: it needs architectural
+   consequence and a Roosevelt-delta to qualify), or a process runbook governed by an
+   existing decision. Doubt resolves DOWN to OPS.
+
+================================================================================
+## 7. Research scope requested by the operator -- NOT YET PERFORMED
+================================================================================
+
+The operator asked for best-practice workflow options grounded in real-world
+documentation and processes used by datacenters running this stack. That research has NOT
+been done; nothing in this file is its result. Candidate sources:
+
+- Canonical Charmed OpenStack reference architectures and operations guidance;
+  `terraform-provider-juju`; Juju bundle/overlay lifecycle practice.
+- Sovereign Cloud Stack (SCS) operational documentation -- directly relevant, since this
+  deployment implements the scs-0302 Domain Manager persona (D-051, D-064).
+- NetBox and Nautobot source-of-truth-driven automation, golden configuration, and
+  intended-vs-actual reconciliation models.
+- GitOps control-loop practice for infrastructure, specifically where the approval gate
+  sits relative to render and apply.
+- MAAS plus OpenTofu substrate lifecycle patterns for multi-site deployments.
+- OpenStack Operations Guide material on change management and drift.
+
+For each: what the pattern is, who runs it at datacenter scale on this stack, where the
+approval gate sits, what it automates unattended, and what it deliberately refuses to
+automate. Deliverable: options with trade-offs plus a recommendation measured against
+the Roosevelt-delta fitness function.
diff --git a/docs/audit/queued-findings-20260726.txt b/docs/audit/queued-findings-20260726.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..71fedad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/queued-findings-20260726.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+# Queued findings + unlogged advice -- end-of-session sweep, 2026-07-26
+#
+# WHY THIS FILE EXISTS. The 2026-07-26 session ran long and produced two classes of
+# content that lived only in the session transcript: committee findings that were
+# ACKNOWLEDGED but deliberately NOT acted on, and a secrets-storage recommendation given
+# verbally on request. A transcript is not a repo surface. This is the durable copy.
+#
+# NOTHING HERE IS RULED OR BUILT. These are logged findings and unruled advice (hard rule
+# 1: findings are logged, never executed mid-step). Status lives in CURRENT-STATE only.
+
+================================================================================
+PART A -- ADVICE GIVEN VERBALLY THAT IS **NOT** ALREADY REPO-CARRIED
+================================================================================
+
+IMPORTANT FRAMING, checked before writing this: MOST of the secrets-storage
+recommendation given in session was ALREADY in the repo and is NOT new.
+  - OpenBao / BUSL relicensing / the fork question .... docs/D-068-vault-1.8-vs-1.16-analysis.md
+  - Vault auto-unseal, root-Vault topology ............ same file + D-069 discussion
+  - `scripts/creds-mint.sh` (atomic mint->store->register, with modes, refusal-to-overwrite,
+    and a creds-audit gate) ........................... docs/design-decisions.md D-137, item 2(a)
+A future session should read those FIRST and treat the items below as the delta, not as a
+new proposal. Re-proposing what is already ruled is this project's measured failure mode.
+
+--- A1. Tang / Clevis (NBDE) as the no-HSM unseal mechanism  [NOT in repo: 0 hits]
+No HSM or KMS is available (operator-confirmed 2026-07-26), which removes the standard
+Vault auto-unseal path. Network-bound disk encryption (Tang servers + Clevis binding) is
+the usual on-prem substitute: unseal material is recoverable ONLY while the host can reach
+N Tang servers on the management network, so a disk that leaves the datacenter is inert.
+It maps onto the existing per-DC isolation posture (SEC-012/-016 per-DC power keys) and
+costs no hardware. Suggested shape: DC Vaults transit-unseal from an Office1 unsealer; the
+unsealer's own material Tang-bound (plus TPM measurement if Roosevelt hardware has TPM 2.0
+-- UNKNOWN, and it decides Tang-alone vs Tang+TPM); Shamir shares exist only as physical
+break-glass, split across sites, never on a jumphost.
+
+--- A2. MAAS 3.7 Vault integration is AVAILABLE AND DISABLED  [MEASURED 2026-07-26]
+    ssh voffice1 'sudo maas config-vault status'  ->  status: disabled
+                                                      unconfigured_regions: [voffice1]
+MAAS 3.3+ can store its secrets in Vault instead of its database -- including power
+credentials, the category behind SEC-012, SEC-016 and SEC-021. This is a native, supported,
+in-stack capability that is simply switched off.
+  ** CIRCULAR DEPENDENCY, design around it before enabling at Roosevelt: MAAS provisions
+  the metal, Vault runs on that metal, and MAAS-with-Vault will not start without Vault.
+  On bare metal that is a bootstrap-ordering problem, not a config step. The usual answer
+  is a management-site Vault that is NOT MAAS-provisioned. Enabling it in VR1 FIRST -- where
+  the substrate is virtual and recoverable -- is what a rehearsal is for.
+
+--- A3. Vault SSH secrets engine (SSH CA)  [NOT in repo: 0 hits]
+Six of the twelve no-mint credentials in the research capture are ed25519 keypairs, and
+every per-DC power key, edge key and service key is a static file that lives forever. An
+SSH CA issuing short-lived certificates collapses that entire category: no file to
+consolidate, no key to rotate, no matrix row that can go stale. Highest structural leverage
+of anything discussed, and it depends on the fork decision (A-framing) landing first.
+
+--- A4. Sequencing advice, and one recommendation to NOT do something
+Recommended order: (1) resolve the Vault-vs-OpenBao fork question; (2) build the D-137
+`creds-mint.sh` already specified in item 2(a) -- BEFORE Stage 5, because Stage 5 is the
+largest credential-minting event in the project (per-DC MAAS keys, the Juju cloud
+credential, bootstrap controller/CA/agent secrets, and behind them Vault init material,
+the 8 Octavia PKI artifacts and admin-openrc); (3) MAAS->Vault rehearsed in VR1; (4) SSH CA;
+(5) Juju + Barbican secret backends.
+RECOMMENDED AGAINST: a sops/age encryption-at-rest stopgap. It was raised and then withdrawn
+in the same session -- if the Vault path is real it is throwaway work, and tooling churn
+that presents as progress is this project's own recorded failure mode (GA-F06).
+
+================================================================================
+PART B -- COMMITTEE FINDINGS ACKNOWLEDGED BUT **NOT** ACTED ON
+================================================================================
+From the six-lens audit, 2026-07-26. Each was reproduced or reasoned by its lens and left
+deliberately. Ranked by consequence.
+
+--- B1. `mint-ref` line pins rot SILENTLY  [lens 6]
+`s4_mint_ref` checks only that the target file exists and that the line number is <= EOF.
+There is NO content assertion. Edit anything above a cited line and the mint-ref now points
+at unrelated code while S4 still reports `[ok] every script:/runbook: reference resolves`.
+30+ rows carry line pins into actively-edited runbooks and scripts. AT ROOSEVELT the
+runbooks are rewritten for bare metal, so every line-pinned mint-ref becomes
+wrong-but-passing simultaneously. Suggested fix: store an anchor token (step id, function
+name, short literal) alongside or instead of the line, and assert it appears at/near the
+cited line.
+
+--- B2. Ruling-5 remediation and ruling-5 EVASION are indistinguishable to the checker  [lens 4]
+S6 groups by `id`. The sanctioned fix for the `maas-region-admin` conflation (migrate the 19
+`maas admin` call sites to a service identity) and the evasion (rename one row's id to
+`maas-region-admin-svc`) BOTH turn the check green. The notes warn humans not to do the
+latter; nothing mechanical distinguishes them.
+
+--- B3. No non-emptiness check in tier 2  [lens 2]
+`creds-audit.sh:59` asserts `[ -s "$path" ]`; the matrix checker has no equivalent. A
+zero-byte credential file reads as PRESENT and correctly-moded.
+
+--- B4. `sec-ref` is never validated  [lens 2]
+Contrast S4 (mint-ref) and S7 (notes-ref), both of which resolve their references. A wrong
+SEC pointer is exactly the class caught by hand FOUR times this session (SEC-015 once,
+then both `juju-maas-user` rows, plus the tfstate row). A validator must parse the ledger's
+TABLE form (`| SEC-006 |`), not `## SEC-` headings.
+
+--- B5. No "source-of-record implies a consolidated copy" invariant  [lens 2]
+`netbox-secret-key` and `netbox-admin` are VM-resident with NO consolidated copy at all --
+the exact founding SEC-009 shape ("a VM-minted secret has no forcing function to reach the
+folder") -- and nothing flags it.
+
+--- B6. `cardinality` is largely inert, with a one-token bypass  [lenses 2 + 6]
+Of 81 rows the field affects only S1's enum validation and S5's `per-DC` filter;
+`singleton`, `per-site`, `per-node` and `per-tenant` have no semantic effect, and `per-node`
+is used by no row. Relabelling a row `per-DC` -> `singleton` removes it from S5 entirely --
+the cheapest way to silence the standing SEC-021 asymmetry findings, and nothing guards it.
+The plan claims cardinality is "REQUIRED for Roosevelt transfer -- without it the matrix
+cannot express '9 nodes'"; as built it expresses no such thing. Either make it load-bearing
+(an `instances` field, or template expansion generating the per-DC/per-node/per-tenant row
+set) or demote the claim. THIS IS A DESIGN QUESTION AND NEEDS AN OPERATOR RULING.
+
+--- B7. S5 is structurally BINARY  [lens 6]
+`dcs = ["vr1-dc0", "vr1-dc1"]`, `DC_TOKEN_RE = dc[01]`, `SITE_KEY_RE` an enum of `vr1-*`
+literals, and a pairwise set-difference. A third DC needs four source edits and S5 does not
+generalise to N sites. Suggested fix: derive the site set from the matrix, validate
+region-qualification by SHAPE not enum, and restructure S5 to group-by-normalised-shape
+across N sites.
+
+--- B8. T22's metadata-only guard is narrower than it reads  [lens 1]
+The wordlist omits `open()` -- the checker's actual read mechanism -- and `dd`, `sed`, `awk`,
+`base64`. It also greps comments and docstrings, so prose alone can false-RED it (measured
+twice this session: the word "more" tripped it). T51 partially covers the transfer half.
+
+--- B9. `--dc` narrows only S5  [lens 1]
+Its help text says it narrows the per-DC checks; in fact S1-S4, S6, S7 and tier 2 still
+process all rows, so the flag WEAKENS a run rather than scoping it. Either make it narrow
+the run or remove it.
+
+--- B10. Low severity, recorded for completeness  [lens 1]
+Dead code at the `observed`-membership guard (unreachable since `observed` is pre-populated);
+`s3_render_drift`'s unused `notes` parameter; `os.path.join(repo, path)` returns an absolute
+mint-ref path unchanged, escaping the repo bound; S7's orphan scan only considers keys
+prefixed `n-`.
+
+================================================================================
+PART C -- ALSO DEFERRED BY RULING (recorded so they are not mistaken for oversights)
+================================================================================
+- SEC-024 RETENTION: whether the two `terraform.tfstate.pre-*` state-surgery snapshots
+  should exist at all. Operator-deferred to stage close 2026-07-26. Both gates (G6, G16)
+  are CLOSED and the outer plan has converged to zero diff repeatedly since, but deletion
+  is irreversible with no other copy of that state.
+- SEC-024 umask CAUSE: not investigated (outside the ruled scope). A future `tofu apply`
+  may write 0664 again; the P5 gate will catch it.
+- `--render` source-field derivation from `vm-secret-locations`: not wired; two fields are
+  explicitly skipped as PENDING rather than silently matched.
+- Manifests are not yet REPLACED by rendered output. Ruling 2 makes them generated; doing
+  the flip changes what `creds-audit` demands at three sites, so it stays operator-gated.
diff --git a/docs/audit/skill-divergence-20260725.md b/docs/audit/skill-divergence-20260725.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f8f57b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/skill-divergence-20260725.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# 90 -- Skill divergence: the Chat-side copy is stale (operator-flagged 2026-07-25)
+================================================================================
+
+The operator asked whether the Chat seat was using the mounted skill or the repo skill,
+and stated the Chat one is very stale. Confirmed. The Chat seat WAS using the mounted
+copy for the early part of the session and has switched to the repo copy
+(`.claude/skills/openstack-cloud-ops/SKILL.md`, 245 lines at bc9a2df). The mounted copy
+is 130 lines.
+
+The Chat-side copy cannot be rewritten from here -- the skills mount is read-only. The
+repo copy must be uploaded to the Chat/project skill surface by the operator. Until then
+any Chat session starts from the stale text.
+
+## Divergences found (mounted -> repo)
+
+- REPO PATH. Mounted names `openstack-caracal-ipv4` as authoritative and hardcodes a
+  clone URL. Repo says never hardcode the repo's own name or path (it has been
+  renamed/forked once, D-110) and ASK the operator for the exact clone URL. **This is
+  the direct cause of the failed clone at the start of this session** -- the seat tested a
+  path from memory instead of asking. The repo skill would have prevented it.
+- PHASE AUTHORITY. Mounted asserts the current phase is VR0 DC0 testcloud. Repo: phase
+  and stage live in `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` ONLY (GA-R1) and are never trusted from the
+  skill or memory; the current mission is VR1 two-DC plus Office1 headend.
+- JUMPHOST. Mounted says `vopenstack-jesse`. Repo says `vcloud`, and carries the D-128
+  two-plane operating model (Plane 1 substrate on vcloud; Plane 2 MAAS/NetBox/inner-tofu
+  via `ssh voffice1`).
+- RECORD AUTHORITY. Mounted has NO GA section at all. Repo carries GA-R1..R7: one
+  changelog per session (never per-topic files), one ruling per operator exchange with
+  the exact utterance quoted, the OPEN/BLOCKED/HELD/CLOSED status vocabulary, D-number
+  admission with [ARCH]/[OPS] tags, memory governance, and the reconciliation
+  circuit-breaker.
+- DELIVERY CONVENTION. Mounted says "deliver as repo-relative ZIP plus a changelog
+  entry". Repo says deliver with an entry in the SESSION changelog, ONE per session,
+  GA-R2/D1. **The first draft of this handoff pack was built as per-topic files on the
+  mounted skill's instruction and had to be rebuilt.**
+- ROUTING GAPS. Mounted has no VR1 DC-DC track, no `references/platform-traps.md`, no
+  `references/opentofu-provider-docs.md`, no `site-baseleg.sh` / `dc-rack-net.sh` rows,
+  and no per-DC power-credential invariant (SEC-012/SEC-016).
+
+## Action
+
+Operator uploads the repo copy to the Chat/project skill surface. Per the repo skill's
+own stage-close rule, the skill is swept in the same close as the stage -- this
+divergence should be closed then if not sooner.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/audit/sprygit-requirements-inputs-20260725.md b/docs/audit/sprygit-requirements-inputs-20260725.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..014c3fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/sprygit-requirements-inputs-20260725.md
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# SpryGit dev-handover: requirements inputs (pinned, document not yet written)
+
+**Date:** 2026-07-25. **Status:** PINNED / inputs only. No requirements have been
+drafted. This file exists so the work resumes without re-derivation.
+
+STATUS: PINNED, not started. The operator ruled 2026-07-25: "Hold the SpryGit document
+creation until after we finish up the Code handover but make sure it is pinned so we can
+continue it shortly." This handoff pack IS the Code handover, so SpryGit is the next Chat
+deliverable.
+
+## What is being produced
+
+A DEV HANDOVER DOCUMENT for the in-house SpryGit team: a full feature list covering
+basic functions, advanced functions, protocols, API surface, and other requirements,
+scoped so the product has everything needed for proper integration into this stack and
+the processes being developed here.
+
+## Why it is sequenced after this pack, and why it matters more than a wishlist
+
+The operating model pinned in item 70 has a REAL DEPENDENCY on git-host capability that
+GitBucket does not meet. SpryGit's requirements are therefore not speculative -- they are
+derived from a concrete pipeline this project is about to build. Known inputs already
+identified:
+
+- CI/runner: GitBucket has no Actions-style runner, which is the gap blocking "the
+  renderer runs automatically" (item 70 section 5).
+- SSH access: deferred to v2 on GitBucket; the current workaround is HTTPS basic auth.
+  An automated push needs a credential posture better than that.
+- Merge-request review as the APPROVAL GATE (item 70 section 2) -- the diff is the change
+  request, so review, required approvals, and merge policy are load-bearing, not
+  cosmetic.
+- Group/path semantics: this repo has already moved once (D-110), and the skill's rule is
+  never to hardcode its path. Redirects on move are a requirement, not a nicety --
+  GitBucket's lack of one cost a failed clone at the start of the 2026-07-25 Chat
+  session.
+- The browse-URL-vs-clone-URL trap: GitBucket's browse URL yields a silent empty clone.
+- Airgap/mirror behaviour per D-107.
+
+## Sources the operator authorised
+
+Current products in use, project knowledge, and online research into other git products'
+feature sets.
+
+## Not started
+
+No requirements have been drafted. Nothing in this file is a requirement list -- it is
+the pin plus the inputs already known, so the work resumes without re-derivation.
diff --git a/docs/audit/stage4-carve-residue-cleanup-20260727.txt b/docs/audit/stage4-carve-residue-cleanup-20260727.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cad246d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/stage4-carve-residue-cleanup-20260727.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+=== Stage 4 carve residue cleanup + dc1 nginx removal -- 2026-07-27 ===
+repo HEAD: 84951307a918a695e6f7f84ed4f8c992f248cd01  branch: dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy
+
+SCOPE: the residue CURRENT-STATE flagged at the 2026-07-23 carve, deferred to stage close:
+192.168.1.0/24 + emptied fabric-5 + ~90 empty auto-created fabrics. Plus the nginx install
+left behind on dc1 by the removed mirror.
+
+METHOD: read-only audit FIRST, emptiness PROVEN per fabric, never assumed. Deleting a MAAS
+fabric cascades to its VLANs, and this repo lost 9 machine records to exactly that class on
+2026-07-21 because the association check ran AFTER the delete. Here a fresh occupancy
+snapshot (fabrics + subnets + ipranges + every machine interface) was taken IMMEDIATELY
+before the batch, and the cascade check was ALSO re-run after each delete.
+
+--- 1. pre-cleanup audit: 108 fabrics, 90 empty / 18 occupied ---
+A fabric counted EMPTY only with zero subnets, zero ipranges and zero node interfaces
+across all its VLANs. The audit also caught an ORDERING dependency the flag did not state:
+192.168.1.0/24 (subnet id 8) was the ONLY occupant of fabric-5, so the subnet had to be
+deleted first or the fabric delete would have cascaded it away.
+
+KEPT -- load-bearing, verified occupied (fabric id / name / cidr / node interfaces):
+  0    fabric-0                 10.10.0.0/24 + 2602:f3e2:f01:100::/64   office1 base + GUA
+  1    fabric-1                 10.10.1.0/24                            office1 compose (2 LXD guests)
+  2    fabric-2                 172.31.0.0/30                           dc0 transit
+  3    fabric-3                 192.168.122.0/24                        libvirt default
+  4    fabric-4                 10.12.8.0/22                            dc0 metal-admin/boot, 9 nodes
+  141  fabric-141               172.31.0.4/30                           dc1 transit
+  142  fabric-142               10.12.68.0/22                           dc1 metal-admin/boot, 9 nodes
+  188-192  vr1-dc0-{provider-public,metal-internal,data-tenant,storage,replication}  9-18 ifaces each
+  193-197  vr1-dc1-{provider-public,metal-internal,data-tenant,storage,replication}  9-18 ifaces each
+
+DELETED:
+  subnet id=8  192.168.1.0/24   the superseded OPNsense FACTORY LAN (both edges were
+                                re-addressed to 10.12.4.1 / 10.12.64.1); 0 ipranges, 0 interfaces
+  fabric id=5  fabric-5         empty once subnet 8 was gone (held only its vid-0 default VLAN)
+  fabrics 6..95                 90 auto-created empties, each re-verified against a fresh
+                                occupancy snapshot taken immediately before the batch
+
+--- 2. post-cleanup fabric list (17, all accounted for above) ---
+fabric count: 17
+  0     fabric-0                   vlans=[(5001, 0)]
+  1     fabric-1                   vlans=[(5002, 0)]
+  2     fabric-2                   vlans=[(5003, 0)]
+  3     fabric-3                   vlans=[(5004, 0)]
+  4     fabric-4                   vlans=[(5005, 0)]
+  141   fabric-141                 vlans=[(5142, 0)]
+  142   fabric-142                 vlans=[(5143, 0)]
+  188   vr1-dc0-provider-public    vlans=[(5189, 0)]
+  189   vr1-dc0-metal-internal     vlans=[(5190, 0)]
+  190   vr1-dc0-data-tenant        vlans=[(5191, 0)]
+  191   vr1-dc0-storage            vlans=[(5192, 0)]
+  192   vr1-dc0-replication        vlans=[(5193, 0)]
+  193   vr1-dc1-provider-public    vlans=[(5194, 0)]
+  194   vr1-dc1-metal-internal     vlans=[(5195, 0)]
+  195   vr1-dc1-data-tenant        vlans=[(5196, 0)]
+  196   vr1-dc1-storage            vlans=[(5197, 0)]
+  197   vr1-dc1-replication        vlans=[(5198, 0)]
+
+--- 3. CASCADE CHECK (the 2026-07-21 lesson, run after) ---
+  machines: 20  {'Deployed': 2, 'Ready': 18}
+  power_type: {'lxd': 2, 'virsh': 18}
+  interfaces-per-machine: {1: 2, 7: 18}
+  interfaces ORPHANED by the deletes: 0 []
+  placement tags: {'openstack-vr1-dc0': 9, 'openstack-vr1-dc1': 9}
+  READING: 18 Ready + 2 Deployed office1 guests, all 18 still power_type=virsh, 7 interfaces
+  each (6 flat planes per D-133 + br-ex), ZERO orphaned interfaces, tags 9+9 intact.
+
+--- 4. dc1 nginx install removed (it was a MIRROR prereq; the proxy uses :3142) ---
+  /etc/nginx purged
+  listening :80 -> 0
+  listening :3142 -> 2
+  purged nginx + nginx-common (nothing else depended on them; no nginx-core was installed);
+  autoremoved liblockfile-simple-perl + liblog-agent-perl, debmirror's orphaned perl deps.
+
+--- 5. both DCs' artifact paths re-verified AFTER all of the above ---
+  OK   proxy serves http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/dists/jammy/Release (200)
+  OK   proxy serves http://ubuntu-cloud.archive.canonical.com/ubuntu/dists/jammy-updates/caracal/Release (200)
+dc-cache-proxy check (dc1): PASS
+  OK   mirror answers http://10.12.8.4/ (200)
+  OK   last-sync: OK 2026-07-27T08:43:46Z ubuntu=0 uca=0
+dc-mirror check (dc0): PASS
diff --git a/docs/audit/stage4-carve-verify-20260723.txt b/docs/audit/stage4-carve-verify-20260723.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b464c16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/stage4-carve-verify-20260723.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+# Stage 4 carve verification -- 2026-07-23 (read-only; Plane 2 via voffice1)
+# D-133 flat carve + D-134-amended bands; commands shown inline
+
+== ipranges read (dynamic moved to .201-.254 both DCs; office1 untouched):
+1	dynamic	10.10.1.100	10.10.1.200	10.10.1.0/24
+2	dynamic	10.12.8.201	10.12.8.254	10.12.8.0/22
+3	dynamic	10.12.68.201	10.12.68.254	10.12.68.0/22
+
+== spaces read (six plane spaces, two DC subnets each):
+provider-public	10.12.4.0/22, 10.12.64.0/22
+metal-admin	10.12.68.0/22, 10.12.8.0/22
+metal-internal	10.12.12.0/22, 10.12.72.0/22
+data-tenant	10.12.16.0/22, 10.12.76.0/22
+storage	10.12.32.0/22, 10.12.80.0/22
+replication	10.12.36.0/22, 10.12.84.0/22
+undefined	10.10.0.0/24, 10.10.1.0/24, 172.31.0.0/30, 172.31.0.4/30, 192.168.1.0/24, 192.168.122.0/24, 2602:f3e2:f01:100::/64
+
+== per-node interface trees (18 nodes; name/type/fabric/links):
+-- nhg3nf (wired-thrush):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-4	static:10.12.8.100
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc0-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc0-metal-internal	static:10.12.12.100
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc0-data-tenant	static:10.12.16.100
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc0-storage	static:10.12.32.100
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc0-replication	static:10.12.36.100
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc0-provider-public	static:10.12.4.100
+-- ssyexn (ace-robin):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-4	static:10.12.8.101
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc0-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc0-metal-internal	static:10.12.12.101
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc0-data-tenant	static:10.12.16.101
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc0-storage	static:10.12.32.101
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc0-replication	static:10.12.36.101
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc0-provider-public	static:10.12.4.101
+-- sk8c4d (real-filly):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-4	static:10.12.8.102
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc0-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc0-metal-internal	static:10.12.12.102
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc0-data-tenant	static:10.12.16.102
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc0-storage	static:10.12.32.102
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc0-replication	static:10.12.36.102
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc0-provider-public	static:10.12.4.102
+-- dbcq8h (keen-dove):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-4	static:10.12.8.120
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc0-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc0-metal-internal	static:10.12.12.120
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc0-data-tenant	static:10.12.16.120
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc0-storage	static:10.12.32.120
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc0-replication	static:10.12.36.120
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc0-provider-public	static:10.12.4.120
+-- sgwfnb (superb-piglet):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-4	static:10.12.8.121
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc0-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc0-metal-internal	static:10.12.12.121
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc0-data-tenant	static:10.12.16.121
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc0-storage	static:10.12.32.121
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc0-replication	static:10.12.36.121
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc0-provider-public	static:10.12.4.121
+-- kghggm (first-oryx):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-4	static:10.12.8.150
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc0-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc0-metal-internal	static:10.12.12.150
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc0-data-tenant	static:10.12.16.150
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc0-storage	static:10.12.32.150
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc0-replication	static:10.12.36.150
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc0-provider-public	static:10.12.4.150
+-- 8mtpxq (wise-stud):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-4	static:10.12.8.151
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc0-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc0-metal-internal	static:10.12.12.151
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc0-data-tenant	static:10.12.16.151
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc0-storage	static:10.12.32.151
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc0-replication	static:10.12.36.151
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc0-provider-public	static:10.12.4.151
+-- sn6qda (alert-cub):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-4	static:10.12.8.152
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc0-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc0-metal-internal	static:10.12.12.152
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc0-data-tenant	static:10.12.16.152
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc0-storage	static:10.12.32.152
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc0-replication	static:10.12.36.152
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc0-provider-public	static:10.12.4.152
+-- xqqwdq (moral-salmon):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-4	static:10.12.8.153
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc0-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc0-metal-internal	static:10.12.12.153
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc0-data-tenant	static:10.12.16.153
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc0-storage	static:10.12.32.153
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc0-replication	static:10.12.36.153
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc0-provider-public	static:10.12.4.153
+-- x8t386 (big-trout):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-142	static:10.12.68.100
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc1-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc1-metal-internal	static:10.12.72.100
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc1-data-tenant	static:10.12.76.100
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc1-storage	static:10.12.80.100
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc1-replication	static:10.12.84.100
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc1-provider-public	static:10.12.64.100
+-- 6xhcnf (real-wasp):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-142	static:10.12.68.101
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc1-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc1-metal-internal	static:10.12.72.101
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc1-data-tenant	static:10.12.76.101
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc1-storage	static:10.12.80.101
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc1-replication	static:10.12.84.101
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc1-provider-public	static:10.12.64.101
+-- qc3sem (apt-ocelot):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-142	static:10.12.68.102
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc1-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc1-metal-internal	static:10.12.72.102
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc1-data-tenant	static:10.12.76.102
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc1-storage	static:10.12.80.102
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc1-replication	static:10.12.84.102
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc1-provider-public	static:10.12.64.102
+-- m8y6kr (ample-buck):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-142	static:10.12.68.120
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc1-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc1-metal-internal	static:10.12.72.120
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc1-data-tenant	static:10.12.76.120
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc1-storage	static:10.12.80.120
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc1-replication	static:10.12.84.120
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc1-provider-public	static:10.12.64.120
+-- sgqrcc (divine-heron):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-142	static:10.12.68.121
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc1-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc1-metal-internal	static:10.12.72.121
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc1-data-tenant	static:10.12.76.121
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc1-storage	static:10.12.80.121
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc1-replication	static:10.12.84.121
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc1-provider-public	static:10.12.64.121
+-- qp4krq (cute-satyr):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-142	static:10.12.68.150
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc1-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc1-metal-internal	static:10.12.72.150
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc1-data-tenant	static:10.12.76.150
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc1-storage	static:10.12.80.150
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc1-replication	static:10.12.84.150
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc1-provider-public	static:10.12.64.150
+-- 8dfwmh (tender-elk):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-142	static:10.12.68.151
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc1-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc1-metal-internal	static:10.12.72.151
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc1-data-tenant	static:10.12.76.151
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc1-storage	static:10.12.80.151
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc1-replication	static:10.12.84.151
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc1-provider-public	static:10.12.64.151
+-- pf47qm (big-eel):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-142	static:10.12.68.152
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc1-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc1-metal-internal	static:10.12.72.152
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc1-data-tenant	static:10.12.76.152
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc1-storage	static:10.12.80.152
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc1-replication	static:10.12.84.152
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc1-provider-public	static:10.12.64.152
+-- y3h4sw (right-spider):
+enp1s0	physical	fabric-142	static:10.12.68.153
+enp2s0	physical	vr1-dc1-provider-public	
+enp3s0	physical	vr1-dc1-metal-internal	static:10.12.72.153
+enp4s0	physical	vr1-dc1-data-tenant	static:10.12.76.153
+enp5s0	physical	vr1-dc1-storage	static:10.12.80.153
+enp6s0	physical	vr1-dc1-replication	static:10.12.84.153
+br-ex	bridge	vr1-dc1-provider-public	static:10.12.64.153
+
+== machine statuses (expect all Ready):
+superb-piglet	sgwfnb	Ready
+wired-thrush	nhg3nf	Ready
+alert-cub	sn6qda	Ready
+first-oryx	kghggm	Ready
+keen-dove	dbcq8h	Ready
+ace-robin	ssyexn	Ready
+real-filly	sk8c4d	Ready
+wise-stud	8mtpxq	Ready
+moral-salmon	xqqwdq	Ready
+big-trout	x8t386	Ready
+cute-satyr	qp4krq	Ready
+ample-buck	m8y6kr	Ready
+tender-elk	8dfwmh	Ready
+big-eel	pf47qm	Ready
+right-spider	y3h4sw	Ready
+divine-heron	sgqrcc	Ready
+apt-ocelot	qc3sem	Ready
+real-wasp	6xhcnf	Ready
diff --git a/docs/audit/stage4-discovery-20260723.txt b/docs/audit/stage4-discovery-20260723.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0af212
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/stage4-discovery-20260723.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# Stage 4 discovery capture -- 2026-07-23 (read-only, Plane 2 via voffice1)
+# Command: maas admin rack-controllers read | jq ...
+voffice1	mtstwf
+vvr1-dc0	7chphy
+vvr1-dc1	nmpcq4
+
+# Command: maas admin machines read | jq (hostname/system_id/status/zone/pool/power/boot-mac/fabric)
+office1-netbox	prrsp8	Deployed	default	default	lxd	00:16:3e:92:76:c4	fabric-1
+office1-tailscale	rcys3q	Deployed	default	default	lxd	00:16:3e:77:5c:da	fabric-1
+superb-piglet	sgwfnb	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:00:18:ab:b4	fabric-4
+wired-thrush	nhg3nf	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:00:be:69:c5	fabric-4
+alert-cub	sn6qda	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:00:b1:94:d1	fabric-4
+first-oryx	kghggm	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:00:5f:8d:42	fabric-4
+keen-dove	dbcq8h	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:00:1b:19:e6	fabric-4
+ace-robin	ssyexn	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:00:02:ff:57	fabric-4
+real-filly	sk8c4d	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:00:4f:de:a9	fabric-4
+wise-stud	8mtpxq	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:00:48:86:2c	fabric-4
+moral-salmon	xqqwdq	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:00:2b:ed:ab	fabric-4
+big-trout	x8t386	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:01:d1:01:01	fabric-142
+cute-satyr	qp4krq	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:01:d1:06:01	fabric-142
+ample-buck	m8y6kr	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:01:d1:04:01	fabric-142
+tender-elk	8dfwmh	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:01:d1:07:01	fabric-142
+big-eel	pf47qm	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:01:d1:08:01	fabric-142
+right-spider	y3h4sw	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:01:d1:09:01	fabric-142
+divine-heron	sgqrcc	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:01:d1:05:01	fabric-142
+apt-ocelot	qc3sem	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:01:d1:03:01	fabric-142
+real-wasp	6xhcnf	Ready	default	default	virsh	52:54:01:d1:02:01	fabric-142
+
+# Command: maas admin interfaces read sgwfnb (one dc0 node, physical NICs)
+enp1s0	52:54:00:18:ab:b4	fabric-4
+enp2s0	52:54:00:50:48:88	fabric-98
+enp3s0	52:54:00:78:fb:c5	fabric-100
+enp4s0	52:54:00:cc:84:61	fabric-103
+enp5s0	52:54:00:e4:ab:df	fabric-105
+enp6s0	52:54:00:5b:93:c4	fabric-107
+
+# Command: maas admin maas get-config name=default_distro_series
+"noble"
+# Command: maas admin boot-resources read (Synced)
+grub-efi-signed/uefi	amd64/generic
+grub-efi/uefi	arm64/generic
+grub-ieee1275/open-firmware	ppc64el/generic
+pxelinux/pxe	i386/generic
+ubuntu/noble	amd64/ga-24.04
+ubuntu/noble	amd64/ga-24.04-lowlatency
+ubuntu/noble	amd64/hwe-24.04
+ubuntu/noble	amd64/hwe-24.04-edge
+ubuntu/noble	amd64/hwe-24.04-lowlatency
+ubuntu/noble	amd64/hwe-24.04-lowlatency-edge
diff --git a/docs/audit/stage4-mirror-gate-20260727.txt b/docs/audit/stage4-mirror-gate-20260727.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1e9632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/stage4-mirror-gate-20260727.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+=== Stage 4 mirror gate -- measured state 2026-07-27 (read-only) ===
+repo HEAD: 4b192a19ee8142313d0f3788399075fd067a01c3  branch: dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy
+
+WHY THIS CAPTURE EXISTS. The Stage 4 DoD (runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md:472-485)
+requires 'per-DC mirror reachable from nodes'. GA-R6 requires a stage to close on a NAMED
+executable check whose output the closing commit cites. That check -- dc-mirror.sh check --
+was FALSE-GREENING on the single most important line: it tested that last-sync.status EXISTS
+and printed the contents behind an unconditional 'OK'. Both racks read PASS while neither
+had a good sync. Fixed this session (harness 19 -> 24); below is the state the FIXED check
+reports. The mirror gate is therefore NOT MET as of this capture -- honestly, for the first
+time.
+
+--- 1. dc0 (full mirror, D-135 item 1) : dc-mirror.sh check ---
+  OK   /usr/local/sbin/dc0-mirror-net-apply matches
+  OK   /etc/systemd/system/dc0-mirror-net.service matches
+  OK   /etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d/dc0-mirror.conf matches
+  OK   /usr/local/sbin/dc0-mirror-sync matches
+  OK   /etc/systemd/system/dc0-mirror-sync.service matches
+  OK   /etc/systemd/system/dc0-mirror-sync.timer matches
+  OK   /etc/nginx/sites-available/dc0-mirror matches
+  OK   /etc/nginx/sites-enabled/dc0-mirror enabled
+  OK   dc0-mirror-net.service enabled
+  OK   dc0-mirror-sync.timer enabled
+  OK   10.12.8.4/22 on virbr2 (vr1-dc0-metal-admin)
+  OK   default route via edge 10.12.4.1
+  OK   nginx active
+  OK   mirror answers http://10.12.8.4/ (200)
+  MISS last-sync FAILED: FAIL 2026-07-27T00:54:54Z ubuntu=255 uca=0 -- the mirror content is NOT attested current; investigate before any gate cites this check
+dc-mirror check (dc0): FAIL
+
+--- 2. dc0 root cause: transient upstream fetch failure, content intact ---
+FAIL 2026-07-27T00:54:54Z ubuntu=255 uca=0
+949G	/var/lib/dc-mirror/ubuntu
+342M	/var/lib/dc-mirror/cloud-archive
+jammy
+jammy-security
+jammy-updates
+Result=exit-code
+ExecMainStatus=1
+ActiveState=failed
+NextElapseUSecRealtime=Tue 2026-07-28 00:14:48 UTC
+LastTriggerUSec=Mon 2026-07-27 00:49:42 UTC
+Jul 27 00:54:49 vvr1-dc0 dc0-mirror-sync[1560492]: Download of dists/jammy/Release failed: 500 read timeout
+Jul 27 00:54:50 vvr1-dc0 dc0-mirror-sync[1560492]: Errors:
+Jul 27 00:54:50 vvr1-dc0 dc0-mirror-sync[1560492]:  Download of dists/jammy/Release failed: 500 read timeout
+Jul 27 00:54:50 vvr1-dc0 dc0-mirror-sync[1560492]: Failed to download some Release, Release.gpg or InRelease files!
+Jul 27 00:54:54 vvr1-dc0 systemd[1]: dc0-mirror-sync.service: Failed with result 'exit-code'.
+Jul 27 00:54:54 vvr1-dc0 systemd[1]: Failed to start dc0-mirror-sync.service - dc0 mirror upstream sync (dc-mirror.sh; D-135 item 1: apt+UCA).
+
+--- 3. dc1 (apt caching proxy is the RULED artifact path, D-135 amendment) ---
+  OK   apt-cacher-ng installed
+  OK   /etc/apt-cacher-ng/acng.conf.d/dc1-cache-proxy.conf matches
+  OK   apt-cacher-ng active
+  OK   listening on :3142
+  OK   10.12.68.4/22 on virbr6 (vr1-dc1-metal-admin)
+  OK   default route via edge 10.12.64.1
+  OK   proxy serves http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/dists/jammy/Release (200)
+  OK   proxy serves http://ubuntu-cloud.archive.canonical.com/ubuntu/dists/jammy-updates/caracal/Release (200)
+dc-cache-proxy check (dc1): PASS
+
+--- 4. dc1 dormant debmirror: the fallback, and how fragile its dormancy is ---
+  OK   /usr/local/sbin/dc1-mirror-net-apply matches
+  OK   /etc/systemd/system/dc1-mirror-net.service matches
+  OK   /etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d/dc1-mirror.conf matches
+  OK   /usr/local/sbin/dc1-mirror-sync matches
+  OK   /etc/systemd/system/dc1-mirror-sync.service matches
+  OK   /etc/systemd/system/dc1-mirror-sync.timer matches
+  OK   /etc/nginx/sites-available/dc1-mirror matches
+  OK   /etc/nginx/sites-enabled/dc1-mirror enabled
+  OK   dc1-mirror-net.service enabled
+  OK   dc1-mirror-sync.timer enabled
+  OK   10.12.68.4/22 on virbr6 (vr1-dc1-metal-admin)
+  OK   default route via edge 10.12.64.1
+  OK   nginx active
+  OK   mirror answers http://10.12.68.4/ (200)
+  MISS last-sync UNKNOWN: status says RUNNING (RUNNING 2026-07-23T21:49:35Z) but dc1-mirror-sync.service is NOT active -- the sync died without writing a terminal state (stale marker, not a success)
+dc-mirror check (dc1): FAIL
+RUNNING 2026-07-23T21:49:35Z
+330G	/var/lib/dc-mirror/ubuntu
+enabled
+NextElapseUSecRealtime=
+LastTriggerUSec=Fri 2026-07-24 00:52:13 UTC
+Result=signal
+ActiveState=failed
+
+READING OF 4: the timer is ENABLED with an EMPTY next-elapse because the service sits in
+failed/Result=signal from the 2026-07-24 pause-kill. D-135-amended ruling says dc1's
+debmirror is PAUSED and 'kept dormant as the fallback' -- but nothing ENFORCES that. The
+dormancy is a side effect of a failed unit, not a declared state; a systemctl reset-failed
+would re-arm a 330G -> ~949G pull on a rack whose artifact path is now the proxy.
diff --git a/docs/audit/stage5-controller-capacity-20260724.txt b/docs/audit/stage5-controller-capacity-20260724.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2bc1940
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/stage5-controller-capacity-20260724.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+### GATE CAPTURE: Fork-1 (a) 10th controller VM -- whole-host RAM budget
+### Date 2026-07-24. Controller modeled as +8 GiB / +4 vCPU per-DC containment overhead
+### (Model B: the juju controller VM is a peer of the node VMs inside each vvr1-dcN).
+
+===== BASELINE: built layout 3+2+4, 2 DCs (defaults) =====
+=== dc-dc-whole-host-budget: VR1 nested capacity (D-121 / R-3 / Model B) ===
+  Per-DC node fleet: 104 vCPU / 384 GiB / 2850 GiB
+  Model B: each containment VM (vvr1-dcN) holds one DC's fleet -> ~400 GiB RAM each
+    + containment overhead 2 x (4 vCPU / 16 GiB)
+  Office1 voffice1: 16/32/600; edges: 3 x (2 vCPU / 2 GiB)
+
+  TOTAL allocation : 238 vCPU / 838 GiB / 6300 GiB
+  MEASURED host    : 256 vCPU / 1024 GiB / 10240 GiB
+  RAM   : 838/1024 GiB = 82%   <- BINDING resource
+  vCPU  : 238/256 = 93%   (overcommits in a sim; not a hard ceiling)
+  disk  : 6300/10240 GiB = 62%   (thin-provisioned)
+
+VERDICT: FIT -- RAM within budget (186 GiB headroom).
+WHOLE-HOST: model=B ram=838/1024GiB verdict=FIT headroom=186GiB vcpu=238/256 disk=6300/10240GiB
+(exit 0)
+
+===== +CONTROLLER: +8 GiB/+4 vCPU per-DC containment overhead (x2 DCs) =====
+=== dc-dc-whole-host-budget: VR1 nested capacity (D-121 / R-3 / Model B) ===
+  Per-DC node fleet: 104 vCPU / 384 GiB / 2850 GiB
+  Model B: each containment VM (vvr1-dcN) holds one DC's fleet -> ~408 GiB RAM each
+    + containment overhead 2 x (8 vCPU / 24 GiB)
+  Office1 voffice1: 16/32/600; edges: 3 x (2 vCPU / 2 GiB)
+
+  TOTAL allocation : 246 vCPU / 854 GiB / 6300 GiB
+  MEASURED host    : 256 vCPU / 1024 GiB / 10240 GiB
+  RAM   : 854/1024 GiB = 83%   <- BINDING resource
+  vCPU  : 246/256 = 96%   (overcommits in a sim; not a hard ceiling)
+  disk  : 6300/10240 GiB = 62%   (thin-provisioned)
+
+VERDICT: FIT -- RAM within budget (170 GiB headroom).
+WHOLE-HOST: model=B ram=854/1024GiB verdict=FIT headroom=170GiB vcpu=246/256 disk=6300/10240GiB
+(exit 0)
diff --git a/docs/audit/stage5-expansion-review-20260724.md b/docs/audit/stage5-expansion-review-20260724.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe09c62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/audit/stage5-expansion-review-20260724.md
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+# Deployment-expansion review -- vr1-dc1 (4-node hyperconverged -> 9-node role-separated)
+
+**Date:** 2026-07-24. **Branch:** `dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy`.
+**Convened by:** operator ("Have subagents deploy a deployment script review for
+additional cross connections, updates, associations, and pinning updates that are
+also needed based on the stack expansion").
+
+**Status:** ADVISORY / audit record. Findings dispositioned below (handled in the
+render / follow-up / VERIFY-LIVE / no-change). Adopts nothing. `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md`
+remains the status authority (GA-R1). Companion to
+`docs/audit/committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.md`.
+
+Three independent read-only reviewers (relations/bindings/cross-DC; config/pins/channels;
+deployment-scripts). Every load-bearing claim was re-checked against the repo before
+recording.
+
+## A. Handled IN the render (this session; validated)
+
+- **ovn-chassis provider MACs** -- `bundle.yaml` carried VR0's 4 `openstack0-3`
+  provider MACs (`52:54:00:*`); re-homed to the 2 dc1 COMPUTE nodes' provider-public
+  (enp2s0) MACs `52:54:01:d1:04:02` / `52:54:01:d1:05:02` (ovn-chassis is subordinate
+  to the 2-unit nova-compute). NOTE: these are the substrate-PINNED values (scheme
+  `52:54:01:d1:NN:PP`, provider = NIC ordinal `:02`, `opentofu/vr1-dc1-substrate/main.tf`)
+  -- config-carried as-built, not inferred; still confirm at `juju deploy --dry-run`.
+- **nova-compute num_units 3 -> 2** (2 compute nodes, D-121 Option C).
+- **ceph-osd = 4** was already correct (matches R-3's 4 storage nodes); the stale
+  "ceph-osd 3" comment in `overlays/dc-ha-scaleup.yaml` was corrected to 4.
+- **provider-bundle-check.py** ovn-chassis check: skip the VR0 Pattern-A MAC set on a
+  role-separated bundle (verify present + well-formed instead).
+
+## B. Follow-up (deploy scripts / gates -- NOT render-blocking, needed before their gate)
+
+- **`preflight.sh` gates the wrong artifact** -- runs `provider-bundle-check.py bundle.yaml`
+  BARE (base bundle, default dc0 bands, role tags absent so placement self-skips). Must
+  invoke the real dc1 deploy input: `--overlay overlays/vr1-dc1-machines.yaml --overlay
+  overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml --overlay overlays/dc-ha-scaleup.yaml --dc vr1-dc1` (the
+  checker already supports this; only the call site is VR0-frozen). RENDER-ADJACENT.
+- **`pre-flight-checks.sh` is VR0-frozen** -- never calls the `$DC` selectors; VIP band
+  vars are dc0 (and `unset` under the vr1-dc1 lib-net arm -> trips `set -u`); host loops
+  resolve by hostname (`host_sysid`) but VR1 MAAS hostnames are random -- must use
+  `host_sysid_by_bootmac "${HOST_BOOT_MAC[$h]}"`. Fails every dc1 node as written.
+- **`cloud-assert.sh` false-passes decorative HA** -- only quorum-checks mysql (A2) +
+  ovn-central (A3); the 12 scaled hacluster-fronted API services get no pacemaker-quorum
+  / VIP-ownership assertion, so a VIP parked on one node (the exact `cluster_count`-still-1
+  failure D-121 targets) passes clean. Needs a per-hacluster "3 online / VIP owned" check
+  before the post-deploy acceptance gate.
+- **`juju bootstrap` unconstrained** (phase-4 Step 2) -- with 9 Ready nodes tagged
+  `openstack-vr1-dc1` in a region that sees both DCs, an unconstrained bootstrap can grab
+  a bundle node. Needs a distinct controller tag + `--constraints tags=<controller-tag>`
+  (pairs with the D-104-amendment 10th VM).
+- **phase-4 runbook drift** -- claims `lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc1` "fails loud until
+  populated"; it was populated 2026-07-23. Fold into the Step-4 de-stale.
+- **Cross-DC (D-108) only the LOCAL leg wired** -- rbd-mirror `ceph-remote` (peer ceph-mon)
+  and radosgw multisite (realm/zonegroup/zone + sync) are absent; both are cross-model /
+  cross-controller (D-104) and staged as DR follow-ups per D-108's "prove one-way first".
+
+## C. VERIFY-LIVE gates (into the deploy runbook; not render changes)
+
+- **vault 1.8/stable real HA-on-MySQL at 3 units** (D-121's own GATE) -- confirm leader
+  election on the MySQL backend before commit; if it fails, evaluate Raft -> D-068, NEVER
+  fall back to etcd.
+- **hacluster 2.4/stable `cluster_count`** -- confirm it means "peers required before VIP
+  binds"; else the VIP can bootstrap off one node (decorative HA).
+- **Ceph pools land at defaults size=3 / min_size=2 / failure-domain=host** -- not set
+  anywhere; the D-121 R-3 rebuild-headroom argument silently depends on these holding on 4
+  storage nodes. Post-deploy assertion.
+- **ovn-chassis dc1 compute provider MACs** present locally (section A).
+
+## D. RESOLVE-BEFORE-DEPLOY (operator decisions; VIP-overlay layer, separate from the render)
+
+- **Vault VIP (decorative-HA regression).** `dc-ha-scaleup.yaml` scales vault -> 3 +
+  `vault-hacluster cluster_count: 3` + re-adds `[vault:ha, vault-hacluster:ha]`, but NO
+  `vip:` is set on vault anywhere (base or overlays) -- it was dropped with BUNDLEFIX-002
+  when vault was de-HA'd. D-020 [corrected DOCFIX-201: D-020, not D-036] lists vault among the apps carrying provider+metal VIPs.
+  Without a VIP, kv consumers (barbican-vault -> `vault:secrets`) get one unit's
+  `vault_url`, not a stable HA endpoint = decorative HA. Fix = add a dc1-band vault VIP in
+  an overlay (needs a band octet) + the vault-HA VERIFY-LIVE (section C). designate is
+  VIP-less BY DESIGN (dnsaas), not a regression -- the contrast confirms the class.
+- **v4-only vs dual-stack phasing.** `overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml` (v4-only, concrete dc1
+  bands) and `overlays/dc-dc-ipv6-family-matrix.yaml` (v4+v6, unrendered `{{TOKEN}}`s) BOTH
+  own `vip:` for the same 10 apps; overlay merge is per-key REPLACE, so applying both =
+  last-wins (dual-stack lost, or literal tokens deployed). Only bites if both are applied
+  together: a v4-first phase-4 deploy uses only vr1-dc1-vips (no collision). Operator
+  decides whether dc1 phase-4 is v4-only (defer IPv6) or dual-stack (forces reconciling
+  the two overlays into ONE vip string per app now).
+- **machines-block overlay merge (`vr1-dc1-machines.yaml`)** -- documented juju behavior,
+  but no offline merger exists to prove it here; confirm at `juju deploy --dry-run`.
+  Fallback: inline the dc1 tags into a rendered dc1 bundle.
+
+## E. Confirmed CORRECT under the expansion (no change)
+
+- **All app relations / space bindings / subordinate associations HOLD under role
+  separation** -- because all 9 role nodes get the uniform 6-NIC set (SEC-011, uniform-NIC
+  ruling); ceph clients on control LXD, `octavia:ovsdb-cms -> data-tenant` +
+  `ovn-chassis-octavia` on control, ovn-chassis on the 2 compute nodes -- all satisfied.
+  (Caveat: holds ONLY while the uniform-6-NIC decision stands.)
+- **No channel/pin change** required by 3-unit HA or role separation (D-002 pins hold).
+- **`lib-hosts.sh` vr1-dc1 arm** is complete + measured (9 role nodes, octet bands, boot
+  MACs, per-DC tag) -- not a placeholder.
+- **`provider-bundle-check.py` placement section** is role-aware + harnessed (this session).
+- **`cloud-assert.sh` A2/A3** already expect 3 units (mysql/ovn). `ceph-osd=4`,
+  `expected-osd-count: 4`, `monitor-count: 3`, `reserved-host-memory: 8192` (D-040, ruled
+  retained) all correct.
+- **dc-dc phase-3/4 runbooks are discover-live** (do not hardcode a node count); the
+  `openstack0-3` loops live only in the VR0 teardown/reenroll path, not the dc1 deploy path.
+
+## F. Design signal
+
+These findings motivate a NetBox->deploy coupling (a per-DC renderer/pipeline that
+GENERATES the overlays + tfvars from NetBox IPAM, making the deploy gates DC-aware and
+eliminating the hand-render fragility + the VIP-overlay collision by construction). Being
+scoped as a new PROPOSED D-number (NetBox-deploy coupling; next-free per ledger-scan) in
+the design-discussion seat (Chat). This is the escalation of the committee's Fork-2
+(deferred renderer tool).
diff --git a/docs/dc-dc-buildout-design.md b/docs/dc-dc-buildout-design.md
index c9175a6..57d0fb8 100644
--- a/docs/dc-dc-buildout-design.md
+++ b/docs/dc-dc-buildout-design.md
@@ -117,7 +117,12 @@
 Build: per DC, MAAS commissions and deploys the node VMs; provider NIC left RAW (br-ex
 discipline, D-100); the VLAN-103 metal-internal bridge stack pre-built by MAAS.
 Gate: nodes deployed; the six planes present per node with correct fabrics/VLANs; provider
-NIC raw; PXE (v4) working; per-DC mirror reachable from nodes; NTP from edge working.
+NIC raw; PXE (v4) working; per-DC artifact source reachable. (DOCFIX-204, 2026-07-27:
+this line formerly read "per-DC mirror reachable from nodes; NTP from edge working".
+The node-side half is gate G17 -- powered-off nodes cannot be probed in Stage 4 under
+the READY-handoff ruling -- and the edge-NTP clause is SUPERSEDED by D-129(iv), which
+keeps the MAAS hierarchy as time authority. docs/CURRENT-STATE.md is the status
+authority for both.)
 Owns: D-103, D-100 (br-ex), D-107 (mirror + NTP).
 
 ### Phase 4 -- Juju controller + OpenStack bundle (per DC)
diff --git a/docs/dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md b/docs/dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md
index dcf2ad5..a7b4a18 100644
--- a/docs/dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md
+++ b/docs/dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@
 |---|---|
 | **Goal** | Bring the discovered node VMs to a deployed OS, ready for Juju. |
 | **Build** | Per DC: MAAS commissions + deploys the node VMs; provider NIC left RAW (br-ex discipline, D-100); VLAN-103 metal-internal bridge stack pre-built by MAAS. |
-| **Gate** | Nodes deployed; six planes present per node with correct fabrics/VLANs; provider NIC raw; PXE (v4) working; per-DC mirror reachable; NTP from edge working. |
+| **Gate** | Nodes READY + carved + tagged (NOT "deployed" -- MAAS-deploy is SKIPPED per the 2026-07-23 READY-handoff ruling / DOCFIX-200; Juju provisions at Stage 5); six planes present per node with correct fabrics/VLANs; provider NIC raw; PXE (v4) working; per-DC artifact source answering on its own address with an attested-current sync (dc0 = D-135 item-1 mirror, dc1 = the D-135-AMENDED apt caching proxy -- the two DCs differ BY RULING). Node-side reachability and the node time source are gate **G17**, split out 2026-07-27 (operator ruling, GA-R5) because powered-off nodes cannot be probed in this stage. `NTP from edge` was STRUCK -- superseded by D-129(iv) 2026-07-21, which keeps the MAAS hierarchy as time authority and gives the edge no NTP role (DOCFIX-204). |
 | **Owns** | D-103, D-100 (br-ex), D-107 (mirror + NTP). |
 | **Reuse vs new** | PARTIAL reuse. `runbooks/phase-00-teardown-maas-reset.md` carries the MAAS commission/deploy + br-ex discipline this repo already validated for a single rack; the per-DC multi-rack registration is new, the deploy mechanics are precedent. |
 | **Authoring status** | **Runbook WRITTEN 2026-07-09: `runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md`.** Adapts `phase-00-teardown-maas-reset.md`'s validated single-rack commission/deploy/carve mechanics per DC, run once per `$DC` (dc1/dc2). Requires `lib_net_select_dc "$DC"` first (DOCFIX-151); explicitly documents that `lib_hosts_select_dc "$DC"` is EXPECTED to fail for both DCs until this stage's own real host enrollment populates `lib-hosts.sh` -- a deliberate chicken-and-egg, not a bug. Surfaces 7 real gaps in a named section (no OpenTofu module stands up a per-DC MAAS rack controller VM itself; `reenroll-hosts.sh`/`carve-host-interfaces.sh`/`phase-00-maas-standup.sh` are not `$DC`-parameterized; node count/sizing now RULED (D-121/R-3 = 9/DC), so that sub-gap is closed; DC2 additionally blocked at the selector layer; no identified owner for the per-DC artifact mirror; MAAS status for VM-host-discovered domains unconfirmed; `HOST_TAG`/fabric-name literals are DC0-specific). NOT YET EXECUTED. |
diff --git a/docs/dc-dc-netbox-buildout-scope.md b/docs/dc-dc-netbox-buildout-scope.md
index 0d0a419..235592d 100644
--- a/docs/dc-dc-netbox-buildout-scope.md
+++ b/docs/dc-dc-netbox-buildout-scope.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Status:** planning/scope reference for the Code stream. NOT a decision record -- it
 consolidates ADOPTED decisions and flags the sub-decisions still needing operator ratification
-(candidate D-111+; assign via `ledger-scan` at adoption).
+(sub-decision 1 = the v6 subcarve, RATIFIED as D-111 on 2026-07-11; DOCFIX-202).
 **Authority order:** repo `design-decisions.md` (ADOPTED) > this doc > live NetBox (a
 reconciliation target, not a source) > design-exploration chats. NetBox is the IPAM apex
 (D-010, D-103) -- everything below it consumes it; it is never read back as a planning input.
@@ -129,13 +129,13 @@
 
 ---
 
-## 5. Sub-decisions requiring operator ratification (candidate D-111+)
+## 5. Sub-decisions (item 1 = v6 subcarve RATIFIED as D-111 2026-07-11 -- DOCFIX-202 demoted this from open; check the register before treating any item below as open)
 
 None of these block *reading* NetBox; they block *trusting the exact values written*. Each is a
 grep-before-assign D-NNN when ruled.
 
 1. **Per-plane subcarve (the big one).** `dc-dc-prefixes-import.py`'s ULA/GUA subdivision is the
-   script's OWN proposal, explicitly un-ratified: ULA = a `/56`-per-DC out of the org `/48` (dc1
+   script's OWN proposal, RATIFIED as D-111 (2026-07-11; DOCFIX-202 -- was mislabeled un-ratified): ULA = a `/56`-per-DC out of the org `/48` (dc1
    `::0/56`, dc2 `::1:00/56`), then a `/64` per ULA-bearing plane in fixed order; GUA =
    provider-public gets the whole `DC_GUA_PREFIX` as one `/64`. **Two conflicts to resolve:** (a)
    this does NOT use the deployed `NN` role mnemonic (provider at `NN=10`, etc.) -- decide whether
diff --git a/docs/design-decisions.md b/docs/design-decisions.md
index d151964..f4bbf3f 100644
--- a/docs/design-decisions.md
+++ b/docs/design-decisions.md
@@ -2031,6 +2031,30 @@
 
 **Remaining open item:** the exact NetBox literals (org ULA /48, per-DC GUA carve, DC2's v4 supernet) -- pending NetBox assignment (gap #3 in `docs/dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md`'s tooling gap register), not a ratification question.
 
+### RULING NOTE 2026-07-25 -- D-101 address-family policy CONFIRMED (no amendment)
+
+**Status:** D-101's family matrix CONFIRMED by operator ruling 2026-07-25 (GA-R5). This
+NOTE records the ruling; it changes NOTHING in D-101 (the matrix rationale already reads
+"v6 wherever possible, v4 only where forced").
+
+Question as presented: whether dc1 phase-4 deploys v4-only (deferring IPv6, per the
+expansion review's option (b)) or dual-stack.
+
+Operator utterance, verbatim (2026-07-25): "Dual stack to be used where IPv4 is required,
+IPv6 where IPv6 only makes sense."
+
+Clarifying exchange, verbatim: "Dual stack deployment for DC0 and DC1. This is the
+deployment when the dual-stack is added"
+
+**Effect:** the v4-only phasing option (expansion review option (b)) is CLOSED, for BOTH
+DC0 and DC1 in this deployment. `overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml` (v4-only) is not a
+D-101-conformant deploy input on its own; the `vr1-dc1-vips` / `dc-dc-ipv6-family-matrix`
+per-key REPLACE collision must be reconciled to ONE dual-family `vip` per app per DC
+before deploy. STILL OPEN under this ruling: octavia's family -- D-101 places `lb-mgmt`
+in the IPv6-only ULA group, but `overlays/dc-dc-ipv6-family-matrix.yaml` documents live
+upstream IPv6 breakage there (LP #1911788, #1913409); operator sub-ruling pending (see the
+D-136 open questions).
+
 ---
 
 ## D-102: IPv6 tenant addressing and MTU sub-policy (VR1)
@@ -2104,6 +2128,53 @@
 
 **References:** relates to D-071 (routine update cadence / Juju controller patch policy) without amending it; interacts with D-108 (per-DC control-plane backup / restore in the DR drill).
 
+### D-104 -- AMENDMENT (2026-07-24): the per-DC controller is a DEDICATED 10th node VM, not one of the 9
+
+**Status:** ADOPTED 2026-07-24 (operator ruling, GA-R5). Question as presented
+(Track-2 Fork 1, committee-reviewed
+`docs/audit/committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.md`): "The vr1-dc1 substrate
+is exactly 9 nodes (3 control + 2 compute + 4 storage), all needed for D-121
+Option C roles, with no controller slot. D-104 requires a per-DC Juju controller
+on an in-DC MAAS machine (VR0 precedent = a dedicated `juju` VM). Where should the
+dc1 Juju controller live?" Operator answer, exact selection: **"Dedicated 10th VM
+(Recommended)"** (over "Bootstrap onto a node, shrink a role" and "Co-locate on a
+control node"). The committee was unanimous for this option on all four lenses.
+
+**Decision.** D-104's "in-DC MAAS-deployed machine" is instantiated as a
+DEDICATED controller VM per DC, SEPARATE from the D-121 Option C role nodes. The
+built substrate carried exactly 9 role nodes (a latent gap against D-104); this
+amendment closes it by ADDING a 10th node VM to each DC substrate for the Juju
+controller. It matches the VERIFIED VR0 precedent (a dedicated `juju` VM separate
+from openstack0-3, `docs/maas-as-built-reference.md`) and the Roosevelt end-state
+(dedicated controller hardware, scaling to 3-unit HA there).
+
+- **The 9 OpenStack-role nodes are UNCHANGED** -- D-121 Option C (3 control + 2
+  compute + 4 storage) stands; the controller does NOT consume a role node, so the
+  Ceph rebuild headroom (R-3) and the quorum/anti-affinity spread are preserved.
+  The rejected alternatives each broke exactly one of those (shrink-a-role reversed
+  R-3; co-locate collapsed the 3-node control quorum).
+- **Additive, not a substrate reopening** -- the inner caller is
+  `for_each = local.vr1_dc1_nodes` (`opentofu/vr1-dc1-substrate/main.tf:140`),
+  keyed; adding the 10th key plans `1 add / 0 change / 0 destroy`.
+- **Distinct tag, no role tag** -- the controller VM carries its OWN MAAS tag
+  (`juju-controller-vr1-dc1`) and NONE of the role tags, so `juju bootstrap
+  --constraints tags=juju-controller-vr1-dc1` targets it deterministically and no
+  OpenStack `tags=` role constraint can cross-grab it (pairs with the Fork-3
+  per-role-tag scheme).
+- **Capacity GATE: PASS (measured, not inferred).** `scripts/dc-dc-whole-host-budget.py`
+  for the 10-node x 2-DC shape (controller modeled as +8 GiB / +4 vCPU per-DC
+  containment overhead) -> RAM 854/1024 GiB = 83%, FIT, 170 GiB headroom
+  (`docs/audit/stage5-controller-capacity-20260724.txt`; baseline 3+2+4 = 838 GiB
+  / 82%). vCPU allocation 96% (overcommits in a sim; not a hard ceiling).
+- **Controller sizing** is small/single-unit (VR1 test-only economy, unchanged);
+  the exact vCPU/mem/disk is a substrate-authoring value, MEASURED into the tfvars
+  at build time, not fixed here.
+
+**Roosevelt analog:** a dedicated per-DC controller machine (bare metal), scaling
+to 3-unit HA. **Cross-note to D-121:** the Option C node COUNT (9 role nodes/DC)
+is not changed by this amendment; the controller is a separate machine, tracked
+here under D-104.
+
 ---
 
 ## D-105: CAPI management-cluster placement and COS / Magnum scope (VR1)
@@ -3375,7 +3446,7 @@
 modeling at testcloud scale"): the hacluster + VIP relations were included at `num_units: 1` as a
 **decorative** pattern -- "a single unit can't form a real HA quorum" -- explicitly so that
 "Roosevelt scale-up is mechanical: change `num_units: 1` -> `num_units: 3` and rerun." The bundle
-already carries all 12 hacluster subordinates and, per **D-036**, both provider+metal VIPs on every
+already carries all 12 hacluster subordinates and, per **D-020**, both provider+metal VIPs on every
 clustered API app. VR1 (the regional rehearsal) is where that decorative HA is made real -- the
 missing units get added.
 
@@ -3389,7 +3460,7 @@
 
 | App | Now | -> | Mechanism | Governing |
 |---|---|---|---|---|
-| keystone, glance, neutron-api, nova-cloud-controller, placement, cinder, openstack-dashboard, octavia, barbican, magnum, designate | 1 | 3 | hacluster + dual VIP (already wired) | D-009, D-036 |
+| keystone, glance, neutron-api, nova-cloud-controller, placement, cinder, openstack-dashboard, octavia, barbican, magnum, designate | 1 | 3 | hacluster + dual VIP (already wired) | D-009, D-020 |
 | ceph-radosgw | 1 | 3 | hacluster + VIP (wired; NOT in D-009's named 12 but HA-eligible) | -- |
 | rabbitmq-server | 1 | 3 | native clustering / quorum queues (no hacluster) | -- |
 | vault | 1 | 3 | see the backend sub-question below | D-006 (revised by C1) |
@@ -3491,7 +3562,7 @@
 3. **Per-node sizing:** RULED (control 16/64/150, compute 12/48/100, storage 8/24/550; Status).
 
 **Related:** D-009 (decorative HA pattern this executes), D-006 + C1 (vault backend history),
-D-036 (dual VIPs, already present), D-062 (mysql-at-3), D-108 (rbd-mirror stays 1), D-040
+D-020 (dual VIPs, already present), D-062 (mysql-at-3), D-108 (rbd-mirror stays 1), D-040
 (reserved memory), D-104 (single-unit JUJU controller -- unaffected; this is the OpenStack control
 plane, not the Juju bootstrap node), SEC-003 (unseal). Does NOT touch DC2/`vr1-dc1` scope.
 
@@ -4472,3 +4543,760 @@
 **Status:** Q3 RULED 2026-07-23; item 1 remains OPEN on its sole remainder -- the Q2 PATH
 selection (2a/2b/2c) + deadline at Roosevelt Vault design time. Q1 ruled, Q2 structure
 ruled, Q3 ruled. **Related:** D-071 (vehicle), the two amendments above.
+
+---
+
+## D-133: ADOPTED -- VR1 DC plane carve is FLAT per-NIC (no VLAN-103 stack); next deployment rehearses hardware-faithful NIC topology (bonds/trunks) [ARCH]
+
+**Status:** ADOPTED 2026-07-23 (Stage 4 open, branch dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy).
+Question as presented: "How should metal-internal be carved on VR1 DC nodes? The design
+text (VR0 Pattern A) says a VLAN-103 stack on the metal NIC, but the built substrate gives
+each node a dedicated flat metal-internal NIC (enp3s0) on its own isolated plane network."
+Options presented: flat on the dedicated NIC (recommended) / VLAN-103 stack on enp1s0 /
+defer for deeper analysis. Operator asked for discussion first; the analysis below was
+presented. Operator ruling, exact utterance (2026-07-23): "Fine, keep it flat but on the
+next deployment we need to build the VMs with exact hardware duplicated networking so we
+can work out any bonding/trunking kinks."
+
+**Decision (two coupled parts, one exchange):**
+1. **VR1 DCs carve every plane FLAT on its dedicated node NIC.** Metal-internal is an
+   untagged subnet on the enp3s0 plane network (dc0: 10.12.12.0/22, dc1: 10.12.72.0/22);
+   no br-metal.103 / br-internal stack exists in VR1. VID 103 is a VR0-only fact. This
+   SUPERSEDES the D-052-era Pattern A VLAN-103 shape FOR VR1 DC NODES ONLY -- VR0's
+   as-built carve is untouched and remains the validated tagged-VLAN precedent.
+2. **PINNED TO THE NEXT DEPLOYMENT (standing requirement, not a VR1 change):** the next
+   rehearsal's node VMs must duplicate the TARGET HARDWARE's exact NIC topology --
+   real NIC count, bond members, VLAN trunks -- so bonding/trunking kinks are worked
+   out in rehearsal, not on metal. The VR1 6-flat-NIC node-vm shape is a tagged shim
+   and must NOT be carried forward once real hardware specs exist. This composes with
+   D-132 (Roosevelt MAAS topology, also pinned to next-deployment design time).
+
+**Context (measured 2026-07-23, docs/audit/stage4-discovery-20260723.txt).** VR0's
+as-built table (this file, 2026-06-29 inventory) shows VLAN-sharing occurred exactly
+where planes outnumbered NICs (enp1s0 provider+VIP VID 104; enp7s0 metal-admin+internal
+VID 103) and every plane with its own NIC ran flat -- the VLAN was a NIC-scarcity
+workaround, not a design principle. The VR1 substrate (D-121/D-123, applied both DCs)
+gives each node 6 NICs, one per plane, MACs config-pinned; bundle.yaml binds by Juju
+space name, which maps to MAAS subnets -- charms are agnostic to VLAN vs flat beneath
+the space. Roosevelt's real carve (bonds + trunks on few NICs) is neither option here
+and is re-derived from real switch/NIC inventory at Roosevelt design time; part 2 makes
+that rehearsal explicit definition-of-scope for the next deployment's substrate.
+
+**Affected surfaces (DOCFIX/delivery queued to this stage, not silently edited):**
+dc-dc-buildout-design.md plane table "VID 103" + "VLAN-103 bridge stack" build lines;
+dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md Stage 4 Build row; runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md
+Step 5's VR0-literal carve tree; scripts/lib-net.sh vr1-dc0 arm (inherits VR0's
+METAL_INTERNAL_VID=103/IFACE=br-internal via the D-101 no-op -- needs an explicit
+VR1-carve comment or unset, WITH its harness, at the carve delivery). A1 test: a
+Roosevelt build session greps this before designing the bond/trunk carve.
+
+---
+
+## D-134: ADOPTED -- VR1 DC node static addressing: per-role octet bands with headroom [ARCH]
+
+**Status:** ADOPTED 2026-07-23 (Stage 4, branch dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy).
+Question as presented: "Adopt the per-role band plan for VR1 DC node statics (both DCs,
+same octet per node across all six planes): control .10-.19, compute .20-.49, storage
+.201-.254, with .4-.9 reserved for future utility nodes and .50-.99 formally reserved as
+the VIP band?" Operator answer: "Adopt as recommended." (The .40-.48 flat band was
+presented first and REJECTED -- operator directive, exact utterance: "Per role bands
+with headroom. Give me a recommendation".)
+
+**Decision.** On every VR1 DC plane (/22), the LAST-OCTET bands are:
+
+**SUPERSEDED by the 2026-07-23 AMENDMENT below (DOCFIX-203) -- do NOT use these bands. The
+CONTIGUOUS table under `## D-134 -- AMENDMENT (2026-07-23)` is authoritative (.4-.49 utility,
+.50-.99 VIP, .100-.200 nodes [control .100-.119 / compute .120-.149 / storage .150-.200],
+.201-.254 dynamic). This original is kept only as the record of what was rejected and why.**
+
+| Band | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| .1-.9 | infrastructure: .1 gateway (routed planes), .2 rack, .3 DNS forwarder (metal-admin); .4-.9 RESERVED for future per-DC utility/infra nodes (D-131 sub-4 / D-132 context) |
+| .10-.19 | CONTROL nodes (10 slots) |
+| .20-.49 | COMPUTE nodes (30 slots) |
+| .50-.99 | VIP band, formally reserved (measured today: .50-.60, 11 VIPs, VIP_COUNT_EXPECT=11 -- headroom to ~3x for Roosevelt service growth) |
+| .100-.200 | dynamic/enlistment range (D-120 inheritance; live on metal-admin) |
+| .201-.254 | STORAGE nodes (54 slots -- the role most likely to sprawl; echoes D-120's high node band on the office1 compose net) |
+
+One octet per node, IDENTICAL across all six planes (D-052 stable-octet discipline
+kept). Same bands in BOTH DCs (each plane is its own L2; no cross-DC collision).
+VR1 assignments: control-01..03 = .10-.12, compute-01..02 = .20-.21,
+storage-01..04 = .201-.204, keyed by tofu node name (config-of-record identity via
+pinned boot MAC -- NEVER by the random MAAS hostnames).
+
+**Context (measured 2026-07-23).** Collision check against every live reservation:
+bundle VIPs .50-.60 (grep of bundle.yaml), 10.12.12.4 also present in bundle (low
+single digits not fully free -- bands start at .10), FIP pool 10.12.5.0-10.12.7.254
+(provider third-octet space, not the .0/24 row), metal-admin dynamic .100-.200 (D-120),
+rack .2 + forwarder .3 (D-131 sub-1). Supersedes nothing: VR0's .40-.43 (D-052) stays
+VR0's as-built; this is the VR1+ convention. A1 test: Roosevelt greps this before
+assigning any node address plan.
+
+---
+
+## D-134 -- AMENDMENT (2026-07-23): CONTIGUOUS band table (supersedes the original table)
+
+**Status:** RULED 2026-07-23, same session as the original entry. The operator rejected
+the original table's interleaving -- exact utterance: "I want to find carves were we are
+not breaking up IP addresses with other blockes in between like what is currently layed
+out. Check the reservations and carves to resuffle the IP addresses and blocks in a
+better order." Movability analysis presented (pinned: .1/.2/.3 live infra, .50-.60
+bundle VIP literals, FIP pool rows 1-3 on provider forcing node suffixes into row 0;
+movable: the D-120-inherited dynamic range, a MAAS ip-range object, nodes powered off).
+Two contiguous layouts presented; question: "Which contiguous band layout should replace
+D-134's table?" Operator answer: "Option B: swap (Recommended)".
+
+**Superseding band table (row 0 of every VR1 DC plane /22, both DCs):**
+
+| Band | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| .1-.3 | infrastructure: .1 gateway, .2 rack, .3 DNS forwarder (metal-admin) |
+| .4-.49 | RESERVED: future per-DC utility/infra nodes (46 slots) |
+| .50-.99 | VIP band (measured .50-.60 today; ~3x headroom) |
+| .100-.200 | NODES, one contiguous run: control .100-.119, compute .120-.149, storage .150-.200 |
+| .201-.254 | dynamic/enlistment range (MOVED from .100-.200; 54 leases) |
+
+VR1 assignments: control-01..03 = .100-.102, compute-01..02 = .120-.121,
+storage-01..04 = .150-.153. Stable octet per node across all six planes unchanged.
+
+**Consequences.** The DC metal-admin dynamic ranges (dc0 10.12.8.100-200, dc1
+10.12.68.100-200 -- the D-120-INHERITED copies, ruled at Step D / dc1 standup) MOVE to
+.201-.254 as the carve's first gated mutation per DC, BEFORE static assignment; done
+with nodes powered off (no active leases; future enlistments indifferent to range
+position). D-120's own office1 compose-net ranges (10.10.1.0/24) are UNTOUCHED -- this
+amendment diverges the DC planes from the compose-net band order deliberately (nodes
+mid-row, dynamic high) and is the authority for that divergence.
+
+---
+
+## D-135: ADOPTED (AMENDED 2026-07-24) -- VR1 per-DC artifact mirror realization (D-107 build-out, staged) [ARCH]
+
+**Status:** ADOPTED 2026-07-23 (Stage 4, branch dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy). Two
+GA-R5 exchanges, both quoted. (1) The Stage-4 mirror gate: a rehearsal-scoped D-107
+exception was presented as Recommended and REJECTED -- operator answer: "Build the
+mirror now". (2) This staged plan: question "Adopt the D-135 staged mirror plan
+(rack-host placement at the utility .4 address per DC) and build item 1 -- the apt +
+Ubuntu Cloud Archive mirror, debmirror+nginx, both DCs -- now?"; operator answer:
+"Adopt + build item 1 (Recommended)".
+
+**AMENDED 2026-07-24 (GA-R5, third exchange -- Stage 4): the DC1 apt path.**
+Question: "DC1 is blocked waiting on its full ~950 GiB debmirror (~35% done);
+adopt a caching proxy (apt-cacher-ng) on DC1 as the INTERIM apt path to unblock
+the DC1 build now, keeping DC0 on the full mirror?" Operator answer, exact
+utterance: "We will use it on DC1 to keep the build moving forward. We will
+replace DC1 cache with a full mirror afterwards and test the full mirror
+deployment on DC0." CONSEQUENCE: DC1 = interim caching proxy
+(`scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh`, apt-cacher-ng proxy mode at the utility .4:3142,
+consumed via `juju model-config apt-http-proxy`), to be REPLACED by a full
+mirror afterward; DC0 stays the full-mirror deployment under test. Both
+artifact-delivery models thus get exercised this rehearsal -- direct Roosevelt
+input for the D-132/D-133 utility-node design. SCOPE: the proxy caches apt only
+(archive/security/UCA); charmhub is controller-side (Office1), snaps ride the
+still-open edge egress or await D-135 item 3 (egress narrowing remains the
+deferred closing mutation). The paused DC1 debmirror (~330 GiB) is KEPT dormant,
+not deleted, as the fallback for the later full-mirror completion.
+
+**Decision.** D-107's per-DC mirror is BUILT (not excepted) for VR1, staged by what
+Stage 5 consumes:
+- **Placement (all classes):** ON each DC's rack host (vvr1-dc0 / vvr1-dc1; measured
+  2026-07-23: 2.9T disk, ~9G used, ~400G free RAM each), served at the FIRST D-134
+  utility-band address on metal-admin: dc0 10.12.8.4, dc1 10.12.68.4 (alias on the
+  metal-admin bridge, forwarder-.3 pattern; bridge DISCOVERED from the libvirt net
+  name, never a baked virbrN). Repo-carried, site-keyed `scripts/dc-mirror.sh` +
+  harness; part of DC-standup definition-of-done from here on. Roosevelt analog: the
+  same service on per-DC utility nodes (D-132/D-133 pinned set).
+- **Item 1 (BUILT NOW): apt + UCA.** Full jammy amd64 BINARY mirror
+  (main/restricted/universe/multiverse; jammy + jammy-updates + jammy-security; no
+  sources) plus Ubuntu Cloud Archive jammy-updates/caracal, synced per-DC through
+  that DC's OWN edge (D-107 sub-item: independent upstream pull, confirmed), served
+  by nginx. Stage-5 wiring: `juju model-config apt-mirror=` per DC model -- MAAS
+  global config and office1 untouched.
+- **Item 2 (PINNED to Stage 5 open): images/simplestreams** (sstream-mirror; Juju
+  container-image metadata + glance-simplestreams-sync mirror config; amphora stays
+  locally built via octavia-diskimage-retrofit -- no mirror class).
+- **Item 3 (measure-then-rule at Stage 5 start): charmhub + snaps.** NOT designed
+  here; first deploy measures what the controller/nodes actually fetch, then options
+  (local charm files via `juju download` / caching proxy / snap-store-proxy) get
+  their own ruling.
+- **Egress narrowing is the CLOSING mutation:** D-107's edge scope (NTP + mirror
+  sync ONLY; general node egress killed) is applied AFTER the mirror proves out,
+  not before.
+- **NTP conflict resolved:** D-107's nodes-chrony-from-edge is SUPERSEDED by the
+  later D-129(iv) ruling (MAAS hierarchy stays the time authority); the edge remains
+  the SITE's upstream sync point.
+
+**AMENDMENT 2026-07-27 -- the two DCs test two STRATEGIES; dc1's full mirror is REMOVED,
+not paused.** The 2026-07-24 amendment recorded dc1's debmirror as "PAUSED ... kept dormant
+as the fallback" and said "DC1's proxy is REPLACED by a full mirror afterward", i.e. a
+temporary state converging on two full mirrors. That is SUPERSEDED. Operator statement,
+exact utterance (2026-07-27): **"DC0 is the test of a full mirror. DC1 is the test of the
+mirror proxy. DC1 needed the partially created full mirror and associated
+script/files/settings removed."** So the per-DC split is the DELIBERATE EXPERIMENT, not an
+interim: dc0 = full mirror, dc1 = caching proxy, each proven on its own DC. There is no
+fallback and no later convergence. EXECUTED the same day: dc1's 330G partial mirror, its
+units, timer, sync helper, nginx vhost, resolved drop-in and the `debmirror` package are all
+removed (capture `docs/audit/dc1-mirror-teardown-20260727.txt`).
+
+**Consequence that had to be fixed FIRST (a measured coupling trap).** `dc-cache-proxy.sh`
+did not own its utility net layer -- it REUSED `dc-mirror.sh`'s `<site>-mirror-net.service`
+and refused to install without it. On dc1, whose ruled path is the PROXY, three files named
+`dc1-mirror-*` (net unit, apply helper, resolved DNS drop-in) were therefore load-bearing
+FOR THE PROXY. Two consequences, both real: the recorded mirror-removal procedure would have
+silently killed the proxy (and with it the Stage-5 dc1 apt path), and the proxy could not be
+REBUILT after such a teardown, because nothing but `dc-mirror.sh install` created the net
+layer -- so rebuilding a proxy meant reinstalling the whole mirror apparatus including an
+ENABLED daily debmirror timer. Teardown-and-rebuild did not converge. The net layer now
+lives in `dc-cache-proxy.sh` as `<site>-cache-proxy-net.service` (+ apply helper + its own
+resolved drop-in), neutrally named so a proxy-only DC carries NO mirror-named dependency;
+the two net units are safe to coexist where a site runs both (idempotent `ip addr replace` /
+`ip route replace` on identical MEASURED values), so dc0 is unaffected. Proven by removing
+the live address and route outright and applying the proxy-owned unit ALONE. **Roosevelt: a
+DC's artifact-delivery strategy must be changeable without rebuilding the other strategy's
+apparatus -- per-DC utility-node services own their own network prerequisites.**
+
+**A1 test:** Roosevelt greps this for the mirror service shape, the utility-address
+convention, the staged class order, the measure-then-rule posture on charmhub/snaps, and
+the per-DC-strategy rule that a utility service owns its own net prerequisites.
+
+## D-136: NetBox-coupled per-DC render pipeline for bundle overlays and tfvars [ARCH]
+
+**Status:** PROPOSED 2026-07-25 (Chat design seat, repo HEAD bc9a2df; operator has not
+ruled on the mechanism). Escalates the renderer deferral in
+`docs/audit/committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.md` (Fork 2, "hand-render dc1 now,
+extract the tool when dc0 forces the second render") to a NetBox-coupled generator.
+Supersedes nothing.
+
+**Problem.** Addressing is authoritative in NetBox (office1-netbox, the VR1 working
+apex, DOCFIX-195) but reaches the deploy as HAND-RENDERED static literals: NetBox ->
+imported by `netbox/*.py` -> literals in `scripts/lib-net.sh` / `lib-hosts.sh` and
+tfvars -> hand-rendered into `bundle.yaml` and `overlays/*.yaml`. There is no live pull
+and no generator. Measured fragility:
+
+- BUNDLEFIX-052 (ceph-rbd-mirror binding) and a YAML flow-comma slip, one session.
+- The app-to-VIP set exists in FOUR live places and no two agree: D-020's ratified list
+  (11 apps, includes vault, excludes ceph-radosgw); `bundle.yaml` and
+  `overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml` (11, vault dropped, ceph-radosgw added);
+  `overlays/dc-dc-ipv6-family-matrix.yaml` (10, plus octavia deliberately commented at
+  lines 140-152).
+- Two overlays own `vip:` for the same 10 applications under per-key REPLACE and
+  last-wins, so the deploy input depends on overlay ORDER, not on a reconciled value.
+- vault carries no `vip:` anywhere in the tracked tree while `overlays/dc-ha-scaleup.yaml`
+  scales it to 3 units and declares `vault-hacluster` at `cluster_count: 3`. HA intent
+  the artifact does not express, and an unrecorded departure from D-020.
+
+Under the 2026-07-25 family ruling (see the ruling record for this date) the per-app
+VIP becomes a six-address dual-family string, for BOTH DCs. That roughly doubles the
+hand-maintained literal count at the precise point where the hand-render has already
+failed twice.
+
+**What the pipeline PULLS** (verified present in
+`netbox/draft/vr1-office1-current-20260725.json`, captured 2026-07-25):
+
+- Six-plane v4 `/22`s and v6 `/60`+`/64` per DC, selectable by `scope_site`
+  (`vr1-dc0`, `vr1-dc1`); 92 of 139 prefixes carry `scope_site`, and the `role` slugs
+  match the plane names exactly.
+- The D-111 API-VIP `/64` per DC (`2602:f3e2:f02:11::/64` dc0, `2602:f3e2:f03:11::/64`
+  dc1) and the shared metal `/60` at `:20`, admin `/64` `:20`, internal `/64` `:21`.
+- Aggregates (`2602:f3e2::/36` ARIN, `fd50:840e:74e2::/48` org ULA, RFC1918,
+  `23.157.124.0/24`), the D-120 bands as ip-ranges, two rack-controller static IPs.
+
+**What it CANNOT pull today** (scoping constraint, not a defect): VIPs -- the record
+holds four ip-addresses and none is a VIP. MAC pins and node inventory -- there is no
+`dcim/devices` and no `dcim/interfaces` in the record at all. VLANs/VIDs -- no
+`ipam/vlans`; the VLAN-group buildout is the open G4 item at
+`docs/dc-dc-netbox-buildout-scope.md` section 4e.
+
+**Where the gap actually is (per `docs/audit/decision-recon-20260725.md`, 4-lens,
+2026-07-25).** The PREFIX layer is COMPLETE and DRIFT-FREE -- all 12 plane `/22`s, both
+transit `/30`s, both uplinks, both GUA `/48`s, the ARIN `/36`, the full v6 subcarves and
+the org ULA are present and match `lib-net.sh` value-for-value. The gap is entirely
+SUB-PREFIX, and it is what this decision exists to close:
+
+- **The D-134 bands** (as amended 2026-07-23, the CONTIGUOUS table: `.1-.3` infra,
+  `.4-.49` reserved utility, `.50-.99` VIP, `.100-.200` nodes with control `.100-.119` /
+  compute `.120-.149` / storage `.150-.200`, `.201-.254` dynamic) exist ONLY as decision
+  prose -- in neither NetBox nor `lib-net.sh`. `lib-net.sh` carries only the dc0 VIP
+  octet band `.50-.60`, UNSET for dc1.
+- **The 33 VIP addresses** (11 services x provider/admin/internal, `.50-.60`) exist ONLY
+  as hand-maintained literals in `overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml`. They are internally
+  consistent with the bundle octet-for-octet, but they are not a projection of the apex.
+
+So a generator has nothing to pull for either. **Division of labour, corrected:** the
+coupling MODELS the bands (as ip-ranges) and the VIP addresses (as scoped ip-addresses)
+IN the apex, then GENERATES the overlays from them, so the overlay becomes a projection
+of NetBox rather than a parallel hand-maintained truth. The per-DC values file is
+therefore TRANSITIONAL -- it carries bands and VIPs by hand only until they land in the
+apex, after which it shrinks to genuinely non-IPAM convention.
+
+**Options.**
+
+- **(A) Build the generator now and gate the dc1 deploy on it.** The forced dual-stack
+  reconciliation IS its first job, so hand-rendering then rebuilding pays twice.
+  Against: an unproven tool on the critical path of an otherwise-ready deploy; its
+  first output has nothing to diff against; MAC pins and VLANs are absent from the
+  record, so the tool cannot be complete on this timeline.
+
+- **(B) Hand-render both DCs dual-stack; build the generator for Roosevelt.** Fork 2's
+  lean, and "render once to learn the parameter surface" has real force. Against:
+  roughly 170 dual-family literals by hand, at the point the hand-render has already
+  produced two defects on the simpler v4-only artifact.
+
+- **(C) Split at the seam: build the BACK half now, add the FRONT half later.
+  RECOMMENDED.** Reconcile once, by hand, INTO a per-DC values file carrying every
+  plane CIDR, VIP band, app-to-VIP map (one reconciled dual-family string per app,
+  vault included) and role tag. Render the overlays from it with a thin deterministic
+  substitution step. Both DCs ship on it. The NetBox front half (record -> values file)
+  is added later without touching the back half, because the interface is frozen.
+
+**Why (C).** It captures the whole benefit -- one source of truth, no two lists to
+drift -- without absorbing the front half's unknowns (VIP representability, MAC and
+VLAN buildout, token handling, network reach), none of which are on this deploy's
+critical path. It makes the front half testable BY REPRODUCTION: once the schema is
+frozen, NetBox-generated values are validated by diffing against known-good
+hand-authored values for a DC that already deployed. Option (A) has no such gate. And
+the values file is not scaffolding -- it is the permanent seam between IPAM fact and
+deployment convention in the target operating model (pinned separately).
+
+**Honest cost of (C):** the schema and substitution layer are written before the NetBox
+schema is fully known, so the seam may need one refactor when the front half lands.
+
+**Eliminated by construction.**
+
+1. The VIP-overlay collision -- one reconciled `vip` per app per DC, emitted once; no
+   second overlay to race, so deploy input stops depending on overlay order.
+2. Vault decorative HA -- an application scaled with an `hacluster` peer and no VIP
+   becomes a GENERATOR-TIME error instead of a silent runtime condition.
+3. Family drift -- D-101's matrix applied once in code instead of by a human ~170
+   times. The validator asserts family-per-plane-per-SITE, not mere presence: the
+   record currently carries GUA storage prefixes for `vr0-dc0` and `willamette` while
+   VR1 storage is ULA, so a generator selecting on `role` alone pulls the wrong family.
+4. Reserved-range skew -- per D-074 the tenant-CIDR reserved set is the six plane
+   `/22`s (today sourced from `scripts/lib-net.sh` into `scripts/net_overlap.py` as
+   argv) plus the live-resolved `capi-mgmt-subnet` and the metadata range. Generating
+   the plane rows from the same values file removes the risk of onboarding a tenant
+   validated against the WRONG DC's planes.
+
+**DC-aware gates (part of this proposal).** `scripts/preflight.sh` validates the real
+per-DC deploy input via `scripts/provider-bundle-check.py --overlay --dc`, not the base
+bundle alone. `scripts/cloud-assert.sh` gains a per-hacluster VIP-owned check, so a
+scaled application with no VIP fails rather than passes. Bootstrap carries the
+controller-tag constraint.
+
+**Mechanism (front half, when built).** Extending `netbox/*.py` is preferred over a
+third-party NetBox OpenTofu provider. The existing tools already establish the correct
+posture: one script per SOURCE (`office1-record-dump.py` vs `prod-draft-dump.py`),
+read-only, token from the environment, never embedded or printed. A provider must
+additionally be mirrorable into the per-DC airgap mirror (D-107) or it is disqualified
+on Roosevelt, and it would put a write-capable credential in the tofu run while
+write-back is deferred (DOCFIX-195). Reads only; no write-back under this decision.
+
+**Scope boundary.**
+
+- IN: the six operator planes per DC, VIP bands, plane CIDRs, per-DC role tags, and the
+  generated per-DC overlays and tfvars.
+- OUT -- TENANT SPACE, permanently. Per `docs/dc-dc-netbox-buildout-scope.md:128`
+  per-tenant `/60`s are Neutron-managed (D-016/D-074) and not enumerated in NetBox. Per
+  D-074 tenant private CIDRs are TENANT-CHOSEN and MAY OVERLAP, enforced only against
+  the reserved-range registry. NetBox models pools, aggregates and reserved ranges; it
+  never models a tenant's own networks. A maintainer extending the generator "one more
+  table" into tenant space would either fight Neutron or gate tenant provisioning on an
+  operator-side IPAM write, breaking the tenant self-service model this cloud is sold
+  on.
+- IN: WRITES TO office1-netbox. DOCFIX-195 (operator ruling 2026-07-15) rules that
+  during VR1 `office1-netbox` takes ALL writes and `netbox.baldurkeep.com` stays a
+  READ-ONLY v1 reference with merge-back DEFERRED to end-of-deployment. Precedent tool:
+  `netbox/d120-compose-bands.py --commit` already loaded the D-120 bands into the apex.
+  (An earlier draft of this entry scoped apex writes OUT on a misreading of DOCFIX-195;
+  that would have scoped the coupling out of its own core job -- see the gap below.)
+- OUT: writes to `netbox.baldurkeep.com` (deferred, DOCFIX-195; P2 merge-back).
+- OUT: VLAN / space / fabric -- PERMANENTLY, not pending. office1-netbox holds zero VLAN
+  objects and that is CORRECT BY DESIGN: VR1 is untagged-per-fabric on every plane in
+  both DCs (D-133, superseding VR0's VID-103/104), so a VLAN object would document
+  tagging that does not exist on the wire. The bundle binds by SPACE NAME -> MAAS subnet
+  by CIDR, never by VLAN/fabric/subnet id. VLAN/space/fabric is MAAS-sourced; NetBox is
+  IPAM only.
+- OUT: MAC pins. They already have a working source of record and are drift-free across
+  substrate `main.tf` <-> `lib-hosts.sh` `HOST_BOOT_MAC` <-> bundle ovn-chassis <->
+  discovery. They stay substrate/lib-hosts-sourced; this is not a NetBox gap.
+
+**Roosevelt-delta (A1).** Roosevelt is N bare-metal DCs. Hand-rendering is O(N) human
+renders of a ~170-literal dual-family artifact; a generator plus one values file per DC
+plus one validator is O(1) tooling and O(N) data. The transferable artifact is the
+triple: renderer, values file, validator. This is why the back half is worth building
+even while the front half waits.
+
+**Artifact shape (RULED 2026-07-25 -- operator ruling, GA-R5).** Question as presented:
+there is no `vr1-dc0-vips.yaml`; dc0's VIPs are inline in `bundle.yaml` while dc1 has an
+overlay -- under the family ruling both DCs need v6 legs, so the asymmetry must break:
+(i) symmetric (extract dc0 to its own overlay, base becomes VIP-free) or (ii) asymmetric
+(dc0 v6 legs into base, two renderer output modes forever)? Operator utterance, verbatim:
+"Your question about 1 or 2, go with 1. Base bundle and everything else is applied via
+overlay." Effect (option (i), symmetric per-DC overlays): `bundle.yaml` becomes VIP-free
+and holds topology only; every per-DC value, dc0's included, arrives via overlay. dc0's
+VIPs are extracted from base into `overlays/vr1-dc0-vips.yaml`. The renderer therefore has
+ONE output shape per DC and Roosevelt's Nth DC is the same shape as its first.
+
+**PREREQUISITE, sequenced FIRST (per the recon's sequencing insight).** Extend
+`netbox/sandbox-fidelity-check.py` BEFORE the coupling is built. Today it covers only the
+D-115/D-117/D-120 delta and diffs the FROZEN 90-prefix `netbox.baldurkeep.com` draft, not
+the current 139-prefix office1-netbox apex; it is blind to D-124 and D-134. It gates every
+apex reconciliation this coupling depends on, and the coupling's whole value proposition
+is eliminating the drift those reconciliations chase. An unextended checker cannot verify
+the apex mutations in the gap list above, so building the generator first would mean
+writing to the apex with no trustworthy fidelity gate.
+
+**A hard tooling coupling nobody has flagged.** `scripts/lib-net.sh:59` sets
+`VIP_COUNT_EXPECT=11`, consumed by `scripts/pre-flight-checks.sh` at :79 (warn on vip
+line count) and :99-102, where a count mismatch is a **fail**, not a warn. Adding vault's
+VIP takes the count to 12, so `VIP_COUNT_EXPECT` must move to 12 in the same change or
+the gate fails. Note that CURRENT-STATE flags `pre-flight-checks.sh` as VR0-frozen (no
+`$DC` selector), so whether it gates VR1 today needs confirming -- but the constant is in
+the shared library and any DC-aware successor inherits it. **Sibling constant (flagged by
+the 2026-07-25 pack review, missed by the pack):** `scripts/lib-net.sh:58` sets
+`VIP_OCTET_MAX=60`, consumed by the octet range-check at `pre-flight-checks.sh:81`; vault's
+`.61` violates it, so `VIP_OCTET_MAX` must bump alongside `VIP_COUNT_EXPECT` (`.61` is
+band-legal per the D-134-amended `.50-.99` VIP band -- the fix is the constant, not the
+octet). A second stale `VIP_COUNT_EXPECT=11` restatement lives in D-134's band-table prose,
+and `lib-net.sh:157` UNSETS both for the vr1-dc1 arm. A generator emitting the VIP set
+should DERIVE this count rather than carry it as a second literal.
+
+**Gate relationship.** This decision does NOT gate the dc1 deploy. What the family
+ruling gates, and what must be resolved before deploy, is three items: (1) the vault
+VIP plus its band octet (a D-020 conformance repair, OPS not ARCH); (2) the octavia
+family sub-ruling; (3) the reconciled dual-family VIP literals for both DCs, in the
+symmetric overlay shape above. The subcarve is NOT among them -- D-111 (ADOPTED
+2026-07-11) already ratifies the per-plane v6 subcarve and the values are imported for
+both DCs.
+
+**Open questions (operator).**
+
+1. Metal VIP host addresses come straight out of the plane `/64` and share it with node
+   addresses; D-111's VIP-dedicated `/64` at `:11` exists only on the provider/GUA leg.
+   Confirm no MAAS deployed-node band claims the VIP octet on the metal planes. A
+   collision is repaired by a D-111 amendment (a metal VIP sub-range), not by values.
+2. Octavia family. D-101 places `lb-mgmt` in the IPv6-only ULA group, but
+   `overlays/dc-dc-ipv6-family-matrix.yaml:63-82` documents live upstream IPv6
+   breakage on that path (LP #1911788, #1913409). Recommendation: dual-stack octavia's
+   API endpoint like its ten peers, keep `lb-mgmt` v4 as a logged D-101 exception, on
+   the ruling's own standard -- a path with open upstream bugs is not where IPv6-only
+   "makes sense". This is an exception to an ADOPTED decision and is the operator's.
+3. Does the reserved-range registry become a first-class NetBox object, or continue to
+   be derived (plane rows from prefixes; `capi-mgmt-subnet` and metadata live-resolved
+   per D-074/D-035)? Deriving is recommended; D-074's stated gain is that NetBox's
+   uniqueness duty shrinks to the routed space. Operator has asked for more information
+   before ruling.
+4. Values-file format and location; and whether generated artifacts are COMMITTED
+   (reviewable diffs, recommended) or generated at deploy time (unreviewable).
+5. Automation runner, event delivery, and status-back (CORRECTED 2026-07-25 -- the
+   earlier "GitBucket has no runner" gap framing is VOID). **Jenkins IS the runner** --
+   operator-side and already running (v1 K8s + app deploys); nothing is stood up and no
+   git-host / Actions-style runner is required. Carry-forward: this is the revisit trigger
+   for the deferred "Jenkins CI poll job" at `docs/handoff-20260703-open-items.md:159`. The
+   real requirements are TWO, NEITHER yet verified against the running GitBucket instance
+   (do NOT promote to a SpryGit must-have until checked): (a) **reliable event emission** --
+   webhook delivery with retry, a delivery log, and manual replay (a silently dropped
+   webhook renders nothing and nobody notices -- worse than no automation); (b) a
+   **status-back API** -- Jenkins writes the `provider-bundle-check` and `repo-lint`
+   verdicts onto the merge request as commit status/checks, so the RENDERED-DIFF approval
+   gate (the operating model's gate) can actually see the validator verdict -- this is the
+   requirement that protects the gate. PLACEMENT is OPEN (operator ruling required): the
+   Jenkins job on `voffice1` for VR1 (D-128 already routes Plane 2 -- MAAS/NetBox/inner
+   tofu -- there, and the render reads Office1-side NetBox + git), with per-DC utility-node
+   agents as the Roosevelt shape once D-132 ratifies -- BUT D-132 is PROPOSED and per-DC
+   utility nodes are NOT built in VR1 (D-134's .4-.49 band is reserved for FUTURE nodes;
+   D-135's mirror at .4 is a RACK-HOST service address, not a node); and whether an Office1
+   job emitting BOTH DCs' overlays brushes D-105's cross-DC roll-up prohibition. The HTTPS
+   credential is a security-ledger row, not part of this decision.
+
+**Related:** D-020 (dual provider+metal VIPs -- NOT D-036, mis-cited as such in SEVEN
+live sites; see DOCFIX-201 in this session's changelog), D-100/D-101 (addressing,
+families, mesh), D-111 (per-DC v6 subcarve, ADOPTED), D-052/D-053 (bindings, six-plane
+split), D-104 + 2026-07-24 amendment (controller VM), D-107 (per-DC airgap mirror),
+D-108 (cross-DC), D-119 (region-qualified tags), D-121 (Option C + R-3), D-016/D-074
+(tenant CIDRs), D-035 (capi-mgmt reserved), D-067 (barbican-vault on metal-internal),
+D-110 (repo has moved; never hardcode its path), D-133 (flat per-NIC carve, no VLAN
+stack -- why VLANs are correctly absent from the apex), D-134 + its 2026-07-23
+AMENDMENT (the contiguous band table; the amendment is authoritative and the original
+table above it is superseded), D-124 (rack statics), D-131 (DNS forwarder .3), D-135
+(mirror .4), D-105 (per-DC-only, cross-DC roll-up prohibition -- open Q5 placement),
+D-128 (Plane-2 operating model -- the VR1 render/Jenkins host), D-132 (per-DC MAAS
+topology, PROPOSED -- the Roosevelt per-DC-agent shape), DOCFIX-195 (apex takes all VR1
+writes; baldurkeep merge-back deferred),
+BUNDLEFIX-052. Companion audit records: `docs/audit/decision-recon-20260725.md`,
+`docs/audit/stage5-expansion-review-20260724.md`,
+`docs/audit/committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.md`.
+
+
+## D-137: ADOPTED -- credential mint-and-consolidate pipeline: make consolidation STRUCTURAL, not remembered [ARCH]
+
+**Status:** ADOPTED 2026-07-26 -- all five sub-rulings RULED individually (GA-R5), each
+committed and pushed before the next was asked; implementation UNBLOCKED. Sub-ruling
+selections, verbatim: (1) enforcement = "Blocking in preflight"; (2) derivation = "Derive
+manifests from matrix (Recommended)"; (3) remote scope = "Declared locations only
+(Recommended)"; (4) policy home = "D-137 is the authority (Recommended)"; (5) identity =
+"Fold in as a D-137 invariant (Recommended)". Full question texts and consequences are in
+the sub-ruling blocks below. Originally PROPOSED 2026-07-25 (repo HEAD `1155729`; operator asked for
+"a better best practices method for minting and saving these credentials going forward"
+and "a durable rule to make sure when accounts are created there is a consolidation
+that happens every time so credentials aren't misplaced or lost"). Supersedes nothing.
+Would make the SEC-009 standing convention a D-governed policy with a Roosevelt-transferable home.
+
+**ADOPTED 2026-07-26 -- all five sub-rulings RULED individually (GA-R5, one exchange
+each), each committed and pushed before the next was asked. Implementation is UNBLOCKED.
+The five sub-rulings and their verbatim operator selections are recorded below.**
+
+**Sub-ruling 1 (ENFORCEMENT STRENGTH) -- RULED 2026-07-25.** Question as presented:
+"D-137 ruling 1 of 5 -- enforcement strength. This decides whether the rule binds or
+merely advises, and it gates rulings 2-5." Options presented: blocking in preflight /
+blocking plus a PreToolUse guard / advisory only. Operator selection, exact:
+**"Blocking in preflight"**. CONSEQUENCE: the credential check runs inside
+`scripts/preflight.sh` as a new `Pn` and HARD-FAILS (exit 1) on any expected-but-absent,
+undeclared, or per-DC-asymmetric credential -- no deploy proceeds past a credential gap.
+NOT adopted: the PreToolUse guard (so an agent is not constrained at write time, only at
+the deploy gate) and advisory-only (explicitly the posture that failed -- the phase-3
+prose rule was advisory and never fired at either DC standup: dc0 carried 3 and dc1 1
+undeclared secret). Preflight is the correct home per its own header intent: it exists to
+collapse a fragmented gate surface into one artifact, so a creds gate operators must
+remember to run separately is the exact failure mode preflight was built to delete.
+
+**Sub-ruling 2 (DERIVATION) -- RULED 2026-07-25.** Question as presented: "D-137 ruling
+2 of 5 -- derivation. The committee's main risk finding was GA-F06: a hand-maintained
+matrix becomes a fourth surface that goes stale, fails falsely, and gets switched off.
+How do the matrix and the manifests relate?" Options presented: derive manifests from the
+matrix / cross-check only / thin overlay on manifests. Operator selection, exact:
+**"Derive manifests from matrix (Recommended)"**. CONSEQUENCE: the matrix is the SINGLE
+SOURCE. `creds-matrix` gains a `--render` mode that regenerates
+`creds-manifests/*.manifest`, and the gauntlet FAILS if the checked-in manifests differ
+from rendered output -- dual maintenance is eliminated, matching the D-136
+generate-don't-duplicate instinct. ACCEPTED COST, stated at ruling time: the manifests
+become GENERATED artifacts, so hand-edits will be clobbered and today's governance prose
+(SEC-NNN linkage, mint dates/hosts, the "off-manifest" carve-outs for the Juju client
+credential store, the deliberately-un-consolidated findings) must become MATRIX FIELDS or
+be regenerated into the rendered header -- it must not be silently dropped. That prose is
+load-bearing: `vr1-dc1.manifest:18-20` is what recorded the dc0 edge-keypair backfill
+debt, and `vr1-office1.manifest:24-27` carries the un-consolidated residue.
+
+**Sub-ruling 3 (REMOTE DISCOVERY SCOPE) -- RULED 2026-07-26** (this session crossed the
+date boundary; sub-rulings 1-2 were given and pushed 2026-07-25). Question as presented:
+"D-137 ruling 3 of 5 -- remote discovery scope. This is the half that finds
+unknown-unknowns (it's what would catch the shadow `*-creds/` stores on voffice1,
+SEC-022). The tension is tenant isolation on a commercial multi-tenant cloud." Options
+presented: declared locations only / declared plus a bounded home sweep / broad
+filesystem sweep. Operator selection, exact: **"Declared locations only (Recommended)"**.
+CONSEQUENCE: a new declared list (`creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations`, rows
+`<host-role> <path>`) bounds `--remote` absolutely -- it never walks outside the list. No
+tenant surface is touched; the D-069 custody boundary and the hard-isolation posture are
+preserved, and the check stays fast and auditable on a live region.
+
+**FAITHFUL-IMPLEMENTATION NOTE (not an override).** "Declared locations" must be
+populated with everything ALREADY KNOWN to hold credential material, or this ruling
+leaves measured defects uncovered. The list must therefore include, at minimum: per-site
+creds folders on the jumphost AND on the headend (SEC-022 -- the shadow stores), the
+region's `/root/maas-secrets/` (SEC-020), and the three directories the creation-point
+inventory found outside the SEC-009 convention (`docs/audit/creds-creation-points-20260725.md`
+FINDING 2): the Vault init directory (5 unseal shares + root token), the Octavia PKI
+directory (8 artifacts incl. two CA private keys), and the per-tenant directories. ALSO
+`overlays/octavia-pki.yaml` inside the repo clone. Accepted residual, inherent to the
+ruling: a secret minted at a location nobody ever declares stays invisible -- so ADDING a
+row to this list is part of the definition-of-done for any new mint site.
+
+**Sub-ruling 4 (POLICY HOME) -- RULED 2026-07-26.** Question as presented: "D-137 ruling
+4 of 5 -- policy home. Where does the credential-lifecycle RULE live as authority? Today
+it lives only in the security ledger, which is a register of exposures -- so no gate can
+cite it, and it has no Roosevelt-transferable home." Options presented: D-137 is the
+authority / policy stays in the ledger / split by audience. Operator selection, exact:
+**"D-137 is the authority (Recommended)"**. CONSEQUENCE: D-137 becomes the
+credential-lifecycle POLICY AUTHORITY. The SEC-009 standing-convention block in
+`docs/security-ledger.md` DEMOTES to a pointer at D-137, and the ledger returns to being
+purely a register of exposures and rotation obligations (its stated purpose, and the GA-R4
+F3 amendment's intent). Gates may then cite a D-number as authority rather than citing an
+exposure register. Satisfies the GA-R3 A1 test directly: a Roosevelt build session greps
+`docs/design-decisions.md` before touching a built surface, so the rule must live there to
+be found. IMPLEMENTATION CARE: the demotion must MOVE the convention text, not delete it
+-- SEC-009's block carries the founding history (the NetBox-token miss that motivated the
+control) and the enforcement description; that history stays in the ledger as history,
+while the RULE moves to D-137.
+
+**Sub-ruling 5 (IDENTITY FOLD-IN) -- RULED 2026-07-26.** Question as presented: "D-137
+ruling 5 of 5 -- identity fold-in. SEC-020 found that `admin` is both the human GUI login
+and the automation identity (its API key drives 19 call sites in 4 scripts). I split that
+off to avoid batching rulings, but the matrix has a `principal` column, which would make
+the conflation machine-detectable. Fold it in, or keep it separate?" Options presented:
+fold in as a D-137 invariant / keep separate as its own D / fold in with detection
+deferred. Operator selection, exact: **"Fold in as a D-137 invariant (Recommended)"**.
+CONSEQUENCE: D-137 gains the invariant **one identity serves one principal type**, and the
+matrix's `principal` column ENFORCES it -- a credential serving both `human` and `service`
+is a FAIL, not an observation. The SEC-020 conflation is therefore machine-detectable, and
+NO separate D-number is needed (the identity question that SEC-020 left "proposable but
+unassigned" is hereby absorbed here). The `operator`/`admin` split performed 2026-07-25 is
+the reference fix pattern. Note the invariant will FAIL on today's tree by design: `admin`
+serves a human GUI row and a service API row simultaneously, which is the defect, and
+`juju-vr1-dc0`/`-dc1` are superusers with unstored passwords (service-only by ruling) --
+those rows encode the intended end state, so the first run is expected to be red.
+
+**ALL FIVE SUB-RULINGS ARE NOW RULED. This entry moves from PROPOSED to ADOPTED and
+implementation is unblocked** -- see the Status line above. Design record, committee review and the measured findings
+that shaped them: plan `whimsical-wandering-spindle`, capture
+`docs/audit/creds-creation-points-20260725.md`, rows SEC-021/-022/-023.
+
+**Problem -- the existing control cannot detect the failure class it was built for.**
+SEC-009 (2026-07-15) established the `~/<site>-creds/` convention AND its enforcement
+(`creds-manifests/<site>.manifest` + `scripts/creds-audit.sh`), explicitly BECAUSE a
+VM-minted secret had been missed (the NetBox token addendum names that exact class).
+Measured evidence that it did not hold:
+
+- `scripts/site-headend-install.sh:416-455` minted FOUR secrets on the region VM on
+  2026-07-13 (`/root/maas-secrets/{db.pass,admin.pass,admin.apikey,lxd-trust.pass}`,
+  via `newpass`). The office1 manifest was seeded with 11 entries on 2026-07-15 and
+  `creds-audit vr1-office1` reported CLEAN -- while all four sat undeclared and
+  invisible. `admin.pass` surfaced only on 2026-07-25, TWELVE days later, and only
+  because a task went looking for it (SEC-020).
+- **Root mechanism: the audit is DECLARATION-based.** The manifest IS the declaration,
+  so an undeclared secret is structurally undetectable. The `<vm>:<path>` provenance
+  field exists for precisely this class but only helps once a human remembers to write
+  the row. A green CLEAN is therefore not evidence that nothing was missed.
+- `creds-audit.sh:25` takes a single mandatory `<site>` argument -- no `--all`. Auditing
+  the estate means three invocations and remembering three site names.
+- It is wired into exactly ONE place, and as PROSE:
+  `runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md:498` ("MUST report ... before declaring
+  this DC done"). It is NOT in `preflight.sh` (THE single pre-deploy gate), NOT in
+  `cloud-assert.sh`, NOT in `repo-lint`, NOT in the gauntlet. Nothing executable
+  enforces it.
+- Consequence measured at this session's open: dc0 carried THREE undeclared secrets and
+  dc1 ONE -- i.e. that standup definition-of-done line did not fire at EITHER DC
+  standup, and both racks were declared done anyway.
+- No D governs credential mint/custody generally: D-069 covers Vault unseal-key custody
+  only; D-126 covers per-env access-key ISOLATION, not lifecycle. The rule currently
+  lives in `docs/security-ledger.md`, a register of EXPOSURES -- not a decision
+  authority, so it has no Roosevelt-transferable home and no gate can cite it.
+
+**Proposal.**
+
+*1. The rule (the invariant).* Minting and consolidating are ONE operation, never two
+steps with a human in between. A credential that exists without a manifest row is a
+DEFECT, not a to-do. A secret minted on a site VM is PULLED to the jumphost by the
+jumphost-side caller in the same runbook step that mints it -- never "consolidated
+later", because later is when it is lost. Values are verified by format or behavior,
+never printed, never in argv (the SEC-018 discipline; note `maas changepassword` has no
+`--password` and `createadmin --password` violates it, so stdin is the sanctioned path
+-- proven working 2026-07-25).
+
+*2. The tooling that makes it structural.*
+- (a) `scripts/creds-mint.sh` -- the ONLY sanctioned way a credential comes into
+  existence. Modes: `--generate` (openssl, umask 077), `--pull <vm>:<path>` (VM-minted,
+  sets provenance automatically), `--stdin` (externally minted). In ONE run it writes
+  the file 0600, appends the manifest row, refuses to overwrite an existing entry, and
+  exits non-zero unless `creds-audit` is CLEAN afterward. Consolidation becomes
+  impossible to skip because it is not a separate action.
+- (b) `creds-audit.sh --all` (iterate `creds-manifests/*.manifest`; no site name to
+  remember) and `--remote` -- the DISCOVERY inversion. `--remote` walks a declared set
+  of known secret locations (new `creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations`: `<vm> <path>`),
+  enumerates what is actually THERE by metadata only, and FAILS on any file with no
+  matching `<vm>:<path>` row. This is the only proposed piece that would have caught
+  `admin.pass` on 2026-07-15; without it the audit stays blind by construction.
+- (c) Gate wiring so it cannot be forgotten: `creds-audit --all` inside
+  `scripts/preflight.sh`, plus an offline-safe harness in the gauntlet; the phase-3
+  standup line stays as belt-and-braces rather than as the only control.
+- (d) `site-headend-install.sh` amendment: on completion emit a machine-readable list of
+  the secrets it minted (paths + modes, NO values) so the caller can `creds-mint --pull`
+  each one deterministically. This script minted all four missed secrets; closing the
+  class at its source is the highest-leverage single change.
+
+*3. Roosevelt delta (the A1 test).* Roosevelt mints per-DC IPMI/BMC credentials, Vault
+material, and per-DC MAAS service credentials on real hardware where a lost credential
+can mean a lost node. A Roosevelt build session should grep THIS before creating any
+credential. That is why the rule belongs in a D and not only in an exposure register.
+
+**Open forks (operator rules; PROPOSED means present, not implement).**
+1. ENFORCEMENT STRENGTH: (a) advisory -- audit reports, human acts; (b) blocking --
+   `preflight.sh` hard-fails on an unconsolidated or undeclared secret, so no deploy
+   proceeds; (c) blocking PLUS a PreToolUse guard that refuses secret-writing command
+   shapes outside `creds-mint.sh`. Trade: (c) is the only option that constrains an
+   agent mid-session, but adds a hook that can itself misfire on legitimate shapes.
+2. `--remote` DISCOVERY SCOPE: declared-directories-only (predictable, but a secret
+   minted somewhere undeclared stays invisible) vs a broader filesystem sweep for
+   secret-shaped filenames (catches more, but is invasive on a live region and could
+   surface tenant material -- a hard-isolation concern on a commercial multi-tenant
+   cloud).
+3. POLICY HOME: this D becomes the credential-lifecycle authority and SEC-009's
+   convention block demotes to a pointer, vs the policy staying in the security ledger
+   with this D covering only the tooling.
+
+**Related, deliberately NOT folded in.** SEC-020 flagged a separate identity question --
+`admin` doubles as the human GUI login and the automation identity (its API key drives
+the `maas admin` profile across 19 call sites in 4 scripts). That is "who holds
+accounts"; this D is "how secret material is stored". Same lifecycle family, different
+decisions; folding them would batch two rulings and violate GA-R5.
+
+**IMPLEMENTATION AMENDMENT 2026-07-26 (12-column matrix schema) [OPS].** Recorded here
+because the amendment previously existed only in a session changelog and the build-spec
+file; GA-R2 rule 1 makes a changelog non-citable and rule 5 consolidates it away, so the
+only durable home for an operational choice that outlives the stage is this entry.
+The matrix schema went from 10 to 12 columns and a row was re-keyed from one credential to
+one (credential, location) PAIR. Added: `custody`
+(`consolidated` | `source-of-record` | `off-manifest-known` | `not-consolidated-ruled`) and
+`notes-ref` (an id-keyed pointer into `creds-matrix-notes.md`). Question as presented:
+"reply with a go on the schema amendment"; operator answer, exact utterance:
+"go with the 12-column amendment", 2026-07-26.
+WHY: a read-first round-trip check of the three checked-in manifests proved the 10-column
+form could not carry what sub-ruling 2 forbids dropping, and sub-ruling 3 places four
+deliberate, reasoned credential copies INSIDE `--remote`'s declared locations, where
+`creds-audit.sh`'s undeclared-file check would report every one as a defect. This
+IMPLEMENTS sub-ruling 2 ("this prose must become MATRIX FIELDS") rather than changing what
+D-137 decides; the five sub-rulings are untouched. OPS under GA-R3 (mechanism detail,
+doubt resolves DOWN); no new D-number.
+NOTE the `not-consolidated-ruled` token encodes standing SEC-020(i) operator rulings as
+machine-readable data -- that is the reason this belongs in a decision surface and not
+only in session scratch.
+
+**COMMITTEE AUDIT 2026-07-26 -- implementation defects found post-adoption.** A six-lens
+read-only review of the tier-1 + tier-2 build reproduced eight false-greens, the most
+consequential being that tier 2 keys existence on host-role ALONE and never consults
+`site-key`, so a credential present at one site satisfies the row for every site. Status,
+the full defect list, and remediation progress live in `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` (GA-R1);
+this note exists so a reader of D-137 is not left believing the adopted design shipped
+sound. The DESIGN is unchanged and was not faulted; the defects are implementation.
+
+**SUB-RULING 1 ENFORCEMENT EXECUTED 2026-07-26 (tier 1).** The adopted ruling is
+"blocking in preflight"; the open question was whether to wire it while the register is
+red by design, or defer until after per-row remediation. Question as presented: wire the
+blocking `Pn` as ruled, or defer. Operator answer, exact utterance: "wire tier 1 as the
+blocking preflight Pn". Tier 1 (STATIC, offline) now runs as `scripts/preflight.sh` P5,
+blocking, ahead of the stage-2 reminders block, and FAILS CLOSED if the checker is absent.
+Tier 1 was the half that needed no further exchange because its findings ARE the three
+ruled failure classes (expected-but-absent / undeclared / per-DC-asymmetric). Tier 2's
+`Pn` is deliberately NOT wired: it requires `--remote`, `--privileged` and a
+caller-supplied `--pending-stage`, which do not belong in an unattended gate -- that
+remains an open operator decision. Status and the live consequence live in
+`docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` (GA-R1).
+
+**CREDENTIAL-LIFECYCLE POLICY (moved here 2026-07-26 by sub-ruling 4; supersedes the
+SEC-009 convention block, which is now a pointer).** This is the standing rule; the
+security ledger is an exposure/rotation register and no longer states it.
+
+1. **Consolidation.** ALL sensitive files and environment/config files for a site live in
+   a single `~/<site>-creds/` folder on the jumphost: folder 0700, files 0600, public key
+   halves 0644. No loose credential files in `~`. Every site follows this from day one --
+   never accumulate loose `<site>*.env` and consolidate later.
+2. **At mint time, not later.** A credential is consolidated and registered AT THE MOMENT
+   IT IS MINTED. "Later" is when it is lost. This is a data-loss/continuity control as
+   much as a security one: scattered credentials disappear between sessions.
+3. **The register is the expected state.** `creds-matrix.tsv` declares what MUST exist;
+   `creds-manifests/*.manifest` are DERIVED from it (sub-ruling 2), so a manifest is no
+   longer the place to declare anything by hand.
+4. **Discovery is bounded absolutely** by `creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations`
+   (sub-ruling 3). A location that is not declared is not audited, and an unaudited
+   location is how SEC-022 happened. **Adding a location row is definition-of-done for
+   any new mint site.**
+5. **One identity serves one principal type** (sub-ruling 5), enforced by the matrix
+   `principal` column.
+6. **Enforcement is blocking, not advisory** (sub-ruling 1): tier 1 runs as
+   `scripts/preflight.sh` P5 and fails the deploy. Advisory was rejected as the posture
+   that demonstrably failed -- `creds-audit` read CLEAN while four region-VM secrets sat
+   undeclared.
+
+CARRIED FORWARD WITH CORRECTIONS, not verbatim: the moved text's specific counts
+("11 entries", "7/7") and its description of manifests as hand-declared were stale by
+2026-07-26 and are not reproduced. The rehearsal-scoped posture it recorded still holds --
+real credential hardening (rotation, revocation, non-shared tokens) remains deferred to
+post-teardown cycles per SEC-009's original rationale, while consolidation happens NOW.
diff --git a/docs/security-ledger.md b/docs/security-ledger.md
index ffa9473..697592b 100644
--- a/docs/security-ledger.md
+++ b/docs/security-ledger.md
@@ -23,19 +23,38 @@
 | SEC-013 | 2026-07-20 | **MAAS API key materialized to disk on the region.** An admin-scoped MAAS API key (`consumer:token:secret`) was placed by the operator in a 0600 file on `voffice1` so the `opentofu/vr1-dc0-maas` root could consume it via `TF_VAR_maas_api_key`. It grants FULL MAAS admin API access (machines, power, deploy, users). Two exposure surfaces beyond the file itself: (a) the OpenTofu **state file** of any root that uses the maas provider records it -- unavoidable with this provider, so that state inherits credential handling (0600, never committed); (b) a MAAS CLI profile was also created for the operator user from the same key. It was verified by FORMAT ONLY (71 bytes, 3 colon-separated parts) and never printed, echoed, or passed in argv. | 2026-07-20 step-D part 2; `opentofu/vr1-dc0-maas/main.tf` header; session changelog item 15 | operator | **OPEN -- rotation obligation (surface NARROWED 2026-07-21).** The retire-fully ruling was executed 2026-07-21: `opentofu/vr1-dc0-maas` removed from the repo, the on-disk key file (`~/vr1-dc0-creds/maas-api-key.txt` on voffice1) and the root's `terraform.tfstate` DELETED, absence verified by listing (session changelog 2026-07-21 items 13-15; NOTE the pod-object deletion cascaded to the 9 machine records -- incident capture `docs/audit/incident-20260721-pod-delete-cascade.txt`, recovered same-day). REMAINING surface: the operator's MAAS CLI profile only. Rotate the underlying API key at v1 close, or immediately if `voffice1` is rebuilt/shared. Custody detail off-repo per D-069. |
 | SEC-014 | 2026-07-21 | **Rack cluster secret exposed to session context.** During the commissioning diagnosis, a read of `/var/snap/maas/<rev>/agent.yaml` on the DC0 rack (hunting the agent resolver's config surface) returned the rack's MAAS cluster `secret` into the Claude session context, the operator terminal scrollback, and the as-executed log (`~/as-executed/2026-07-21-ops-commissioning-diag.log`, 0600, jumphost-only). The secret authenticates rack<->region enrollment. The read was not anticipated to contain a credential (config file, not a key file); disclosed same-session. | 2026-07-21 session changelog item 6; docs/audit/commissioning-diag-20260721.txt | operator | **OPEN -- rotation obligation.** Rotate the MAAS shared secret (= rack re-enrollment for `7chphy`) at a convenient maintenance point, or immediately if session artifacts leave the jumphost. Process fix queued: add `agent.yaml` to the guard hook's never-read list alongside key/cred globs. |
 | SEC-011 | 2026-07-16 | **Node least-connectivity gap (not an L2 breach).** Under D-121 Option C role separation, all nodes get a uniform 6-plane NIC set, so a ceph-osd STORAGE node has a leg on provider-public (external/FIP) + data-tenant (tenant geneve) -- planes it never binds per D-052. Planes stay isolated L2 (no crosstalk). | 2026-07-16 plane-segregation review; `opentofu/main.tf` `local.vr1_dc0_node_nics` | operator | **CLOSED 2026-07-16 (operator ruling -- keep uniform 6-NIC).** Review R3-F10: A2's cross-examination refuted the attack-surface concern -- in the isolated-L2 sim the unbound vNICs have no reachability out, and pruning would INCREASE Roosevelt-delta (baremetal trunks all VLANs to every node on bonded NICs, so all planes are present regardless of L3 binding). Uniform 6-NIC is the more Roosevelt-faithful model. Accepted non-issue; no code change. |
-| SEC-015 | 2026-07-23 | **dc1 edge SSH private key staged transiently on the DC1 rack.** The `vr1-dc1-edge_ed25519` private key (root-granting on `vr1-dc1-opnsense`) was scp'd to `vvr1-dc1:~/vr1-dc1-edge_ed25519` (0600) so `opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh` -- which SSHes the edge directly, no ProxyJump -- could mint the API key there (dc0 method). It existed on the rack only for the mint + v4-addressing phase and was `shred -u`'d immediately after (absence verified by `ls`). The permanent copy stays on vcloud `~/vr1-dc1-creds/` (SEC-007 pattern: edge SSH is the only management path -- a rotation obligation, not a delete-me). | 2026-07-23 session changelog item 6; docs/changelog-20260723-g12-dc1-edge.md | operator | **OPEN -- rotation obligation (transient exposure already remediated).** The on-disk rack copy is gone; the standing surface is the vcloud key + the minted API key/secret (`~/vr1-dc1-creds/opnsense-api.txt`). Rotate both at v1 close, or immediately if vcloud is rebuilt/shared. Roosevelt note: metal edges reached differently may avoid the rack-staging step entirely (a ProxyCommand-from-vcloud mint keeps the key off the rack -- deferred, not adopted this build to stay on the dc0-proven path). |
+| SEC-015 | 2026-07-23 | **dc1 edge SSH private key staged transiently on the DC1 rack.** The `vr1-dc1-edge_ed25519` private key (root-granting on `vr1-dc1-opnsense`) was scp'd to `vvr1-dc1:~/vr1-dc1-edge_ed25519` (0600) so `opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh` -- which SSHes the edge directly, no ProxyJump -- could mint the API key there (dc0 method). It existed on the rack only for the mint + v4-addressing phase and was `shred -u`'d immediately after (absence verified by `ls`). The permanent copy stays on vcloud `~/vr1-dc1-creds/` (SEC-007 pattern: edge SSH is the only management path -- a rotation obligation, not a delete-me). | 2026-07-23 session changelog item 6; docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260723-g12-dc1-edge.md | operator | **OPEN -- rotation obligation (transient exposure already remediated).** The on-disk rack copy is gone; the standing surface is the vcloud key + the minted API key/secret (`~/vr1-dc1-creds/opnsense-api.txt`). Rotate both at v1 close, or immediately if vcloud is rebuilt/shared. Roosevelt note: metal edges reached differently may avoid the rack-staging step entirely (a ProxyCommand-from-vcloud mint keeps the key off the rack -- deferred, not adopted this build to stay on the dc0-proven path). |
 
-| SEC-016 | 2026-07-23 | **Dedicated dc1 MAAS->libvirt power key (per-DC isolation -- operator-ruled).** dc1 commissioning needs `power_type=virsh`, which has the REGION's MAAS snap SSH to the dc1 rack's libvirt to power-cycle nodes. RULING (GA-R5) -- question presented: "How should the region drive the dc1 rack's libvirt for node power control (power_type=virsh)?" options (A) reuse the SEC-012 key on dc1, (B) mint a dedicated dc1 power key. Operator answer, exact utterance (option selected): **"Mint a dedicated dc1 power key"** -- a SEPARATE per-DC MAAS->libvirt keypair, NOT cross-DC reuse of SEC-012's key. Mechanism: private half in the region MAAS snap (`/var/snap/maas/current/root/.ssh/` + per-host `ssh config` Host 172.31.0.6 -> that IdentityFile, so 172.31.0.2/dc0 keeps SEC-012 and 172.31.0.6/dc1 uses this one); public half authorizes jessea123 (libvirt group) on the dc1 rack. The maas-node-power SCRIPT's own mapping virsh (jessea123 on voffice1) uses the dc1 SERVICE key via voffice1 `ssh config` -- the dc0 split exactly (script=svc key, MAAS=dedicated key). | 2026-07-23 session changelog; docs/changelog-20260723-g12-dc1-edge.md; dc0 precedent SEC-012 | operator | **OPEN -- rotation obligation.** (1) ROTATE at v1 close or if the region/dc1 rack is rebuilt/shared. (2) Same libvirt-group SCOPE hardening candidate as SEC-012 (power-only polkit grant). (3) FRAGILITY: the snap-side key + ssh config live under per-revision `/var/snap/maas/current/` and may not survive a snap refresh -- re-assert after any refresh (queued to DC standup DoD). Roosevelt-relevance: establishes PER-DC power-credential isolation (bare metal: per-DC IPMI/BMC creds, never a shared cross-DC power credential) -- whether that becomes a standing D-principle is a follow-up, not blocking. |
+| SEC-016 | 2026-07-23 | **Dedicated dc1 MAAS->libvirt power key (per-DC isolation -- operator-ruled).** dc1 commissioning needs `power_type=virsh`, which has the REGION's MAAS snap SSH to the dc1 rack's libvirt to power-cycle nodes. RULING (GA-R5) -- question presented: "How should the region drive the dc1 rack's libvirt for node power control (power_type=virsh)?" options (A) reuse the SEC-012 key on dc1, (B) mint a dedicated dc1 power key. Operator answer, exact utterance (option selected): **"Mint a dedicated dc1 power key"** -- a SEPARATE per-DC MAAS->libvirt keypair, NOT cross-DC reuse of SEC-012's key. Mechanism: private half in the region MAAS snap (`/var/snap/maas/current/root/.ssh/` + per-host `ssh config` Host 172.31.0.6 -> that IdentityFile, so 172.31.0.2/dc0 keeps SEC-012 and 172.31.0.6/dc1 uses this one); public half authorizes jessea123 (libvirt group) on the dc1 rack. The maas-node-power SCRIPT's own mapping virsh (jessea123 on voffice1) uses the dc1 SERVICE key via voffice1 `ssh config` -- the dc0 split exactly (script=svc key, MAAS=dedicated key). | 2026-07-23 session changelog; docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260723-g12-dc1-edge.md; dc0 precedent SEC-012 | operator | **OPEN -- rotation obligation.** (1) ROTATE at v1 close or if the region/dc1 rack is rebuilt/shared. (2) Same libvirt-group SCOPE hardening candidate as SEC-012 (power-only polkit grant). (3) FRAGILITY: the snap-side key + ssh config live under per-revision `/var/snap/maas/current/` and may not survive a snap refresh -- re-assert after any refresh (queued to DC standup DoD). Roosevelt-relevance: establishes PER-DC power-credential isolation (bare metal: per-DC IPMI/BMC creds, never a shared cross-DC power credential) -- whether that becomes a standing D-principle is a follow-up, not blocking. |
 
-**STANDING CONVENTION (SEC-009, 2026-07-15): per-site credential/env consolidation.** ALL sensitive
-files AND environment/config files for a site live in a single `~/<site>-creds/` folder on vcloud,
-mode 0700, files 0600 (public keys 0644). No loose env files in `~`. Sites: `~/vr1-office1-creds/`
-(exists); when DC deployment starts, `~/vr1-dc0-creds/` and `~/vr1-dc1-creds/` follow the SAME
-pattern from day one -- do not accumulate loose `vr1-dc0*.env` in `~` and consolidate later. This is
-a DATA-LOSS / continuity control as much as a security one: scattered creds get lost between
-sessions and after compaction. Rationale is looser-security-but-strict-hygiene: this is a closed
-in-house test, so real credential hardening (rotation, revocation, non-shared tokens) is deferred to
-post-teardown redeploy cycles (test2/3/4+), but consolidation happens NOW so nothing is lost.
+| SEC-017 | 2026-07-24 | **Third-party Claude Code plugin `caveman@caveman` (JuliusBrussee/caveman) installed at USER scope on vcloud -- a standing per-session/per-prompt third-party code-execution surface on a credential-bearing jumphost.** SessionStart + UserPromptSubmit hooks run `node` on every session start and every prompt while `enabledPlugins` is true, INDEPENDENT of the `CAVEMAN_DEFAULT_MODE` guard (the env var gates terse-output ARMING, NOT hook EXECUTION). Inspected benign at SHA `0d95a81` by a 4-seat council audit + operator self-remeasure 2026-07-24: no network egress, no shell, one gated subprocess (`/caveman-stats` only), symlink-hardened flag I/O, zero PATH contribution/shadowing. This verdict is POINT-IN-TIME: `plugin.json` carries no `version` field (every git commit is a new "version"), the marketplace source tracks the default branch with no tag/SHA ref -> the code is NOT declaratively pinnable; third-party-marketplace auto-update is OFF by default (Claude Code 2.1.218) but flippable via the `/plugin` UI or managed settings. Baseline: git clone HEAD `0d95a81d35a9f2d123a5e9430d1cfc43d55f1bb0` (tree clean), executing cache copy == clone (only a `.in_use` runtime marker differs); 6 audited files' full sha256 recorded in the 2026-07-24 changelog. | docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260723-caveman-optin-guard.md (commit 338c919); docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260724-caveman-disable.md; this session's council audit | operator | **OPEN -- supply-chain re-verify obligation (NOT a credential rotation).** DISABLED on the live host 2026-07-24: `enabledPlugins."caveman@caveman"=false` at BOTH user (`~/.claude/settings.json`) and committed repo (`.claude/settings.json`, higher precedence) scope, `CAVEMAN_DEFAULT_MODE=off` retained -- this STOPS the per-turn hook execution from the next session start. Marketplace entry RETAINED so a deliberate re-enable for hardened-workflow deployment TESTING stays possible. STANDING DUTY: on ANY re-enable OR plugin update, RE-VERIFY the hooks against the baseline (confirm the clone is at `0d95a81`; re-hash + `diff` the cache copy vs the marketplace clone) BEFORE trusting -- the benign verdict does not survive a version bump. Keep-available-vs-uninstall decision DEFERRED (NOT yet ruled). Provenance for the disable: operator accepted the council-review recommendations this session (exact utterance: "I'll accept your recommendations"). Register note: OPS adoption, no D-number (GA-R3 -- no Roosevelt-delta; precedent D-129); this row is the durable home the ledger mandate requires ("row at discovery, never only a note"). Count note: this row takes open SEC rows 12 -> 13; CURRENT-STATE G14 reconciles the count at Stage 4 close per its existing deferral pattern. |
+
+| SEC-018 | 2026-07-24 | **Dedicated dc0 MAAS admin API key (Juju -> MAAS cloud credential).** Created so the vr1-dc0 Juju controller can authenticate to the Office1 MAAS region (bootstrap + provision dc0 nodes). Per-DC credential isolation (SEC-012/-016 pattern; NEVER a cross-DC key): dedicated MAAS superuser `juju-vr1-dc0`, its API key staged at `~/vr1-dc0-creds/maas-api-key.txt` on vcloud (SEC-009, 0600), generated FROM the jumphost so it never persisted on the region, verified by FORMAT ONLY (parts=3, 70 chars), never printed/echoed/in argv. The user's password is random + UNSTORED (Juju auths via the key). GRANT: admin-scoped MAAS API (full machine/power/deploy). | 2026-07-24 driven creation (as-executed `2026-07-24-dc-maas-creds`); phase-4 Step 2.0; docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260724-caveman-disable.md item 7 | operator | **OPEN -- rotation obligation.** Rotate at v1 close, or immediately if it leaks or the region/jumphost is rebuilt/shared. Note it also lands in whatever Juju add-credential store + the maas-provider state of any root that consumes it (same 0600 handling). **2026-07-24: a runtime copy now lives in Juju's client credential store on voffice1 (`~/.local/share/juju/credentials.yaml`, cloud `vr1-maas`, credential `vr1-dc0-cred`) -- the canonical file stays on vcloud; this is the operator-noted consequence of running the Juju client on the headend (voffice1) per D-128.** Roosevelt: per-DC cloud credential. Custody off-repo per D-069. |
+
+| SEC-019 | 2026-07-24 | **Dedicated dc1 MAAS admin API key (Juju -> MAAS cloud credential).** Same as SEC-018 for the vr1-dc1 Juju controller: dedicated MAAS superuser `juju-vr1-dc1`, key staged at `~/vr1-dc1-creds/maas-api-key.txt` on vcloud (0600), generated from the jumphost, format-verified (parts=3, 70 chars), never printed; random unstored password. GRANT: admin-scoped MAAS API. | 2026-07-24 driven creation (as-executed `2026-07-24-dc-maas-creds`); phase-4 Step 2.0; docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260724-caveman-disable.md item 7 | operator | **OPEN -- rotation obligation** (same disposition as SEC-018). **2026-07-24: runtime copy now in Juju's client credential store on voffice1 (`vr1-maas` / `vr1-dc1-cred`); canonical file stays on vcloud.** Roosevelt: per-DC cloud credential. Custody off-repo per D-069. |
+
+| SEC-020 | 2026-07-25 | **MAAS region superuser passwords: an un-consolidated VM-minted secret, plus a new human GUI identity -- and the human/service identity conflation underneath both.** (a) The `admin` superuser's password was minted ON the region VM by `scripts/site-headend-install.sh:452` (`newpass` -> 28 chars alphanumeric, no trailing newline) and sat root-only at `voffice1:/root/maas-secrets/admin.pass` since 2026-07-13, never consolidated to `~/vr1-office1-creds/` -- the SAME SEC-009 miss class the NetBox token established (a site-VM-minted secret with no forcing function to reach the folder). It was NOT lost and NOT unset: MEASURED working this session (login POST 204 with the stored value vs 400 with a wrong-password control; Django `has_usable_password=True`). The prior claim that MAAS web-GUI login "does NOT exist / was never minted" (session-ledger 2026-07-25 close) is FALSIFIED and corrected in the same commit. (b) ROOT CAUSE of the miss: `admin` is simultaneously the human GUI login AND the automation identity -- the installer mints its API key (`:453`) and logs the CLI in as profile `admin` (`:455`), and 19 `maas admin ...` call sites across 4 scripts (`site-headend-install.sh` 10, `phase-04-network-verify.sh` 5, `phase-04-network-create.sh` 3, `phase-00-teardown-release.sh` 1) hardcode that profile. Automation only ever needed the KEY, so nobody ever needed the PASSWORD, so nothing forced it into the folder. (c) NEW standing credential: superuser `operator` (email `jesse.austin@neumatrix.com`) minted 2026-07-25 for HUMAN GUI login, 32-char base64 generated on vcloud, set via **stdin -- never argv** (SEC-018 discipline; note `maas changepassword` has no `--password` and `createadmin --password` would expose it in argv, the shape `site-headend-install.sh:452` uses). Both passwords now at `~/vr1-office1-creds/{maas-admin-password,maas-operator-password}` 0600, declared in `creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest`, `creds-audit vr1-office1` CLEAN. | this session (operator-ruled scope: "New account + consolidate only" -- no existing password rotated); measured captures in `docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260725-maas-admin-recovery.md`; `scripts/site-headend-install.sh:452-455` | operator | **OPEN -- rotation obligation on TWO credentials** (`admin` + `operator` region superusers; rotate at v1 close, or immediately if vcloud/the region is rebuilt or shared). `admin`'s password was deliberately NOT rotated this session (operator-ruled) -- so `voffice1:/root/maas-secrets/admin.pass` REMAINS source-of-record and the vcloud file is a byte-identical (sha256-verified) working copy; **any future `admin` rotation MUST update both copies in one operation or the VM copy becomes a stale trap.** ALSO OPEN, un-actioned by ruling (hard rule 1, findings are logged not executed): (i) `voffice1:/root/maas-secrets/{admin.apikey,db.pass,lxd-trust.pass}` are still un-consolidated -- `admin.apikey` is deliberately NOT copied (trivially regenerable via `maas apikey --username=admin`, and a second copy is pure added surface), `db.pass`/`lxd-trust.pass` are region infrastructure and out of this task's scope; (ii) the DURABLE fix for the miss class is a `site-headend-install.sh` amendment to consolidate at mint time (queued, unruled); (iii) the human/service conflation in (b) is proposable as the next-free D-number, tagged [ARCH], a Roosevelt-delta (per-identity MAAS separation / audit attribution on a multi-tenant cloud) -- NOT assigned, GA-R3 doubt-resolves-DOWN, operator's call. Count note: this row takes open SEC rows 15 -> 16; CURRENT-STATE G14 (which still reads 12) reconciles at Stage 4 close per its existing deferral. Custody off-repo per D-069. |
+
+| SEC-021 | 2026-07-25 | **dc0 credential custody defects -- a consolidated credential is ABSENT from its recorded location, and the per-DC power key diverges in name, host and custody.** (a) `docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260719-dc0-deploy-stepB.md:263` records the dc0 edge REST API credential written to `~/vr1-dc0-creds/opnsense-api.txt` (0600, secret never printed). A `find` over vcloud `$HOME` returns `opnsense-api.txt` for `vr1-office1` (2026-07-13) and `vr1-dc1` (2026-07-23) ONLY -- **there is no dc0 copy**. It was never added to dc0's manifest, so `creds-audit vr1-dc0` reports CLEAN. A changelog asserting consolidation is not evidence the consolidation survived. SEVERITY: this is a custody/record defect plus an API-access gap, NOT a management lockout -- `vr1-dc0-edge_ed25519{,.pub}` IS present, and D-112(c) makes key-only SSH the primary edge management path. (b) The dc0 MAAS->libvirt power key (SEC-012) is `maas-virsh_ed25519` on **voffice1**, while dc1's equivalent (SEC-016) is `vr1-dc1-maas-power_ed25519{,.pub}` on **vcloud** and manifest-declared: same purpose, different filename, different host, and dc0 carries no `.pub`. Per-DC rows that should be symmetric are not, and nothing compares them. | measured read-only this session (folder listings both hosts, `find` over vcloud `$HOME`, both manifests); D-137 research; plan `whimsical-wandering-spindle` findings F1+F3 | operator | **OPEN.** (a) needs a decision between RE-MINT (D-113(a2) vendor model, the dc1-proven path) and locating an off-jumphost copy; until then dc0 has no API management path from vcloud. (b) needs a naming/custody reconciliation to the dc1 shape, and dc0's key should gain a jumphost copy + manifest row -- note SEC-016's standing fragility applies harder to dc0: the snap-side key lives under per-revision `/var/snap/maas/current/` and may not survive a snap refresh, and dc0 currently has NO jumphost copy to re-assert from. NOT actioned this session (hard rule 1; findings are logged, never executed mid-task). Custody off-repo per D-069. |
+
+| SEC-022 | 2026-07-25 | **Two UNAUDITED shadow `*-creds/` credential stores exist on voffice1 -- an entire parallel store outside every control.** `ssh voffice1 'ls -d ~/*-creds/'` returns `~/vr1-dc0-creds/` AND `~/vr1-dc1-creds/`, holding real key material (dc0: `maas-virsh_ed25519` 464 bytes 2026-07-20, `vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519{,.pub}`). SEC-009's convention says ALL site secrets live in `~/<site>-creds/` on the JUMPHOST; nothing anticipated a second store on the headend. `scripts/creds-audit.sh:29-31` derives `CREDS="$CREDS_ROOT/${SITE}-creds"` with `CREDS_ROOT` defaulting to `$HOME` **on whatever host it runs on** -- i.e. vcloud only -- and the script contains no `ssh`/`scp` at all, so these stores are structurally invisible to every check that exists. This is a SCOPE gap in the control itself, not a one-off miss: the D-128 operating model puts Plane-2 execution ON voffice1, so headend-resident credentials are expected to keep appearing. | measured read-only this session; `scripts/creds-audit.sh:29-31` (no remote capability); D-137 research finding F2 | operator | **OPEN -- scope gap + rotation obligation.** Every file in those stores is a live credential with no manifest row, no mode/presence enforcement, and no rotation tracking. Remediation is coupled to the D-137 `--remote` fork (declared-directories vs broader sweep) which is UNRULED -- so no tooling is built yet. Interim: treat `voffice1:~/*-creds/` as in-scope for any rotation performed at v1 close. Custody off-repo per D-069. |
+
+| SEC-023 | 2026-07-25 | **Sprawl detection has systematic blind spots, and one exposure is already PREDICTED for Stage 5.** `scripts/creds-audit.sh:72-73` sprawl-globs exactly `*.env`, `.*.env`, `*appcred*`, `*-cred*.txt`, `*authkey*`, `*.token`. That set misses whole file classes this repo actually uses: `admin.pass`, `*.apikey`, `*.key`, `*.pem`, `*_ed25519`, and `maas-api-key.txt` (which is manifest-declared in TWO sites yet would not be caught loose). PREDICTED EXPOSURE: `scripts/phase-03-admin-openrc.sh:32` writes `RC="${RC:-$HOME/admin-openrc}"` and `:72` writes `export OS_PASSWORD='$ADMIN_PASS'` into it -- a credential-bearing file in the HOME ROOT, outside any `*-creds/` folder, whose filename matches NONE of the sprawl globs. It does not exist yet (Stage 5 has not run), so no discovery sweep can flag it today; it is recorded here in advance so the mint is not missed when Stage 5 executes. NOTE the keystone admin password is CHARM-generated but OPERATOR-materialized (`:52` extracts it via `juju run keystone/leader get-admin-password`) -- the operator-ruled "materialization test" puts it firmly in scope. | measured read-only this session; `scripts/creds-audit.sh:72-73`; `scripts/phase-03-admin-openrc.sh:32,52,72`; D-137 research finding F4 | operator | **OPEN -- latent, becomes live at Stage 5.** Two remediations, both UNRULED and NOT built: widen the sprawl globs (cheap, independent of D-137), and add an expected-state row so the openrc credential is asserted rather than discovered. Until then, whoever runs Stage 5 phase-03 must consolidate `~/admin-openrc` into the site creds folder BY HAND at mint time. Count note: SEC-021/-022/-023 take open SEC rows 16 -> 19. Custody off-repo per D-069. |
+
+| SEC-024 | 2026-07-26 | **`opentofu/terraform.tfstate.backup` carries the Office1 MAAS API key in PLAINTEXT at file mode 0664.** SEVERITY CORRECTED 2026-07-26 (measured, same day the row was opened): the original wording called it "group- and world-readable", which overstated it. The FILE BITS are 0664, but `opentofu/` is **0700** and `~` is 0750, so no other account can traverse to it and it is NOT effectively readable today. This is a DEFENCE-IN-DEPTH defect -- one `chmod` on the directory, a `cp -p` elsewhere, or an archive/extract would expose it -- not a live exposure. DOCFIX-175 records that `maas_api_key` reaches the OpenTofu state file in clear; the live `terraform.tfstate` is correctly 0600, but its automatically-written `.backup` sibling is 0664. MEASURED `stat -c '%n %a'` this session on the jumphost clone. FOUND BY the D-137 credential matrix on its first run after the committee fixes: the world-readable check had been gated to `custody=consolidated` rows (43 of 77 rows unchecked), and the tfstate siblings were not declared locations at all -- so neither the mode nor the file was visible to any control. Of the two `terraform.tfstate.pre-*` snapshots, `pre-G16-20260721` is also 0664 and `pre-G6-20260719` is 0600 -- an inconsistency consistent with an accidental umask at write time rather than a deliberate mode. Neither snapshot nor the backup is git-TRACKED (both match `.gitignore:72-73`), so SEC-004's public-repo exposure is NOT implicated. Other accounts exist on the host (`logxen` uid 1000, `libvirt-qemu`), which is why the directory mode is the only thing standing between them and the key. | measured 2026-07-26; `creds-matrix.py --tier2` E2 WORLD-READABLE; DOCFIX-175; capture `docs/audit/d137-tier2-postcommittee-20260726.txt` | operator | **OPEN -- logged, NOT actioned (hard rule 1).** Remediation is a `chmod` on the jumphost plus a decision about whether the historical snapshots should be retained at all; both are mutations and neither is in this step's scope. Rotation of the underlying key remains the SEC-018/-019 obligation. **RETENTION RULED 2026-07-27 (GA-R5) -- question as presented: delete both `pre-*` state-surgery snapshots, keep both, or keep `pre-G6` and delete `pre-G16`, noting both gates are CLOSED and deletion is irreversible with no other copy of that pre-surgery state. Operator answer, exact utterance: "Keep both".** Both snapshots are RETAINED at 0600, neither git-tracked, as the only record of state prior to the two direct tfstate edits (G6 autostart, G16 channels). This row therefore stays OPEN as a standing WATCH, not an open remediation: the mode defect is fixed, but the umask CAUSE was out of ruled scope so a future apply may rewrite 0664 -- preflight P5 is the detection. Custody off-repo per D-069. |
+
+| SEC-025 | 2026-07-27 | **NetBox web-GUI `admin` password consolidated to the jumphost -- a HUMAN GUI login that had never left the VM it was minted on.** Found by the 2026-07-27 consolidation audit, which enumerated the accounts that ACTUALLY EXIST instead of the ones the register already knew about. The password was minted on `office1-netbox` at stage 2 (`operator-terminal`, no repo mint command -- research FINDING 1 class) and sat ONLY at `/root/netbox-secrets/admin.pass` (0600, root-owned, 28 bytes). This is the THIRD instance of one miss class: the founding SEC-009 defect (`api.token`), SEC-020 (`admin.pass` for MAAS), and now this -- a VM-minted human credential with no forcing function to reach the operator's folder, so the human who needs it cannot find it and no audit reports it missing. It was structurally invisible: the matrix carried the row as `off-manifest-known`, which asserts nothing about the jumphost. REMEDIATED THE SAME DAY (this row is opened for the exposure the remediation CREATES, not for the gap it closed): a byte-identical copy now sits at `~/vr1-office1-creds/netbox-admin-password` (0600 in a 0700 dir), sha256-verified at both ends, value never printed or echoed. The VM copy REMAINS source-of-record. | 2026-07-27 consolidation audit, capture `docs/audit/creds-consolidation-audit-20260727.txt`; matrix rows `netbox-admin` (netbox=source-of-record, jumphost=verbatim-copy); `creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest` | operator | **OPEN -- rotation obligation + a stale-copy hazard.** (1) ROTATE at v1 close, or immediately if the jumphost is rebuilt or shared -- the same obligation SEC-007 and SEC-020 carry for the other consolidated human passwords. (2) STALE-COPY HAZARD: two copies now exist and nothing keeps them in step, so any future rotation MUST update BOTH or the jumphost copy becomes a trap that reads healthy -- identical to the caveat SEC-020 records for `maas-admin-password`. D-137 tier 3 (V1) now asserts byte-identity between them, so a divergence is at least DETECTABLE, which it was not before. (3) Distinct identity from `netbox-secret-key` (a service secret) and from the two NetBox API tokens -- do not merge them; note SEC-006's upstream token is separately declared burned with revocation ruled-deferred. Custody off-repo per D-069. |
+
+**CREDENTIAL-LIFECYCLE POLICY LIVES IN D-137 -- this register does not carry the rule.**
+DEMOTED 2026-07-26 per D-137 sub-ruling 4 ("D-137 is the authority"): the standing
+consolidation convention that used to be stated here has MOVED to
+`docs/design-decisions.md` D-137, which is now the credential-lifecycle policy authority.
+This ledger returns to being purely an EXPOSURE/ROTATION register: one row per exposure,
+with its disposition. Do not re-state policy here -- a gate may now cite a D-number
+instead of an exposure row, which was the point of the ruling.
+
+SEC-009's FOUNDING HISTORY stays below, deliberately: the NetBox-token miss is what
+established the convention, and history is exactly what this register is for.
 
 **ADDENDUM (2026-07-15): the sandbox NetBox token was MISSED by the original consolidation.** It lived
 only at `/root/netbox-secrets/api.token` on `office1-netbox`, never in `~/vr1-office1-creds/` -- the
@@ -48,16 +67,12 @@
 copy on the jumphost, mirroring how `vr1-netbox.env` holds the upstream token. See
 `docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260715-fidelity-check-scope-correctness.md`.
 
-**ENFORCEMENT (2026-07-15) -- so the miss cannot recur, esp. for DC0/DC1.** The convention was never
-ENFORCED; a VM-minted secret had no forcing function to get consolidated and no check to catch a miss.
-Now built (`docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260715-creds-audit.md`):
-- **`creds-manifests/<site>.manifest`** -- declares EXACTLY the secrets a site must hold, each with its
-  mode and PROVENANCE (`local`, or `<vm>:<path>` for VM-minted secrets -- the class that was missed).
-  `creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest` seeded (11 entries) and the live folder audits CLEAN.
-- **`scripts/creds-audit.sh <site>`** -- verifies the live `~/<site>-creds/` against the manifest
-  (presence, 0700 folder / declared file modes, non-empty), flags UNDECLARED files in the folder, and
-  scans the home root for SPRAWL (loose `*.env`/`*.token`/`*authkey*` outside any `*-creds/`). Reads NO
-  secret values -- metadata only. Harness `tests/creds-audit/` (7/7).
-- **Standing rule:** run `bash scripts/creds-audit.sh vr1-dcN` at the CLOSE of each DC standup, and
-  consolidate+manifest every secret AT MINT TIME (not "later" -- later is when it is lost). Wired into
-  the `dc-dc-phase3` runbook.
+**ENFORCEMENT -- HISTORY (2026-07-15).** The convention was never ENFORCED; a VM-minted
+secret had no forcing function to get consolidated and no check to catch a miss. The
+2026-07-15 build introduced `creds-manifests/<site>.manifest` and `scripts/creds-audit.sh`
+(`docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260715-creds-audit.md`). That machinery is now
+SUPERSEDED in its policy role by D-137: manifests are DERIVED from `creds-matrix.tsv`
+rather than hand-declared, discovery is bounded by `creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations`,
+and enforcement is a blocking preflight gate rather than a run-it-and-remember habit.
+The current rule text is in D-137; this paragraph is kept as the record of what existed
+before it.
diff --git a/docs/session-ledger.md b/docs/session-ledger.md
index 6cb278a..f1e23f4 100644
--- a/docs/session-ledger.md
+++ b/docs/session-ledger.md
@@ -30,35 +30,32 @@
 <!-- SECTION: machine-derived | OWNER: ledger-scan (regenerate; never hand-edit) -->
 ## Machine-derived (re-seed from `scripts/ledger-scan.sh`; do not hand-edit)
 
-_Re-seeded from the 2026-07-23 close scan (post-queue-pass; scanner amendment-attribution
-fix verified -- D-132 restored to the list). Re-run `bash scripts/ledger-scan.sh` to refresh._
+_Re-seeded from a 2026-07-26 scan (D-137 build session), at the GA-R4/F1 rotation.
+Re-run `bash scripts/ledger-scan.sh` to refresh._
 
-- **PROPOSED / OPEN decisions:** D-068 (Vault substrate hardening, Roosevelt), D-071 ADOPTED
-  2026-07-21 (all four points ruled -- drops off the scan), D-129 (RESOLVED as a decision 2026-07-21: all four subs ruled -- (i) COS scrapes edge per-DC,
-  (ii) os-frr to Roosevelt design, (iii) per-site Tailscale = dedicated node not edge, (iv) MAAS
-  NTP hierarchy stays; office1 live install + qga retrofit remain as G13 execution items; entry
-  drops off the scan's open list), D-131 (node-facing DNS strategy for
-  rack-only controllers -- PARTIALLY RULED: sub-1 ruled + delivered 2026-07-21, sub-2 ruled
-  2026-07-21 (metal-admin only), sub-3 resolved 2026-07-21 (no defect), sub-4 open + pinned
-  DNS architectural review;
-  now surfaced by the scan itself after the PARTIAL fix), D-132 (Roosevelt per-DC MAAS
-  topology -- PROPOSED 2026-07-21, operator-pinned to the next deployment). Status lines in
-  `docs/design-decisions.md` are the only ruling authority.
-- **OPEN security rows:** 12 open per `bash scripts/ledger-scan.sh` (re-verified at G12 close
-  2026-07-23; SEC-013 surface NARROWED 2026-07-21; SEC-015 (transient dc1 edge key on rack,
-  remediated) + SEC-016 (dedicated dc1 MAAS->libvirt power key, per-DC isolation) OPENED
-  2026-07-23, both rotation obligations). The SEC register of record
-  is `docs/security-ledger.md`; row-level dispositions live THERE only (GA-R4 amendment F3) --
-  this block carries pointer + count, never rows.
-- **Next-free numbers:** D = **133**, DOCFIX = **200**, BUNDLEFIX = 052.
+- **PROPOSED / OPEN decisions (4):** D-068 (Vault substrate hardening, Roosevelt -- sole
+  remainder is Q2 path selection at Roosevelt Vault design time), D-131 (node-facing DNS for
+  rack-only controllers [ARCH] -- sub-4 open + the pinned DNS architectural review), D-132
+  (Roosevelt per-DC MAAS topology [ARCH], operator-pinned to the next deployment), D-136
+  (NetBox-coupled per-DC render pipeline [ARCH], non-gating). D-137 is ADOPTED and correctly
+  drops off the scan. Status lines in `docs/design-decisions.md` are the only ruling authority.
+- **OPEN security rows:** **21** per `bash scripts/ledger-scan.sh` (was 20). SEC-025 opened
+  2026-07-27 -- the NetBox web-GUI `admin` password, a HUMAN login that had never left the VM
+  it was minted on, now consolidated to `~/vr1-office1-creds/`; the row covers the at-rest
+  exposure the copy CREATES, not the gap it closed. (SEC-024, 2026-07-26, was the previous
+  addition.) The SEC register of record is `docs/security-ledger.md`; row-level dispositions
+  live THERE only (GA-R4/F3) -- this block carries pointer + count, never rows.
+- **Next-free numbers:** D = **138**, DOCFIX = **205** (204 assigned 2026-07-27 -- the stale
+  "NTP from edge" Stage-4 gate bullet, superseded by D-129(iv), repaired across four surfaces),
+  BUNDLEFIX = **053**.
+- **Gates:** G17 OPENED 2026-07-27 by operator ruling (node-side artifact reachability split out
+  of Stage 4; the gate table in `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md` is the authority).
 - **Standing numbering rule:** never write an identifier-shaped token (D-/DOCFIX-/BUNDLEFIX-NNN)
-  ABOVE the real high-water mark anywhere in `docs/` or `runbooks/` prose -- historically a decoy
-  token in prose inflated the next-free counter (hardened in DOCFIX-174); the authoring discipline
-  stands regardless.
-- **`ledger-scan` D-115 false-positive: RESOLVED.** The scan now keys on the LAST `**Status:**`
-  line per `## D-NNN:` block (see `scripts/ledger-scan.sh` awk), not arbitrary body prose, so D-115
-  (ADOPTED) no longer shows as PROPOSED/OPEN. The general hygiene -- trust the Status line over body
-  text -- still holds.
+  ABOVE the real high-water mark anywhere in `docs/` or `runbooks/` prose -- historically a
+  decoy token in prose inflated the next-free counter (hardened in DOCFIX-174).
+- **`ledger-scan` D-115 false-positive: RESOLVED.** The scan keys on the LAST `**Status:**`
+  line per `## D-NNN:` block, not arbitrary body prose. The general hygiene -- trust the
+  Status line over body text -- still holds.
 
 <!-- END: machine-derived -->
 
@@ -109,155 +106,13 @@
   2026-07-21 disconnected-session transcript, not in a repo surface.
 
 
-## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-18 -- grounding audit (Phases 1-4); GA-R4 bounded summary
+## ROTATED 2026-07-26 (GA-R4 rule 3 / F1 -- oldest-first, cap restored)
 
-- Audit Phases 1-4 COMPLETE, each externally reviewed; FULL FREEZE upheld (zero pre-audit surfaces edited).
-- Phase 1: record-audit extractor + inventory (12 contradiction groups); outer plan CAPTURED 7/2/7; GA-F01..F15.
-- Phase 2: docs/CURRENT-STATE.md authored -- the single status authority; operator SIGNED (G11, section 11).
-- Phase 3: fresh-agent grounding test, 3 probes 21/21 PASS; hole H1 amended into the G9 row.
-- Phase 4: GA-R1..R7 + stage-status vocabulary (Option A + H1) ALL RATIFIED, utterances quoted (docs/audit/ga-rulings.md).
-- Phase 5 NOT opened: sweep plan DRAFTED (docs/audit/phase5-sweep-plan.md, commit 687dfa8) awaiting external review.
-- DC0 apply remains STOPPED (G9); D-130 unruled; expected plan triple UNRESOLVED (CURRENT-STATE section 5).
-- Next session: FRESH operator session, auto-memory ON (GA-R7 rule 8); read sweep plan + CURRENT-STATE.md first.
-- Status lives ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md (GA-R1); this entry is narrative + pointers, not status.
-- Full session body: docs/archive/session-20260718-grounding-audit.md (GA-R4 rules 1-2, first live compliance run).
-- GA-R4 F1 cap (<300 lines) not yet enforceable: the one-time rotation is Phase-5 Batch 4 (rule 6) -- noted, not skipped.
-- POST-CLOSE ADDENDUM (2026-07-19): sweep plan externally reviewed PASS; amendments S1-S5 applied in
-  a single commit (15ccfbd). Batch 0 was PRESENTED and HELD -- operator routed execution to the fresh
-  session. Fresh session: read docs/audit/phase5-sweep-plan.md + docs/CURRENT-STATE.md, then gate Batch 0.
-
-## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-19 -- GA Phase-5 sweep (Batches 0-6) + AUDIT EXIT (bounded, GA-R4)
-
-- All six sweep batches executed + closed in ONE session under per-batch operator gates.
-- Tooling: L10 status-coupling lint (WARN->FAIL), SEC pointer+count scan, wrap-aware counters,
-  vocab-keyed extractor + archive exclusion (operator-ruled). Gauntlet grew 69 -> 70 harnesses.
-- D-130 ADOPTED (a) + implemented + v7/v8-verified; G6 state surgery (operator-ruled); expected
-  triple 6/0/6 recorded and re-verified twice (postG6 + phase6-exit captures).
-- Record fixes GA-F02..F05/F10..F12/F14..F16; H1 token migration; E1 gate-type tags; ARCH/OPS
-  D-tags + D-129 split (operator-ruled); R3-F register fully dispositioned (S1).
-- Memory hygiene per provenance rulings (2 files removed, GA-F16 found+fixed); ledger rotated
-  1187->131; 96 changelogs + 25 docs consolidated to archive; top-level docs/ = 16.
-- Skill swept against ratified GA-R1..R7 (checklist committed). Exit runs 1-6 ALL PASS incl.
-  fresh probe trio 21/21 (7/7 on all three); operator RE-SIGNED CURRENT-STATE 2026-07-19.
-- AUDIT EXITED: G3 + G11 CLOSED, FREEZE lifted, G9 OPEN (gated logged apply, G8 first).
-- Full body: docs/archive/session-20260719-phase5-sweep.md. Status lives ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
-
-## SESSION 2026-07-19 (continued) -- DC0 deploy, step A (logged: dc0-deploy)
-
-- Same session continued past the audit close at operator direction (skill re-invoked; fresh-session
-  hygiene noted and waived by the operator's go).
-- G8 passed in-session; validate PASS; pre-apply capture == 6/0/6; saved plan applied: 6/0/6 exact.
-- vvr1-dc0 RUNNING (108 vCPU / 416 GiB / autostart off); guests untouched; convergence = no diff.
-- Next: step B (bootstrap vvr1-dc0: site-headend-install --role rack --host-nodes + SEC-010 check,
-  OPNsense base prep ON the VM) -- needs transit reachability + the dc0 key (D-126 DC rows).
-- PAUSED at the A/B boundary (2026-07-19): operator moving to a fresh session. Step B's measured
-  starting facts: vvr1-dc0 NICs = mesh-vr1-dc0-office1 + vr1-dc0-uplink (NO transit NIC yet --
-  measure how reach works before wiring ssh; D-124 tfvars local+present; dc0 key minted).
-  Fresh session: CURRENT-STATE first, then resume at runbook step B in the dc0-deploy logged window
-  (same-day log appends).
-
-## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-21 -- commissioning diagnosis + repair (logged: ops-commissioning-diag; bounded, GA-R4)
-
-- Session DISCONNECTED before its bookend; entry landed same-day by the successor session after
-  read-only re-verification (9/9 Ready, forwarder active+enabled, dhcpd both controllers).
-- G10 commissioning RESOLVED: ALL 9 DC0 nodes Ready, shapes exact to D-121 Option C.
-- Two stacked faults, both measured: (1) the 2026-07-20 in-place apply regenerated all 9 node NIC
-  MACs -- MAAS records repaired in place (operator-ruled), read-back 9/9; (2) MAAS 3.7 rack-only
-  agent resolver SERVFAILs everything on an internet-isolated rack -- dc0-node-dns dnsmasq
-  forwarder workaround (operator-ruled), live and proven (canary Ready ~3 min). LP report queued.
-- D-131 PROPOSED (rack-only node DNS, Roosevelt-relevant); SEC-014 OPENED (rack cluster secret
-  exposure); committee record closed by addendum. Phase-7 tag cleanup verified done.
-- QUEUED delivery: node-vm MAC pinning + harness; forwarder + rack-legs repo persistence;
-  platform-traps + appendix-A entries; stale-pod cleanup at stage close (with SEC-013).
-- REMAINING in G10: netem step E only (netem-link passwordless-sudo blocker).
-- Details: docs/changelog-20260721-commissioning-diag.md + docs/audit/commissioning-diag-20260721.txt.
-  Status lives ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
-
-## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-21 -- close-and-delivery session (bounded, GA-R4)
-
-- Session DISCONNECTED before its bookend (second same-day disconnect); all seven deliverable
-  commits were already pushed (8b3adb3..8a9c04c), so only this entry + the netem-install record
-  were outstanding. Landed by the successor session after read-only re-verification.
-- Delivered: predecessor (ops-commissioning-diag) close landed; node-vm MAC pinning (54 measured
-  pins) + power-ownership guard ruled and APPLIED on voffice1 (0/9/0 exact, converged zero diff);
-  D-131 sub-1 RULED + dc-rack-net.sh shipped AND installed on the rack (check 10/10, SOA probe);
-  incident docs (appendix-A x2, platform-traps 1e corollary, LP draft -- operator to file);
-  step-E netem sudo RULED (scoped NOPASSWD) + fragment shipped (gauntlet 75 ALL GREEN).
-- Post-disconnect: operator ran the netem-tc install interactively; successor VERIFIED read-only
-  (0440 root:root, byte-identical, sudo -n -l grant checks exit 0 --
-  docs/audit/netem-sudo-install-20260721.txt). Step E is now UNBLOCKED (gated run pending).
-- Details: docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260721-close-and-delivery.md. Status lives ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
-
-## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-21 -- STAGE 3 CLOSED + MERGED (third session; bounded, GA-R4)
-
-- Bookend landed at stage close while the session may continue (two same-day disconnects argued
-  for durable-early); any further work appends a POST-CLOSE ADDENDUM (07-18 precedent).
-- Step E netem DONE (targeted apply at an operator-ruled 1/1/0 STOP; placeholder live on virbr5)
-  -> G10 CLOSED. G16 opened for the office1 channels residual, then CLOSED same-day
-  (operator-ruled state surgery; outer plan back to ZERO DIFF).
-- Ruling 1 retire-fully EXECUTED: vr1-dc0-maas removed, stale pod + SEC-013 key file + tfstate
-  deleted. INCIDENT: the pod delete cascaded to the 9 machine records (association check ran
-  post-delete -- owned); recovered same-hour via re-enlist/power/commission, 9/9 Ready, shapes
-  exact, NEW MAAS hostnames. Appendix-A entry shipped (check pod machine list BEFORE delete).
-- Also: ledger-scan PARTIAL fix, DOCFIX-197, D-103/D-123 amendments, GA-R7 memory review.
-- STAGE 3 CLOSED (operator-ruled): consolidation + skill sweep + gauntlet 76 ALL GREEN; merge
-  commit 8d0d155 on main; branch retired local+remote. Next stage branches off main.
-- Open queue unchanged: D-131 sub-2..4, SEC-014 rotation, D-068/D-071/D-129, G12 (dc1), G15.
-- Details: docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260721-netem-install-verify.md (archived at the
-  successor's bookend). Status lives ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
-
-## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-21 -- queue-pass session (fourth same-day; bounded, GA-R4)
-
-- Recovered the predecessor's undelivered committee verdict from its transcript; the
-  tenant-onboarding items are PINNED to a deployment-close consideration review (operator-directed;
-  self-contained block in the retained section above).
-- Queue pass, one GA-R5 ruling per exchange, each committed+pushed: D-131 sub-2 ruled
-  (metal-admin-only) + sub-3 RESOLVED by measurement (no dhcpd option-6 defect; stale read;
-  operator-run capture); D-129 subs (i)-(iv) ALL RULED -- decision-complete, G13 execution-only;
-  D-071 ADOPTED (all four points); D-068 items 2-3 RULED; D-100 netem placeholder CONFIRMED.
-- Filed/pinned: D-132 PROPOSED (per-DC MAAS topology, operator verbatim); DNS architectural
-  review pinned to D-131 sub-4. Delivered: cloud-assert A9 vault-kv AppRole probe
-  (harness 15/15; gauntlet 76 ALL GREEN).
-- G12 [R] leg CLOSED: vr1-dc1 addressing RATIFIED (D-124 amendment; apex confirm-free at
-  authoring). Remaining [V]: vars + substrate root + build.
-- Open after this session: D-068 item 1 (draft), D-131 sub-4 (LP + pinned review), D-132
-  (pinned), G12 [V], G13 execution, 10 SEC rows, LP filing (operator).
-- Details: docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260721-tenant-review-pin.md. Status lives ONLY
-  in CURRENT-STATE.md.
-
-## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-21 -- G12 dc1-authoring session (fifth same-day; bounded, GA-R4)
-
-- Session DISCONNECTED before its bookend; entry landed by the successor session 2026-07-22
-  after read-only re-verification (tree, branch, harnesses). No cloud state was touched.
-- Delivered pre-drop (commit cbc1104 on branch dc-dc-g12-dc1-substrate -- branch UNPUSHED at
-  the drop): dc1 apex confirm-free capture (transit /30 + rack 10.12.68.2 FREE, planes already
-  consistent) + dc-rack-mgmt-import per-site --site support (117/117; live dry-run PASS).
-- INTERRUPTED mid-item-3, authored UNCOMMITTED in tree: vr1_dc1 vars + vvr1-dc1 module +
-  vr1-dc1-uplink, inner root opentofu/vr1-dc1-substrate/ (54 MACs pre-pinned 52:54:01:d1),
-  lib-net.sh dc1 arm + selection guard, dc-selector 40/40. Drop point: BEFORE the gauntlet --
-  successor run = 6/76 FAILED, six harnesses still assert the retired vr1-dc1 fail-loud arm
-  (docs/audit/gauntlet-20260722-g12-dropstate.txt). Owed: reconcile -> ALL GREEN -> delivery
-  entry -> commit+push; THEN the operator-gated apex --commit stays G12's next gated step.
-- Details: docs/changelog-20260721-g12-dc1-authoring.md (item 3 = drop-state record). Status
-  lives ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
-
-## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-22 -- G12 dc1 build session (bounded, GA-R4)
-
-- Opened from the drop-state; predecessor's owed reconcile DELIVERED (six harnesses + two sighted
-  surfaces; gauntlet 76 ALL GREEN; landed as authoring-changelog item 4). Duplicate idle Claude
-  session checked at operator request -- already exited, nothing culled.
-- G12 [V] leg executed through the D-125 gate, every mutation operator-gated, all pushed:
-  apex --commit (transit /30 + rack IP, read-back idempotent); dc1 svc key minted (audit CLEAN);
-  outer step A 5/0/0 exact; cloudinit-vm interface_macs shipped + voffice1 dc1-transit NIC 0/2/0
-  (full MAC pins, post-bounce battery ALL PASS); transit .5<->.6 live; rack ENROLLED (nmpcq4) with
-  SEC-010 both ends + 26.7 base (hash-verified dc0 copy); inner step C 28/28 from voffice1 (one
-  fix-forward: serial-staging dir), 10/10 domains RUNNING, edge at the 26.7 login prompt; D-125
-  egress gate PASS (two identical runs). Queued findings: changelog items 7/9 (four tool gaps).
-- NEXT session: edge bootstrap (D-112(c) driver rebuild -- v6 + five measured lessons at
-  changelog-20260719-dc0-deploy-stepB.md:241-260; edge keypair mint first) -> API key -> v4
-  addressing -> rack standup DoD -> commissioning 9/9 -> G12 close-out; operator-gated merge to
-  main is the hard new-session gate after that.
-- Details: docs/changelog-20260722-g12-dc1-build.md (items 1-10). Status lives ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
+The eight oldest closed-session summaries (2026-07-18 through the fifth 2026-07-21
+session) moved VERBATIM to `docs/archive/session-ledger-rotated-20260726.md`. The live
+ledger was 413 lines against the 300-line cap -- a breach the 2026-07-25 close recorded as
+OWED. Each rotated summary still points at its own archived full body; only the summaries
+moved. Sessions from 2026-07-22 onward remain live below.
 
 ## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-23 -- G12 dc1 edge->commission + CLOSE + MERGE (bounded, GA-R4)
 
@@ -278,6 +133,32 @@
   refresh fragility); D-068 item1, D-131 sub-4, D-132 pinned. Next stage branches off main.
 - Full body: docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260723-g12-dc1-edge.md. Status ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
 
+## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-23 -- Stage 4 OPEN + carve + mirrors (bounded, GA-R4)
+
+- Stage 4 OPENED (branch dc-dc-stage4-phase3-maas-deploy); discovery captured; D-133
+  (flat per-NIC carve; hw-faithful NICs next deployment) + D-134 (+amendment: contiguous
+  bands, Option B swap) ADOPTED, utterances quoted.
+- CARVE EXECUTED both DCs (logged stage4-carve): ranges .201-.254, 10 fabrics, 90 NIC
+  re-homes, subnets+spaces, 18 nodes statics + br-ex; all Ready; capture committed.
+- Deploy model RULED: Ready handoff (DOCFIX-200 -- runbook Step 4 would have broken
+  Stage 5); jammy images synced; per-DC tags applied 9+9.
+- Mirror: exception REJECTED -> D-135 ADOPTED; dc-mirror.sh shipped (19/19, gauntlet 77);
+  INSTALLED both racks; initial syncs RUNNING at last check (hours; verify
+  last-sync.status before citing). INCIDENT: dc1 edge pf never regenerated post-
+  addressing -- filter reload fixed; appendix-A + DoD + script amendment QUEUED.
+- OWNED: pipe-masked L10 lint FAIL (repaired); dc0-only egress probe wrongly assumed
+  symmetric (item 9).
+- Delivery batch LANDED before close (item 11): lib-hosts VR1 arms populated (tofu-name
+  keys, pinned MACs, D-134 octets, host_sysid_by_bootmac) + D-133 guards in the two VR0
+  flow scripts + appendix-A pf entry + DoD items 8-9 + item-4 range fix; dc-selector 48,
+  gauntlet 77 GREEN. At close: both syncs RUNNING (dc0 13G / dc1 15G pulled).
+- OPEN in-stage for the NEXT session: verify last-sync.status OK both racks (this
+  session's watcher dies with it -- check at open); mirror node-side reachability gate;
+  set-interface-v4 reload amendment (queued OPTION, unruled); local permission-rules
+  prune (`Bash(ssh *)` flag); then the stage close-out set (consolidation, skill sweep,
+  GA-R7 memory review, final gauntlet, operator-gated merge).
+- Details: docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260723-stage4-open.md. Status ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
+
 ## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-23 -- queue pass + D-068 rulings (bounded, GA-R4)
 
 - Queue fully processed. Repo: 5 script/harness fixes (prep-image bash -s; headend hints +
@@ -296,3 +177,133 @@
   detached amendments hijack the preceding decision's last-status -- D-132 dropped); FIXED
   number-keyed + regression cases (48/48), scan re-verified, machine block re-seeded.
 - Details: docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260723-queue-pass.md. Status ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
+
+## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-24 -- caveman guardrails + DC1 proxy-build start (bounded, GA-R4)
+
+- caveman plugin DISABLED (enabled:false both scopes) + SEC-017 + guardrails (repo-lint L11
+  *.original.md detector; deny compress; CLAUDE.md norm). commits up to 338c919..d0db020.
+- DC-mirror: DC0 full mirror still syncing; DC1 debmirror PAUSED ~330G (bandwidth NOT the
+  bottleneck, measured) + switched to an INTERIM apt caching proxy (D-135 AMENDED 2026-07-24):
+  scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh shipped + INSTALLED on dc1 (serves archive+UCA 200). Two per-DC
+  Stage-5 test methods (dc0 full-mirror / dc1 proxy) = gates on ONE branch, not sub-branches.
+- DC1 Stage-5 deploy STARTED: per-DC MAAS creds (SEC-018/-019); Juju 3.6.25 on voffice1
+  (headend, D-128); add-cloud vr1-maas + add-credential both DCs; VIP overlay
+  overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml; phase-4 Step 2.0 (MAAS-cred task) added. commits ..116e9b2.
+- **BLOCKED before bootstrap (committee-reviewed):** committed bundle.yaml is still VR0 4-node
+  HYPERCONVERGED; VR1 dc1 is 9 ROLE-SEPARATED (D-121 Option C). Architecture DECIDED, deploy
+  ARTIFACTS not rendered (dc-ha-scaleup.yaml partial/unrendered/dc0-named/stale/unwired; tag/
+  placement/num_units unhandled; phase-4 runbook stale). DNS confirmed GREEN for bootstrap
+  (D-131 forwarder resolves external; hang can't recur) -- but bootstrap needs edge egress OPEN
+  (juju agents/snaps unmirrored); do NOT narrow egress until after bootstrap.
+- OWNED: I fabricated a "D-193" reference in analysis (cardinal sin) -- corrected to D-121;
+  verified NOT persisted to repo. NEXT SESSION: render vr1-dc1 role-separated HA bundle +
+  wire overlays + de-stale phase-4, THEN bootstrap. Full detail: CURRENT-STATE Stage-4 bullet.
+- Status ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md. Changelog: docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260724-caveman-disable.md.
+
+## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-25 -- handoff-pack execution + recon + Chat D-136 coupling (bounded, GA-R4)
+- ~~**IMMEDIATE NEXT (do FIRST):** MAAS WEB-GUI login does NOT exist -- SEC-018/019 are API/Juju-only
+  keys; the juju-vr1-dc0/dc1 superusers have RANDOM UNSTORED passwords, so the operator is locked
+  out of the MAAS webpage (never minted; no prior task did it). Fix, operator-run on voffice1:
+  `sudo maas createadmin --username=<you> --email=<you>` (or `maas changepassword <user>`); +SEC row.~~
+  **-> FALSIFIED + RESOLVED 2026-07-25 (SEC-020).** The premise was wrong: GUI login DID exist. The
+  `admin` superuser's password was minted 2026-07-13 by `site-headend-install.sh:452` and MEASURED
+  working this session (login 204 with the stored value vs 400 wrong-password control) -- it was
+  merely root-only on voffice1 and un-consolidated (the SEC-009 miss class, not a missing account).
+  Only the two `juju-*` clause was correct. DONE under operator-ruled scope "New account +
+  consolidate only": `admin` password consolidated byte-identical to `~/vr1-office1-creds/`
+  (VM copy stays source-of-record, NOT rotated); NEW `operator` superuser minted for human GUI
+  login (stdin, never argv); dc0/dc1 manifest backfill -> `creds-audit` CLEAN all three sites.
+  The `juju-vr1-dc0/dc1` passwords remain random+unstored BY RULING -- their API keys are
+  load-bearing for the blocked Stage-5 bootstrap, and `operator` removes any need to log in as them.
+- RECORD PHASE DONE + pushed (thru 87cec53): Rulings 1/2/3 (GA-R5 verbatim), D-136 PROPOSED (NetBox
+  render pipeline, opt C, non-gating), DOCFIX-201 (D-020 not D-036, 7 sites)/-202/-203; pack-review
+  committee + Chat open-Q5 (Jenkins IS the runner) folded in. DC0 mirror COMPLETE (949G+342M). lint 0.
+- GATED EXECUTION pending (each gated): verify MAAS role tags LIVE (deploy-blocking) -> 10th
+  controller VM -> dc0 VIP extract (2 commits) -> vault-VIP repair (BLOCKER-1/2 + VIP_OCTET_MAX) ->
+  DC-aware gates -> bootstrap. KEEP _handoff-not-committed/ (item 60 vault values not yet consumed).
+- Open sub-rulings: octavia family, reserved-range registry, vault-vip-derivation file. Deferred:
+  CURRENT-STATE s4 stale-HIGH, G14 SEC 12->15, phase-4 designate. Chat skill pkg:
+  .claude/skills/openstack-cloud-ops-consolidated-20260725.md. Detail: changelog items 1-17.
+
+## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-25 -- MAAS admin-account recovery (SEC-020; bounded, GA-R4)
+- **PREMISE FALSIFIED before any mutation:** MAAS GUI login DID exist -- `admin` pw minted
+  2026-07-13 by site-headend-install.sh:452, MEASURED working (204 vs 400 wrong-pw control).
+  Defect was root-only + un-consolidated on voffice1 (SEC-009 class), NOT a missing account.
+- Scope RE-RULED by operator: "New account + consolidate only" -- no existing password rotated.
+- DONE: `operator` superuser minted (pw via stdin, never argv); `admin` pw consolidated
+  byte-identical to ~/vr1-office1-creds/ (**VM copy stays source-of-record**); dc0/dc1 manifest
+  backfill -> creds-audit CLEAN x3; README index lists both. juju-* UNTOUCHED by ruling (their
+  SEC-018/019 keys gate the blocked Stage-5 bootstrap). SEC-020 opened (open rows 15->16);
+  falsified IMMEDIATE NEXT struck; machine-derived block re-seeded.
+- OWNED: called a login probe read-only; it authenticated, writing last_login twice (benign).
+- LOGGED not executed: headend-install consolidate-at-mint; conflation proposable as next-free D
+  [ARCH]; 3 /root secrets unmoved. **GA-R4 F1: ledger 370 lines at OPEN vs 300 cap -- rotation OWED.** (DISCHARGED 2026-07-26: rotated oldest-first to 280 lines; see the ROTATED block above.)
+- Gauntlet 79 GREEN, repo-lint 0-fail, b2b0c80 pushed. Bookend EARLY (07-21 precedent); further
+  work appends a POST-CLOSE ADDENDUM. Details: docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260725-maas-admin-recovery.md.
+
+## POST-CLOSE ADDENDUM 2026-07-26 -- D-137 ADOPTED (GA-R4; 07-18/07-21 addendum precedent)
+- The 2026-07-25 close bookend landed early by design; this addendum records the work that
+  followed it rather than re-opening the entry.
+- Operator asked for a better mint/save method + "a durable rule ... so credentials aren't
+  misplaced or lost". Committee review (5 lenses) run; the operator's own insight drove the
+  design: a discovery sweep can NEVER detect a credential that was never minted -- absence
+  is invisible to discovery -- so an expected-state credential MATRIX is the missing half.
+- **D-137 ADOPTED 2026-07-26**, all five sub-rulings RULED individually (GA-R5, each pushed
+  before the next was asked): enforcement = blocking in preflight; manifests DERIVED from
+  the matrix; --remote bounded to declared locations; D-137 is the policy authority
+  (SEC-009 demotes to a pointer); identity conflation FOLDED IN as the one-identity-one-
+  principal invariant. (SUPERSEDED SAME-DAY: implementation was built, committee-audited and
+  remediated later on 2026-07-26 -- see CURRENT-STATE, which is the status authority. This
+  line is kept as the narrative record of where the session stood at the time.)
+- Research: 3 read-only agents. Capture `docs/audit/creds-creation-points-20260725.md` --
+  55 MINT sites, and **12 declared secrets have NO mint command anywhere** (`ssh-keygen`
+  = ZERO hits repo-wide), plus three credential dirs outside the SEC-009 convention.
+- **SEC-021/-022/-023 OPENED** (rows 16 -> 19): a consolidated dc0 credential ABSENT from
+  its recorded location; two UNAUDITED shadow *-creds/ stores on the headend; sprawl-glob
+  blind spots incl. a PREDICTED Stage-5 admin-openrc exposure. All logged-not-actioned.
+- NEXT as recorded at the time: build per `docs/D-137-implementation-plan.md`. THAT HAPPENED
+  in the same-day successor session (tiers 1-3 built, six-lens committee audit, remediation,
+  preflight P5 wired, SEC-009 demoted). Current status: CURRENT-STATE only.
+- Status ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md. Detail: docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260725-maas-admin-recovery.md.
+
+## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-26 -- D-137 build + committee audit + remediation (bounded, GA-R4)
+
+- D-137 was ADOPTED-not-built at open; all THREE tiers now exist plus enforcement (preflight
+  P5 blocking). 17 commits `af1b682..1696d08` pushed. Stage 4 stays OPEN; no stage closed.
+- Six-lens committee audited the build; FOUR converged on one root cause -- tier 2 keyed
+  existence on host-role alone, ignoring site-key, so one site's credential satisfied every
+  site, MASKING SEC-021's dc0 on-disk absence. 8 false greens, all reproduced and fixed.
+- Owned: ~21 inferred filenames (reported six); systemic sec-ref mis-attribution;
+  CURRENT-STATE cited a verdict file for measurements it lacked. 2 claims WITHDRAWN.
+- Five operator rulings (GA-R5, quoted on D-137): 12-column schema; tier 1 as blocking P5;
+  tier 2 local-blocking + `stages-reached` coupled by new repo-lint L12; tier 3 probe
+  boundary; SEC-024 chmod. Ruling 4 (SEC-009 -> pointer) executed.
+- SEC-024 opened then remediated (mode), severity corrected first. SEC 19 -> 20. Ledger
+  rotated twice (GA-R4 F1). Gauntlet 79 -> 81 GREEN; repo-lint 0-fail.
+- NEXT: live mission has NOT moved -- resume the DC1 Stage-5 chain per CURRENT-STATE.
+  Unbuilt/unruled advice: `creds-mint.sh` BEFORE Stage 5 (largest minting event).
+- Full body: `docs/archive/session-20260726-d137-build.md`. Status ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
+
+## SESSION CLOSE 2026-07-27 -- creds consolidation + STAGE 4 CLOSE-OUT (bounded, GA-R4)
+
+- Opened on a creds question; ended closing Stage 4. 8 commits `c13cfe4..` pushed. Merge to
+  `main` is the ONLY remaining step and is operator-gated.
+- Creds: dc0 SEC-012 power key consolidated + `.pub` derived (SEC-021(b) as written -- measured
+  first: it IS the dedicated key, and dc0 using the snap default is SEC-016's ruled design, so
+  NO re-mint); NetBox GUI admin password consolidated (**SEC-025**, rows 20->21); dc1 svc `.pub`
+  backfilled. Findings 13 -> 7. MAAS account set verified COMPLETE by enumeration.
+- V2 taught the ruled-deferral state -- reissuing SEC-006's token would have CONTRAVENED a
+  standing 2026-07-13 ruling; the register was what needed changing. `--ledger` added; V2 had
+  shipped with ZERO harness cases.
+- **Two false greens fixed, both in controls that had passed for days:** `dc-mirror.sh check`
+  asserted last-sync EXISTED (dc0 `FAIL`, dc1 4-day-stale `RUNNING` both read OK); and
+  `creds-audit` CLEAN x3 alongside 13 matrix findings. Lesson repo-carried in the skill.
+- Rulings (GA-R5, all quoted): **G17** opened (node-side reachability split out -- powered-off
+  nodes cannot be probed); SEC-024 retention "Keep both"; set-interface-v4 reload "a"; D-135
+  AMENDED (dc0 tests full mirror / dc1 tests proxy -- dc1's 330G mirror REMOVED, not paused).
+- DOCFIX-204: DoD bullet 6 was UNSATISFIABLE (D-129(iv) had ruled the opposite); 4 surfaces.
+  Carve residue: 108 fabrics -> 17, cascade-checked. dc1 nginx purged.
+- OWNED: first draft of the pf reload sat inside the reconfigure heredoc -- would have fixed
+  nothing in the very drop case that caused the bug. Caught pre-ship.
+- Gauntlet ALL GREEN (81), repo-lint 0-fail. Full body: `docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260727-creds-consolidation.md`;
+  stage record `docs/archive/stage-records/vr1-stage4-record.md`. Status ONLY in CURRENT-STATE.md.
diff --git a/docs/vr1-office1-as-built.md b/docs/vr1-office1-as-built.md
index fbd4677..0c0ab52 100644
--- a/docs/vr1-office1-as-built.md
+++ b/docs/vr1-office1-as-built.md
@@ -133,10 +133,10 @@
 | VR1 OpenTofu env | `~/vr1-office1-creds/vr1-stage1.env` (vcloud) | `TF_VAR_*` incl. `TF_VAR_maas_api_key`. Consolidated + chmod 600 2026-07-15 (was loose + 0664, SEC-009). TF_VAR pool-path names updated to D-119 (`vr1_dc0`/`vr1_dc1`). |
 | Tailscale auth key (self-hosted tailnet) | `~/vr1-office1-creds/tailscale-authkey.txt` (vcloud, `0600`) | Operator-supplied, 48 chars. Consumed by PATH, never printed. The copy on the node was SHREDDED after `tailscale up`. Rotate/revoke on the control server at v1 close. |
 
-**Credential consolidation (SEC-009, standing convention):** ALL sensitive + env/config files for a
-site live in one `~/<site>-creds/` folder (0700; files 0600; public keys 0644) -- no loose env files
-in `~`. When DC deployment starts, `~/vr1-dc0-creds/` and `~/vr1-dc1-creds/` follow the same pattern
-from day one. See `docs/security-ledger.md` SEC-009.
+**Credential consolidation -- POLICY POINTER.** The standing rule moved to
+`docs/design-decisions.md` D-137 on 2026-07-26 (sub-ruling 4); it is not restated here.
+This document records this site's as-built credential LOCATIONS (the rows above), which
+is an as-built fact, not policy.
 
 **NetBox API token format (4.6):** the wire form is `nbt_<key>.<plaintext>`. The API's `token` field
 alone is NOT usable -- present it raw and you get `403 Invalid v1 token`. See
diff --git a/logs/as-executed-index.md b/logs/as-executed-index.md
index 03f62f6..09d22f4 100644
--- a/logs/as-executed-index.md
+++ b/logs/as-executed-index.md
@@ -16,3 +16,5 @@
 | 2026-07-21 | ops-commissioning-diag | jesse.austin (Claude Code lane, per-command wrap) | G10 commissioning diagnosis: instrumented run per committee; MAC-drift fault (all 9) repaired in place (ruled); MAAS 3.7 rack-only agent resolver defect found, dc0-node-dns forwarder workaround (ruled); ALL 9 NODES READY; SEC-014 opened; D-131 proposed |
 | 2026-07-22 | dc1-deploy | jesse.austin (Claude Code lane, per-command wrap) | G12 dc1 build: apex --commit (transit /30 + rack IP, 2 objects), dc1 svc key minted, outer apply 5/0/0 exact (vvr1-dc1 + uplink), converged zero diff |
 | 2026-07-23 | ops-sec010-reassert | jesse.austin (Claude Code lane, per-command wrap) | queue-pass live window: SEC-010 nft re-assert all 3 hosts (4/2/2 converged); G13 close -- office1 qga channel 0/1/0 apply + 26.7.1 update + os-iperf; cache-residue delete; captures docs/audit/sec010-reassert-20260723.txt + g13-close-20260723.txt |
+| 2026-07-23 | stage4-carve | jesse.austin (Claude Code lane, per-command wrap) | Stage 4 carve, both DCs: dynamic ranges moved .201-.254 (D-134 amendment), 10 plane fabrics created, 90 NIC re-homes (18 nodes), 8 subnets created + 2 moved off fabric-5, 6 spaces created + 12 VLANs assigned, 18 nodes' statics + br-ex (D-133 flat); capture docs/audit/stage4-carve-verify-20260723.txt |
+| 2026-07-24 | dc-maas-creds | jesse.austin (Claude Code lane, driven) | phase-4 Step 2.0 credential task: created per-DC MAAS admin service users juju-vr1-dc0 / juju-vr1-dc1 (random unstored passwords) + staged their API keys to vcloud ~/vr1-dcN-creds/maas-api-key.txt (format-verified parts=3); SEC-018/-019 opened |
diff --git a/netbox/draft/vr1-office1-current-20260725.json b/netbox/draft/vr1-office1-current-20260725.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..486ff50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/netbox/draft/vr1-office1-current-20260725.json
@@ -0,0 +1,1762 @@
+{
+  "_note": "READ-ONLY snapshot of the office1-netbox RECORD (VR1 working apex, DOCFIX-195). IDs discarded; refs by slug/prefix.",
+  "_source": "http://10.10.1.10:8000",
+  "dcim/regions": [
+    {
+      "description": "Top-level region for US West metros. Holds Eugene (and future West Coast metros).",
+      "name": "US West",
+      "parent": null,
+      "slug": "us-west"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Region0 \u2014 Eugene, OR metro. Nested under US West. Assigned 10.16.0.0/16 IPv4.",
+      "name": "Eugene",
+      "parent": "us-west",
+      "slug": "eugene"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Regions for testing",
+      "name": "Virtual Regions",
+      "parent": null,
+      "slug": "virtual-region"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Region for testing",
+      "name": "VR0",
+      "parent": "virtual-region",
+      "slug": "vr0"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Region for testing",
+      "name": "VR1",
+      "parent": "virtual-region",
+      "slug": "vr1"
+    }
+  ],
+  "dcim/sites": [
+    {
+      "description": "Primary office \u2014 Office0 at 10.16.4.0/24",
+      "name": "Charnelton",
+      "region": "eugene",
+      "slug": "charnelton",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Future manufacturing/OT \u2014 Cloud3 at 10.16.64.0/20 (reserved)",
+      "name": "Cleveland",
+      "region": "eugene",
+      "slug": "cleveland",
+      "status": "planned"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Primary DC and current Internet edge \u2014 Cloud0 at 10.16.16.0/20",
+      "name": "Roosevelt",
+      "region": "eugene",
+      "slug": "roosevelt",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Future tertiary DC \u2014 Cloud2 at 10.16.48.0/20 (reserved)",
+      "name": "Stevenson",
+      "region": "eugene",
+      "slug": "stevenson",
+      "status": "planned"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Site for testing",
+      "name": "VR0 DC0",
+      "region": "vr0",
+      "slug": "vr0-dc0",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Site for testing",
+      "name": "VR0 DC1",
+      "region": "vr0",
+      "slug": "vr0-dc1",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Site for testing",
+      "name": "VR0 Off0",
+      "region": "vr0",
+      "slug": "vr0-off0",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Site for testing",
+      "name": "VR1 DC0",
+      "region": "vr1",
+      "slug": "vr1-dc0",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Site for testing",
+      "name": "VR1 DC1",
+      "region": "vr1",
+      "slug": "vr1-dc1",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "name": "VR1 Off1",
+      "region": "vr1",
+      "slug": "vr1-off1",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Secondary DC \u2014 Cloud1 at 10.16.32.0/20. Future Internet edge once ARIN allocation and transit contracts move.",
+      "name": "Willamette",
+      "region": "eugene",
+      "slug": "willamette",
+      "status": "active"
+    }
+  ],
+  "ipam/aggregates": [
+    {
+      "description": "RFC1918 private IPv4.",
+      "prefix": "10.0.0.0/8",
+      "rir": "rfc-1918"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "ARIN IPv4 allocation.",
+      "prefix": "23.157.124.0/24",
+      "rir": "arin"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "RFC1918 private IPv4 (OOB space).",
+      "prefix": "172.16.0.0/12",
+      "rir": "rfc-1918"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "ARIN IPv6 allocation: the HELD /36 = region-0 of the planned /32 (D-101). Update to /32 after the expand completes.",
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2::/36",
+      "rir": "arin"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Org ULA /48 (internal-only; D-101 literal).",
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2::/48",
+      "rir": "rfc-4193-ula"
+    }
+  ],
+  "ipam/ip-addresses": [
+    {
+      "address": "10.10.1.10/24",
+      "description": "office1-netbox service (D-120 static band; re-IP from .201)",
+      "dns_name": "office1-netbox",
+      "role": null,
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "10.10.1.11/24",
+      "description": "office1-tailscale subnet router (D-120 static band; re-IP from .202)",
+      "dns_name": "office1-tailscale",
+      "role": null,
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "10.12.8.2/22",
+      "description": "vr1-dc0 MAAS rack controller (vvr1-dc0) metal-admin static IP (D-124; D-120 static band)",
+      "dns_name": "vvr1-dc0",
+      "role": null,
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "10.12.68.2/22",
+      "description": "vr1-dc1 MAAS rack controller (vvr1-dc1) metal-admin static IP (D-124 amendment 2026-07-21; D-120 static band)",
+      "dns_name": "vvr1-dc1",
+      "role": null,
+      "status": "active"
+    }
+  ],
+  "ipam/ip-ranges": [
+    {
+      "description": "D-120 static site-services band (.2-.49) -- MAAS static-assign, outside the dynamic range",
+      "end_address": "10.10.1.49/24",
+      "range": "10.10.1.2/24-10.10.1.49/24",
+      "role": null,
+      "start_address": "10.10.1.2/24",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "D-120 MAAS dynamic band (.100-.200) -- enlistment/commissioning/PXE/DHCP",
+      "end_address": "10.10.1.200/24",
+      "range": "10.10.1.100/24-10.10.1.200/24",
+      "role": null,
+      "start_address": "10.10.1.100/24",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "D-120 deployed-node band (.201-.254) -- MAAS auto-assign for compute/OpenStack nodes",
+      "end_address": "10.10.1.254/24",
+      "range": "10.10.1.201/24-10.10.1.254/24",
+      "role": null,
+      "start_address": "10.10.1.201/24",
+      "status": "active"
+    }
+  ],
+  "ipam/prefixes": [
+    {
+      "description": "Local Subnet",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "0.0.0.0/8",
+      "role": "localnet",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "reserved"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Corp Private",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.0.0.0/8",
+      "role": "private",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Office (v4) -- /22 per office (D-115)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.10.0.0/16",
+      "role": "office",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 Off1 -- office /22 (D-115)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.10.0.0/22",
+      "role": "office",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-off1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 Off1 office1-local LAN -- Kea DHCP on the OPNsense edge (D-115)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.10.0.0/24",
+      "role": "office",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-off1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 Off1 LXD compose net (lxdbr0) -- MAAS DHCP (D-114/D-115)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.10.1.0/24",
+      "role": "office",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-off1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Cloud IPs",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.12.0.0/16",
+      "role": "cloud",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 provider-public (v4; D-101)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.12.4.0/22",
+      "role": "provider-public",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 metal-admin (v4; D-101)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.12.8.0/22",
+      "role": "metal-admin",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 metal-internal (v4; D-101)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.12.12.0/22",
+      "role": "metal-internal",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 data-tenant (v4; D-101)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.12.16.0/22",
+      "role": "data-tenant",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 storage (v4; D-101)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.12.32.0/22",
+      "role": "storage",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 replication (v4; D-101)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.12.36.0/22",
+      "role": "replication",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 provider-public (v4; D-101)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.12.64.0/22",
+      "role": "provider-public",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 metal-admin (v4; D-101)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.12.68.0/22",
+      "role": "metal-admin",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 metal-internal (v4; D-101)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.12.72.0/22",
+      "role": "metal-internal",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 data-tenant (v4; D-101)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.12.76.0/22",
+      "role": "data-tenant",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 storage (v4; D-101)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.12.80.0/22",
+      "role": "storage",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 replication (v4; D-101)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.12.84.0/22",
+      "role": "replication",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Current assignment to Willamette dev cloud",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.16.0.0/16",
+      "role": "dc",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "deprecated"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Current assignment to Roosevelt dev cloud",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "10.17.0.0/16",
+      "role": "dc",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "deprecated"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Public ARIN assignment to Abysius Inc",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "23.157.124.0/24",
+      "role": "public",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "CGNAT Reserved",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "100.64.0.0/10",
+      "role": "cgnat",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "reserved"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Localhost",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "127.0.0.0/8",
+      "role": "localhost",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "reserved"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Link-Local",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "169.254.0.0/16",
+      "role": "link-local",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "reserved"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Corp OOB Private",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "172.16.0.0/12",
+      "role": "private",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Edge (v4) -- simulated ISP/WAN segments; mirrors v6 2602:f3e2:fe::/48 (D-115)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "172.30.0.0/16",
+      "role": "edge",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 Off1 office1-wan -- simulated ISP uplink (D-115)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "172.30.1.0/24",
+      "role": "edge",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-off1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "vr1-dc0 simulated-ISP edge WAN (D-115)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "172.30.2.0/24",
+      "role": "edge",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "vr1-dc1 simulated-ISP edge WAN (D-115)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "172.30.3.0/24",
+      "role": "edge",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Transit (v4) -- dedicated per-DC point-to-point transit supernet (D-124, operator-pinned 2026-07-16); UNSCOPED container, each DC's link scoped to its site. Precondition for dc-rack-mgmt-import.",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "172.31.0.0/24",
+      "role": "transit",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "office1<->dc0 management transit -- region<->rack MAAS control path (D-124 Scheme A)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "172.31.0.0/30",
+      "role": "transit",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "office1<->dc1 management transit -- region<->rack MAAS control path (D-124 Scheme A)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "172.31.0.4/30",
+      "role": "transit",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Residential Private",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "192.168.0.0/16",
+      "role": "private",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "reserved"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Public Multicast",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "224.0.0.0/4",
+      "role": "multicast",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "reserved"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Public Reserved - Enterprise Private",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "240.0.0.0/4",
+      "role": "private",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Localhost",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "::1/128",
+      "role": "localhost",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "reserved"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Discard Prefix",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "100::/64",
+      "role": "discard",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "reserved"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Public ARIN assignment to Abysius Inc",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2::/36",
+      "role": "public",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Inter-Regional Infrastructure",
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+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2::/40",
+      "role": "infra",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Inter-Regional Site to Site Links",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2::/48",
+      "role": "infra",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Edge Networks",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:fe::/48",
+      "role": null,
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Private cloud tenant reservation",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:ff::/48",
+      "role": "openstack-tenant",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "reserved"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Eugene Region; Sites receive /24 allocations starting at fc01:0100::/24",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:100::/40",
+      "role": "region",
+      "scope_region": "eugene",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Eugene Regional Infrastructure",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:100::/48",
+      "role": "infra",
+      "scope_region": "eugene",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Eugene Site to Site Links",
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+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:100::/56",
+      "role": "infra",
+      "scope_region": "eugene",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Eugene Regional Offices; Offices are allocated /32 subnets",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:101::/48",
+      "role": "office",
+      "scope_region": "eugene",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
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+      "description": "Reserved for fun and profit",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:101::/56",
+      "role": "office",
+      "scope_region": "eugene",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "reserved"
+    },
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+      "description": "Charnelton",
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+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:101:100::/56",
+      "role": "office",
+      "scope_site": "charnelton",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Willamette Site",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102::/48",
+      "role": "dc",
+      "scope_site": "willamette",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Omega Cloud",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102::/56",
+      "role": "cloud",
+      "scope_site": "willamette",
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+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:10::/60",
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+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
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+      "scope_site": "willamette",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Willamette Omega Cloud \u2014 Provider API VIPs (charm-managed via hacluster; excluded from Neutron pools)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:11::/64",
+      "role": "provider",
+      "scope_site": "willamette",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
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+    },
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+      "description": "",
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+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:20::/60",
+      "role": "metal",
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+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
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+    },
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+      "description": "",
+      "is_pool": false,
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+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:20::/64",
+      "role": "metal",
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+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:30::/60",
+      "role": "data",
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+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
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+    },
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+    },
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+      "description": "",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:40::/60",
+      "role": "storage",
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+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
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+      "description": "",
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+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:40::/64",
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+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:50::/60",
+      "role": "repl",
+      "scope_site": "willamette",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:50::/64",
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+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
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+    },
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+      "description": "",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:80::/60",
+      "role": "lbaas-mgmt",
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+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
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+      "description": "",
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+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:80::/64",
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+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:e0::/60",
+      "role": "vpn",
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+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:f0::/60",
+      "role": "oob",
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+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
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+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:f0::/64",
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+      "scope_site": "willamette",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Psi Cloud",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:100::/56",
+      "role": "cloud",
+      "scope_site": "willamette",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Beta Cloud",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:1600::/56",
+      "role": "cloud",
+      "scope_site": "willamette",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Alpha Cloud",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:102:1700::/56",
+      "role": "cloud",
+      "scope_site": "willamette",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Roosevelt Site",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:103::/48",
+      "role": "dc",
+      "scope_site": "roosevelt",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Second Region",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:200::/40",
+      "role": "region",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "reserved"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Third Region",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:300::/40",
+      "role": "region",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "reserved"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Region 0 (VR0)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e00::/40",
+      "role": "region",
+      "scope_region": "vr0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Region 0 (VR0) Infrastructure",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e00::/48",
+      "role": "infra",
+      "scope_region": "vr0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 Site to Site Links",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e00::/56",
+      "role": "infra",
+      "scope_region": "vr0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC1 to DC0 Site to Site Link",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e00:1::/127",
+      "role": "infra",
+      "scope_region": "vr0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 Off0 to DC0 Site to Site Link",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e00:2::/127",
+      "role": "infra",
+      "scope_region": "vr0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Region 0 (VR0) Offices",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e01::/48",
+      "role": "office",
+      "scope_region": "vr0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Region 0 (VR0) Offices; Reserved for fun and profit",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e01::/56",
+      "role": "office",
+      "scope_region": "vr0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "reserved"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Region 0 (VR0) Office 0 (Off0)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e01:100::/56",
+      "role": "office",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-off0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 Off0 Office Subnet",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e01:100::/64",
+      "role": "office",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-off0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Region 0 (VR0) Datacenter 0 (DC0)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02::/48",
+      "role": "dc",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02::/56",
+      "role": "cloud",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud Provider Prefix",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02:10::/60",
+      "role": "provider",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud Provider Subnet",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02:10::/64",
+      "role": "provider",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud \u2014 Provider API VIPs (charm-managed via hacluster; excluded from Neutron pools)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02:11::/64",
+      "role": "provider",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud Metal Prefix",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02:20::/60",
+      "role": "metal",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud Metal Subnet",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02:20::/64",
+      "role": "metal",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud Data Prefix",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02:30::/60",
+      "role": "data",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud Data Subnet",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02:30::/64",
+      "role": "data",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud Storage Prefix",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02:40::/60",
+      "role": "storage",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud Storage Subnet",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02:40::/64",
+      "role": "storage",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud Replication Prefix",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02:50::/60",
+      "role": "repl",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud Replication Subnet",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02:50::/64",
+      "role": "repl",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud LBaaS Management Prefix",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02:80::/60",
+      "role": "lbaas-mgmt",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud LBaaS Management Subnet",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02:80::/64",
+      "role": "lbaas-mgmt",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud VPN Prefix",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02:e0::/60",
+      "role": "vpn",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud OOB Prefix",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02:f0::/60",
+      "role": "oob",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR0 DC0 Omega Cloud OOB Subnet",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e02:f0::/64",
+      "role": "oob",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Region 0 (VR0) Datacenter 1 (DC1)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:e03::/48",
+      "role": "dc",
+      "scope_site": "vr0-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Region 1 (VR1)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:f00::/40",
+      "role": "region",
+      "scope_region": "vr1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Region 1 (VR1) Infrastructure",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:f00::/48",
+      "role": "infra",
+      "scope_region": "vr1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 Site to Site Links",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:f00::/56",
+      "role": "infra",
+      "scope_region": "vr1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Region 1 (VR1) Offices",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:f01::/48",
+      "role": "office",
+      "scope_region": "vr1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Region 1 (VR1) Offices; Reserved for fun and profit",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:f01::/56",
+      "role": "office",
+      "scope_region": "vr1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.region",
+      "status": "reserved"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 Off1 (D-115) -- mirrors VR0 Off0 e01:100::/56",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:f01:100::/56",
+      "role": "office",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-off1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 Off1 office subnet -- NOT YET DEPLOYED (v6 does not egress the lab)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:f01:100::/64",
+      "role": "office",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-off1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Region 1 (VR1) Datacenter 0 (DC0)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:f02::/48",
+      "role": "dc",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 provider-public (GUA /60; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:f02:10::/60",
+      "role": "provider-public",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 provider-public (GUA /64 active; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:f02:10::/64",
+      "role": "provider-public",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 provider-public (GUA VIP /64; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:f02:11::/64",
+      "role": "provider-public",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Virtual Region 1 (VR1) Datacenter 1 (DC1)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:f03::/48",
+      "role": "dc",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 provider-public (GUA /60; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:f03:10::/60",
+      "role": "provider-public",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 provider-public (GUA /64 active; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:f03:10::/64",
+      "role": "provider-public",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 provider-public (GUA VIP /64; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "2602:f3e2:f03:11::/64",
+      "role": "provider-public",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Centrally assigned ULA (Not Active)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fc00::/8",
+      "role": "private",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "reserved"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Unique Local Addresses (ULA)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd00::/8",
+      "role": "private",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "container"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 metal-admin (ULA metal /60 (admin+internal); D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:220::/60",
+      "role": "metal-admin",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 metal-admin (ULA /64 active; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:220::/64",
+      "role": "metal-admin",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 metal-internal (ULA /64 active (in metal /60); D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:221::/64",
+      "role": "metal-internal",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 data-tenant (ULA /60; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:230::/60",
+      "role": "data-tenant",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 data-tenant (ULA /64 active; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:230::/64",
+      "role": "data-tenant",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 storage (ULA /60; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:240::/60",
+      "role": "storage",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 storage (ULA /64 active; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:240::/64",
+      "role": "storage",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 replication (ULA /60; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:250::/60",
+      "role": "replication",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC0 replication (ULA /64 active; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:250::/64",
+      "role": "replication",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc0",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 metal-admin (ULA metal /60 (admin+internal); D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:320::/60",
+      "role": "metal-admin",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 metal-admin (ULA /64 active; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:320::/64",
+      "role": "metal-admin",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 metal-internal (ULA /64 active (in metal /60); D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:321::/64",
+      "role": "metal-internal",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 data-tenant (ULA /60; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:330::/60",
+      "role": "data-tenant",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 data-tenant (ULA /64 active; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:330::/64",
+      "role": "data-tenant",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 storage (ULA /60; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:340::/60",
+      "role": "storage",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 storage (ULA /64 active; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:340::/64",
+      "role": "storage",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 replication (ULA /60; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:350::/60",
+      "role": "replication",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VR1 DC1 replication (ULA /64 active; D-101/D-111)",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fd50:840e:74e2:350::/64",
+      "role": "replication",
+      "scope_site": "vr1-dc1",
+      "scope_type": "dcim.site",
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Tailscale Addresses",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": true,
+      "prefix": "fd7a:115c:a1e0::/48",
+      "role": "vpn",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Link-Local",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "fe80::/10",
+      "role": "link-local",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "reserved"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Public Multicast",
+      "is_pool": false,
+      "mark_utilized": false,
+      "prefix": "ff00::/8",
+      "role": "multicast",
+      "scope_type": null,
+      "status": "reserved"
+    }
+  ],
+  "ipam/rirs": [
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "is_private": false,
+      "name": "ARIN",
+      "slug": "arin"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "is_private": true,
+      "name": "RFC 1918",
+      "slug": "rfc-1918"
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "is_private": true,
+      "name": "RFC 4193 ULA",
+      "slug": "rfc-4193-ula"
+    }
+  ],
+  "ipam/roles": [
+    {
+      "description": "Six-plane: provider public API VIPs + FIP/ext_net (GUA). D-052/D-101.",
+      "name": "Provider Public",
+      "slug": "provider-public",
+      "weight": 100
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Six-plane: metal admin API, dual-stack v4+ULA (2026-07-09 amendment). D-052/D-101.",
+      "name": "Metal Admin",
+      "slug": "metal-admin",
+      "weight": 110
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Six-plane: metal internal API endpoints, dual-stack v4+ULA. D-052/D-101.",
+      "name": "Metal Internal",
+      "slug": "metal-internal",
+      "weight": 120
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Six-plane: geneve overlay, ULA-only; tenant GUA delegated separately. D-052/D-101.",
+      "name": "Data Tenant",
+      "slug": "data-tenant",
+      "weight": 130
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Six-plane: Ceph cluster incl. cross-DC leg, ULA-only. D-052/D-101/D-108.",
+      "name": "Replication Plane",
+      "slug": "replication",
+      "weight": 150
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "name": "CGNAT",
+      "slug": "cgnat",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Cloud container",
+      "name": "Cloud",
+      "slug": "cloud",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Openstack data plane - shared across datacenters",
+      "name": "Data",
+      "slug": "data",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Datacenter container",
+      "name": "Datacenter",
+      "slug": "dc",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "name": "Discard",
+      "slug": "discard",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "name": "Edge",
+      "slug": "edge",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Shared infrastructure \u2014 ptp transit, device loopbacks, RR loopbacks, anycast.",
+      "name": "Infrastructure",
+      "slug": "infra",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Load-balancer management (Octavia control plane, not dataplane).",
+      "name": "LBaaS Management",
+      "slug": "lbaas-mgmt",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "name": "Link-Local",
+      "slug": "link-local",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "name": "Localhost",
+      "slug": "localhost",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "name": "Localnet",
+      "slug": "localnet",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Bare-metal server NICs + bundled infra: OpenStack control plane, in-band switch mgmt (VLAN 50), Edge-eBGP/DDoS sub-ranges (Roosevelt), RR loopback references. Sized as 2x physical server count.",
+      "name": "Metal",
+      "slug": "metal",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "name": "Multicast",
+      "slug": "multicast",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Out of band management network",
+      "name": "OOB",
+      "slug": "oob",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Office site allocation (/24 within Region0 /20 reserved block).",
+      "name": "Office",
+      "slug": "office",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "OpenStack tenant pool \u2014 shared across tenants",
+      "name": "Openstack Tenant",
+      "slug": "openstack-tenant",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Reserved addresses for private networks",
+      "name": "Private",
+      "slug": "private",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Tenant-reachable. Carries ext_net (FIPs, SNAT egress) and OpenStack public API VIPs. Within each /60: first /64 Neutron FIP pool; next /64 charm API VIPs. Neutron allocation_pools must exclude VIPs.",
+      "name": "Provider",
+      "slug": "provider",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Public addresses assigned by a RIR",
+      "name": "Public",
+      "slug": "public",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "name": "Region",
+      "slug": "region",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "RBD mirror for cross-site Ceph replication. Routed via EVPN type-5 between DCs.",
+      "name": "Replication",
+      "slug": "repl",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "Ceph-Public (L3-routed) + Ceph-Cluster (non-routed VLAN inside /23 L2).",
+      "name": "Storage",
+      "slug": "storage",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "OpenStack tenant networks (Geneve underlay touchdown). Also absorbs DMZ roles under regional scheme.",
+      "name": "Tenant",
+      "slug": "tenant",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "",
+      "name": "Transit",
+      "slug": "transit",
+      "weight": 1000
+    },
+    {
+      "description": "VPN client pools \u2014 site-independent (10.2.0.0/16 Corp Private).",
+      "name": "VPN",
+      "slug": "vpn",
+      "weight": 1000
+    }
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/netbox/office1-record-dump.py b/netbox/office1-record-dump.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e53b93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/netbox/office1-record-dump.py
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Dump the OFFICE1-NETBOX RECORD (the VR1 working IPAM apex) to a reviewable JSON
+artifact. READ-ONLY. NOTHING is ever written to NetBox.
+
+WHY A SEPARATE SCRIPT FROM netbox/prod-draft-dump.py (operator-directed 2026-07-25):
+one script per SOURCE, so each holds only its own credential/URL and the source can
+never be confused. The two NetBoxes are DIFFERENT systems with DIFFERENT roles:
+
+  - prod-draft-dump.py  -> netbox.baldurkeep.com  : the FROZEN v1 REFERENCE (4.5.8,
+        bare 40-char v1 token). Takes NO write during VR1 (DOCFIX-195); it is the
+        eventual production apex, held read-only.
+  - THIS script         -> office1-netbox 10.10.1.10:8000 : the VR1 WORKING APEX /
+        "the RECORD" (4.6.4, assembled v2 token nbt_<key>.<plaintext>). This is what
+        every VR1 consuming system (OpenTofu, MAAS, the overlays, the Juju bundle)
+        actually reads (DOCFIX-195), and what has been EDITED as the dc0/dc1 buildout
+        proceeded -- so this is the "current in-cloud NetBox" state.
+
+Use this to capture the CURRENT apex for a design/review session that has no live infra
+(e.g. Chat). It is a point-in-time snapshot; re-run to refresh.
+
+TOKEN NEVER TRAVELS: the script reads NETBOX_URL + NETBOX_TOKEN from the environment;
+source the record env first (below). It is not embedded and not printed (only the base
+URL + per-endpoint counts are printed).
+
+TRAP -- User-Agent (references/platform-traps.md): the baldurkeep upstream 403s the
+default Python UA; office1-netbox does not have that WAF, but we send an accepted UA
+regardless (harmless) so the same code path works against either 4.5/4.6 apex.
+
+Usage:
+    . ~/vr1-office1-creds/vr1-netbox-sandbox.env      # NETBOX_URL=http://10.10.1.10:8000 + v2 NETBOX_TOKEN
+    python3 netbox/office1-record-dump.py --out netbox/draft/vr1-office1-current-YYYYMMDD.json
+"""
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+UA = "curl/8.5.0"
+
+# Same IPAM object set + dependency order as prod-draft-dump.py, so the two apexes
+# produce structurally comparable dumps (a fidelity diff is then meaningful).
+ENDPOINTS = [
+    ("ipam/rirs", ["name", "slug", "is_private", "description"]),
+    ("ipam/roles", ["name", "slug", "weight", "description"]),
+    ("dcim/regions", ["name", "slug", "parent", "description"]),
+    ("dcim/sites", ["name", "slug", "status", "region", "description"]),
+    ("ipam/aggregates", ["prefix", "rir", "description"]),
+    ("ipam/prefixes", ["prefix", "status", "role", "scope_type", "scope_id",
+                       "description", "is_pool", "mark_utilized"]),
+    ("ipam/ip-ranges", ["start_address", "end_address", "status", "role", "description"]),
+    ("ipam/ip-addresses", ["address", "status", "role", "dns_name", "description"]),
+]
+
+
+def die(msg):
+    print("FAIL: %s" % msg, file=sys.stderr)
+    sys.exit(2)
+
+
+def require_env(name):
+    v = os.environ.get(name)
+    if not v:
+        die("%s is not set. Source the RECORD env first: "
+            ". ~/vr1-office1-creds/vr1-netbox-sandbox.env" % name)
+    return v
+
+
+def get_all(base, token, path):
+    """Paginate an endpoint fully. Read-only."""
+    out = []
+    url = "%s/api/%s/?limit=200" % (base, path)
+    while url:
+        req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={
+            "Authorization": "Token %s" % token,     # v2 wire form: Token nbt_<key>.<plaintext>
+            "Accept": "application/json",
+            "User-Agent": UA,
+        })
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=45) as r:
+                data = json.load(r)
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            if exc.code in (401, 403):
+                die("HTTP %d on %s -- check the RECORD env token is the ASSEMBLED v2 form "
+                    "(nbt_<key>.<plaintext>), not the API's bare token field." % (exc.code, path))
+            die("HTTP %d on %s: %s" % (exc.code, path, exc.reason))
+        out += data["results"]
+        url = data.get("next") or None
+    return out
+
+
+def slim(obj, fields):
+    """Keep only what a downstream fidelity/seed step needs; nested refs -> slug/value.
+    IDs are DISCARDED (they are apex-local and would mis-link on the way into another apex)."""
+    rec = {}
+    for f in fields:
+        v = obj.get(f)
+        rec[f] = (v.get("slug") or v.get("value")) if isinstance(v, dict) else v
+    return rec
+
+
+def rewrite_prefix_scope(rec, obj, site_id_to_slug, region_id_to_slug):
+    """Rewrite a prefix's scope_id (apex-local id) to a slug the reader can re-resolve."""
+    sid, st = obj.get("scope_id"), obj.get("scope_type")
+    if sid is not None and st == "dcim.site":
+        rec["scope_site"] = site_id_to_slug.get(sid)
+    elif sid is not None and st == "dcim.region":
+        rec["scope_region"] = region_id_to_slug.get(sid)
+    rec.pop("scope_id", None)
+    return rec
+
+
+def main():
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.split("\n\n", 1)[0])
+    ap.add_argument("--out", required=True, help="Path to write the JSON snapshot")
+    args = ap.parse_args()
+
+    base = require_env("NETBOX_URL").rstrip("/")
+    token = require_env("NETBOX_TOKEN")
+
+    print("Reading the office1-netbox RECORD from %s (READ-ONLY) ..." % base)
+    raw_sites = get_all(base, token, "dcim/sites")
+    site_id_to_slug = {s["id"]: s["slug"] for s in raw_sites}
+    raw_regions = get_all(base, token, "dcim/regions")
+    region_id_to_slug = {r["id"]: r["slug"] for r in raw_regions}
+
+    draft = {"_source": base,
+             "_note": "READ-ONLY snapshot of the office1-netbox RECORD (VR1 working apex, "
+                      "DOCFIX-195). IDs discarded; refs by slug/prefix."}
+    for path, fields in ENDPOINTS:
+        rows = raw_sites if path == "dcim/sites" else get_all(base, token, path)
+        slimmed = []
+        for o in rows:
+            rec = slim(o, fields)
+            if path == "ipam/prefixes":
+                rec = rewrite_prefix_scope(rec, o, site_id_to_slug, region_id_to_slug)
+            if path == "ipam/ip-ranges":
+                rec["range"] = "%s-%s" % (rec.get("start_address"), rec.get("end_address"))
+            slimmed.append(rec)
+        draft[path] = slimmed
+        print("  %-18s %d" % (path, len(slimmed)))
+
+    os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(args.out)), exist_ok=True)
+    with open(args.out, "w") as fh:
+        json.dump(draft, fh, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
+        fh.write("\n")
+    print("\nWrote %s. NOTHING was written to NetBox." % args.out)
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())
diff --git a/netbox/prod-draft-dump.py b/netbox/prod-draft-dump.py
index af7793a..686080d 100755
--- a/netbox/prod-draft-dump.py
+++ b/netbox/prod-draft-dump.py
@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 """
-Dump the UPSTREAM NetBox draft to a reviewable JSON artifact. READ-ONLY.
+Dump the FROZEN v1 REFERENCE NetBox (netbox.baldurkeep.com) to a reviewable JSON
+artifact. READ-ONLY. SOURCE SEPARATION (operator-directed 2026-07-25): this script
+pulls ONLY the baldurkeep v1 reference (4.5.8, bare 40-char token, no writes during
+VR1 per DOCFIX-195). To dump the CURRENT VR1 working apex / RECORD (office1-netbox,
+4.6.4, v2 token), use the SEPARATE netbox/office1-record-dump.py -- one script per
+source so a credential/URL can never be confused.
 
 This is phase 1 of the two-phase sandbox seeding loop documented in
 docs/session-ledger.md:
diff --git a/overlays/dc-ha-scaleup.yaml b/overlays/dc-ha-scaleup.yaml
index 4262fb9..18ad8c8 100644
--- a/overlays/dc-ha-scaleup.yaml
+++ b/overlays/dc-ha-scaleup.yaml
@@ -16,19 +16,14 @@
 # per-DC bundle deploy is two stages out). No live cloud reached this session.
 #
 # =====================================================================
-# ##### STAGE-4 BINDING REQUIRED -- READ BEFORE RENDER #####
-# Every `to:` target below is a {{TOKEN}} placeholder for one of the three
-# Option C control nodes (vr1-dc0-control-01..03, D-121). The REAL Juju machine
-# IDs do NOT exist yet -- they bind at Stage 4, AFTER MAAS enlists the Option C
-# node VMs. Do NOT invent concrete `lxd:N` numbers here: a wrong number
-# silently mis-places a unit and defeats the anti-affinity that is the entire
-# HA value. Render this file (substitute the three tokens with the measured,
-# enlisted control-node machine IDs) ONLY at Stage 4/5, exactly as
-# dc-dc-ipv6-family-matrix.yaml's VIP tokens are rendered. The rendered
-# bundle.yaml `machines:` block MUST define those same three IDs.
-#   {{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_01}}  -> control node 1 machine id
-#   {{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_02}}  -> control node 2 machine id
-#   {{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_03}}  -> control node 3 machine id
+# ##### RENDERED 2026-07-24 -- tokens bound to logical control ids 0/1/2 #####
+# The three {{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_0N}} tokens are RENDERED to the bundle.yaml machines
+# block's LOGICAL control ids (0,1,2 -- the 3 control nodes, D-121 Option C). These
+# ids are DC-neutral (both dc0 and dc1 use the same logical machines block; the DC
+# tag is applied per-DC via overlays/vr1-dc1-machines.yaml), so this overlay is now
+# DC-agnostic. The positional 3-entry `to:` lists give one-per-control-node
+# anti-affinity (unit0->0, unit1->1, unit2->2); provider-bundle-check.py enforces the
+# 3-distinct-machine spread on the MERGED bundle, so a token/id collision is caught.
 # =====================================================================
 #
 # PLACEMENT / ANTI-AFFINITY (D-121 balance rule). Juju bundles have NO dedicated
@@ -81,7 +76,7 @@
 #
 # NOT changed here (deliberately, per D-121): mysql-innodb-cluster / ovn-central
 # / ceph-mon (already 3 in the base bundle); ceph-osd / nova-compute (scale-out,
-# sized to node count -- Option C = ceph-osd 3, nova-compute 2, on the storage /
+# sized to node count -- Option C = ceph-osd 4 (D-121 R-3 amendment), nova-compute 2, on the storage /
 # compute nodes, NOT control-node containers); ceph-rbd-mirror stays 1 (D-108);
 # memcached / designate-bind / glance-simplestreams-sync unchanged.
 # =====================================================================
@@ -92,51 +87,51 @@
   # Each: 1 -> 3 units, one per control node (positional anti-affinity).
   keystone:
     num_units: 3
-    to: ["lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_01}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_02}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_03}}"]
+    to: ["lxd:0", "lxd:1", "lxd:2"]
 
   glance:
     num_units: 3
-    to: ["lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_01}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_02}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_03}}"]
+    to: ["lxd:0", "lxd:1", "lxd:2"]
 
   neutron-api:
     num_units: 3
-    to: ["lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_01}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_02}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_03}}"]
+    to: ["lxd:0", "lxd:1", "lxd:2"]
 
   nova-cloud-controller:
     num_units: 3
-    to: ["lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_01}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_02}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_03}}"]
+    to: ["lxd:0", "lxd:1", "lxd:2"]
 
   placement:
     num_units: 3
-    to: ["lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_01}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_02}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_03}}"]
+    to: ["lxd:0", "lxd:1", "lxd:2"]
 
   cinder:
     num_units: 3
-    to: ["lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_01}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_02}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_03}}"]
+    to: ["lxd:0", "lxd:1", "lxd:2"]
 
   openstack-dashboard:
     num_units: 3
-    to: ["lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_01}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_02}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_03}}"]
+    to: ["lxd:0", "lxd:1", "lxd:2"]
 
   octavia:
     num_units: 3
-    to: ["lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_01}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_02}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_03}}"]
+    to: ["lxd:0", "lxd:1", "lxd:2"]
 
   barbican:
     num_units: 3
-    to: ["lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_01}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_02}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_03}}"]
+    to: ["lxd:0", "lxd:1", "lxd:2"]
 
   magnum:
     num_units: 3
-    to: ["lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_01}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_02}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_03}}"]
+    to: ["lxd:0", "lxd:1", "lxd:2"]
 
   designate:
     num_units: 3
-    to: ["lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_01}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_02}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_03}}"]
+    to: ["lxd:0", "lxd:1", "lxd:2"]
 
   ceph-radosgw:
     num_units: 3
-    to: ["lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_01}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_02}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_03}}"]
+    to: ["lxd:0", "lxd:1", "lxd:2"]
 
   # ---- RabbitMQ: native quorum clustering, NO hacluster. min-cluster-size is
   #      MANDATORY at multi-unit (D-009 AMENDMENT 2026-07-02, item A above). ----
@@ -144,13 +139,13 @@
     num_units: 3
     options:
       min-cluster-size: 3
-    to: ["lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_01}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_02}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_03}}"]
+    to: ["lxd:0", "lxd:1", "lxd:2"]
 
   # ---- Vault: MySQL-backed (v-a), scale to 3, re-HA'd via vault-hacluster
   #      (defined below) + the relation re-added at the foot of this file. ----
   vault:
     num_units: 3
-    to: ["lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_01}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_02}}", "lxd:{{VR1_DC0_CONTROL_03}}"]
+    to: ["lxd:0", "lxd:1", "lxd:2"]
 
   # ---- vault-hacluster: RE-DECLARED (item C above). Removed by BUNDLEFIX-002
   #      when vault was de-HA'd; D-121 (v-a) brings it back. Shape matches the
diff --git a/overlays/vr1-dc1-machines.yaml b/overlays/vr1-dc1-machines.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ceac025
--- /dev/null
+++ b/overlays/vr1-dc1-machines.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# overlays/vr1-dc1-machines.yaml
+#
+# Retag the 9-machine block from the vr1-dc0 base to vr1-dc1 for the dc1 deploy.
+# ONE Office1 MAAS region sees BOTH DCs' nodes (D-104/D-123 single region), so the
+# machines-block constraint must carry the DC-scoping tag or dc1's model could grab a
+# dc0 node. The DC tag (openstack-vr1-dc1) selects THIS DC's nodes; the role sub-tag
+# (control/compute/storage, applied at Stage 4 per Fork-3) selects the role. The base
+# bundle.yaml is the vr1-dc0 source of truth (matches overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml);
+# this overlay + the VIP overlay are the two per-DC deltas for dc1.
+#
+# Applied (with the HA scale-up + VIP overlays):
+#   juju deploy ./bundle.yaml \
+#     --overlay overlays/vr1-dc1-machines.yaml \
+#     --overlay overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml \
+#     --overlay overlays/dc-ha-scaleup.yaml -m "${DC1_MODEL}"
+#
+# VERIFY-LIVE: confirm the machines-block override merges as expected at
+# `juju deploy --dry-run` BEFORE deploy (no offline juju merger exists to prove it
+# here). If it does not take, the fallback is inlining these dc1 tags into a rendered
+# dc1 bundle (cheap) -- see committee-20260724-track2-bundle-render.md, Fork 2.
+machines:
+  "0":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc1,control
+  "1":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc1,control
+  "2":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc1,control
+  "3":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc1,compute
+  "4":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc1,compute
+  "5":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc1,storage
+  "6":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc1,storage
+  "7":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc1,storage
+  "8":
+    constraints: arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc1,storage
diff --git a/overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml b/overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b226ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml
+# Per-DC VIP overlay for vr1-dc1 (the runbook's "DC2"). D-135 amendment /
+# phase-4 Step 4: bundle.yaml hardcodes the API VIPs in vr1-dc0's bands, so
+# deploying vr1-dc1 re-homes them into ITS bands. Base bundle stays the vr1-dc0
+# source of truth; this overlay is applied only for the dc1 deploy:
+#   juju deploy ./bundle.yaml --overlay ./overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml
+#
+# Mapping (MEASURED from scripts/lib-net.sh lib_net_select_dc vr1-dc1, PLANE_NAME):
+#   provider-public 10.12.4  -> 10.12.64   metal-admin 10.12.8 -> 10.12.68
+#   metal-internal  10.12.12 -> 10.12.72   (host octets .50-.60 UNCHANGED)
+# The three VIPs per service are public / admin / internal API endpoints
+# (D-101 inherits the family layout; only the network prefix moves per DC).
+applications:
+  keystone:
+    options:
+      vip: "10.12.64.50 10.12.68.50 10.12.72.50"
+  barbican:
+    options:
+      vip: "10.12.64.51 10.12.68.51 10.12.72.51"
+  cinder:
+    options:
+      vip: "10.12.64.52 10.12.68.52 10.12.72.52"
+  glance:
+    options:
+      vip: "10.12.64.53 10.12.68.53 10.12.72.53"
+  magnum:
+    options:
+      vip: "10.12.64.54 10.12.68.54 10.12.72.54"
+  neutron-api:
+    options:
+      vip: "10.12.64.55 10.12.68.55 10.12.72.55"
+  nova-cloud-controller:
+    options:
+      vip: "10.12.64.56 10.12.68.56 10.12.72.56"
+  octavia:
+    options:
+      vip: "10.12.64.57 10.12.68.57 10.12.72.57"
+  openstack-dashboard:
+    options:
+      vip: "10.12.64.58 10.12.68.58 10.12.72.58"
+  placement:
+    options:
+      vip: "10.12.64.59 10.12.68.59 10.12.72.59"
+  ceph-radosgw:
+    options:
+      vip: "10.12.64.60 10.12.68.60 10.12.72.60"
diff --git a/runbooks/appendix-A-troubleshooting.md b/runbooks/appendix-A-troubleshooting.md
index bb5f6b9..5030c17 100644
--- a/runbooks/appendix-A-troubleshooting.md
+++ b/runbooks/appendix-A-troubleshooting.md
@@ -807,3 +807,48 @@
          docs/audit/incident-20260721-recovery-verify.txt). NOTE: MAAS
          assigns NEW random hostnames at re-enlistment -- update anything
          quoting the old ones.
+
+## Symptom: LAN clients of a freshly-addressed DC edge get 100% loss to the internet; the edge gateway pings fine; the edge ITSELF egresses fine  [2026-07-23]
+
+CAUSE:   The edge's pf ruleset was never REGENERATED after v4 addressing.
+         `opnsense-set-interface-v4 --commit` runs `configctl interface
+         reconfigure` -- which applies the address to the kernel -- but does
+         NOT reload the pf filter, so OPNsense's automatic outbound NAT
+         rules for the (re-)addressed LAN are never generated. Forwarded
+         LAN packets leave the WAN un-NAT'd; the upstream libvirt NAT only
+         masquerades sources in ITS OWN subnet, so replies never come back.
+         MASKING TRAP: any later plugin install / config apply reloads the
+         filter as a side effect -- dc0's 2026-07-20 qga/plugin work did
+         exactly that, which made dc0 "work" and hid the defect until dc1
+         (which had no such later work) exposed it at the mirror build.
+
+CHECK:   On the edge: `pfctl -s nat` -- a healthy edge shows automatic
+         `nat on <wan> inet from (<lan>:network) ...` rules; the broken
+         state shows ONLY the `no nat/rdr proto carp` boilerplate. Both
+         edges' config.xml can be IDENTICAL (same WAN_GW gateway_item) --
+         this is a runtime-ruleset gap, not a config gap.
+
+FIX:     On the edge: `configctl filter reload`, then re-test from a LAN
+         client (rack): ping internet IP 0% loss, `curl -sI http://1.1.1.1/`
+         -> HTTP 301.
+
+PREVENTED IN THE TOOL (2026-07-27, operator-ruled): `opnsense-set-interface-v4
+         --commit` now runs `configctl filter reload` itself and reads the
+         automatic NAT rules back with `pfctl -s nat`. So a fresh edge cannot
+         reach this state through the normal addressing path. Prose-only
+         prevention was rejected: DC standup DoD item 8 existed and did NOT
+         fire at dc1, and this repo has a measured record of prose controls
+         not firing (D-137's own wiring sat as prose at phase-3:498 and
+         missed BOTH DC standups).
+         PLACEMENT DETAIL, because it is the easy thing to get wrong: the
+         reload runs over a FRESH connection to the post-move address, NOT on
+         the next line of the `interface reconfigure` heredoc. Re-addressing
+         the interface you arrived on drops the session DURING the
+         reconfigure, so a following command in that stream never executes --
+         which is exactly this incident's own scenario (dc1's LAN moved
+         192.168.1.1 -> 10.12.64.1 over the LAN itself). A reload on that
+         next line would look like a fix while fixing nothing precisely when
+         it matters. Harness cases 15-15f encode all of this.
+         The NAT read-back is REPORTED, not gated: at an edge's very first
+         addressing there may legitimately be no gateway yet and therefore no
+         NAT to generate. The hard gate remains address-on-the-kernel.
diff --git a/runbooks/dc-dc-phase2-tofu-dc-substrate.md b/runbooks/dc-dc-phase2-tofu-dc-substrate.md
index 4013fc3..3bb5108 100644
--- a/runbooks/dc-dc-phase2-tofu-dc-substrate.md
+++ b/runbooks/dc-dc-phase2-tofu-dc-substrate.md
@@ -760,11 +760,13 @@
 3. **Serial-log staging dir** `/var/lib/libvirt/vr1/staging/` on the rack --
    created by `site-headend-install.sh --host-nodes` (since 2026-07-23; its
    absence failed the dc1 inner apply at 18/28). `--check` verifies it.
-4. **Region-side MAAS subnet config on the DC's metal-admin subnet:** D-120
-   dynamic range (.100-.200), D-131 `dns_servers=<rack forwarder IP>` +
-   `allow_dns=false`, then DHCP `dhcp_on=true primary_rack=<rack system_id>`
-   -- verify dhcpd RUNNING by process on the rack, not by MAAS self-report
-   (the 2026-07-20 Temporal incident class).
+4. **Region-side MAAS subnet config on the DC's metal-admin subnet:** dynamic
+   range at **.201-.254** (D-134 AMENDMENT 2026-07-23 supersedes the original
+   D-120-inherited .100-.200 position -- .100-.200 is now the contiguous NODE
+   band), D-131 `dns_servers=<rack forwarder IP>` + `allow_dns=false`, then
+   DHCP `dhcp_on=true primary_rack=<rack system_id>` -- verify dhcpd RUNNING
+   by process on the rack, not by MAAS self-report (the 2026-07-20 Temporal
+   incident class).
 5. **Per-DC MAAS->libvirt power key (SEC-012 dc0 / SEC-016 dc1 -- standing
    invariant, RULED).** Each DC gets its OWN dedicated power keypair, never
    cross-DC reuse: private half in the region MAAS snap
@@ -784,6 +786,20 @@
    audit file (dc0: `commissioning-diag-20260721`; dc1:
    `dc1-commissioning-verify-20260723` -- READY in ~3.5 min when 1-6 are in
    place).
+8. **Edge pf ruleset regenerated + LAN-client egress proven (2026-07-23
+   incident).** After the edge's v4 addressing, run `configctl filter
+   reload` on the edge, then from the RACK prove LAN-side egress: ping an
+   internet IP 0% loss + `curl -sI http://1.1.1.1/` returning 301 (the
+   D-125 signature). WITHOUT the reload a fresh edge passes NO LAN traffic
+   (automatic outbound NAT rules are never generated) with a perfectly
+   reachable gateway -- appendix-A carries the symptom. Do NOT rely on
+   plugin installs to reload the filter as a side effect (that masking is
+   exactly how dc0 hid this from dc1).
+9. **Per-DC artifact mirror (D-135 item 1).** `scripts/dc-mirror.sh install
+   <site>` on the rack (net layer -> printed apt line -> re-run install),
+   then `sync <site>`; verify `check <site>` PASS and, post-sync,
+   `last-sync.status` reads OK. The mirror serves the D-134 utility .4 on
+   metal-admin; Stage 5 wires it via `juju model-config apt-mirror=`.
 
 ---
 
diff --git a/runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md b/runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md
index 4662c81..e768823 100644
--- a/runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md
+++ b/runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
 1.  DC selector              lib_net_select_dc "$DC"; note lib_hosts_select_dc fails  (read-only)
 2.  Discover                 find $DC's node VMs live in MAAS            (read-only)
 3.  Commission                per discovered node                        [MUTATION: gated]
-4.  Deploy                    per discovered node                        [MUTATION: gated]
+4.  Tag + base images         nodes STAY Ready (DOCFIX-200)              [MUTATION: gated]
 5.  Pattern A carve (adapted) per node, RAW provider NIC + VLAN-103 stack [MUTATION: gated]
 6.  PXE / boot-fabric verify  confirm v4 PXE + fabric landing             (read-only)
 7.  Mirror + NTP verify       per-DC mirror reachable; edge NTP           (read-only)
@@ -262,35 +262,29 @@
 
 ---
 
-## Step 4 -- Deploy each node [MUTATION: gated, per node]
+## Step 4 -- Tag each node; nodes STAY Ready (DOCFIX-200; NO MAAS deploy)
 
-Do not pass a hardcoded `distro_series`/`osystem` -- no script in this repo
-sets one (checked: `reenroll-hosts.sh`, `phase-00-maas-standup.sh`, and the
-rest of `scripts/` are all silent on OS release, meaning DC0's own hosts
-deploy off MAAS's region-level default). Confirm `$DC`'s rack/region default
-live before deploying, rather than assuming it matches DC0's:
+> **DOCFIX-200 (2026-07-23, operator-ruled at first execution).** This step
+> originally instructed `maas machine deploy` per node. That CONTRADICTED the
+> validated VR0 flow and would have BROKEN Stage 5: `phase-01-bundle-deploy.md`'s
+> own precondition is machines "Ready/power=off; MAAS carve applied", and
+> `juju deploy bundle.yaml` then provisions them itself -- Juju allocates READY
+> MAAS machines and requests its own base (`default-base: ubuntu@22.04`); it
+> cannot allocate an already-Deployed machine. Ruling (question: "skip
+> MAAS-deploy ... and sync jammy images into the region now as the enabling
+> step?"; operator answer: "Ready + jammy images (Recommended)"): Stage 4 ends
+> with nodes READY + carved + tagged; the enabling mutation is syncing the
+> bundle's base images into the region instead.
 
-**CHECK -- MAAS's configured default OS release**
+**RUN (once per region, not per node) -- ensure the bundle's base images are
+synced.** The bundle's `default-base` (read it from `bundle.yaml`, do not
+assume) must exist as a Synced boot resource before Stage 5:
 ```bash
-maas "${MAAS_PROFILE:-admin}" maas get-config name=default_distro_series
+maas "${MAAS_PROFILE:-admin}" boot-source-selections create 1 os=ubuntu release=jammy arches=amd64 subarches='*' labels='*'
+maas "${MAAS_PROFILE:-admin}" boot-resources import
+# poll until the release shows Synced:
+maas "${MAAS_PROFILE:-admin}" boot-resources read | jq -r '.[] | select(.type=="Synced") | .name' | sort -u
 ```
-If `$DC` needs a different release than the default (a real design
-decision, not assumed here), that override is itself a value to record and
-justify, not silently pass.
-
-> CAUTION: deploy installs the OS and reboots the machine -- gated, one node
-> at a time.
-
-**RUN -- per Ready node**
-```bash
-maas "${MAAS_PROFILE:-admin}" machine deploy <system_id>
-```
-
-**VERIFY**
-```bash
-maas "${MAAS_PROFILE:-admin}" machine read <system_id> | jq -r '.status_name'
-```
-Expect `Deployed`.
 
 **Apply the deploy-placement tag** (phase-00 precedent: `reenroll-hosts.sh`'s
 "Apply MAAS tag ... (deploy placement prereq)" step -- without a tag the
@@ -401,31 +395,55 @@
 
 ---
 
-## Step 7 -- Per-DC mirror + edge NTP verify (READ-ONLY)
+## Step 7 -- Per-DC artifact source + time authority verify (READ-ONLY)
 
-Per gap #5: CONFIRM the per-DC artifact mirror this D-107 gate item
-requires actually exists and where, before running a reachability check
-against it. If it does not exist yet, STOP this sub-check, log the gap
-(it blocks the "airgap nodes pull only from an in-DC mirror" posture
-D-107 requires), and do not fabricate a mirror endpoint to check against.
+**REWRITTEN 2026-07-27 (DOCFIX-204).** As originally written this step was
+unrunnable and, in one half, contradicted a later ruling. Both defects are
+recorded here rather than quietly patched, because the step's old text is the
+kind that gets followed:
 
-**CHECK (once the real mirror address is known) -- reachable from a deployed node**
+1. Gap #5 (no owner for the per-DC artifact mirror) is **RESOLVED** -- D-135
+   built it, so the "if it does not exist yet, STOP" branch is history. But the
+   two DCs deliberately have **DIFFERENT** artifact paths (D-135 AMENDMENT
+   2026-07-24), and a single mirror check applied to both fails on dc1 by design.
+2. The edge-NTP half is **SUPERSEDED by D-129(iv)** (RULED 2026-07-21, "Keep MAAS
+   hierarchy (Recommended)" -- no NTP role on the edge). It asked you to confirm
+   the edge is the time source, which the ruling explicitly refused.
+3. Both checks said "from a deployed node". Under the READY-handoff ruling
+   (DOCFIX-200) nodes are never deployed in this stage -- they stay powered off
+   in `Ready` and Juju provisions them at Stage 5. The node-side half is
+   therefore tracked at gate **G17**, not here.
+
+**CHECK -- the artifact source answers on its own address, with an ATTESTED-CURRENT
+sync.** Run the site's own checker; do not hand-roll a curl. Both were fixed on
+2026-07-27 to assert on sync status instead of merely printing it -- a PASS from
+before that date does not mean what it appears to.
+
 ```bash
-# from the deployed node, or via its MAAS-reported address:
-curl -sI http://<measured-mirror-address>/ | head -1
+# dc0 -- D-135 item 1: a full debmirror served by nginx on the D-134 utility .4
+ssh -i ~/vr1-dc0-creds/vr1-dc0_svc_ed25519 -J voffice1 jessea123@<dc0-rack-transit-ip> \
+    'sudo bash -s' -- check dc0 < scripts/dc-mirror.sh
+
+# dc1 -- D-135 AMENDMENT: the ruled path is an apt CACHING PROXY, not a mirror.
+# dc1's debmirror is PAUSED and dormant as the fallback; checking it as a mirror
+# is expected to FAIL and is NOT this gate.
+ssh -i ~/vr1-dc1-creds/vr1-dc1_svc_ed25519 -J voffice1 jessea123@<dc1-rack-transit-ip> \
+    'sudo bash -s' -- check dc1 < scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh
 ```
+Take the rack transit IP from `scripts/lib-hosts.sh` (`VIRSH_POWER_ADDRESS`), never
+from memory -- hard rule 2.
 
-**CHECK -- NTP from `$DC`'s own OPNsense edge (D-107: nodes get chrony from
-their DC edge, which syncs upstream; Office1 is NOT in this path)**
+**CHECK -- time authority is the MAAS hierarchy (D-129(iv), NOT the edge).** MAAS
+serves NTP to the nodes it manages; the edge carries no NTP role. This is a
+node-side observation, so it runs when a node has actually booted an OS -- i.e.
+at Stage 5 first boot, alongside G17, not in this stage:
 ```bash
+# on a booted node (Stage 5), confirm the source is the MAAS hierarchy:
 chronyc sources
-# or, if chrony is not yet configured on a freshly-deployed node:
 timedatectl show -p NTP -p NTPSynchronized
 ```
-Confirm the source is `$DC`'s own edge address (measured, not assumed) --
-not Office1, not a public pool directly (D-107: the edge is the only
-component with controlled internet egress; nodes are airgapped at the node
-boundary).
+Confirm the source is the MAAS-served address (measured, not assumed) -- NOT the
+DC edge, which D-129(iv) removed from this path.
 
 ---
 
@@ -473,33 +491,71 @@
 
 ## GATE (Stage 4 exit condition, per DC -- restated honestly from the buildout design)
 
-Per `docs/dc-dc-buildout-design.md` Section 4 Phase 3:
-- Nodes deployed (Steps 3-4: all discovered `$DC` nodes read `Deployed`).
+Per `docs/dc-dc-buildout-design.md` Section 4 Phase 3 (its "Nodes deployed"
+wording corrected by DOCFIX-200 -- deployment is Stage 5's `juju deploy`, per
+the phase-01 precondition this stage hands off to):
+- Nodes READY + carved + tagged; the bundle's base images Synced in the
+  region (Steps 3-4 as corrected).
 - The six planes present per node with correct fabrics/VLANs (Step 5's
   per-node GATE, Step 8's topology cross-check).
 - Provider NIC raw (Step 5 GATE: `enp1s0`/equivalent carries no config
   beyond what MAAS's own br-ex build applies).
 - PXE (v4) working (Step 6).
-- Per-DC mirror reachable from nodes (Step 7 -- CONDITIONAL on gap #5 being
-  resolved; if the mirror does not exist yet, this GATE bullet is honestly
-  NOT MET and Stage 4 is not complete for `$DC`, full stop, regardless of
-  how clean the MAAS-side steps came out).
-- NTP from the DC's own OPNsense edge working (Step 7).
+- Per-DC artifact source reachable ON ITS OWN ADDRESS, with an ATTESTED-CURRENT
+  sync (Step 7). **SPLIT 2026-07-27 (operator ruling, GA-R5 -- recorded in the
+  G17 gate row of `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md`, which is the authority).** Gap #5 is
+  resolved -- D-135 built the artifact source per DC -- but the original bullet
+  said "reachable FROM NODES", and the READY-handoff ruling (DOCFIX-200) leaves
+  every node powered off in `Ready`, so a node-side probe cannot run in this
+  stage at all. GA-R6 E3 forbids a conditional close, so the node-side half
+  moved to its own gate row **G17** (trigger: Stage 5 first boot). What this
+  bullet now requires, per DC:
+  - dc0 -- `dc-mirror.sh check dc0` PASS, which as of 2026-07-27 ASSERTS on
+    `last-sync.status` rather than merely printing it. It previously passed on a
+    `FAIL` status; do not trust any pre-2026-07-27 PASS for this bullet.
+  - dc1 -- `dc-cache-proxy.sh check dc1` PASS. dc1's ruled artifact path is the
+    apt CACHING PROXY, not a mirror (D-135 AMENDMENT 2026-07-24); its debmirror
+    is paused and dormant as the fallback. Checking dc1 as a mirror fails by
+    design and is not this bullet.
+- ~~NTP from the DC's own OPNsense edge working (Step 7).~~ **STRUCK -- SUPERSEDED
+  by D-129(iv), RULED 2026-07-21: "Keep MAAS hierarchy (Recommended)", no NTP
+  role on the edge.** The replacement check is that the node's time source is the
+  MAAS hierarchy (see Step 7). This bullet was unsatisfiable as written: it
+  required the edge to be the time source, which the ruling explicitly refused.
 
-All six true, for every node Step 2 discovered for `$DC` -> Stage 4 complete
-for that DC. Run the whole runbook again with the other `$DC` value for the
-second DC; the two DCs' completions are independent (D-100: no shared
-control plane), so one can be done before the other.
+All bullets true, for every node Step 2 discovered for `$DC` -> Stage 4 complete
+for that DC (with the node-side reachability half tracked separately at G17).
+Run the whole runbook again with the other `$DC` value for the second DC; the two
+DCs' completions are independent (D-100: no shared control plane), so one can be
+done before the other.
 
 > **CREDS-CONSOLIDATION CLOSE-OUT (SEC-009 enforcement -- non-negotiable).** Standing up a DC MINTS
 > secrets on its VMs and on the jumphost -- MAAS API key, per-DC NetBox token (if any), node/edge SSH
 > keys, OPNsense root creds, tailscale authkey, Juju/Vault material. **The moment each is minted,
-> consolidate it into `~/$DC-creds/` (0700; files 0600) and add it to `creds-manifests/$DC.manifest`
-> with its provenance (`local` or `<vm>:<path>`).** Do NOT defer this -- "later" is when secrets get
-> lost (and after a compaction they are gone). This is the exact class that bit us: office1's sandbox
+> consolidate it into `~/$DC-creds/` (0700; files 0600), add a row to `creds-matrix.tsv`, and --
+> if it introduces a new place secrets live -- add a row to `creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations`.**
+> UPDATED 2026-07-26 (D-137): do NOT hand-edit `creds-manifests/$DC.manifest`. Manifests are now
+> DERIVED from the matrix (sub-ruling 2), and an undeclared LOCATION is never audited at all
+> (sub-ruling 3) -- which is how SEC-022 happened. Policy text: `docs/design-decisions.md` D-137.
+>
+> Do NOT defer this -- "later" is when secrets get lost (and after a compaction they are gone). This is the exact class that bit us: office1's sandbox
 > NetBox token, minted on the VM at `/root/netbox-secrets/`, went un-consolidated until it was needed
-> (SEC-009 addendum). Before declaring this DC done, `bash scripts/creds-audit.sh $DC` MUST report
-> **CLEAN** (folder perms, every manifest entry present, no undeclared files, no home-root sprawl).
+> (SEC-009 addendum). Before declaring this DC done, BOTH must hold:
+> `bash scripts/creds-audit.sh $DC` reports **CLEAN** (folder perms, every manifest entry
+> present, no undeclared files, no home-root sprawl), AND
+> `python3 scripts/creds-matrix.py` shows no NEW finding class for this DC -- it is the
+> blocking preflight gate P5, so a DC standup that adds an unregistered credential will stop
+> the next deploy rather than surface later.
+>
+> ALSO AT DC-STANDUP CLOSE (operator-run, D-137 tier 2 remote + tier 3, ruled 2026-07-26 --
+> these are NOT deploy gates, because a host outage or a snap refresh must not turn the
+> deploy red for reasons that are not about credentials):
+> - `python3 scripts/creds-matrix.py --tier2 --tier3 --remote --privileged`
+>   -- the remote existence sweep plus cross-copy sha256 provenance. Capture to
+>   `docs/audit/` and cite it in the close.
+> - `bash scripts/creds-probe.sh --list`, then `--run` once you accept the blast radius.
+>   **`--run` AUTHENTICATES** and writes an audit/login record on every target; that is the
+>   cost of knowing a credential still works.
 
 ---
 
diff --git a/runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md b/runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md
index 2f99bd7..00afe4f 100644
--- a/runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md
+++ b/runbooks/dc-dc-phase4-juju-bundle-per-dc.md
@@ -22,12 +22,35 @@
 
 **Prerequisites (must be true entering this stage, per DC):** Stage 4
 (`runbooks/dc-dc-phase3-maas-enlist-deploy.md`) done for that DC -- nodes
-Deployed; six planes present with correct fabrics/VLANs; provider NIC raw;
-PXE (v4) working; that DC's own artifact mirror reachable; NTP from that
-DC's edge working; `scripts/lib-hosts.sh`'s per-DC host data populated (that
+**READY** (NOT Deployed: MAAS-deploy is SKIPPED per the 2026-07-23 READY-handoff
+ruling / DOCFIX-200 -- THIS runbook is what provisions them, and expecting
+Deployed nodes here is exactly the breakage that ruling prevented); six planes
+present with correct fabrics/VLANs; provider NIC raw; PXE (v4) working; that
+DC's own artifact source reachable on its own address (dc0 = the D-135 item-1
+mirror, dc1 = the D-135-AMENDED apt caching proxy consumed via
+`juju apt-http-proxy` -- the two DCs differ BY RULING, so do not assume a
+mirror at dc1); `scripts/lib-hosts.sh`'s per-DC host data populated (that
 stage's own follow-up delivery) so `lib_hosts_select_dc "$dc"` no longer
 fails loud for it.
 
+**THIS STAGE OWES GATE G17 (inherited from Stage 4, split out 2026-07-27 by
+operator ruling -- see the G17 row in `docs/CURRENT-STATE.md`, the authority).**
+Stage 4 could not verify that a NODE reaches its DC's artifact source, or that a
+node's time source is the MAAS hierarchy, because under the READY-handoff ruling
+its nodes never boot an OS. **First boot in this stage is the first moment either
+is observable, so capture both then** -- per DC, from a booted node:
+
+- dc0: `curl -sI http://10.12.8.4/` returns 200.
+- dc1: apt fetches through the proxy at `10.12.68.4:3142` (NOT a mirror -- D-135
+  amendment).
+- both: `chronyc sources` shows the MAAS-served time source, NOT the DC edge
+  (D-129(iv) removed the edge from that path).
+
+Capture the output to a dated file and cite it in the commit that closes G17. If
+first boot happens without these captures being taken, the observation window has
+passed and G17 needs a deliberate rescue-boot to answer -- so take them the first
+time.
+
 !!! Every command block in the referenced `phase-01..08` runbooks that reads
     `scripts/lib-net.sh` or `scripts/lib-hosts.sh` values (VIP bands, host
     octets, `KEYSTONE_VIP_DEFAULT`, etc.) MUST be preceded, in THIS stage's
@@ -116,6 +139,31 @@
 model as VR0/DC0's original bootstrap -- a fresh `juju bootstrap` targeting
 THIS DC's MAAS cloud/region, not a reused controller.
 
+**Step 2.0 -- Per-DC MAAS service credential [DEPLOYMENT-TIME TASK; MUST precede bootstrap]**
+
+Juju authenticates to the MAAS region with an API key -- this is NOT created by
+any prior stage, so it is a standing deployment-time task per DC. Per the per-DC
+credential-isolation discipline (SEC-012/-016; Roosevelt analog: per-DC cloud
+credentials), issue a DEDICATED MAAS admin service user + its OWN key per DC --
+never reuse one key across DCs. On the MAAS region host (VR1: `voffice1`):
+```bash
+# service account -- Juju auths via the API key, not this password; use a random one
+sudo maas createadmin --username=juju-<dc> --email=juju-<dc>@<realm>
+```
+Generate the key so it lands ONLY in the JUMPHOST per-site creds folder
+(`~/vr1-<dc>-creds/maas-api-key.txt` on vcloud, SEC-009 convention -- NOT a new
+location on the region), never echoed to a terminal (a printed MAAS key is
+burned, SEC-006). Run the generate FROM the jumphost so the key transits ssh
+stdout straight into the vcloud file (no persistent copy on the region):
+```bash
+ssh <region> 'sudo maas apikey --username=juju-<dc> --generate' \
+  > ~/vr1-<dc>-creds/maas-api-key.txt
+chmod 600 ~/vr1-<dc>-creds/maas-api-key.txt
+awk -F: '{print "parts:", NF}' ~/vr1-<dc>-creds/maas-api-key.txt   # expect 3; do NOT cat
+```
+Register the MAAS cloud + this credential in Juju consuming the key BY PATH/stdin
+(never argv). Each key is a rotation obligation -- open a per-DC SEC row when issued.
+
 **CHECK (read-only) -- confirm the target MAAS cloud is registered to Juju**
 ```bash
 juju clouds --client | grep -i maas
diff --git a/scripts/carve-host-interfaces.sh b/scripts/carve-host-interfaces.sh
index 576141f..a3bbc38 100644
--- a/scripts/carve-host-interfaces.sh
+++ b/scripts/carve-host-interfaces.sh
@@ -52,9 +52,16 @@
 # always has, implicitly against DC0/VR0's real plane scheme and enrolled
 # hosts (backward compatible by construction). Set DC=vr0-dc0|vr1-dc0|vr1-dc1 to select (D-119)
 # explicitly; the selectors' own fail-loud behavior becomes this script's own
-# exit code via set -e. No second validation layer is added.
+# exit code via set -e. VR1 DCs are REFUSED even though lib-hosts' VR1 arms
+# are populated (2026-07-23): this script builds the VR0 Pattern-A tree
+# (br-metal + VLAN-103 br-internal stack), which D-133 SUPERSEDES for VR1 --
+# VR1 DC nodes carve every plane FLAT on its dedicated NIC (executed via the
+# MAAS API at Stage 4; capture docs/audit/stage4-carve-verify-20260723.txt).
 DC="${DC:-}"
 if [ -n "$DC" ]; then
+  case "$DC" in vr1-*)
+    echo "FAIL: $DC refused -- this script carves the VR0 Pattern-A VLAN-103 stack, superseded for VR1 by D-133 (flat per-NIC carve, applied at Stage 4). There is nothing for it to do on a VR1 fleet." >&2
+    exit 1 ;; esac
   lib_net_select_dc "$DC"
   lib_hosts_select_dc "$DC"
 fi
diff --git a/scripts/creds-audit.sh b/scripts/creds-audit.sh
index 009f030..558e8ce 100755
--- a/scripts/creds-audit.sh
+++ b/scripts/creds-audit.sh
@@ -68,9 +68,28 @@
 done
 
 # 4. sprawl: sensitive-looking files loose in CREDS_ROOT, OUTSIDE any *-creds/ folder
+#
+# GLOBS WIDENED 2026-07-26 (D-137 / SEC-023). The original six patterns had measured blind
+# spots: they would not have matched `admin.pass` (the SEC-020 secret that sat undetected
+# for 12 days), any bare SSH private key, any PEM or `.key`, a `.apikey`, or the
+# `~/admin-openrc` that phase-03 is PREDICTED to write at Stage 5. A sprawl check that
+# cannot see the exposures already on the register is not a control.
+#
+# DOTFILES ADDED 2026-07-26 (committee finding): the widening was still a depth-1 glob over
+# NON-dot names, so `.admin.pass` -- the dotfile sibling of the very secret the widening
+# cites as its motivation -- stayed invisible. SEC-009's founding case was `.vr1-netbox.env`,
+# a dotfile, so this class is not hypothetical. STILL NOT COVERED and logged, not fixed:
+# secrets nested in a SUBDIRECTORY outside a `*-creds/` folder -- that needs a walk, not a
+# glob, and a walk needs a declared bound (D-137 ruling 3) rather than an ad-hoc recursion.
 shopt -s nullglob
 for path in "$CREDS_ROOT"/*.env "$CREDS_ROOT"/.*.env "$CREDS_ROOT"/*appcred* \
-            "$CREDS_ROOT"/*-cred*.txt "$CREDS_ROOT"/*authkey* "$CREDS_ROOT"/*.token; do
+            "$CREDS_ROOT"/*-cred*.txt "$CREDS_ROOT"/*authkey* "$CREDS_ROOT"/*.token \
+            "$CREDS_ROOT"/*.pass "$CREDS_ROOT"/*.apikey "$CREDS_ROOT"/*.key \
+            "$CREDS_ROOT"/*.pem "$CREDS_ROOT"/*_ed25519 "$CREDS_ROOT"/*_rsa \
+            "$CREDS_ROOT"/*openrc* \
+            "$CREDS_ROOT"/.*.pass "$CREDS_ROOT"/.*.apikey "$CREDS_ROOT"/.*.key \
+            "$CREDS_ROOT"/.*.pem "$CREDS_ROOT"/.*_ed25519 "$CREDS_ROOT"/.*_rsa \
+            "$CREDS_ROOT"/.*.token "$CREDS_ROOT"/.*openrc*; do
   [ -f "$path" ] || continue
   fail "SPRAWL: sensitive file loose in $CREDS_ROOT: $(basename "$path") (belongs in a *-creds/ folder)"
 done
diff --git a/scripts/creds-matrix.py b/scripts/creds-matrix.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc95a92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/creds-matrix.py
@@ -0,0 +1,1107 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+creds-matrix.py -- D-137 credential-matrix checker (ADOPTED 2026-07-26).
+
+The matrix (`creds-matrix.tsv`) is the EXPECTED-state register of every credential this
+cloud is supposed to have. This script reconciles it against what the repo actually
+declares. It exists because `creds-audit` is DECLARATION-based -- the manifest IS the
+declaration, so an undeclared secret is structurally invisible -- and because no discovery
+sweep can EVER detect a credential that was never minted at all. Absence is invisible to
+discovery; only a forward register makes it a FAIL.
+
+THREE TIERS, increasing cost (plan: docs/D-137-implementation-plan.md):
+  1. STATIC     offline; runs in the gauntlet                    <-- BUILT (default)
+  2. EXISTENCE  local + remote reads; the preflight gate          <-- BUILT (--tier2)
+  3. VALIDITY   provenance digests + behavioral probes           <-- NOT BUILT YET
+A tier that did not run SELF-SKIPS with an explicit [ok] naming it. Nothing here ever
+passes silently -- a silent pass is the false-green this whole design exists to prevent,
+and the same applies to a location that could not be read (see the probe states below).
+
+METADATA ONLY. This script reads the matrix, the manifests, and the notes file. It never
+opens a credential, and it must never gain a content-reading verb (its harness greps the
+source to enforce that, mirroring tests/creds-audit/run-tests.sh:71-73).
+
+EXPECTED RED BY DESIGN. A clean run against today's tree would mean the checker is wrong.
+See the plan's "EXPECTED RED BY DESIGN" section: the ruling-5 identity conflation, the 12
+operator-terminal reproducibility-debt rows, and SEC-021's per-DC divergence are DEFECTS
+the register surfaces, not bugs to silence. Do not delete a row to go green.
+
+Usage:
+  python3 scripts/creds-matrix.py                 # tier 1 (static) -- the gauntlet entry
+  python3 scripts/creds-matrix.py --all           # every implemented tier + skip notices
+  python3 scripts/creds-matrix.py --dc vr1-dc1    # narrow the per-DC checks to one DC
+  python3 scripts/creds-matrix.py --render        # print manifests rendered from the matrix
+  python3 scripts/creds-matrix.py --tier2 --remote --privileged \
+      --pending-stage vr0-phase01 ...             # the full three-site existence sweep
+Exit: 0 clean, 1 findings, 2 usage/IO error. ASCII-only output.
+"""
+import sys, os, re, glob, shlex, fnmatch, argparse, subprocess
+
+COLUMNS = ("id", "cardinality", "site-key", "host-role", "filename", "access-type",
+           "principal", "custody", "mint-stage", "mint-ref", "sec-ref", "notes-ref")
+NCOL = len(COLUMNS)
+
+CARDINALITY = {"singleton", "per-site", "per-DC", "per-node", "per-tenant"}
+HOST_ROLE   = {"jumphost", "headend", "rack", "edge", "netbox", "cloud", "unit", "client", "-"}
+ACCESS_TYPE = {"gui", "api", "ssh", "cli-profile", "console", "none"}
+PRINCIPAL   = {"human", "service", "-"}
+CUSTODY     = {"consolidated", "source-of-record", "off-manifest-known",
+               "not-consolidated-ruled", "verbatim-copy"}
+# Custodies whose files live IN the site creds folder, and therefore appear in its
+# (generated) manifest. `verbatim-copy` adds a byte-identity assertion for tier 3; it does
+# not move the file out of the folder.
+IN_FOLDER = {"consolidated", "verbatim-copy"}
+
+# site-key discipline imported from scripts/lib-net.sh:160-162 / lib-hosts.sh:153-155:
+# region-qualified only. A bare `dc0` is REJECTED -- it is the drifting form that has
+# repeatedly meant two different things across the two DCs.
+SITE_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^(vr1-dc[01]|vr1-office1)$")
+MINT_REF_RE = re.compile(r"^(script|runbook):([^:]+):(\d+)$")
+DC_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r"dc[01]")
+
+# The manifest mode column is DERIVED, not a matrix field: a public key half is 0644,
+# everything else 0600. That rule reproduces all three checked-in manifests exactly, so
+# it stays a derivation rather than a 13th column.
+# A filename may carry a `<token>` placeholder for a per-tenant / per-node instance name
+# (`<client>-svc-cred.txt`). Without this the per-tenant rows could never match a real
+# basename, so at the first tenant onboard they would have produced five false absences
+# AND five false undeclared findings on the SAME five real files -- noise that trains
+# operators to ignore the most sensitive rows in the register (committee finding).
+TEMPLATE_RE = re.compile(r"<[a-z]+>")
+
+
+def fn_matches(declared, actual):
+    """Exact match, unless the declared name carries a `<token>` instance placeholder.
+
+    Per-tenant and per-node rows name an instance they cannot know at authoring time.
+    Without this the tenant rows could never match a real basename, so the first tenant
+    onboard would have produced five false absences AND five false undeclared findings on
+    the SAME five real files -- noise that trains operators to ignore the most sensitive
+    rows in the register (committee finding)."""
+    if "<" not in declared:
+        return declared == actual
+    return fnmatch.fnmatchcase(actual, TEMPLATE_RE.sub("*", declared))
+
+
+def derived_mode(filename):
+    return "644" if filename.endswith(".pub") else "600"
+
+
+class Row(object):
+    def __init__(self, fields, lineno):
+        self.lineno = lineno
+        for name, value in zip(COLUMNS, fields):
+            setattr(self, name.replace("-", "_"), value)
+
+    def key(self):
+        # `id` is part of the key on purpose: two DIFFERENT identities may legitimately
+        # share one file (the Vault init artifact holds both the unseal shares and the
+        # root token). What is never legitimate is the SAME identity declared twice at
+        # the same location.
+        return (self.id, self.site_key, self.host_role, self.filename)
+
+    def has_artifact(self):
+        # `filename == "-"` means the credential has no host artifact (it lives in the
+        # cloud, on a unit, or -- the juju-user case -- nowhere at all). Existence-type
+        # checks must SKIP such rows, never fault them.
+        return self.filename != "-"
+
+
+def load_matrix(path, fails):
+    rows = []
+    try:
+        with open(path) as fh:
+            lines = fh.readlines()
+    except IOError as exc:
+        sys.stderr.write("ERROR: cannot read matrix %s: %s\n" % (path, exc)); sys.exit(2)
+    for n, line in enumerate(lines, 1):
+        text = line.split("#", 1)[0].strip()
+        if not text:
+            continue
+        fields = text.split()
+        if len(fields) != NCOL:
+            fails.append("matrix:%d has %d field(s), want %d -- a field with whitespace "
+                         "in it would also land here: %s" % (n, len(fields), NCOL, text[:60]))
+            continue
+        rows.append(Row(fields, n))
+    return rows
+
+
+def load_manifest(path):
+    """Return {filename: (mode, source)} for a checked-in manifest, or None if absent."""
+    if not os.path.exists(path):
+        return None
+    out = {}
+    with open(path) as fh:
+        for line in fh:
+            text = line.split("#", 1)[0].strip()
+            if not text:
+                continue
+            parts = text.split()
+            if len(parts) >= 3:
+                out[parts[0]] = (parts[1], parts[2])
+            elif len(parts) == 2:
+                out[parts[0]] = (parts[1], "-")
+            else:
+                # Do NOT drop it: a bare filename with no mode used to vanish, so the
+                # undeclared-file bound never fired for it -- exactly T8's defect class.
+                out[parts[0]] = ("?", "?")
+    return out
+
+
+def load_notes(path):
+    keys = set()
+    if not os.path.exists(path):
+        return None
+    with open(path) as fh:
+        for line in fh:
+            if line.startswith("## "):
+                keys.add(line[3:].strip())
+    return keys
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- tier 1
+def s1_schema(rows, oks, fails):
+    bad = 0
+    if not rows:
+        # A register with no rows asserts nothing, yet every check below reports clean
+        # over an empty set. That is the both-bounds failure applied to the input itself.
+        fails.append("S1 FLOOR: the matrix has ZERO rows -- an empty register cannot be "
+                     "clean, it is unpopulated")
+        return
+    for r in rows:
+        where = "matrix:%d %s" % (r.lineno, r.id)
+        if r.cardinality not in CARDINALITY:
+            fails.append("%s cardinality '%s' invalid" % (where, r.cardinality)); bad += 1
+        if r.site_key != "-" and not SITE_KEY_RE.match(r.site_key):
+            fails.append("%s site-key '%s' is not region-qualified (bare 'dc0' is REJECTED)"
+                         % (where, r.site_key)); bad += 1
+        if r.host_role not in HOST_ROLE:
+            fails.append("%s host-role '%s' invalid (must be a role token, never a VM name)"
+                         % (where, r.host_role)); bad += 1
+        if r.access_type not in ACCESS_TYPE:
+            fails.append("%s access-type '%s' invalid" % (where, r.access_type)); bad += 1
+        if r.principal not in PRINCIPAL:
+            fails.append("%s principal '%s' invalid" % (where, r.principal)); bad += 1
+        if r.custody not in CUSTODY:
+            fails.append("%s custody '%s' invalid" % (where, r.custody)); bad += 1
+    seen = {}
+    for r in rows:
+        if r.has_artifact():
+            if r.key() in seen:
+                fails.append("matrix:%d duplicate (id,site,host-role,filename) row -- also "
+                             "at matrix:%d" % (r.lineno, seen[r.key()])); bad += 1
+            seen[r.key()] = r.lineno
+    if not bad:
+        oks.append("S1 schema: %d rows, all enums valid, site-keys region-qualified, "
+                   "no duplicate (id,site,host-role,filename)" % len(rows))
+
+
+def s2_manifest_coverage(rows, manifest_dir, oks, fails):
+    """BOTH BOUNDS. Imported from netbox/sandbox-fidelity-check.py:131-143, which records
+    the identical false-green in-repo: a subset-only check 'was an upper bound
+    masquerading as an assertion. It must be BOTH bounds.' Here the same failure is one
+    level up -- enumerate no expectations and nothing is ever undeclared, so the register
+    reads CLEAN while declaring nothing."""
+    # BOTH BOUNDS AT THE SITE LEVEL TOO. Enumerating only the sites the MATRIX mentions
+    # is the same false-green one level up: an empty (or site-truncated) matrix would
+    # examine no manifest, find nothing undeclared, and report CLEAN while every declared
+    # credential sat unregistered. The site set is the UNION of both sides.
+    sites = {r.site_key for r in rows if r.site_key != "-"}
+    if os.path.isdir(manifest_dir):
+        for entry in os.listdir(manifest_dir):
+            if entry.endswith(".manifest"):
+                sites.add(entry[:-len(".manifest")])
+    sites = sorted(sites)
+    total_missing = total_extra = total_drift = 0
+    for site in sites:
+        manifest = load_manifest(os.path.join(manifest_dir, "%s.manifest" % site))
+        if manifest is None:
+            fails.append("S2 %s: no manifest file -- every site in the matrix needs one"
+                         % site)
+            continue
+        # A manifest declares exactly the CONSOLIDATED jumphost copies for its site.
+        expected = {r.filename: r for r in rows
+                    if r.site_key == site and r.custody in IN_FOLDER
+                    and r.host_role == "jumphost" and r.has_artifact()}
+        # bound 1: expected-but-absent
+        for fname, r in sorted(expected.items()):
+            if fname not in manifest:
+                total_missing += 1
+                fails.append("S2 %s EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: '%s' (id %s%s) is expected by the "
+                             "matrix but NOT declared in the manifest -- the credential is "
+                             "either missing or undeclared"
+                             % (site, fname, r.id, "" if r.sec_ref == "-" else ", " + r.sec_ref))
+        # bound 2: declared but unexpected
+        for fname in sorted(manifest):
+            if fname not in expected:
+                total_extra += 1
+                fails.append("S2 %s UNEXPECTED-EXTRA: manifest declares '%s' with no "
+                             "matching matrix row -- add it to the register or remove it"
+                             % (site, fname))
+        # field drift on the rows present in both
+        for fname, r in sorted(expected.items()):
+            if fname not in manifest:
+                continue
+            want = derived_mode(fname)
+            if manifest[fname][0] != want:
+                total_drift += 1
+                fails.append("S2 %s FIELD DRIFT: '%s' manifest mode %s, matrix derives %s"
+                             % (site, fname, manifest[fname][0], want))
+        # rows the matrix marks as deliberately NOT in the folder must not appear in it
+        for r in rows:
+            if (r.site_key == site and r.host_role == "jumphost" and r.has_artifact()
+                    and r.custody not in IN_FOLDER and r.filename in manifest):
+                total_drift += 1
+                fails.append("S2 %s FIELD DRIFT: '%s' is custody=%s yet declared in the "
+                             "manifest" % (site, r.filename, r.custody))
+    if not (total_missing or total_extra or total_drift):
+        oks.append("S2 manifest coverage: both bounds clean across %d site(s)" % len(sites))
+
+
+def s3_render_drift(rows, manifest_dir, notes, oks, fails):
+    """D-137 ruling 2: manifests are DERIVED; checked-in must equal rendered."""
+    sites = sorted({r.site_key for r in rows if r.site_key != "-"})
+    drift = pending = 0
+    for site in sites:
+        manifest = load_manifest(os.path.join(manifest_dir, "%s.manifest" % site))
+        if manifest is None:
+            continue
+        for fname, mode, source, r in render_rows(rows, site):
+            if fname not in manifest:
+                continue                       # already reported by S2
+            if manifest[fname][0] != mode:
+                drift += 1
+                fails.append("S3 %s render drift: '%s' mode checked-in=%s rendered=%s"
+                             % (site, fname, manifest[fname][0], mode))
+            if source == "PENDING-TIER2":
+                # The source field for a VM-minted credential needs the declared PATH,
+                # which ruling 3 puts in creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations -- a tier-2
+                # artifact. Skip the field EXPLICITLY rather than let it read as matching.
+                pending += 1
+                continue
+            if manifest[fname][1] != source:
+                drift += 1
+                fails.append("S3 %s render drift: '%s' source checked-in=%s rendered=%s"
+                             % (site, fname, manifest[fname][1], source))
+    if pending:
+        oks.append("S3 render: %d source field(s) SKIPPED -- rendering them needs the "
+                   "declared path from creds-manifests/vm-secret-locations (ruling 3); the "
+                   "list now EXISTS but the source-field derivation is not wired" % pending)
+    if not drift:
+        # SCOPE, stated so this [ok] cannot be over-read: S3 compares
+        # PARSED ROW FIELDS (mode, source) for rows present on both sides. It does NOT
+        # compare manifest header prose or field-definition blocks, and render emits only
+        # consolidated jumphost rows -- so ruling 2's "checked-in == rendered" obligation
+        # is only PARTLY gated here. Full byte-equality becomes enforceable when the
+        # manifests are actually replaced by rendered output (operator-gated; see the
+        # 2026-07-26 changelog, item 3).
+        oks.append("S3 render drift: rendered row fields (mode, source) match checked-in; "
+                   "header prose and non-jumphost rows are OUT OF SCOPE of this compare")
+
+
+def render_rows(rows, site):
+    """Yield (filename, mode, source, row) for one site's rendered manifest."""
+    src_of_record = {}
+    for r in rows:
+        if r.custody == "source-of-record":
+            src_of_record.setdefault(r.id, r)
+    out = []
+    for r in rows:
+        if (r.site_key == site and r.custody in IN_FOLDER
+                and r.host_role == "jumphost" and r.has_artifact()):
+            source = "PENDING-TIER2" if r.id in src_of_record else "local"
+            out.append((r.filename, derived_mode(r.filename), source, r))
+    # Sort on the rendered fields only -- Row is not orderable, and a duplicate row
+    # (T5) would otherwise reach a Row-vs-Row comparison and crash before S1's finding
+    # could be printed.
+    return sorted(out, key=lambda t: t[:3])
+
+
+def s4_mint_ref(rows, repo, oks, fails):
+    bad = 0
+    terminal = 0
+    for r in rows:
+        ref = r.mint_ref
+        if ref == "-":
+            continue
+        if ref == "operator-terminal":
+            terminal += 1
+            continue
+        m = MINT_REF_RE.match(ref)
+        if not m:
+            fails.append("matrix:%d %s mint-ref '%s' is not script:<path>:<line>, "
+                         "runbook:<path>:<line>, or operator-terminal"
+                         % (r.lineno, r.id, ref)); bad += 1
+            continue
+        _, path, line = m.groups()
+        full = os.path.join(repo, path)
+        if not os.path.exists(full):
+            fails.append("matrix:%d %s mint-ref target does not exist: %s"
+                         % (r.lineno, r.id, path)); bad += 1
+            continue
+        if not os.path.isfile(full):
+            fails.append("matrix:%d %s mint-ref target is not a file: %s"
+                         % (r.lineno, r.id, path)); bad += 1
+            continue
+        try:
+            with open(full, errors="replace") as fh:
+                n = sum(1 for _ in fh)
+        except OSError as exc:
+            fails.append("matrix:%d %s mint-ref target unreadable (%s): %s"
+                         % (r.lineno, r.id, exc.__class__.__name__, path)); bad += 1
+            continue
+        if int(line) > n:
+            fails.append("matrix:%d %s mint-ref %s points past EOF (file has %d lines)"
+                         % (r.lineno, r.id, ref, n)); bad += 1
+    if not bad:
+        oks.append("S4 mint-ref: every script:/runbook: reference resolves to a real "
+                   "location")
+    # Research FINDING 1 is a DEBT REPORT, not a failure: `ssh-keygen` returns zero hits
+    # repo-wide, so these rows genuinely have no mint command. Admitting them is the point.
+    if terminal:
+        oks.append("S4 provenance debt: %d row(s) are mint-ref=operator-terminal -- NOT "
+                   "reproducible from the repo (research FINDING 1). Admitted by design; "
+                   "converting them is remediation, not a checker fix." % terminal)
+
+
+def s5_per_dc_symmetry(rows, dc_filter, oks, fails):
+    """Per-DC rows must be SYMMETRIC. sec-ref and notes-ref are excluded from the
+    comparison -- the two DCs legitimately carry different SEC rows for the same shape."""
+    dcs = ["vr1-dc0", "vr1-dc1"]
+    if dc_filter:
+        oks.append("S5 per-DC symmetry: --dc %s narrows the run; symmetry needs BOTH DCs, "
+                   "so the check is SKIPPED (explicitly, not passed)" % dc_filter)
+        return
+    shapes = {}
+    for dc in dcs:
+        shapes[dc] = set()
+        for r in rows:
+            if r.site_key != dc or r.cardinality != "per-DC":
+                continue
+            shapes[dc].add((
+                DC_TOKEN_RE.sub("dcN", r.id),
+                DC_TOKEN_RE.sub("dcN", r.filename),
+                r.host_role, r.access_type, r.principal, r.custody, r.mint_stage,
+                DC_TOKEN_RE.sub("dcN", r.mint_ref),
+            ))
+    only0 = shapes["vr1-dc0"] - shapes["vr1-dc1"]
+    only1 = shapes["vr1-dc1"] - shapes["vr1-dc0"]
+    for label, extra, missing_from in (("vr1-dc0", only0, "vr1-dc1"),
+                                       ("vr1-dc1", only1, "vr1-dc0")):
+        for shape in sorted(extra):
+            fails.append("S5 ASYMMETRY: %s declares id=%s file=%s on %s (custody=%s) with "
+                         "no counterpart in %s -- a per-DC credential must exist at BOTH "
+                         "DCs in the same shape"
+                         % (label, shape[0], shape[1], shape[2], shape[5], missing_from))
+    if not (only0 or only1):
+        oks.append("S5 per-DC symmetry: %d shared per-DC shape(s), no asymmetry"
+                   % len(shapes["vr1-dc0"]))
+
+
+def s6_principal_invariant(rows, oks, fails):
+    """D-137 ruling 5: ONE IDENTITY SERVES ONE PRINCIPAL TYPE. Rows sharing an `id` are
+    forms/copies of one identity, so two differing principals across them IS the
+    conflation. Rows with principal '-' (non-credential artifacts) are skipped."""
+    by_id = {}
+    for r in rows:
+        if r.principal == "-":
+            continue
+        by_id.setdefault(r.id, {}).setdefault(r.principal, []).append(r)
+    bad = 0
+    for ident in sorted(by_id):
+        principals = by_id[ident]
+        if len(principals) > 1:
+            bad += 1
+            detail = "; ".join(
+                "%s via %s" % (p, ", ".join(sorted({x.access_type for x in rs})))
+                for p, rs in sorted(principals.items()))
+            fails.append("S6 IDENTITY CONFLATION: id '%s' serves %d principal types (%s) "
+                         "-- ruling 5 requires one identity to serve one principal type"
+                         % (ident, len(principals), detail))
+    if not bad:
+        oks.append("S6 principal invariant: every identity serves exactly one principal "
+                   "type (%d identities checked)" % len(by_id))
+
+
+def s7_notes_ref(rows, notes, notes_path, oks, fails):
+    if notes is None:
+        fails.append("S7 notes file missing: %s -- the 12-column amendment makes it the "
+                     "home for every governance note ruling 2 forbids dropping" % notes_path)
+        return
+    bad = 0
+    used = set()
+    for r in rows:
+        if r.notes_ref == "-":
+            continue
+        used.add(r.notes_ref)
+        if r.notes_ref not in notes:
+            fails.append("matrix:%d %s notes-ref '%s' has no '## %s' entry in the notes file"
+                         % (r.lineno, r.id, r.notes_ref, r.notes_ref)); bad += 1
+    orphans = sorted(k for k in notes if k.startswith("n-") and k not in used)
+    for k in orphans:
+        fails.append("S7 orphan note '%s' is referenced by no matrix row" % k)
+    if not bad and not orphans:
+        oks.append("S7 notes: %d note key(s) referenced, all resolve, none orphaned"
+                   % len(used))
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- tier 2
+# A declared path is interpolated into a remote shell command, so its charset is a
+# security boundary, not a style rule: ruling 3 calls the bound ABSOLUTE, and an
+# unvalidated `;` or `$(...)` in this file would execute on the remote host -- under
+# `sudo -n` when --privileged is passed. Shell metacharacters are rejected outright and
+# the path is additionally shell-quoted at use.
+SAFE_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_@%+=:,./~*-]+$")
+SAFE_TARGET_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$")       # no leading '-', no ssh options
+
+
+def load_stages(path, rows, fails):
+    """The declared reach of each mint stage (D-137 tier 2). Returns {token: bool} or None.
+
+    EXHAUSTIVE BY CONSTRUCTION: every mint-stage token the matrix uses must be classified
+    here. An unclassified token is a hard FAIL, never a default -- defaulting to `reached`
+    floods the run with false absences, and defaulting to `pending` silently defers real
+    ones, which is the false-green class this control exists to prevent."""
+    if not os.path.exists(path):
+        return None
+    out = {}
+    for n, line in enumerate(open(path), 1):
+        text = line.split("#", 1)[0].strip()
+        if not text:
+            continue
+        parts = text.split()
+        if len(parts) != 2 or parts[1] not in ("reached", "pending"):
+            fails.append("stages-reached:%d must be '<stage> reached|pending', got: %s"
+                         % (n, text[:50])); continue
+        out[parts[0]] = (parts[1] == "reached")
+    used = {r.mint_stage for r in rows}
+    for tok in sorted(used - set(out)):
+        fails.append("stages-reached: mint-stage '%s' is used in the matrix but NOT "
+                     "classified -- classify it reached|pending; the checker will not "
+                     "default it in either direction" % tok)
+    for tok in sorted(set(out) - used):
+        fails.append("stages-reached: '%s' is classified but used by no matrix row -- "
+                     "stale declaration" % tok)
+    return out
+
+
+def load_locations(path, repo, fails):
+    """The ruling-3 declared-location list.
+    Returns [(role, site, ssh_target, path)], or None if the file is ABSENT."""
+    if not os.path.exists(path):
+        return None
+    out = []
+    for n, line in enumerate(open(path), 1):
+        text = line.split("#", 1)[0].strip()
+        if not text:
+            continue
+        parts = text.split()
+        if len(parts) != 4:
+            fails.append("vm-secret-locations:%d has %d field(s), want 4 "
+                         "(<host-role> <site-key> <ssh-target> <path>)" % (n, len(parts)))
+            continue
+        role, site, target, p = parts
+        if site != "-" and not SITE_KEY_RE.match(site):
+            fails.append("vm-secret-locations:%d site-key '%s' is not region-qualified"
+                         % (n, site)); continue
+        if not SAFE_TARGET_RE.match(target):
+            fails.append("vm-secret-locations:%d ssh-target '%s' has unsafe characters "
+                         "-- it is passed to ssh argv" % (n, target)); continue
+        # The repo has been renamed once (D-110); its name is never hardcoded.
+        p = p.replace("<repo>", repo)
+        if not SAFE_PATH_RE.match(p):
+            fails.append("vm-secret-locations:%d path '%s' contains a shell metacharacter "
+                         "-- rejected: this string reaches a remote shell" % (n, p))
+            continue
+        out.append((role, site, target, p))
+    return out
+
+
+# Probes return (state, {basename: mode}) where state is one of:
+#   "ok"          the location was read
+#   "absent"      the directory does not exist (a stage not yet reached, usually)
+#   "unreadable"  it EXISTS but could not be listed -- typically root-owned
+#   "unreachable" the host could not be contacted
+#
+# `unreadable` exists as its own state because of a false green found during the build:
+# a shell glob over an unreadable directory does not expand, the loop finds no files, and
+# the probe would have returned an EMPTY listing -- reporting "nothing undeclared here"
+# about a directory it was never able to open. The region secrets dir (SEC-020) is exactly
+# such a directory. "Could not look" must never be recorded as "nothing there".
+def _dir_of(pattern):
+    """The directory whose readability decides this location's state.
+
+    For `dir/*` that is the directory. For a LITERAL FILE path it is the containing
+    directory -- previously this returned None for literal paths, so they skipped the
+    absent/unreadable determination entirely and an unreadable directory read as
+    'fully probed, nothing there' (committee finding: the same false green T33 was
+    written to kill, surviving in the other path form)."""
+    # Both forms want the same thing: dirname("a/b/*") == "a/b" (the directory whose
+    # readability we test) and dirname("a/b/file") == "a/b" (the file's parent). An
+    # earlier rewrite rstripped "/*" first and climbed one level too far.
+    return os.path.dirname(pattern)
+
+
+def probe_local(pattern):
+    """METADATA ONLY -- stat, never file content."""
+    d = _dir_of(pattern)
+    if d:
+        dx = os.path.expanduser(d)
+        # A glob (~/tenant-*/*) may legitimately match nothing; only a literal
+        # directory path can be judged absent or unreadable.
+        if not glob.has_magic(dx):
+            if not os.path.isdir(dx):
+                # CANNOT conclude "absent" if the PARENT is not traversable: to an
+                # unprivileged reader a root-owned directory is indistinguishable from a
+                # missing one. Reporting it absent would be a benign-looking skip over a
+                # location that exists and holds secrets -- measured on the region
+                # secrets dir (SEC-020), which read "does not exist" on the first sweep.
+                parent = os.path.dirname(dx.rstrip("/")) or "/"
+                if not os.path.isdir(parent):
+                    return ("absent", {})          # the whole tree is absent
+                if not os.access(parent, os.R_OK | os.X_OK):
+                    return ("unreadable", {})
+                return ("absent", {})
+            if not os.access(dx, os.R_OK | os.X_OK):
+                return ("unreadable", {})
+    found = {}
+    for f in glob.glob(os.path.expanduser(pattern)):
+        if os.path.isfile(f):
+            found[os.path.basename(f)] = oct(os.stat(f).st_mode & 0o777)[2:]
+    return ("ok", found)
+
+
+def probe_remote(target, pattern, privileged=False):
+    """METADATA ONLY over ssh -- stat, never file content.
+
+    `privileged` prefixes `sudo -n` and is used ONLY as an escalation retry after an
+    unprivileged probe returned `unreadable`. Escalating only where it is actually needed
+    keeps the privileged surface as small as the ruling-3 bound already keeps the search
+    surface. It still reads metadata only: mode and name, never content."""
+    d = _dir_of(pattern)
+    probe = ""
+    if d and not glob.has_magic(d):
+        # See probe_local: "not a directory" is only ABSENT when the parent is
+        # traversable; otherwise the truth is that we could not look. Guarded by
+        # has_magic because a multi-word glob expansion makes `[ -d ... ]` a syntax
+        # error, which silently disabled this whole state machine (committee finding).
+        q = d   # validated by SAFE_PATH_RE; NOT quoted -- see note above
+        probe = ('p=$(dirname %s); '
+                 'if [ ! -d %s ]; then '
+                 '  if [ ! -d "$p" ]; then echo "__STATE__ absent"; '
+                 '  elif [ -r "$p" ] && [ -x "$p" ]; then echo "__STATE__ absent"; '
+                 '  else echo "__STATE__ unreadable"; fi; '
+                 'elif [ ! -r %s ] || [ ! -x %s ]; then echo "__STATE__ unreadable"; fi; '
+                 % (q, q, q, q))
+    # __DONE__ is the liveness marker. Without it, a loop that simply matched nothing
+    # exits non-zero with empty output and was reported as UNREACHABLE -- which gated the
+    # whole role and converted every absence FAIL at that role into an [ok]. Reaching
+    # __DONE__ proves the command ran on the host, so "found nothing" is a real
+    # observation and only its ABSENCE means we could not reach the host.
+    cmd = probe + ('for f in %s; do [ -f "$f" ] && stat -c "%%n %%a" "$f"; done; '
+                   'echo __DONE__' % pattern)   # pattern validated, deliberately unquoted
+    if privileged:
+        cmd = "sudo -n sh -c " + shlex.quote(cmd)
+    try:
+        p = subprocess.run(["ssh", "-o", "BatchMode=yes", "-o", "ConnectTimeout=10",
+                            target, cmd], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60)
+    except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
+        return ("unreachable", {})
+    if p.returncode == 255:                      # ssh transport failure
+        return ("unreachable", {})
+    found = {}
+    done = False
+    for line in p.stdout.splitlines():
+        if line.startswith("__STATE__ "):
+            return (line.split(None, 1)[1].strip(), {})
+        if line.strip() == "__DONE__":
+            done = True
+            continue
+        bits = line.rsplit(None, 1)
+        if len(bits) == 2:
+            found[os.path.basename(bits[0])] = bits[1]
+    if not done:
+        return ("unreachable", {})
+    return ("ok", found)
+
+
+def tier2_existence(rows, locations, use_remote, use_privileged, stages,
+                    oks, fails):
+    """EXISTENCE: everything expected is present at its expected role, and nothing
+    undeclared sits at any declared location -- including the remote ones (ruling 3)."""
+    # SCOPE = (host-role, site-key), NOT host-role alone. Keying on role alone merged all
+    # three jumphost creds folders into one basename namespace, so a credential present at
+    # ANY site satisfied the row for EVERY site -- which is how SEC-021's dc0
+    # opnsense-api.txt absence passed a green sweep while tier 1 flagged it. Four committee
+    # lenses converged on this. A location with site `-` is not site-scoped and serves rows
+    # that are likewise `-`.
+    by_scope = {}
+    for role, site, target, pat in locations:
+        by_scope.setdefault((role, site), []).append((target, pat))
+
+    observed = {}          # (role, site) -> {basename: mode}
+    # A role is COMPLETE only if EVERY declared location for it was probed. Absence can
+    # only be asserted over a fully-probed role: with one location skipped, the other
+    # locations' listings would "cover" the role and manufacture false EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT
+    # findings for credentials that live in the location nobody looked at. Measured on the
+    # first live sweep, where skipping the region secrets dir made every credential in it
+    # report as missing from the headend.
+    incomplete = set()
+    for role, site, _t, _p in locations:
+        observed.setdefault((role, site), {})
+    skipped_remote = 0
+    for role, site, target, pat in locations:
+        scope = (role, site)
+        if target != "local":
+            if not use_remote:
+                skipped_remote += 1
+                incomplete.add(scope)
+                continue
+            state, seen = probe_remote(target, pat)
+            if state == "unreadable" and use_privileged:
+                pstate, pseen = probe_remote(target, pat, privileged=True)
+                if pstate == "ok":
+                    oks.append("E0 %s location '%s' read via ESCALATION (sudo -n, metadata "
+                               "only) after an unprivileged probe could not open it"
+                               % (role, pat))
+                    state, seen = pstate, pseen
+                else:
+                    fails.append("E0 ESCALATION FAILED: %s location '%s' is still "
+                                 "unreadable with sudo -n (%s) -- still no conclusion "
+                                 "about its contents" % (role, pat, pstate))
+        else:
+            state, seen = probe_local(pat)
+        # "absent" is a CONCLUSIVE observation -- we looked and the location is not there,
+        # so it hides nothing. Only "could not look" states gate the role.
+        if state in ("unreadable", "unreachable"):
+            incomplete.add(scope)
+        if state == "absent":
+            oks.append("E0 %s location '%s' does not exist -- SKIPPED (typically a mint "
+                       "stage this deployment has not reached)" % (role, pat))
+            continue
+        if state == "unreadable":
+            # NOT a pass and NOT an empty listing: the location exists and could not be
+            # opened, so nothing may be concluded about what is or is not inside it.
+            fails.append("E0 UNREADABLE: %s location '%s' EXISTS but could not be listed "
+                         "-- no conclusion may be drawn about its contents; re-run with "
+                         "sufficient privilege" % (role, pat))
+            continue
+        if state == "unreachable":
+            oks.append("E0 %s (%s) UNREACHABLE -- location '%s' SKIPPED explicitly; "
+                       "an unreachable host is never a pass" % (role, target, pat))
+            continue
+        observed.setdefault(scope, {}).update(seen)
+
+    if skipped_remote:
+        oks.append("E0 %d remote location(s) SKIPPED -- rerun with --remote to include "
+                   "the headend shadow stores (SEC-022) and the region secrets dir "
+                   "(SEC-020)" % skipped_remote)
+
+    # bound 1: every expected artifact present at its expected role
+    absent = 0
+    deferred = 0
+    gated = 0
+    undeclarable = []
+    for r in rows:
+        if not r.has_artifact():
+            continue
+        scope = (r.host_role, r.site_key)
+        if scope not in by_scope and (r.host_role, "-") not in by_scope:
+            # NOT silently skipped: a row whose scope has no declared location can never
+            # be checked, and the module's contract is that nothing passes quietly.
+            undeclarable.append("%s '%s' (%s/%s)"
+                                % (r.id, r.filename, r.host_role, r.site_key))
+            continue
+        pools = [observed.get(scope, {})]
+        if r.site_key != "-":
+            pools.append(observed.get((r.host_role, "-"), {}))   # shared location
+        hit = got = None
+        for pool in pools:
+            hit = next((f for f in pool if fn_matches(r.filename, f)), None)
+            if hit:
+                got = pool[hit]
+                break
+        if hit:
+            want = derived_mode(r.filename)
+            if r.custody in IN_FOLDER and got != want:
+                fails.append("E2 MODE: %s '%s' at %s/%s is %s, want %s"
+                             % (r.id, r.filename, r.host_role, r.site_key, got, want))
+            elif r.principal != "-" and want == "600" and int(got, 8) & 0o007:
+                # World-readable SECRET, at ANY custody (a `.pub` half derives 644 and is
+                # public by design, so it is excluded). The exact-mode check above only
+                # covers `consolidated` rows, which left 43 of 77 rows -- including the
+                # SEC-020 region dir and the SEC-022 shadow stores, the two that motivated
+                # remote probing -- with no mode check at all.
+                fails.append("E2 WORLD-READABLE: %s '%s' at %s/%s is mode %s"
+                             % (r.id, r.filename, r.host_role, r.site_key, got))
+            continue
+        if scope in incomplete:
+            gated += 1
+            continue
+        if stages.get(r.mint_stage, True) is False:
+            # NOT-YET-EXPECTED per creds-manifests/stages-reached, which is a derived
+            # projection of CURRENT-STATE coupled to it by repo-lint L12. The script still
+            # carries no status claim of its own (GA-R1).
+            deferred += 1
+            continue
+        absent += 1
+        fails.append("E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: %s '%s' expected at %s, not found "
+                     "(mint-stage %s%s)"
+                     % (r.id, r.filename, "%s/%s" % (r.host_role, r.site_key),
+                        r.mint_stage,
+                        "" if r.sec_ref == "-" else ", " + r.sec_ref))
+
+    # bound 2: nothing undeclared at a declared location
+    declared = {}
+    for r in rows:
+        if r.has_artifact():
+            declared.setdefault((r.host_role, r.site_key), set()).add(r.filename)
+    undeclared = 0
+    for scope in sorted(observed):
+        for name in sorted(observed[scope]):
+            names = set(declared.get(scope, set()))
+            if scope[1] == "-":
+                # a shared location is satisfied by ANY site's row at that role
+                for (role2, _s2), decl in declared.items():
+                    if role2 == scope[0]:
+                        names |= decl
+            if not any(fn_matches(d, name) for d in names):
+                undeclared += 1
+                fails.append("E3 UNDECLARED: '%s' present at %s/%s but in NO matrix row "
+                             "for that site -- an undeclared secret is the exact class "
+                             "creds-audit cannot see" % (name, scope[0], scope[1]))
+
+    if deferred:
+        oks.append("E1 %d expected artifact(s) deferred as not-yet-minted per "
+                   "creds-manifests/stages-reached"
+                   % deferred)
+    if gated:
+        oks.append("E1 %d expected artifact(s) NOT JUDGED -- their role (%s) has at least "
+                   "one location that could not be probed, so absence cannot be asserted "
+                   "over it" % (gated, ", ".join("%s/%s" % c
+                                                 for c in sorted(incomplete))))
+    if undeclarable:
+        fails.append("E4 UNCHECKABLE: %d row(s) have no declared location for their "
+                     "(role, site) and can never be verified -- add a location row or "
+                     "correct the matrix: %s" % (len(undeclarable), "; ".join(undeclarable)))
+    if not (absent or undeclared):
+        oks.append("E1/E3 existence: every expected artifact present and nothing "
+                   "undeclared, across %d fully-probed role(s)"
+                   % len([c for c in observed if c not in incomplete]))
+    return observed
+
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- tier 3
+# VALIDITY. Motivated by a measured gap: `creds-audit` PARSES declared provenance and
+# NEVER verifies it, so SEC-020's stale-trap warning -- "any future rotation MUST update
+# both copies in one operation or the region copy becomes a stale trap" -- has been
+# unchecked prose since the day it was written. The sha256 equality it depends on was a
+# ONE-TIME manual act on 2026-07-25 and nothing has re-verified it since.
+#
+# DIGESTS ONLY, NEVER CONTENT. `sha256sum` is invoked as an external command on BOTH sides
+# so that only a 64-hex digest ever enters this process -- the plan's hard constraint is
+# "compare sha256sum digests over ssh -- never transfer content", and reading bytes into
+# Python to hash them locally would satisfy the letter and not the spirit.
+SHA_RE = re.compile(r"^([0-9a-f]{64})\s")
+
+
+def digest_local(path):
+    try:
+        p = subprocess.run(["sha256sum", path], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60)
+    except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
+        return None
+    m = SHA_RE.match(p.stdout)
+    return m.group(1) if m else None
+
+
+def digest_remote(target, path, privileged=False):
+    cmd = "sha256sum %s" % path                      # path validated by SAFE_PATH_RE
+    if privileged:
+        cmd = "sudo -n sh -c " + shlex.quote(cmd)
+    try:
+        p = subprocess.run(["ssh", "-o", "BatchMode=yes", "-o", "ConnectTimeout=10",
+                            target, cmd], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60)
+    except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
+        return None
+    m = SHA_RE.match(p.stdout)
+    return m.group(1) if m else None
+
+
+# Declared-state vocabulary in docs/security-ledger.md. Keyword matching on prose is
+# FRAGILE and deliberately conservative: a small explicit set, and every hit REPORTS the
+# matched word so a human can see the basis rather than trusting the parse.
+REVOKED_WORDS = ("BURNED", "REVOKED", "COMPROMISED")
+
+# A declared-dead credential whose REMEDIATION the operator has explicitly deferred is a
+# different state from one nobody has ruled on, and V2 must not report them identically:
+# SEC-006 has carried "**DEFERRED by operator ruling 2026-07-13: revoke at completion of
+# this deployment.**" since before this checker existed, so failing it every run reports the
+# operator's own standing decision as a defect and trains readers to skip the finding.
+#
+# THE MATCH IS DELIBERATELY NARROW, and the narrowness is the whole safety property. It
+# demands BOTH the emphasis-cased state word AND an explicit attribution to an operator
+# ruling -- the GA-R5 bar. A looser pattern (any "defer") would let a credential be silenced
+# by a sentence merely *discussing* deferral, which converts this check into the false green
+# the register exists to prevent. Ruled-deferred is still reported, as an ACKNOWLEDGED
+# DEFERRAL naming the ruling; it is never dropped and never silent.
+DEFERRAL_RE = re.compile(r"DEFERRED\b[^|]{0,120}?operator ruling")
+
+
+def load_sec_states(path):
+    """{SEC-NNN: (state-word, snippet, deferral)} for rows the ledger declares dead.
+
+    `deferral` is the matched ruled-deferral phrase, or None when no operator ruling has
+    deferred the remediation.
+    """
+    out = {}
+    if not os.path.exists(path):
+        return out
+    for line in open(path):
+        m = re.match(r"\|\s*(SEC-\d+)\s*\|", line)
+        if not m:
+            continue
+        for w in REVOKED_WORDS:
+            if w in line:
+                i = line.index(w)
+                d = DEFERRAL_RE.search(line)
+                out[m.group(1)] = (w, line[max(0, i - 60):i + 80].strip(),
+                                   d.group(0).strip() if d else None)
+                break
+    return out
+
+
+def v2_declared_state(rows, sec_states, oks, fails):
+    """A credential the ledger declares DEAD must not sit in the register as healthy.
+
+    Nothing reconciled these two surfaces before: SEC-006 has recorded the NetBox upstream
+    token as BURNED -- "must be revoked + reissued, not merely rotated" -- since 2026-07-12,
+    while the matrix carried it as an ordinary `consolidated` row. This is the durable half
+    of validity: a liveness probe is a snapshot that can be stale a minute later, but a
+    declared revocation does not un-declare itself."""
+    bad = 0
+    deferred = 0
+    for r in rows:
+        if r.sec_ref == "-" or r.sec_ref not in sec_states:
+            continue
+        word, snippet, deferral = sec_states[r.sec_ref]
+        if r.custody not in IN_FOLDER and r.custody != "source-of-record":
+            continue
+        if deferral:
+            # Reported, not dropped. The credential is still live and still exposed -- the
+            # ruling defers the REMEDIATION, it does not change the state -- so the notice
+            # says so rather than reading as an all-clear.
+            deferred += 1
+            oks.append("V2 ACKNOWLEDGED DEFERRAL: id '%s' (%s) is custody=%s and %s declares "
+                       "it %s, but remediation is DEFERRED BY OPERATOR RULING -- the credential "
+                       "is still live and still exposed until that ruling is discharged. "
+                       "Ruling text: '%s'"
+                       % (r.id, r.filename, r.custody, r.sec_ref, word, deferral))
+            continue
+        bad += 1
+        fails.append("V2 DECLARED-DEAD BUT REGISTERED HEALTHY: id '%s' (%s) is custody=%s, "
+                     "but %s declares it %s -- a credential that must be revoked and "
+                     "reissued cannot also be a good consolidated copy. Ledger text: ...%s..."
+                     % (r.id, r.filename, r.custody, r.sec_ref, word, snippet[:90]))
+    if not bad:
+        oks.append("V2 declared state: no credential is registered healthy while its SEC row "
+                   "declares it %s" % "/".join(w.lower() for w in REVOKED_WORDS))
+
+
+def tier3_validity(rows, locations, use_remote, use_privileged, observed, oks, fails):
+    """Copies of one identity must be byte-identical, and the authority must be knowable."""
+    # where each (role, site) lives, so a row can be resolved to a concrete path
+    loc_by_scope = {}
+    for role, site, target, pat in locations:
+        loc_by_scope.setdefault((role, site), []).append((target, pat))
+
+    # WHAT IS COMPARABLE. An identity's rows are not all byte-copies of one another:
+    # `maas-region-admin` covers a password, an API key and a CLI profile -- three distinct
+    # artifacts -- and `netbox-sandbox-token` is a raw token on the VM but an assembled ENV
+    # FILE on the jumphost, same credential, different serialization. Comparing either pair
+    # is a false positive, and the first draft of this check produced exactly those two.
+    # Only two groupings are byte-comparable:
+    #   (a) rows sharing (id, filename) at DIFFERENT scopes -- the same artifact, copied;
+    #   (b) an id's `source-of-record` row against its `verbatim-copy` rows -- a declared
+    #       byte-identical copy under a different name (SEC-020's admin.pass shape).
+    # Anything else is skipped with a reason. A pair we cannot justify comparing is not a
+    # pair we may report drift on.
+    groups = {}
+    for r in rows:
+        if r.has_artifact():
+            groups.setdefault((r.id, r.filename), []).append(r)
+    comparable = [(k, v) for k, v in groups.items() if len(v) > 1]
+    for ident in sorted({r.id for r in rows}):
+        src = [r for r in rows if r.id == ident and r.custody == "source-of-record"
+               and r.has_artifact()]
+        cps = [r for r in rows if r.id == ident and r.custody == "verbatim-copy"
+               and r.has_artifact()]
+        if len(src) == 1 and cps:
+            comparable.append((("%s (declared verbatim copies)" % ident, ""), src + cps))
+
+    compared = matched = skipped = 0
+    verified = []
+    for (gid, _fn), copies in sorted(comparable, key=lambda t: str(t[0])):
+        digests = {}
+        for c in copies:
+            scope = (c.host_role, c.site_key)
+            paths = loc_by_scope.get(scope) or loc_by_scope.get((c.host_role, "-")) or []
+            got = None
+            for target, pat in paths:
+                base = os.path.dirname(pat)
+                if glob.has_magic(os.path.expanduser(base)) or "<" in c.filename:
+                    continue                 # instance-templated: no single resolvable path
+                full = base + "/" + c.filename
+                if target == "local":
+                    if os.path.isfile(os.path.expanduser(full)):
+                        got = digest_local(os.path.expanduser(full))
+                elif use_remote:
+                    got = digest_remote(target, full)
+                    if got is None and use_privileged:
+                        got = digest_remote(target, full, privileged=True)
+                if got:
+                    break
+            if got:
+                digests["%s/%s:%s" % (c.host_role, c.site_key, c.filename)] = got
+        if len(digests) < 2:
+            skipped += 1
+            continue
+        compared += 1
+        if len(set(digests.values())) == 1:
+            matched += 1
+            verified.append(str(gid))
+            continue
+        fails.append("V1 PROVENANCE DRIFT: '%s' -- %d copies that MUST be byte-identical "
+                     "have %d different digests (%s). A rotation updated one copy and not "
+                     "the other; the un-updated copy is a STALE TRAP (SEC-020)."
+                     % (gid, len(digests), len(set(digests.values())),
+                        ", ".join(sorted(digests))))
+    if skipped:
+        oks.append("V1 %d multi-copy identity(ies) SKIPPED -- fewer than two copies could "
+                   "be digested (unresolvable path, instance template, or a location not "
+                   "probed). A digest that could not be taken is never a match."
+                   % skipped)
+    if compared and matched == compared:
+        # Name what was verified. "4 compared" is not an audit trail -- a reader must be
+        # able to see that the SEC-020 pair is among them and not silently skipped.
+        oks.append("V1 provenance: all copies byte-identical for %d group(s): %s"
+                   % (compared, "; ".join(sorted(verified))))
+    elif not compared:
+        oks.append("V1 provenance: no identity had two digestible copies -- NOTHING was "
+                   "verified here; this is a skip, not a pass")
+
+
+def main():
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="D-137 credential-matrix checker")
+    here = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
+    repo = os.path.dirname(here)
+    ap.add_argument("--matrix", default=os.path.join(repo, "creds-matrix.tsv"))
+    ap.add_argument("--manifest-dir", default=os.path.join(repo, "creds-manifests"))
+    ap.add_argument("--notes", default=os.path.join(repo, "creds-matrix-notes.md"))
+    ap.add_argument("--repo", default=repo)
+    ap.add_argument("--dc", default=None, help="narrow per-DC checks to one region-qualified DC")
+    ap.add_argument("--all", action="store_true", help="run every implemented tier")
+    ap.add_argument("--locations",
+                    default=os.path.join(repo, "creds-manifests", "vm-secret-locations"))
+    # V2 reads the SEC register. It was derived from --repo, which the harness must point at
+    # the REAL repo for S4 mint-ref resolution -- so V2 was the one check with no fixture
+    # path and therefore shipped with ZERO harness cases. This override is what makes it
+    # testable; the default is unchanged.
+    ap.add_argument("--ledger",
+                    default=os.path.join(repo, "docs", "security-ledger.md"),
+                    help="SEC register read by tier-3 V2 (default: <repo>/docs/security-ledger.md)")
+    ap.add_argument("--tier2", action="store_true",
+                    help="run tier 2 (EXISTENCE) -- local locations only unless --remote")
+    ap.add_argument("--remote", action="store_true",
+                    help="include ssh locations, bounded ABSOLUTELY by vm-secret-locations "
+                         "(ruling 3). Metadata only; no file content is ever read.")
+    ap.add_argument("--tier3", action="store_true",
+                    help="run tier 3 (VALIDITY): cross-copy sha256 provenance. Implies "
+                         "--tier2, which supplies the probe results.")
+    ap.add_argument("--privileged", action="store_true",
+                    help="allow a `sudo -n` ESCALATION RETRY on a remote location the "
+                         "unprivileged probe could not open (the root-owned region and "
+                         "netbox secret dirs). Retried only where needed; metadata only.")
+    ap.add_argument("--stages",
+                    default=os.path.join(repo, "creds-manifests", "stages-reached"),
+                    help="declared reach of each mint stage. A derived projection of "
+                         "CURRENT-STATE (repo-lint L12 couples them); the script carries "
+                         "no status claim of its own (GA-R1).")
+    ap.add_argument("--render", action="store_true",
+                    help="print manifests rendered from the matrix (does not write)")
+    args = ap.parse_args()
+
+    if args.dc and not SITE_KEY_RE.match(args.dc):
+        sys.stderr.write("ERROR: --dc must be region-qualified (vr1-dc0 | vr1-dc1)\n")
+        return 2
+
+    oks, fails = [], []
+    rows = load_matrix(args.matrix, fails)
+    notes = load_notes(args.notes)
+
+    if args.render:
+        for site in sorted({r.site_key for r in rows if r.site_key != "-"}):
+            print("# %s.manifest -- GENERATED from creds-matrix.tsv (D-137 ruling 2)." % site)
+            print("# Do not hand-edit: regenerate with scripts/creds-matrix.py --render.")
+            for fname, mode, source, r in render_rows(rows, site):
+                if r.notes_ref != "-":
+                    print("# [%s] see creds-matrix-notes.md ## %s" % (r.id, r.notes_ref))
+                print("%-32s %s  %s" % (fname, mode, source))
+            print()
+        return 0
+
+    print("=== creds-matrix: tier 1 (STATIC) ===")
+    s1_schema(rows, oks, fails)
+    s2_manifest_coverage(rows, args.manifest_dir, oks, fails)
+    s3_render_drift(rows, args.manifest_dir, notes, oks, fails)
+    s4_mint_ref(rows, args.repo, oks, fails)
+    s5_per_dc_symmetry(rows, args.dc, oks, fails)
+    s6_principal_invariant(rows, oks, fails)
+    s7_notes_ref(rows, notes, args.notes, oks, fails)
+
+    if args.tier2 or args.tier3 or args.all:
+        print("=== creds-matrix: tier 2 (EXISTENCE) ===")
+        locations = load_locations(args.locations, args.repo, fails)
+        if locations is None:
+            fails.append("tier 2: no declared-location list at %s -- ruling 3 requires one "
+                         "before any discovery may run" % args.locations)
+        elif not locations:
+            fails.append("tier 2: the declared-location list at %s is EMPTY -- ruling 3's "
+                         "bound is absolute, so an unpopulated list REFUSES like a missing "
+                         "one rather than affirming existence over zero locations"
+                         % args.locations)
+        else:
+            stages = load_stages(args.stages, rows, fails)
+            if stages is None:
+                fails.append("tier 2: no stage declaration at %s -- without it the checker "
+                             "cannot tell a MISSING credential from a NOT-YET-MINTED one, "
+                             "and it will not guess" % args.stages)
+                stages = {}
+            observed = tier2_existence(rows, locations, args.remote, args.privileged,
+                                       stages, oks, fails)
+            if args.tier3 or args.all:
+                print("=== creds-matrix: tier 3 (VALIDITY) ===")
+                v2_declared_state(rows, load_sec_states(args.ledger), oks, fails)
+                tier3_validity(rows, locations, args.remote, args.privileged,
+                               observed, oks, fails)
+    else:
+        # SELF-SKIP WITH AN EXPLICIT [ok]: a tier that did not run must be visible.
+        oks.append("tier 2 (EXISTENCE) NOT RUN -- pass --tier2 (add --remote for the "
+                   "headend shadow stores and the region secrets dir)")
+
+    if not (args.tier3 or args.all):
+        oks.append("tier 3 (VALIDITY) NOT RUN -- pass --tier3 (with --tier2) to compare "
+                   "cross-copy sha256 provenance")
+
+    for o in oks:
+        print("  [ok]   %s" % o)
+    for f in fails:
+        print("  [FAIL] %s" % f)
+    print("\n%s: creds-matrix tier 1 -- %d row(s), %d check group(s) clean, %d finding(s)"
+          % ("PASS" if not fails else "FAIL", len(rows), len(oks), len(fails)))
+    return 1 if fails else 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())
diff --git a/scripts/creds-probe.sh b/scripts/creds-probe.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..7871c29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/creds-probe.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# scripts/creds-probe.sh -- D-137 tier 3 BEHAVIOURAL probes (operator-run, credential-using).
+#
+# WHY THIS IS A SEPARATE SCRIPT, and not part of creds-matrix.py.
+# A behavioural probe answers "does this credential still WORK", which requires USING it --
+# i.e. reading the secret value. `creds-matrix.py` is metadata-only by an enforced
+# invariant: its harness greps the source for content-reading verbs (T22) and for
+# content-TRANSFER verbs (T51). Folding probes in would have meant relaxing that guard, and
+# a guard relaxed once stays relaxed. So the credential-using component is separated,
+# small, and auditable on its own terms: THIS is the only file in the control permitted to
+# touch a secret value, and it still never prints one.
+#
+# BOUNDARY (operator-ruled 2026-07-26): full scope INCLUDING OpenStack service credentials.
+# EXCLUDED BY CONSTRUCTION, not by configuration: per-tenant credentials. Probing one means
+# authenticating AS a tenant on a commercial multi-tenant cloud; D-069 keeps tenant custody
+# off-repo and D-137 ruling 3 already excluded tenant surface from discovery for the same
+# reason. A `per-tenant` row is REFUSED below even if a probe is declared for it.
+#
+# SAFETY PROPERTIES, each deliberate:
+#   * NEVER RETRY a failed authentication. Retry loops are what lock accounts, and the MAAS
+#     `admin` identity is load-bearing for 19 call sites. One attempt, then report.
+#   * NEVER put a secret in argv (visible in `ps`) -- values are passed by file or stdin.
+#   * NEVER echo a secret. Probes report an outcome and an HTTP/exit status, nothing else.
+#   * AUTHENTICATION IS A SIDE EFFECT. Every probe writes a login/audit record on its
+#     target. That is unavoidable and is why this is operator-run at stage close and DC
+#     standup close, never a deploy gate. (Measured precedent: a probe called read-only
+#     during the 2026-07-25 SEC-020 work wrote `last_login` twice.)
+#   * STAGE-AWARE. A credential whose mint stage is `pending` in
+#     creds-manifests/stages-reached is SKIPPED explicitly, never reported failed.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   bash scripts/creds-probe.sh --list          # what would be probed, no authentication
+#   bash scripts/creds-probe.sh --run           # probe (AUTHENTICATES; writes audit records)
+# Exit: 0 all probed credentials answered | 1 any probe failed | 2 usage/config error.
+set -uo pipefail
+
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+REPO="$(cd "$HERE/.." && pwd)"
+MATRIX="${MATRIX:-$REPO/creds-matrix.tsv}"
+PROBES="${PROBES:-$REPO/creds-manifests/probes}"
+STAGES="${STAGES:-$REPO/creds-manifests/stages-reached}"
+CREDS_ROOT="${CREDS_ROOT:-$HOME}"
+
+MODE="${1:---list}"
+case "$MODE" in --list|--run) ;; *) echo "usage: creds-probe.sh --list|--run"; exit 2;; esac
+[ -f "$PROBES" ] || { echo "FAIL: no probe declaration at $PROBES"; exit 2; }
+[ -f "$MATRIX" ] || { echo "FAIL: no matrix at $MATRIX"; exit 2; }
+
+P=0; F=0; S=0
+ok()   { echo "  [ok]   $1"; P=$((P+1)); }
+bad()  { echo "  [FAIL] $1"; F=$((F+1)); }
+skip() { echo "  [skip] $1"; S=$((S+1)); }
+
+stage_reached() { # stage_reached <token> -> 0 if reached
+  awk -v t="$1" '!/^#/ && $1==t {print $2}' "$STAGES" 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^reached$'
+}
+cardinality_of() { awk -v i="$1" '!/^#/ && NF==12 && $1==i {print $2; exit}' "$MATRIX"; }
+stage_of()       { awk -v i="$1" '!/^#/ && NF==12 && $1==i {print $9; exit}' "$MATRIX"; }
+
+echo "=== creds-probe: D-137 tier 3 behavioural (${MODE#--}) ==="
+[ "$MODE" = "--run" ] && echo "  NOTE: this AUTHENTICATES. Each probe writes an audit/login record on its target."
+
+while read -r ID KIND TARGET; do
+  case "$ID" in ''|\#*) continue;; esac
+
+  card="$(cardinality_of "$ID")"
+  if [ -z "$card" ]; then
+    bad "$ID: declared as a probe but is in NO matrix row -- stale probe declaration"; continue
+  fi
+  # Tenant surface is refused by construction, not by configuration.
+  if [ "$card" = "per-tenant" ]; then
+    bad "$ID: per-tenant credentials are REFUSED (D-069 / ruling 3) -- remove this probe"; continue
+  fi
+  st="$(stage_of "$ID")"
+  if ! stage_reached "$st"; then
+    skip "$ID: mint-stage '$st' is pending -- not yet minted, so not probed"; continue
+  fi
+  if [ "$MODE" = "--list" ]; then
+    ok "$ID: would probe via '$KIND' -> $TARGET"; continue
+  fi
+
+  case "$KIND" in
+    ssh)
+      # Narrowest possible authentication: opens the connection, runs `true`, no payload.
+      # `-n` (and the redirect) are load-bearing, not belt-and-braces: without them ssh
+      # consumes the while-read loop's stdin and every subsequent probe is silently
+      # skipped. Measured on the first real run -- 1 of 13 probes executed and the run
+      # still exited 0, which is a false green in the tool that exists to prevent them.
+      if ssh -n -o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=10 -o NumberOfPasswordPrompts=0 \
+             "$TARGET" true </dev/null >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        ok "$ID: ssh key authenticates to $TARGET"
+      else
+        bad "$ID: ssh key FAILED to authenticate to $TARGET (not retried -- retry loops lock accounts)"
+      fi ;;
+    https-head)
+      # Unauthenticated reachability of the endpoint the credential is FOR. Proves the
+      # service answers without spending the credential; pairs with a declared-state check.
+      code="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -m 10 -k "$TARGET" 2>/dev/null)"
+      if [ -n "$code" ] && [ "$code" != "000" ]; then
+        ok "$ID: endpoint $TARGET answers (HTTP $code) -- credential NOT spent"
+      else
+        bad "$ID: endpoint $TARGET did not answer"
+      fi ;;
+    declared-only)
+      skip "$ID: declared non-probeable ($TARGET) -- validity rests on V1/V2, by decision" ;;
+    *)
+      bad "$ID: unknown probe kind '$KIND'" ;;
+  esac
+done < "$PROBES"
+
+# Total accounting: every declared probe must be reported in exactly one bucket. Without
+# this a loop that ate its own stdin (see the ssh -n note) reports a clean partial run.
+DECLARED=$(awk '!/^#/ && NF>=3' "$PROBES" | wc -l)
+SEEN=$((P + F + S))
+if [ "$SEEN" != "$DECLARED" ]; then
+  echo "  [FAIL] ACCOUNTING: $DECLARED probes declared but only $SEEN reported -- the run"
+  echo "         did not reach every declaration; treat this run as VOID, not as a pass."
+  F=$((F+1))
+fi
+
+echo
+echo "creds-probe: $P ok, $F failed, $S skipped"
+[ "$F" = 0 ] || exit 1
+exit 0
diff --git a/scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh b/scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..503d687
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh <check|install> <site> -- per-DC apt CACHING PROXY
+# (apt-cacher-ng). D-135 amendment 2026-07-24 (operator-ruled): the INTERIM DC1
+# apt path so the DC1 build starts WITHOUT waiting on the full ~950 GiB
+# debmirror. DC0 stays the full-mirror path (D-135 item 1); DC1's proxy is
+# the DC1 STRATEGY, not an interim step (D-135 AMENDMENT 2026-07-27: "DC0 is the
+# test of a full mirror. DC1 is the test of the mirror proxy."). The earlier
+# "DC1's proxy is REPLACED by a full mirror afterward" plan is SUPERSEDED -- dc1's
+# partial mirror and its whole apparatus were REMOVED 2026-07-27. Roosevelt:
+# cache-proxy vs full-mirror is a per-DC utility-node artifact-delivery choice
+# (D-132/D-133), and each DC proves one of them.
+#
+# RUNS ON THE DC RACK HOST, invoked over ssh like dc-mirror.sh (no clone there):
+#   check:   ssh -i <dc-key> -J voffice1 <user>@<rack-transit-ip> \
+#               'sudo bash -s' -- check dc1 < scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh
+#   install: same with 'install dc1' (idempotent; safe to re-run).
+#
+# PREREQS on the rack:
+#   - apt-cacher-ng must be apt-installed first (fail-loud with the exact line).
+#
+# THIS SCRIPT NOW OWNS ITS OWN UTILITY NET LAYER (changed 2026-07-27).
+#   It previously REUSED dc-mirror.sh's <site>-mirror-net.service for the .4
+#   alias + the edge default route, and refused to install without it. That
+#   coupling was a measured trap: on dc1 -- whose RULED artifact path is this
+#   proxy, NOT a mirror -- three files named `dc1-mirror-*` (the net unit, its
+#   apply helper, and the resolved drop-in) were load-bearing for the PROXY. So
+#   the recorded mirror-removal procedure (07-23 changelog: "stop/disable
+#   <site>-mirror-sync.timer + -net.service, rm the generated files") would have
+#   silently killed the proxy, and anyone tidying up "leftover mirror stuff" on a
+#   proxy-only DC would have done the same. Worse, the proxy could not be REBUILT
+#   after such a teardown: nothing but `dc-mirror.sh install` created the net
+#   layer, so rebuilding a proxy meant reinstalling the whole mirror apparatus
+#   (sync unit, enabled daily timer, nginx vhost, debmirror package).
+#
+#   Now: <site>-cache-proxy-net.service + <site>-cache-proxy-net-apply +
+#   /etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d/<site>-cache-proxy.conf. Neutrally named, owned
+#   here, so a proxy-only DC has NO mirror-named dependency and is independently
+#   rebuildable. The two net units are SAFE TO COEXIST on a site running both
+#   (`ip addr replace` / `ip route replace` are idempotent and both set the same
+#   MEASURED values), so this is additive for dc0, which keeps its mirror.
+#   Roosevelt: a DC's artifact-delivery strategy is a per-DC choice that must be
+#   changeable without a rebuild of the other strategy's apparatus.
+#
+# CONSUMPTION (Stage 5, PROXY mode -- all http apt cached, incl. UCA, no remap):
+#   juju model-config apt-http-proxy=http://<LISTEN>:3142
+#   (or per-node /etc/apt/apt.conf.d: Acquire::http::Proxy "http://<LISTEN>:3142";)
+#
+# EXIT: 0 ok | 1 check failed | 2 bad args/unknown site | 4 install failed.
+# ASCII + LF only.
+set -uo pipefail
+
+MODE="${1:-}"; SITE="${2:-}"
+case "$MODE" in check|install) ;; *)
+  echo "usage: dc-cache-proxy.sh <check|install> <site>" >&2; exit 2 ;; esac
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Site table. Same MEASURED/RULED utility .4 + edge gateway per DC as
+# dc-mirror.sh (the proxy listens at the SAME utility address the deploy
+# already expects). ADD A SITE ONLY WITH MEASURED/RULED VALUES (hard rule 2);
+# the harness rejects rows without a MEASURED tag.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+case "$SITE" in
+  dc0)
+    # MEASURED/RULED 2026-07-23 (D-134 amendment + D-135). NOTE: dc0's RULED
+    # path is the FULL MIRROR (D-135 item 1); this row exists for tooling
+    # parity only -- dc0 is not deployed via the proxy.
+    UTIL_NET="vr1-dc0-metal-admin"
+    LISTEN_CIDR="10.12.8.4/22"
+    EDGE_GW="10.12.4.1"
+    ;;
+  dc1)
+    # MEASURED/RULED 2026-07-24 (D-135 amendment -- interim DC1 apt path):
+    #   LISTEN 10.12.68.4 -- the D-134 utility .4, reused from the mirror-net
+    #     layer; EDGE_GW 10.12.64.1 -- dc1 edge LAN gw (upstream egress).
+    UTIL_NET="vr1-dc1-metal-admin"
+    LISTEN_CIDR="10.12.68.4/22"
+    EDGE_GW="10.12.64.1"
+    ;;
+  *) echo "FAIL: unknown site '$SITE' -- add a MEASURED row block first" >&2; exit 2 ;;
+esac
+LISTEN="${LISTEN_CIDR%%/*}"
+PROXY_PORT="3142"
+ACNG_DROPIN="/etc/apt-cacher-ng/acng.conf.d/${SITE}-cache-proxy.conf"
+# Net layer owned HERE (see the header note). Named for the PROXY, never "mirror".
+NET_HELPER="/usr/local/sbin/${SITE}-cache-proxy-net-apply"
+NET_UNIT="/etc/systemd/system/${SITE}-cache-proxy-net.service"
+RESOLVED_DROPIN="/etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d/${SITE}-cache-proxy.conf"
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Generated config (single source of truth for check AND install). Minimal:
+# apt-cacher-ng in proxy mode caches all http apt (archive/security/UCA) with
+# no per-repo remap; we only pin the port so a package-default change cannot
+# move it. Default CacheDir (/var/cache/apt-cacher-ng) is kept (owner-correct).
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+gen_acng_dropin() {
+  cat <<EOF
+# ${SITE} apt caching proxy -- generated by scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh
+# (D-135 amendment 2026-07-24); do not hand-edit. apt-cacher-ng proxy mode:
+# caches all http apt requested by the DC nodes (archive/security/UCA), no
+# per-repo remap. Consume via: juju model-config apt-http-proxy=http://${LISTEN}:${PROXY_PORT}
+Port: ${PROXY_PORT}
+EOF
+}
+
+# --- the utility net layer this script OWNS ---------------------------------
+# Same MEASURED mechanism dc-mirror.sh proved on both racks 2026-07-23: resolve
+# the bridge from the libvirt network NAME at runtime, then idempotently place
+# the .4 alias and the edge default route. Deliberately identical values, so the
+# two units coexist without fighting where a site runs both.
+gen_net_helper() {
+  cat <<EOF
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ${SITE}-cache-proxy-net-apply -- generated by scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh; do not hand-edit.
+# Places the proxy LISTEN alias (D-134 utility .4) and the default route via the
+# DC edge (the proxy's upstream egress). Bridge resolved from the libvirt network
+# NAME at runtime (virbrN is auto-assigned, not stable identity -- hard rule 3).
+set -euo pipefail
+br_of() {
+  virsh -c qemu:///system net-dumpxml "\$1" | sed -n "s/.*bridge name='\\([^']*\\)'.*/\\1/p"
+}
+ip addr replace ${LISTEN_CIDR} dev "\$(br_of ${UTIL_NET})"
+ip route replace default via ${EDGE_GW}
+EOF
+}
+
+gen_net_unit() {
+  cat <<EOF
+[Unit]
+Description=${SITE} cache-proxy net (dc-cache-proxy.sh; D-135 amendment -- LISTEN alias + edge default route)
+After=libvirtd.service ${SITE}-rack-legs.service network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+RemainAfterExit=yes
+ExecStart=${NET_HELPER}
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
+EOF
+}
+
+gen_resolved_dropin() {
+  cat <<EOF
+# ${SITE} cache-proxy DNS (generated by scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh; D-135 amendment).
+# System DNS = the DC edge resolver: the PROXY must resolve archive.ubuntu.com and
+# the UCA host to serve a cache miss, and the rack has no other working resolver.
+# The MAAS rack agent ignores resolv.conf (D-131), so node DNS is unaffected.
+[Resolve]
+DNS=${EDGE_GW}
+EOF
+}
+
+# Bridge for the utility net, resolved from the libvirt net NAME at runtime
+# (virbrN is auto-assigned, not stable identity -- hard rule 3).
+util_bridge() {
+  virsh -c qemu:///system net-dumpxml "$UTIL_NET" 2>/dev/null \
+    | sed -n "s/.*bridge name='\([^']*\)'.*/\1/p"
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# check -- mutate no CONFIG/service state; report and exit 0 ok / 1 incomplete.
+# (The behavioral smoke test may populate the proxy cache with two Release
+# files -- benign and self-managing; it is the proof the proxy actually serves.)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FAILED=0
+say(){ echo "  $1"; }
+miss(){ echo "  MISS $1"; FAILED=1; }
+
+do_check() {
+  command -v apt-cacher-ng >/dev/null 2>&1 || dpkg -s apt-cacher-ng >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+    && say "OK   apt-cacher-ng installed" || miss "apt-cacher-ng not installed"
+  if [ ! -f "$ACNG_DROPIN" ]; then miss "$ACNG_DROPIN absent"; else
+    if diff -q <(gen_acng_dropin) "$ACNG_DROPIN" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+      say "OK   $ACNG_DROPIN matches"; else miss "$ACNG_DROPIN DIFFERS from generated"; fi
+  fi
+  systemctl is-active --quiet apt-cacher-ng \
+    && say "OK   apt-cacher-ng active" || miss "apt-cacher-ng not active"
+  ss -ltn 2>/dev/null | grep -q ":${PROXY_PORT} " \
+    && say "OK   listening on :${PROXY_PORT}" || miss "not listening on :${PROXY_PORT}"
+  # Utility net layer -- OWNED HERE since 2026-07-27, so assert the ARTIFACTS too,
+  # not just the live effect. Asserting only the live address/route would pass
+  # while the layer was actually provided by <site>-mirror-net.service, which is
+  # exactly the hidden coupling this change removes: it would look independent and
+  # break the moment the mirror was torn down.
+  for pair in "$NET_HELPER:gen_net_helper" "$NET_UNIT:gen_net_unit" \
+              "$RESOLVED_DROPIN:gen_resolved_dropin"; do
+    f="${pair%%:*}"; g="${pair##*:}"
+    if [ ! -f "$f" ]; then miss "$f absent (this script owns the net layer now)"
+    elif diff -q <("$g") "$f" >/dev/null 2>&1; then say "OK   $f matches"
+    else miss "$f DIFFERS from generated"; fi
+  done
+  systemctl is-enabled --quiet "${SITE}-cache-proxy-net.service" 2>/dev/null \
+    && say "OK   ${SITE}-cache-proxy-net.service enabled" \
+    || miss "${SITE}-cache-proxy-net.service not enabled (the layer would not survive a reboot)"
+  br="$(util_bridge)"
+  if [ -n "$br" ] && ip -4 -o addr show dev "$br" 2>/dev/null | grep -q " ${LISTEN}/"; then
+    say "OK   ${LISTEN_CIDR} on $br ($UTIL_NET)"
+  else miss "${LISTEN_CIDR} absent on metal-admin bridge (run: dc-cache-proxy.sh install $SITE)"; fi
+  ip route show default 2>/dev/null | grep -q "via ${EDGE_GW}" \
+    && say "OK   default route via edge ${EDGE_GW}" \
+    || miss "default route via ${EDGE_GW} absent"
+  # Behavioral smoke test: fetch through the proxy (proxy mode) -- archive AND
+  # UCA, the two the deploy needs; proves cache-miss passthrough + upstream reach.
+  if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    for u in "http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/dists/jammy/Release" \
+             "http://ubuntu-cloud.archive.canonical.com/ubuntu/dists/jammy-updates/caracal/Release"; do
+      HTTP="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -x "http://${LISTEN}:${PROXY_PORT}" -m 20 "$u" 2>/dev/null)"
+      [ "$HTTP" = "200" ] && say "OK   proxy serves $u (200)" \
+        || miss "proxy did NOT serve $u (got '$HTTP')"
+    done
+  fi
+  [ "$FAILED" -eq 0 ] && { echo "dc-cache-proxy check ($SITE): PASS"; exit 0; }
+  echo "dc-cache-proxy check ($SITE): FAIL"; exit 1
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# install -- idempotent; requires root. Net layer is a PREREQ (owned by
+# dc-mirror.sh), verified fail-loud; apt-cacher-ng package is fail-loud too.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+do_install() {
+  [ "$(id -u)" = "0" ] || { echo "FAIL: install requires root" >&2; exit 4; }
+  umask 022
+  # Prereq: the libvirt utility net must EXIST (we resolve its bridge). This is a
+  # rack-standup artifact (dc-rack-net.sh), not a mirror artifact -- so a proxy-only
+  # DC has no dependency on the mirror apparatus at any point.
+  br="$(util_bridge)"
+  if [ -z "$br" ]; then
+    echo "FAIL: libvirt network '${UTIL_NET}' not found -- cannot resolve its bridge" >&2
+    echo "  the rack net layer comes first: dc-rack-net.sh install $SITE" >&2
+    exit 4
+  fi
+  # NET LAYER (owned here since 2026-07-27). Written and started BEFORE the proxy,
+  # so the LISTEN address and upstream egress exist independently of any mirror.
+  install -m 0755 /dev/null "$NET_HELPER" || exit 4
+  gen_net_helper > "$NET_HELPER" || exit 4
+  chmod 0755 "$NET_HELPER" || exit 4
+  gen_net_unit > "$NET_UNIT" || exit 4
+  mkdir -p "$(dirname "$RESOLVED_DROPIN")" || exit 4
+  gen_resolved_dropin > "$RESOLVED_DROPIN" || exit 4
+  systemctl daemon-reload || exit 4
+  systemctl enable "${SITE}-cache-proxy-net.service" >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 4
+  systemctl restart "${SITE}-cache-proxy-net.service" \
+    || { echo "FAIL: ${SITE}-cache-proxy-net.service did not apply" >&2; exit 4; }
+  systemctl restart systemd-resolved >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  # Prereq 2: the package (fail-loud, like dc-mirror.sh does for debmirror/nginx).
+  if ! dpkg -s apt-cacher-ng >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "FAIL: apt-cacher-ng not installed" >&2
+    echo "  net layer is up -- run: apt-get update && apt-get install -y apt-cacher-ng" >&2
+    echo "  then re-run: dc-cache-proxy.sh install $SITE" >&2
+    exit 4
+  fi
+  mkdir -p "$(dirname "$ACNG_DROPIN")" || exit 4
+  gen_acng_dropin > "$ACNG_DROPIN" || exit 4
+  systemctl enable apt-cacher-ng >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 4
+  systemctl restart apt-cacher-ng || { echo "FAIL: apt-cacher-ng restart" >&2; exit 4; }
+  echo "dc-cache-proxy install ($SITE): done -- running check:"
+  do_check
+}
+
+case "$MODE" in
+  check)   do_check ;;
+  install) do_install ;;
+esac
diff --git a/scripts/dc-mirror.sh b/scripts/dc-mirror.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..e409a76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/dc-mirror.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# scripts/dc-mirror.sh <check|install|sync> <site> -- per-DC artifact mirror,
+# D-135 item 1 (apt + Ubuntu Cloud Archive; the D-107 build-out, staged).
+# Part of DC-standup definition-of-done from Stage 4 on.
+#
+# RUNS ON THE DC RACK HOST (e.g. vvr1-dc0), not on vcloud/voffice1. Invoke
+# from a repo host over ssh, piping the script (no repo clone needed there):
+#
+#   check:    ssh -i <dc-key> -J voffice1 <user>@<rack-transit-ip> \
+#                 'sudo bash -s' -- check dc0 < scripts/dc-mirror.sh
+#   install:  same with 'install dc0' (idempotent; safe to re-run).
+#   sync:     same with 'sync dc0' -- starts the systemd sync job (async;
+#             the initial jammy+UCA pull is several hundred GB, hours).
+#
+# WHAT IT OWNS (site-keyed table below; every value MEASURED or RULED, cited):
+#   1. <site>-mirror-net.service -- oneshot, After=<site>-rack-legs.service:
+#      (a) adds the mirror LISTEN alias (the FIRST D-134 utility-band address,
+#      .4 on metal-admin) and (b) sets the rack's default route via the DC
+#      edge's LAN gateway -- the D-107 "mirror's upstream sync" egress path,
+#      MEASURED WORKING 2026-07-23 (rack->edge->internet ping 0% loss, curl
+#      HTTP 301 -- the D-125 signature; as-executed log stage4-carve). Bridge
+#      devices are resolved FROM LIBVIRT NETWORK NAMES at runtime (virbrN is
+#      auto-assigned, a drifting ID -- hard rule 3).
+#   2. /etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d/<site>-mirror.conf -- system DNS = the DC
+#      edge's resolver (MEASURED 2026-07-23: edge Unbound answers
+#      archive.ubuntu.com from the rack). Additive: the rack previously had NO
+#      working system DNS; the MAAS rack agent ignores resolv.conf entirely
+#      (measured, D-131), so this cannot regress node DNS.
+#   3. /usr/local/sbin/<site>-mirror-sync -- debmirror runner: Ubuntu jammy
+#      amd64 BINARY mirror (main/restricted/universe/multiverse; jammy,
+#      jammy-updates, jammy-security; no sources) into
+#      /var/lib/dc-mirror/ubuntu, plus Ubuntu Cloud Archive
+#      jammy-updates/caracal into /var/lib/dc-mirror/cloud-archive. GPG
+#      verified against the ubuntu-archive / ubuntu-cloud keyrings. Status in
+#      /var/lib/dc-mirror/last-sync.status.
+#   4. <site>-mirror-sync.service (oneshot) + <site>-mirror-sync.timer (daily,
+#      randomized) -- the upstream re-sync.
+#   5. /etc/nginx/sites-available/<site>-mirror (+ sites-enabled symlink) --
+#      serves /var/lib/dc-mirror on http://<LISTEN>/ (autoindex). Stage-5
+#      wiring consumes this via `juju model-config apt-mirror=` per DC model.
+#
+# PREREQ PACKAGES (install FAILS LOUD if absent; run the printed apt line
+# after the net unit is up -- the rack has no egress until it is):
+#   debmirror nginx ubuntu-keyring ubuntu-cloud-keyring
+#
+# UPSTREAM HOST NOTE (operator, 2026-07-25 -- future PREFERENCE, NOT yet applied):
+#   The MAIN ubuntu archive pulls from --host=archive.ubuntu.com (the generated
+#   <site>-mirror-sync, item 3). PREFER http://mirror.uoregon.edu/ubuntu/ -- the
+#   closest/fastest mirror for this deployment: switch that debmirror line's
+#   `--host=archive.ubuntu.com` -> `--host=mirror.uoregon.edu` (--root stays `ubuntu`).
+#   SCOPE = MAIN archive ONLY. The UCA (cloud-archive) debmirror uses a SEPARATE host
+#   (ubuntu-cloud.archive.canonical.com) that uoregon does NOT mirror -- leave it (or
+#   find a UCA-carrying mirror). Same preference applies to dc-cache-proxy.sh's upstream
+#   and the Roosevelt dedicated mirror. VERIFY uoregon carries jammy{,-updates,-security}
+#   main/restricted/universe/multiverse amd64 before flipping.
+#
+# EXIT: 0 ok | 1 check failed | 2 bad args/unknown site | 4 install failed.
+# ASCII + LF only.
+set -uo pipefail
+
+MODE="${1:-}"; SITE="${2:-}"
+case "$MODE" in check|install|sync) ;; *)
+  echo "usage: dc-mirror.sh <check|install|sync> <site>" >&2; exit 2 ;; esac
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Site table. ADD A SITE ONLY WITH MEASURED/RULED VALUES (hard rule 2); the
+# harness rejects rows without a MEASURED tag.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+case "$SITE" in
+  dc0)
+    # MEASURED/RULED 2026-07-23 (Stage 4, D-134 amendment + D-135; egress
+    # probe in as-executed log stage4-carve):
+    #   LISTEN 10.12.8.4/22 on vr1-dc0-metal-admin -- FIRST utility-band
+    #     address (D-134 .4-.9), mirror service address (D-135).
+    #   EDGE_GW 10.12.4.1 -- dc0 edge LAN gw (lib-net vr1-dc0 PLANE_GW;
+    #     ruled D-124/D-113 addressing), reached via the rack's existing
+    #     provider-public leg 10.12.4.2/22 (dc-rack-net.sh dc0 row).
+    MIRROR_NET="vr1-dc0-metal-admin"
+    LISTEN_CIDR="10.12.8.4/22"
+    EDGE_GW="10.12.4.1"
+    ;;
+  dc1)
+    # MEASURED/RULED 2026-07-23 (same session; dc1 values from the D-124
+    # amendment plane map + lib-net vr1-dc1 arm):
+    #   LISTEN 10.12.68.4/22 on vr1-dc1-metal-admin -- utility-band .4.
+    #   EDGE_GW 10.12.64.1 -- dc1 edge LAN gw (PLANE_GW, ruled provider
+    #     gateway), via the rack's provider-public leg 10.12.64.2/22.
+    MIRROR_NET="vr1-dc1-metal-admin"
+    LISTEN_CIDR="10.12.68.4/22"
+    EDGE_GW="10.12.64.1"
+    ;;
+  *) echo "FAIL: unknown site '$SITE' -- add a MEASURED row block first" >&2; exit 2 ;;
+esac
+LISTEN="${LISTEN_CIDR%%/*}"
+
+MIRROR_ROOT="/var/lib/dc-mirror"
+HELPER="/usr/local/sbin/${SITE}-mirror-net-apply"
+NET_UNIT="/etc/systemd/system/${SITE}-mirror-net.service"
+RESOLVED_DROPIN="/etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d/${SITE}-mirror.conf"
+SYNC_HELPER="/usr/local/sbin/${SITE}-mirror-sync"
+SYNC_UNIT="/etc/systemd/system/${SITE}-mirror-sync.service"
+SYNC_TIMER="/etc/systemd/system/${SITE}-mirror-sync.timer"
+NGINX_SITE="/etc/nginx/sites-available/${SITE}-mirror"
+NGINX_LINK="/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/${SITE}-mirror"
+ARCHIVE_KEYRING="/usr/share/keyrings/ubuntu-archive-keyring.gpg"
+CLOUD_KEYRING="/usr/share/keyrings/ubuntu-cloud-keyring.gpg"
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Generated file contents (single source of truth for check AND install).
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+gen_helper() {
+  cat <<EOF
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ${SITE}-mirror-net-apply -- generated by scripts/dc-mirror.sh; do not hand-edit.
+# Adds the mirror LISTEN alias (D-134 utility .4) and the default route via the
+# DC edge (D-107 mirror-sync egress). Bridge resolved from the libvirt network
+# NAME at runtime (virbrN is auto-assigned, not stable identity).
+set -euo pipefail
+br_of() {
+  virsh -c qemu:///system net-dumpxml "\$1" | sed -n "s/.*bridge name='\\([^']*\\)'.*/\\1/p"
+}
+ip addr replace ${LISTEN_CIDR} dev "\$(br_of ${MIRROR_NET})"
+ip route replace default via ${EDGE_GW}
+EOF
+}
+
+gen_net_unit() {
+  cat <<EOF
+[Unit]
+Description=${SITE} mirror net (dc-mirror.sh; D-135 -- LISTEN alias + edge default route)
+After=libvirtd.service ${SITE}-rack-legs.service network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+RemainAfterExit=yes
+ExecStart=${HELPER}
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
+EOF
+}
+
+gen_resolved_dropin() {
+  cat <<EOF
+# ${SITE} mirror DNS (generated by scripts/dc-mirror.sh; D-135). System DNS =
+# the DC edge resolver (MEASURED answering from the rack, 2026-07-23). The
+# MAAS rack agent ignores resolv.conf (D-131), so node DNS is unaffected.
+[Resolve]
+DNS=${EDGE_GW}
+EOF
+}
+
+gen_sync_helper() {
+  cat <<EOF
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ${SITE}-mirror-sync -- generated by scripts/dc-mirror.sh (D-135 item 1);
+# do not hand-edit. Jammy amd64 binary mirror + UCA caracal, GPG-verified.
+set -uo pipefail
+STATUS="${MIRROR_ROOT}/last-sync.status"
+echo "RUNNING \$(date -u +%FT%TZ)" > "\$STATUS"
+mkdir -p ${MIRROR_ROOT}/ubuntu ${MIRROR_ROOT}/cloud-archive
+debmirror ${MIRROR_ROOT}/ubuntu \\
+  --host=archive.ubuntu.com --root=ubuntu --method=http \\
+  --dist=jammy,jammy-updates,jammy-security \\
+  --section=main,restricted,universe,multiverse \\
+  --arch=amd64 --nosource --diff=none \\
+  --keyring=${ARCHIVE_KEYRING} --progress
+RC1=\$?
+debmirror ${MIRROR_ROOT}/cloud-archive \\
+  --host=ubuntu-cloud.archive.canonical.com --root=ubuntu --method=http \\
+  --dist=jammy-updates/caracal --section=main \\
+  --arch=amd64 --nosource --diff=none \\
+  --keyring=${CLOUD_KEYRING} --progress
+RC2=\$?
+if [ "\$RC1" -eq 0 ] && [ "\$RC2" -eq 0 ]; then
+  echo "OK \$(date -u +%FT%TZ) ubuntu=0 uca=0" > "\$STATUS"; exit 0
+fi
+echo "FAIL \$(date -u +%FT%TZ) ubuntu=\$RC1 uca=\$RC2" > "\$STATUS"; exit 1
+EOF
+}
+
+gen_sync_unit() {
+  cat <<EOF
+[Unit]
+Description=${SITE} mirror upstream sync (dc-mirror.sh; D-135 item 1: apt+UCA)
+After=${SITE}-mirror-net.service network-online.target
+Requires=${SITE}-mirror-net.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+# debmirror dies with "HOME not defined in environment!" under systemd's
+# empty environment (it needs a GPG home) -- measured on the first dc0 run.
+Environment=HOME=/root
+ExecStart=${SYNC_HELPER}
+Nice=10
+IOSchedulingClass=idle
+EOF
+}
+
+gen_sync_timer() {
+  cat <<EOF
+[Unit]
+Description=${SITE} mirror daily upstream re-sync (dc-mirror.sh; D-135)
+
+[Timer]
+OnCalendar=daily
+RandomizedDelaySec=3600
+Persistent=true
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=timers.target
+EOF
+}
+
+gen_nginx_site() {
+  cat <<EOF
+# ${SITE} mirror vhost (generated by scripts/dc-mirror.sh; D-135). Serves the
+# per-DC apt+UCA mirror on the D-134 utility address. Stage-5 wiring:
+# juju model-config apt-mirror=http://${LISTEN}/ubuntu (per DC model).
+server {
+    listen ${LISTEN}:80;
+    root ${MIRROR_ROOT};
+    autoindex on;
+    access_log /var/log/nginx/${SITE}-mirror.access.log;
+}
+EOF
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# check -- mutate NOTHING; report and exit 0 ok / 1 incomplete.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FAILED=0
+say(){ echo "  $1"; }
+miss(){ echo "  MISS $1"; FAILED=1; }
+
+check_file() { # path gen_fn
+  if [ ! -f "$1" ]; then miss "$1 absent"; return; fi
+  if diff -q <("$2") "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1; then say "OK   $1 matches"; else
+    miss "$1 DIFFERS from generated content"; fi
+}
+
+do_check() {
+  check_file "$HELPER" gen_helper
+  check_file "$NET_UNIT" gen_net_unit
+  check_file "$RESOLVED_DROPIN" gen_resolved_dropin
+  check_file "$SYNC_HELPER" gen_sync_helper
+  check_file "$SYNC_UNIT" gen_sync_unit
+  check_file "$SYNC_TIMER" gen_sync_timer
+  check_file "$NGINX_SITE" gen_nginx_site
+  [ -L "$NGINX_LINK" ] && say "OK   $NGINX_LINK enabled" || miss "$NGINX_LINK absent"
+  for u in "${SITE}-mirror-net.service" "${SITE}-mirror-sync.timer"; do
+    [ "$(systemctl is-enabled "$u" 2>/dev/null)" = "enabled" ] \
+      && say "OK   $u enabled" || miss "$u not enabled"
+  done
+  br="$(virsh -c qemu:///system net-dumpxml "$MIRROR_NET" 2>/dev/null \
+        | sed -n "s/.*bridge name='\([^']*\)'.*/\1/p")"
+  if [ -n "$br" ] && ip -4 -o addr show dev "$br" 2>/dev/null | grep -q " ${LISTEN}/"; then
+    say "OK   ${LISTEN_CIDR} on $br ($MIRROR_NET)"
+  else miss "${LISTEN_CIDR} absent on metal-admin bridge"; fi
+  ip route show default 2>/dev/null | grep -q "via ${EDGE_GW}" \
+    && say "OK   default route via edge ${EDGE_GW}" \
+    || miss "default route via ${EDGE_GW} absent"
+  systemctl is-active --quiet nginx \
+    && say "OK   nginx active" || miss "nginx not active"
+  if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    HTTP="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -m 5 "http://${LISTEN}/" 2>/dev/null)"
+    [ "$HTTP" = "200" ] && say "OK   mirror answers http://${LISTEN}/ (200)" \
+      || miss "mirror not answering on http://${LISTEN}/ (got '$HTTP')"
+  fi
+  # ASSERT ON THE STATUS CONTENT, not merely on the file existing. The original form here
+  # tested `[ -f ]` and printed whatever the file said behind an unconditional "OK", so a
+  # sync that FAILED and a sync that never finished both read as green and the check still
+  # exited PASS. MEASURED 2026-07-27, both racks, at the Stage 4 mirror gate: dc0 read
+  # "FAIL 2026-07-27T00:54:54Z ubuntu=255 uca=0" (a transient upstream 500 on
+  # dists/jammy/Release) and dc1 read "RUNNING 2026-07-23T21:49:35Z" -- a marker four days
+  # stale, left by the debmirror the D-135 amendment PAUSED with a signal, so it never wrote
+  # a terminal state. Both printed OK. A gate that cannot distinguish "synced" from "failed"
+  # or "died mid-run" is not a gate, and this is the check the stage closes on (GA-R6).
+  #
+  # RUNNING is deliberately NOT a pass and NOT a plain failure: it is either a sync genuinely
+  # in flight or a corpse, and the two are indistinguishable from the file alone -- so it is
+  # reported as an explicit UNKNOWN that the caller must resolve, never silently accepted.
+  # The cross-check is the unit: a RUNNING marker with no active unit is a corpse.
+  LSS="${MIRROR_ROOT}/last-sync.status"
+  if [ ! -f "$LSS" ]; then
+    miss "last-sync.status absent -- no sync has ever completed, so the mirror content is not attested"
+  else
+    LSTXT="$(tr -d '\r' < "$LSS" | head -1)"
+    case "$LSTXT" in
+      OK*)
+        say "OK   last-sync: $LSTXT" ;;
+      RUNNING*)
+        if systemctl is-active --quiet "${SITE}-mirror-sync.service" 2>/dev/null; then
+          miss "last-sync UNKNOWN: a sync is IN FLIGHT ($LSTXT) -- re-run this check once it finishes; the mirror is not yet attested complete"
+        else
+          miss "last-sync UNKNOWN: status says RUNNING ($LSTXT) but ${SITE}-mirror-sync.service is NOT active -- the sync died without writing a terminal state (stale marker, not a success)"
+        fi ;;
+      FAIL*)
+        miss "last-sync FAILED: $LSTXT -- the mirror content is NOT attested current; investigate before any gate cites this check" ;;
+      *)
+        miss "last-sync UNRECOGNISED: '$LSTXT' -- refusing to interpret an unknown status word as success" ;;
+    esac
+  fi
+  [ "$FAILED" -eq 0 ] && { echo "dc-mirror check ($SITE): PASS"; exit 0; }
+  echo "dc-mirror check ($SITE): FAIL"; exit 1
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# install -- idempotent; requires root. Net layer first (the rack has no
+# egress until it is up), then fail loud on missing packages.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+do_install() {
+  [ "$(id -u)" = "0" ] || { echo "FAIL: install requires root" >&2; exit 4; }
+  umask 022
+  mkdir -p /etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d "$MIRROR_ROOT" || exit 4
+  gen_helper          > "$HELPER"          && chmod 755 "$HELPER" || exit 4
+  gen_net_unit        > "$NET_UNIT"        || exit 4
+  gen_resolved_dropin > "$RESOLVED_DROPIN" || exit 4
+  systemctl daemon-reload || exit 4
+  systemctl enable --now "${SITE}-mirror-net.service" >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 4
+  systemctl try-restart systemd-resolved >/dev/null 2>&1
+  MISSING=""
+  command -v debmirror >/dev/null 2>&1 || MISSING="$MISSING debmirror"
+  command -v nginx     >/dev/null 2>&1 || MISSING="$MISSING nginx"
+  [ -f "$ARCHIVE_KEYRING" ] || MISSING="$MISSING ubuntu-keyring"
+  [ -f "$CLOUD_KEYRING" ]   || MISSING="$MISSING ubuntu-cloud-keyring"
+  if [ -n "$MISSING" ]; then
+    echo "FAIL: missing packages:$MISSING" >&2
+    echo "  net layer is up -- run: apt-get update && apt-get install -y$MISSING" >&2
+    echo "  then re-run: dc-mirror.sh install $SITE" >&2
+    exit 4
+  fi
+  gen_sync_helper > "$SYNC_HELPER" && chmod 755 "$SYNC_HELPER" || exit 4
+  gen_sync_unit   > "$SYNC_UNIT"   || exit 4
+  gen_sync_timer  > "$SYNC_TIMER"  || exit 4
+  gen_nginx_site  > "$NGINX_SITE"  || exit 4
+  ln -sf "$NGINX_SITE" "$NGINX_LINK" || exit 4
+  systemctl daemon-reload || exit 4
+  systemctl enable "${SITE}-mirror-sync.timer" >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 4
+  systemctl start "${SITE}-mirror-sync.timer" >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 4
+  nginx -t >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "FAIL: nginx config test" >&2; exit 4; }
+  systemctl enable --now nginx >/dev/null 2>&1
+  systemctl reload nginx || exit 4
+  echo "dc-mirror install ($SITE): done -- running check:"
+  echo "  (initial sync NOT started -- run: dc-mirror.sh sync $SITE)"
+  do_check
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# sync -- start the systemd sync job (async; hours for the initial pull).
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+do_sync() {
+  [ "$(id -u)" = "0" ] || { echo "FAIL: sync requires root" >&2; exit 4; }
+  systemctl start --no-block "${SITE}-mirror-sync.service" || exit 4
+  echo "dc-mirror sync ($SITE): started (async). Watch:"
+  echo "  systemctl status ${SITE}-mirror-sync.service"
+  echo "  cat ${MIRROR_ROOT}/last-sync.status"
+}
+
+case "$MODE" in
+  check)   do_check ;;
+  install) do_install ;;
+  sync)    do_sync ;;
+esac
diff --git a/scripts/lib-hosts.sh b/scripts/lib-hosts.sh
index 46a25b6..1a1db14 100644
--- a/scripts/lib-hosts.sh
+++ b/scripts/lib-hosts.sh
@@ -51,38 +51,104 @@
 
 # host_sysid <hostname>: resolve the LIVE MAAS system_id by hostname (never
 # hardcode it). Echoes the system_id, or empty if the host is not enrolled.
+# VR0 ONLY: VR0 hostnames are stable (hostname == domain name == power_id).
+# For VR1 DC nodes the MAAS hostname is a RANDOM name RE-MINTED on every
+# (re-)enlistment (measured: the 2026-07-21 pod-delete recovery renamed all 9)
+# -- use host_sysid_by_bootmac() there instead.
 host_sysid() {
   local hn="$1"
   maas "${MAAS_PROFILE:-admin}" machines read 2>/dev/null \
     | jq -r --arg h "$hn" '.[] | select(.hostname==$h) | .system_id' | head -1
 }
 
+# host_sysid_by_bootmac <mac>: resolve the LIVE MAAS system_id by boot-NIC MAC.
+# THE VR1 resolver: VR1 node identity is the tofu node name -> its config-PINNED
+# boot MAC (opentofu/vr1-dcN-substrate; pinned 2026-07-21/22); the MAC survives
+# re-enlistment, the random hostname does not.
+host_sysid_by_bootmac() {
+  local mac="$1"
+  maas "${MAAS_PROFILE:-admin}" machines read 2>/dev/null \
+    | jq -r --arg m "$mac" '.[] | select(.boot_interface.mac_address==$m) | .system_id' | head -1
+}
+
 # --- $DC selector convention (2026-07-09, tooling gap register #1) ---
 #
 # Mirrors lib-net.sh's lib_net_select_dc -- SAME region-qualified selectors
-# (D-119), but the answer here is honestly different, not a parallel no-op:
-# HOSTS / HOST_OCTET / HOST_BOOT_MAC above are VR0 DC0's real, measured,
-# enrolled hosts. VR1 DC0's and VR1 DC1's node VMs are created by
-# opentofu/modules/node-vm (Stage 3 / buildout-design Phase 2), which has not
-# run -- their hostnames, boot MACs, and octets do not exist yet, and
-# VIRSH_POWER_ADDRESS above is VR0 DC0's own vcloud host connection (the
-# buildout design's VR1 vcloud host is a distinct, not-yet-measured endpoint --
-# see opentofu's root `libvirt_uri` variable, also unset). Selecting either VR1
-# DC FAILS LOUDLY rather than inventing placeholder host data or silently
-# reusing VR0 DC0's real hosts for a different DC.
+# (D-119). The VR1 arms were POPULATED 2026-07-23 (Stage 4 carve session) from
+# MEASURED enrollment: both fleets commissioned Ready, identities cross-checked
+# tofu-name -> pinned boot MAC -> live system_id 9/9 per DC
+# (docs/audit/stage4-carve-verify-20260723.txt). Until then both VR1 arms
+# failed loud by design; that era's asymmetry note is history (git).
 #
-# DELIBERATE ASYMMETRY WITH lib-net.sh: `vr1-dc0` is a NO-OP there (D-101 says
-# it inherits VR0 DC0's v4 layout) but FAILS here (it has no enrolled hosts).
-# That is intentional and is asserted by tests/dc-selector.
+# VR1 IDENTITY MODEL (differs from VR0 -- read before consuming these maps):
+#   - HOSTS entries are the TOFU NODE NAMES (config-of-record, stable), NOT
+#     MAAS hostnames -- MAAS names are random and re-minted on re-enlistment.
+#   - Resolve a live system_id via host_sysid_by_bootmac "${HOST_BOOT_MAC[$h]}"
+#     (never via host_sysid; never cache system_ids).
+#   - HOST_OCTET carries the D-134-AMENDED per-role bands (control .100-.102,
+#     compute .120-.121, storage .150-.153), same octet on all six planes
+#     (D-133 flat carve -- applied + verified live, capture above).
+#   - VIRSH_POWER_ADDRESS is the per-DC rack transit URI (ruled step-D shape,
+#     per-machine virsh power -- D-103/D-123 amendments; SEC-012/SEC-016 keys).
+#   - HOST_TAG is the region-qualified per-DC placement tag (ruled 2026-07-23).
+# ONE SELECTION PER SHELL: cross-DC re-selection is REFUSED (stale-value
+# guard, lib-net precedent); same-DC re-selection is a no-op.
+_LIB_HOSTS_SELECTED=""
 lib_hosts_select_dc() {
   local dc="${1:?usage: lib_hosts_select_dc <vr0-dc0|vr1-dc0|vr1-dc1>}"
+  if [ -n "$_LIB_HOSTS_SELECTED" ] && [ "$_LIB_HOSTS_SELECTED" != "$dc" ]; then
+    echo "FAIL: lib-hosts already selected '$_LIB_HOSTS_SELECTED' in this shell -- start a fresh shell to select '$dc' (stale cross-DC host values are the D-117 off-by-one class)" >&2
+    return 1
+  fi
   case "$dc" in
     vr0-dc0)
       : # already the sourced defaults above -- explicit no-op, not a guess.
       ;;
-    vr1-dc0|vr1-dc1)
-      echo "FAIL: $dc has no enrolled hosts yet -- Phase 2/3 node-VM creation (opentofu/modules/node-vm) and MAAS enrollment haven't run for it. Do not invent HOSTS/HOST_OCTET/HOST_BOOT_MAC/VIRSH_POWER_ADDRESS values; populate this file with a real \$dc block once those hosts are actually enrolled and measured." >&2
-      return 1
+    vr1-dc0)
+      # MEASURED 2026-07-23 (Stage 4): 9/9 Ready; MACs are the config pins
+      # (opentofu/vr1-dc0-substrate, pinned from virsh domiflist 2026-07-21);
+      # octets applied live per D-134 amendment; tag applied 9/9 same day.
+      HOSTS=( vr1-dc0-control-01 vr1-dc0-control-02 vr1-dc0-control-03
+              vr1-dc0-compute-01 vr1-dc0-compute-02
+              vr1-dc0-storage-01 vr1-dc0-storage-02 vr1-dc0-storage-03 vr1-dc0-storage-04 )
+      HOST_OCTET=( [vr1-dc0-control-01]=100 [vr1-dc0-control-02]=101 [vr1-dc0-control-03]=102
+                   [vr1-dc0-compute-01]=120 [vr1-dc0-compute-02]=121
+                   [vr1-dc0-storage-01]=150 [vr1-dc0-storage-02]=151
+                   [vr1-dc0-storage-03]=152 [vr1-dc0-storage-04]=153 )
+      HOST_BOOT_MAC=( [vr1-dc0-control-01]=52:54:00:be:69:c5
+                      [vr1-dc0-control-02]=52:54:00:02:ff:57
+                      [vr1-dc0-control-03]=52:54:00:4f:de:a9
+                      [vr1-dc0-compute-01]=52:54:00:1b:19:e6
+                      [vr1-dc0-compute-02]=52:54:00:18:ab:b4
+                      [vr1-dc0-storage-01]=52:54:00:5f:8d:42
+                      [vr1-dc0-storage-02]=52:54:00:48:86:2c
+                      [vr1-dc0-storage-03]=52:54:00:b1:94:d1
+                      [vr1-dc0-storage-04]=52:54:00:2b:ed:ab )
+      VIRSH_POWER_ADDRESS="qemu+ssh://jessea123@172.31.0.2/system"
+      HOST_TAG="openstack-vr1-dc0"
+      ;;
+    vr1-dc1)
+      # MEASURED 2026-07-23 (Stage 4): 9/9 Ready; MACs are the config pins
+      # (opentofu/vr1-dc1-substrate, 52:54:01:d1:NN:01 encodes the node index);
+      # octets applied live per D-134 amendment; tag applied 9/9 same day.
+      HOSTS=( vr1-dc1-control-01 vr1-dc1-control-02 vr1-dc1-control-03
+              vr1-dc1-compute-01 vr1-dc1-compute-02
+              vr1-dc1-storage-01 vr1-dc1-storage-02 vr1-dc1-storage-03 vr1-dc1-storage-04 )
+      HOST_OCTET=( [vr1-dc1-control-01]=100 [vr1-dc1-control-02]=101 [vr1-dc1-control-03]=102
+                   [vr1-dc1-compute-01]=120 [vr1-dc1-compute-02]=121
+                   [vr1-dc1-storage-01]=150 [vr1-dc1-storage-02]=151
+                   [vr1-dc1-storage-03]=152 [vr1-dc1-storage-04]=153 )
+      HOST_BOOT_MAC=( [vr1-dc1-control-01]=52:54:01:d1:01:01
+                      [vr1-dc1-control-02]=52:54:01:d1:02:01
+                      [vr1-dc1-control-03]=52:54:01:d1:03:01
+                      [vr1-dc1-compute-01]=52:54:01:d1:04:01
+                      [vr1-dc1-compute-02]=52:54:01:d1:05:01
+                      [vr1-dc1-storage-01]=52:54:01:d1:06:01
+                      [vr1-dc1-storage-02]=52:54:01:d1:07:01
+                      [vr1-dc1-storage-03]=52:54:01:d1:08:01
+                      [vr1-dc1-storage-04]=52:54:01:d1:09:01 )
+      VIRSH_POWER_ADDRESS="qemu+ssh://jessea123@172.31.0.6/system"
+      HOST_TAG="openstack-vr1-dc1"
       ;;
     dc0|dc1|dc2)
       echo "FAIL: bare '$dc' is RETIRED (D-119). It was AMBIGUOUS ACROSS REGIONS: 'dc0' meant VR0's live DC0 here, but VR1's FIRST DC in the NetBox importer. Use the region-qualified selector: vr0-dc0 | vr1-dc0 | vr1-dc1" >&2
@@ -93,4 +159,5 @@
       return 1
       ;;
   esac
+  _LIB_HOSTS_SELECTED="$dc"
 }
diff --git a/scripts/lib-net.sh b/scripts/lib-net.sh
index 6195b74..341c560 100644
--- a/scripts/lib-net.sh
+++ b/scripts/lib-net.sh
@@ -116,6 +116,14 @@
         # this arm diverges and vr0-dc0's must not. Folding the two arms together
         # would encode the coincidence and lose the reason -- and the reason is
         # the thing that changes (VR1 DC0 gains its own v6 per the family matrix).
+        #
+        # D-133 CAVEAT (2026-07-23): the inherited METAL_INTERNAL_VID=103 /
+        # METAL_INTERNAL_IFACE=br-internal are VR0 CARVE ARTIFACTS ONLY. VR1 DC
+        # nodes carve every plane FLAT on its dedicated NIC (D-133 ADOPTED;
+        # metal-internal = untagged on enp3s0). Do NOT consume these two values
+        # for any VR1 carve/netplan surface -- they survive here solely because
+        # the D-101 inheritance is value-for-value and VR0 tooling still reads
+        # them under the vr0-dc0 arm.
       ;;
     vr1-dc1)
       # VR1's SECOND DC -- literals RATIFIED by the D-124 AMENDMENT (2026-07-21)
diff --git a/scripts/opnsense-set-interface-v4.sh b/scripts/opnsense-set-interface-v4.sh
index c51d603..5743841 100755
--- a/scripts/opnsense-set-interface-v4.sh
+++ b/scripts/opnsense-set-interface-v4.sh
@@ -126,6 +126,29 @@
 echo "=== APPLY (configctl -- saving config does NOT reconfigure the kernel) ==="
 # Re-addressing the interface you are connected THROUGH drops this SSH session by
 # design; the reconfigure still completes on the edge. Do not treat that as a failure.
+#
+# `filter reload` ADDED 2026-07-27 (operator-ruled; appendix-A "edge passes no LAN
+# traffic after v4 addressing"). MEASURED on the fresh dc1 edge 2026-07-23: `interface
+# reconfigure` applies the address to the KERNEL but does NOT regenerate the pf ruleset,
+# so OPNsense never creates its automatic outbound-NAT rules for the (re-)addressed LAN.
+# Forwarded LAN packets then leave the WAN un-NAT'd and replies never return -- the edge
+# passes NO LAN traffic while looking perfectly configured. Without this line the
+# addressing operation is INCOMPLETE, not merely unpolished, which is why the reload
+# belongs here rather than in a runbook step: DoD prose did not fire at dc1, and this
+# repo has a measured record of prose-only controls not firing (D-137's own wiring sat as
+# prose at phase-3:498 and missed BOTH DC standups).
+#
+# The defect is SILENT and self-masking: any later plugin install or config apply reloads
+# the filter as a side effect, so dc0's 2026-07-20 qga/plugin work hid it there until dc1
+# -- which had no later work -- exposed it at the mirror build.
+#
+# IT IS DELIBERATELY *NOT* ON THE NEXT LINE OF THIS HEREDOC. Re-addressing the interface
+# you arrived on drops the session DURING `interface reconfigure`, so a following command
+# in the same stream would never execute on the edge -- and that drop case is precisely
+# the dc1 scenario that produced the defect (the LAN was moved 192.168.1.1 -> 10.12.64.1
+# over the LAN itself). Putting the reload here would have looked like a fix while fixing
+# nothing exactly when it matters. It runs below instead, over a FRESH connection to
+# whichever address the edge now answers on.
 "${SSH[@]}" "root@${EDGE}" sh -s <<EOF || echo "  (connection dropped -- expected when re-addressing the interface you arrived on)"
 configctl interface reconfigure $IFNAME
 EOF
@@ -135,6 +158,30 @@
 # Reach the edge at its NEW address if we just moved the interface we arrived on.
 PROBE_HOST="$EDGE"
 [ "$ADDR" != "$EDGE" ] || PROBE_HOST="$ADDR"
+
+echo
+echo "=== REGENERATE THE PF RULESET (appendix-A: edge passes no LAN traffic) ==="
+# Fresh connection, post-reconfigure, so this runs even when the reconfigure dropped us.
+"${SSH[@]}" "root@${PROBE_HOST}" sh -s <<'EOF' || echo "  WARN: could not reload the filter -- run 'configctl filter reload' on the edge and re-test"
+configctl filter reload
+EOF
+# Report the automatic outbound NAT rules. A healthy edge shows `nat on <wan> inet from
+# (<lan>:network) ...`; the broken state shows ONLY the `no nat/rdr proto carp` boilerplate.
+# This is REPORTED, not gated: at the very first addressing of an edge there may legitimately
+# be no gateway yet and so no NAT to generate, and a hard failure here would block a correct
+# run. The script's hard gate stays the address-on-the-kernel check below -- a self-report is
+# never evidence, but neither is an assertion the operation cannot yet satisfy.
+NATOUT="$("${SSH[@]}" "root@${PROBE_HOST}" sh -s <<'EOF' 2>/dev/null || true
+pfctl -s nat 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'proto carp' | head -5
+EOF
+)"
+if [ -n "$NATOUT" ]; then
+  printf '%s\n' "$NATOUT" | sed 's/^/  /'
+else
+  echo "  WARN: no automatic outbound NAT rules beyond the carp boilerplate."
+  echo "        If this edge is meant to NAT a LAN, that is the appendix-A defect --"
+  echo "        verify with: pfctl -s nat   and re-test from a LAN client (0% loss, curl 301)."
+fi
 OUT="$("${SSH[@]}" "root@${PROBE_HOST}" sh -s <<EOF 2>/dev/null || true
 ifconfig $DEV inet 2>/dev/null | grep 'inet ' || true
 EOF
diff --git a/scripts/preflight.sh b/scripts/preflight.sh
index c6c2a9c..dce908a 100644
--- a/scripts/preflight.sh
+++ b/scripts/preflight.sh
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
 #   P2 bundle invariants    scripts/provider-bundle-check.py
 #   P3 channel assert       scripts/channel_assert.py     (needs charmhub; WARN if offline)
 #   P4 live pre-flight      scripts/pre-flight-checks.sh  (needs MAAS; overlay/VIP/planes/nodes)
-#   P5 reminders            stage-2 gates: juju-spaces-check.sh (AFTER add-model),
+#   P5 credential matrix    scripts/creds-matrix.py --tier2  (D-137 ruling 1;
+#                           tier 1 STATIC + tier 2 LOCAL. Hermetic: no ssh, no sudo.)
+#   P6 reminders            stage-2 gates: juju-spaces-check.sh (AFTER add-model),
 #                           osd-blank-check.sh (sudo), 'juju deploy --dry-run' (phase-01 1.2)
 #
 # Exit: 0 all pass | 1 any FAIL (do NOT deploy) | 2 warnings only (review, then decide).
@@ -40,7 +42,38 @@
   echo "  [FAIL] scripts/pre-flight-checks.sh missing"; note 1
 fi
 
-echo "================ P5: stage-2 reminders (NOT run here) ================"
+echo "================ P5: credential matrix (D-137 tier 1 + tier 2 local) ================"
+# D-137 ruling 1: enforcement is BLOCKING IN PREFLIGHT. Advisory was rejected as the
+# posture that demonstrably failed -- `creds-audit` read CLEAN on 2026-07-15 while four
+# region-VM secrets sat undeclared, and `admin.pass` surfaced 12 days later only because
+# someone looked. Tier 1 is wired here because it is OFFLINE and its findings ARE the three
+# ruled failure classes (expected-but-absent / undeclared / per-DC-asymmetric).
+#
+# LOCAL HALF ONLY, deliberately. `--tier2` without `--remote` is HERMETIC -- no ssh, no
+# sudo, no reachability coupling -- and still checks every jumphost creds folder for
+# undeclared files, wrong modes and missing credentials. The REMOTE half
+# (`--tier2 --remote --privileged`) is an operator-run check at DC-standup close and stage
+# close, NOT a deploy gate: it would let an unrelated host outage, a NOPASSWD change, or a
+# MAAS snap refresh turn the deploy gate red for reasons that are not about credentials,
+# and a gate that fails environmentally is a gate people learn to bypass. Same reasoning
+# `run-tests-all.sh:7-8` gives for staying out of preflight: different cadence.
+#
+# EXPECTED TO FAIL TODAY, BY DESIGN. The register is red on real defects (SEC-021's
+# declaration gaps, the SEC-020 ruling-5 identity conflation, the per-DC power-key
+# asymmetry). That is this gate working, not misconfigured: a deploy should not proceed
+# over an unreconciled credential estate. Going green is remediation, gated per row --
+# do NOT silence it by deleting matrix rows or by demoting this to a warning.
+# FAIL CLOSED if the checker is absent, mirroring P4. Without this guard a missing file
+# makes python3 exit 2, which `note` maps to WARN -- so DELETING the gate would downgrade
+# it to a warning instead of stopping the deploy. A gate that vanishes must never read as
+# a pass (harness T9 encodes this).
+if [ -f scripts/creds-matrix.py ]; then
+  python3 scripts/creds-matrix.py --tier2; note $?
+else
+  echo "  [FAIL] scripts/creds-matrix.py missing"; note 1
+fi
+
+echo "================ P6: stage-2 reminders (NOT run here) ================"
 echo "  - after 'juju add-model': bash scripts/juju-spaces-check.sh"
 echo "  - with sudo:              bash scripts/osd-blank-check.sh"
 echo "  - phase-01 Step 1.2:      juju deploy --dry-run (plan: 50 apps / 97 relations)"
diff --git a/scripts/provider-bundle-check.py b/scripts/provider-bundle-check.py
index ab6ffe5..2d029d0 100644
--- a/scripts/provider-bundle-check.py
+++ b/scripts/provider-bundle-check.py
@@ -25,15 +25,19 @@
 and now also scripts/review-bundle.py (DOCFIX-070). FAIL -> exit 1. ASCII-only output.
 (repo-lint: allow-stale-tokens -- guard checks name retired tokens by necessity)
 """
-import sys, re, ipaddress
+import sys, re, ipaddress, argparse
 try:
     import yaml
 except ImportError:
     sys.stderr.write("ERROR: PyYAML not installed (pip install pyyaml --break-system-packages)\n"); sys.exit(2)
 
-PROVIDER = ipaddress.ip_network("10.12.4.0/22")   # public API VIPs + FIPs share this plane (Pattern A)
-ADMIN    = ipaddress.ip_network("10.12.8.0/22")
-INTERNAL = ipaddress.ip_network("10.12.12.0/22")
+# Per-DC VIP bands (D-101: only the network prefix moves per DC; the octet band is
+# unchanged). --dc selects which set the VIP checks expect; default = the base
+# bundle's dc0 values, so an un-parameterized run is byte-identical to before.
+DC_BANDS = {
+    "vr1-dc0": ("10.12.4.0/22", "10.12.8.0/22", "10.12.12.0/22"),
+    "vr1-dc1": ("10.12.64.0/22", "10.12.68.0/22", "10.12.72.0/22"),
+}
 OCTET_LO, OCTET_HI = 50, 60
 EXPECT_PUBLIC_VIP  = 11
 EXPECT_CHASSIS_MACS = {
@@ -43,14 +47,75 @@
     "52:54:00:99:fc:c2",   # openstack3
 }
 MAC_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{2}(?::[0-9a-f]{2}){5}")
+ROLES = ("control", "compute", "storage")
+
+def _deep_merge(a, b):
+    if isinstance(a, dict) and isinstance(b, dict):
+        out = dict(a)
+        for k, v in b.items():
+            out[k] = _deep_merge(a[k], v) if k in a else v
+        return out
+    return b
+
+def merge_overlay(base, over):
+    """Juju-like overlay merge: applications/machines deep-merge key-by-key (a None
+    overlay value deletes that key), relations append, other top-level keys override.
+    NOTE: this MIRRORS juju's documented merge so the checker validates the effective
+    deploy input; the machines-block merge in particular is CONFIRMED at
+    `juju deploy --dry-run` before deploy (no offline juju merger exists)."""
+    base, over = base or {}, over or {}
+    out = dict(base)
+    for section in ("applications", "machines"):
+        b = dict(base.get(section) or {})
+        for k, v in (over.get(section) or {}).items():
+            if v is None:
+                b.pop(k, None)
+            elif isinstance(b.get(k), dict) and isinstance(v, dict):
+                b[k] = _deep_merge(b[k], v)
+            else:
+                b[k] = v
+        if b:
+            out[section] = b
+    rels = list(base.get("relations") or []) + list(over.get("relations") or [])
+    if rels:
+        out["relations"] = rels
+    for k, v in over.items():
+        if k not in ("applications", "machines", "relations"):
+            out[k] = v
+    return out
+
+def _role_of(spec):
+    """Extract control/compute/storage from a machine spec's `constraints: tags=...`."""
+    m = re.search(r"tags=(\S+)", str((spec or {}).get("constraints", "")))
+    tags = set(m.group(1).split(",")) if m else set()
+    for r in ROLES:
+        if r in tags:
+            return r
+    return None
 
 def main():
-    path = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "bundle.yaml"
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Pattern A / D-052-D-053 + placement bundle invariants")
+    ap.add_argument("path", nargs="?", default="bundle.yaml", help="base bundle (default bundle.yaml)")
+    ap.add_argument("--overlay", action="append", default=[], metavar="FILE",
+                    help="overlay bundle(s), applied in order (juju-like merge) to validate the effective deploy input")
+    ap.add_argument("--dc", choices=sorted(DC_BANDS), default="vr1-dc0",
+                    help="DC whose VIP bands to expect (default vr1-dc0 = the base bundle's own values)")
+    args = ap.parse_args()
+    path = args.path
     try:
         doc = yaml.safe_load(open(path, encoding="utf-8"))
     except Exception as e:
         sys.stderr.write("ERROR: cannot parse %s: %s\n" % (path, e)); return 2
+    for ov in args.overlay:
+        try:
+            doc = merge_overlay(doc, yaml.safe_load(open(ov, encoding="utf-8")))
+        except Exception as e:
+            sys.stderr.write("ERROR: cannot merge overlay %s: %s\n" % (ov, e)); return 2
+    PROVIDER, ADMIN, INTERNAL = (ipaddress.ip_network(x) for x in DC_BANDS[args.dc])
     apps = (doc or {}).get("applications", {}) or {}
+    machines = (doc or {}).get("machines", {}) or {}
+    roles = {str(mid): _role_of(spec) for mid, spec in machines.items()}
+    role_sep = any(roles.values())   # role-separated (VR1) vs hyperconverged base (VR0)
     fails, oks = [], []
 
     def pub(s): return ((s or {}).get("bindings", {}) or {}).get("public")
@@ -98,11 +163,19 @@
         if not bim:
             continue
         macs = set(MAC_RE.findall(bim.lower()))
-        missing = EXPECT_CHASSIS_MACS - macs
-        if missing:
-            fails.append("%s missing chassis MAC(s): %s" % (n, ", ".join(sorted(missing))))
+        if role_sep:
+            # VR1 role-separated: the VR0 openstack0-3 Pattern-A set (D-057/D-060) does not
+            # apply -- dc chassis are the compute-node provider MACs. Verify present + well-formed.
+            if macs:
+                oks.append("%s bridge-interface-mappings: %d well-formed MAC(s) (role-sep; VR0 set N/A)" % (n, len(macs)))
+            else:
+                fails.append("%s bridge-interface-mappings has no valid MAC" % n)
         else:
-            oks.append("%s bridge-interface-mappings: all 4 chassis MACs present (incl openstack0)" % n)
+            missing = EXPECT_CHASSIS_MACS - macs
+            if missing:
+                fails.append("%s missing chassis MAC(s): %s" % (n, ", ".join(sorted(missing))))
+            else:
+                oks.append("%s bridge-interface-mappings: all 4 chassis MACs present (incl openstack0)" % n)
 
     # -- 4. relations: existing apps, explicit endpoints (the magnum-shared-db class) --
     rels = (doc or {}).get("relations", []) or []
@@ -168,6 +241,45 @@
             except Exception as e:
                 fails.append("cannot read policyd zip: %s" % e)
 
+    # -- 8. Placement / anti-affinity (role separation). Activates ONLY when the
+    #       machines block carries control/compute/storage role tags; a base or
+    #       un-rendered bundle has none, so the checks self-skip (base stays green).
+    #       Run on the MERGED bundle (base + overlays) to see the scaled apps' real
+    #       num_units/to:. Catches the decorative-HA paths juju itself won't error on.
+    if role_sep:
+        pf0 = len(fails)
+        n_ctl = sum(1 for r in roles.values() if r == "control")
+        n_cmp = sum(1 for r in roles.values() if r == "compute")
+        n_stg = sum(1 for r in roles.values() if r == "storage")
+        for n, s in apps.items():
+            s = s or {}
+            tos = [str(t) for t in (s.get("to") or [])]
+            if not tos:
+                continue
+            ids = [t.split(":")[-1] for t in tos]
+            for t, mid in zip(tos, ids):                       # a. no dangling placement
+                if mid not in roles:
+                    fails.append("%s to: references undefined machine %r" % (n, t))
+            want = ("storage" if n == "ceph-osd" else "compute" if n == "nova-compute"
+                    else "control" if any(t.startswith("lxd:") for t in tos) else None)
+            if want:                                           # b. role placement
+                off = [t for t, mid in zip(tos, ids) if roles.get(mid) != want]
+                if off:
+                    fails.append("%s placed off-role (want %s node): %s" % (n, want, ", ".join(off)))
+            nu = s.get("num_units")                            # d. anti-affinity
+            if isinstance(nu, int) and nu >= 2 and len(set(ids)) < nu:
+                fails.append("%s num_units=%d but to: has %d distinct machine(s) -- anti-affinity defeat: %s"
+                             % (n, nu, len(set(ids)), ids))
+        for n, want, lbl in (("ceph-osd", n_stg, "storage"), ("nova-compute", n_cmp, "compute")):
+            nu = (apps.get(n) or {}).get("num_units")          # c. bare-metal role counts
+            if isinstance(nu, int) and nu != want:
+                fails.append("%s num_units=%d != %d %s node(s)" % (n, nu, want, lbl))
+        if len(fails) == pf0:
+            oks.append("placement: role-separated (%d control/%d compute/%d storage); "
+                       "anti-affinity + role placement + counts OK" % (n_ctl, n_cmp, n_stg))
+    else:
+        oks.append("placement: no role tags in machines block (base/un-rendered bundle) -- checks skipped")
+
     for o in oks:   print("  [ok]   %s" % o)
     for f in fails: print("  [FAIL] %s" % f)
     print("\n%s: Pattern A / D-052-D-053 bundle invariants (%s)" % ("PASS" if not fails else "FAIL", path))
diff --git a/scripts/reenroll-hosts.sh b/scripts/reenroll-hosts.sh
index 214601f..041e5ba 100644
--- a/scripts/reenroll-hosts.sh
+++ b/scripts/reenroll-hosts.sh
@@ -42,13 +42,17 @@
 # dc-dc-phase3 runbook's Step 1: an explicit $DC env var, never an inferred
 # default. Unset/empty $DC changes NOTHING -- this script runs exactly as it
 # always has, implicitly against DC0/VR0's real, enrolled hosts (backward
-# compatible by construction). Set DC=vr0-dc0|vr1-dc0|vr1-dc1 to select explicitly (D-119); the
-# selectors' own fail-loud behavior becomes this script's own exit code via
-# set -e (lib_hosts_select_dc fails for BOTH vr1-dc0 and vr1-dc1 today -- no
-# per-DC host inventory exists yet for either). No second validation layer is
-# added.
+# compatible by construction). Set DC=vr0-dc0|vr1-dc0|vr1-dc1 to select
+# explicitly (D-119). VR1 DCs are REFUSED here even though lib-hosts' VR1 arms
+# are populated (2026-07-23): this script's re-enroll mechanics are the VR0
+# flow (hostname-keyed, auto-commission assumptions); the VR1-native flow is
+# PXE re-enlist (pinned MACs) + scripts/maas-node-power.sh -- proven in the
+# 2026-07-21 recovery. Do not point this script at a VR1 fleet.
 DC="${DC:-}"
 if [ -n "$DC" ]; then
+  case "$DC" in vr1-*)
+    echo "FAIL: $DC refused -- this is the VR0 re-enroll flow. VR1 re-enrollment is PXE re-enlist (config-pinned MACs) + scripts/maas-node-power.sh (D-103/D-123 amendments); see the 2026-07-21 recovery in appendix-A." >&2
+    exit 1 ;; esac
   lib_net_select_dc "$DC"
   lib_hosts_select_dc "$DC"
 fi
diff --git a/scripts/repo-lint.sh b/scripts/repo-lint.sh
index d467437..42c0550 100644
--- a/scripts/repo-lint.sh
+++ b/scripts/repo-lint.sh
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 # Mutates NOTHING -- except under --record-clientdocs-sweep (DOCFIX-104, rewrites
 # ONLY clientdocs/sweep-receipt.txt) or --record-guide-skill-coupling (rewrites
 # ONLY clientdocs/guide-skill-coupling.txt, the L8 pin); both then lint as usual.
-# See the .py docstring for the check catalog (L1-L10).
+# See the .py docstring for the check catalog (L1-L12).
 # Exit: 0 clean | 1 FAIL findings | 2 warnings only.  ASCII + LF.
 set -uo pipefail
 HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
diff --git a/scripts/repo_lint.py b/scripts/repo_lint.py
index 1f31e2a..bc33b22 100644
--- a/scripts/repo_lint.py
+++ b/scripts/repo_lint.py
@@ -71,6 +71,19 @@
                     Severity: WARN during sweep Batch 0, then FAIL -- flip
                     L10_FAIL (phase5-sweep-plan Batch 0: "WARN for one
                     batch").
+  L11 caveman-resid caveman-compress residue (SEC-017): /caveman-compress
+  L12 stage-couple  creds-manifests/stages-reached is a DERIVED projection of
+                    CURRENT-STATE consumed by the blocking preflight P5 gate; editing it
+                    without CURRENT-STATE in the same change set lets the projection drift
+                    from its authority and the gate silently defer real absences (D-137)
+                    overwrites a prose file IN PLACE and drops a
+                    <name>.original.md backup beside it -- the signature of a
+                    lossy in-place rewrite having run against a repo-tracked
+                    file, incompatible with the verbatim-record discipline
+                    (GA-R1/R5). FAILS on any *.original.md in the tree
+                    (.git / .claude worktrees / .terraform / __pycache__
+                    excluded). Opt out with 'repo-lint: allow-original-md' in
+                    the file for a genuine, reviewed exception.
 
 Exit: 0 clean | 1 FAIL findings | 2 warnings only.  ASCII + LF.
 Usage: python3 scripts/repo_lint.py [--record-clientdocs-sweep] [--record-guide-skill-coupling] [repo-root]
@@ -438,6 +451,54 @@
                              "references/kubernetes.md + troubleshooting.md for the SAME "
                              "update, then re-record: %s" % COUPLING_CMD)
 
+    # ---- L12 stage-declaration coupling (D-137) ----
+    # creds-manifests/stages-reached is a machine-readable PROJECTION of CURRENT-STATE's
+    # stage reach, consumed by the BLOCKING preflight P5 gate: it decides which missing
+    # credentials are "not minted yet" rather than "missing". Editing it without its
+    # authority in the same change set lets the projection drift silently, and a drifted
+    # projection makes the gate DEFER real absences -- a false green. Same coupling L10
+    # applies to state-bearing surfaces, stated as its own rule so each has its own id.
+    if shutil.which("git") and \
+       git("rev-parse", "--is-inside-work-tree").stdout.strip() == "true" and \
+       git("rev-parse", "--verify", "-q", "HEAD").returncode == 0:
+        if git("status", "--porcelain").stdout.strip():
+            l12_scope = "pending change set"
+            l12_changed = set(git("diff", "--name-only", "HEAD").stdout.splitlines())
+            l12_changed |= set(git("ls-files", "--others", "--exclude-standard")
+                               .stdout.splitlines())
+        else:
+            l12_scope = "HEAD commit"
+            l12_changed = set(git("diff-tree", "-r", "--no-commit-id", "--name-only",
+                                  "--root", "HEAD").stdout.splitlines())
+        if ("creds-manifests/stages-reached" in l12_changed
+                and "docs/CURRENT-STATE.md" not in l12_changed):
+            fails.append("L12 %s edits creds-manifests/stages-reached (the D-137 stage "
+                         "projection consumed by the blocking preflight P5 gate) without "
+                         "touching docs/CURRENT-STATE.md -- the projection must not drift "
+                         "from its authority" % l12_scope)
+
+    # ---- L11 caveman-compress residue (SEC-017) ----
+    # /caveman-compress rewrites a prose file IN PLACE and drops a
+    # <name>.original.md backup beside it. That backup is the residue signature
+    # of a lossy in-place rewrite having run against a repo-tracked file --
+    # incompatible with this repo's verbatim-record discipline (GA-R1/R5). FAIL
+    # on any *.original.md in the tree; reuse the all_text() skip set. Escape
+    # hatch: a file carrying a `repo-lint: allow-original-md` marker line is a
+    # reviewed exception (L9 opt-out convention).
+    for p in R.rglob("*.original.md"):
+        if not p.is_file() or ".git" in p.parts or "__pycache__" in p.parts \
+           or ".terraform" in p.parts \
+           or (".claude" in p.parts and "worktrees" in p.parts):
+            continue
+        if "repo-lint: allow-original-md" in p.read_text(errors="replace"):
+            continue
+        rel = p.relative_to(R).as_posix()
+        fails.append("L11 %s: caveman-compress residue (a *.original.md backup = "
+                     "a lossy in-place rewrite ran against a repo-tracked file). "
+                     "Restore the original and delete the backup; /caveman-compress "
+                     "must NEVER run against repo-tracked prose (CLAUDE.md; SEC-017)."
+                     % rel)
+
     for w in warns:
         print("  [WARN] %s" % w)
     for f in fails:
diff --git a/tests/carve-host-interfaces/run-tests.sh b/tests/carve-host-interfaces/run-tests.sh
index 142174b..8bf066c 100644
--- a/tests/carve-host-interfaces/run-tests.sh
+++ b/tests/carve-host-interfaces/run-tests.sh
@@ -83,12 +83,12 @@
 has 'WOULD: create br-ex \(OVS\) parent=enp1s0\(id=100\)'
 has 'Summary: 0 fatal'
 
-run_dc 1 "DC=vr1-dc0: hosts selector fails loud (no per-DC host data)" vr1-dc0
-has 'no enrolled hosts yet'
+run_dc 1 "DC=vr1-dc0: REFUSED (D-133 guard -- VR0 flow, VR1 arms populated 2026-07-23)" vr1-dc0
+has 'superseded for VR1 by D-133'
 absent 'DO:|WOULD:'                                                 # must exit before any MAAS interaction
 
-run_dc 1 "DC=vr1-dc1: hosts selector fails loud (net arm ratified, D-124)" vr1-dc1
-has 'no enrolled hosts yet'
+run_dc 1 "DC=vr1-dc1: REFUSED (D-133 guard -- VR0 flow, VR1 arms populated 2026-07-23)" vr1-dc1
+has 'superseded for VR1 by D-133'
 absent 'DO:|WOULD:'                                                 # must exit before any MAAS interaction
 
 run_dc 1 "DC=bogus: unknown token fails loud" bogus
diff --git a/tests/creds-audit/run-tests.sh b/tests/creds-audit/run-tests.sh
index 7318a57..3b56886 100755
--- a/tests/creds-audit/run-tests.sh
+++ b/tests/creds-audit/run-tests.sh
@@ -67,6 +67,25 @@
               || { no "T6 a non-0700 folder should fail (rc=$rc)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$R/out"; }
 rm -rf "$R"
 
+# T8-T12: SPRAWL BLIND SPOTS the original six globs could not see (D-137 / SEC-023).
+# Each fixture is a real exposure class, not a hypothetical: admin.pass is the SEC-020
+# secret that sat undetected for 12 days, and admin-openrc is the exposure phase-03 is
+# PREDICTED to create at Stage 5.
+for probe in admin.pass:T8 id_ed25519:T9 tenant-ca.pem:T10 svc.apikey:T11 admin-openrc:T12 .admin.pass:T14 .svc_ed25519:T15; do
+  fname="${probe%%:*}"; tag="${probe##*:}"
+  R="$(mkenv)"; printf 'x\n' > "$R/$fname"; rc=$(run "$R")
+  [ "$rc" = 1 ] && grep -q "SPRAWL: sensitive file loose" "$R/out" \
+    && ok "$tag a loose '$fname' in the home root -> SPRAWL (was a blind spot)" \
+    || { no "$tag '$fname' must be caught as sprawl (rc=$rc)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$R/out"; }
+  rm -rf "$R"
+done
+
+# T13: widening must not make the check trigger-happy -- an ordinary file is NOT sprawl.
+R="$(mkenv)"; printf 'notes\n' > "$R/README.md"; printf 'x\n' > "$R/notes.txt"; rc=$(run "$R")
+[ "$rc" = 0 ] && ok "T13 ordinary non-secret files in the home root -> still CLEAN" \
+              || { no "T13 widened globs must not false-positive (rc=$rc)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$R/out"; }
+rm -rf "$R"
+
 # T7: the audit reads NO secret content -- no content-reading verbs in the script
 grep -qE '\b(cat|head|tail|less|more|od|xxd|hexdump)\b' "$AUDIT" \
   && no "T7 the audit contains a content-reading verb -- it must inspect metadata only" \
diff --git a/tests/creds-matrix/classify-findings.py b/tests/creds-matrix/classify-findings.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d38b1a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/creds-matrix/classify-findings.py
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Reduce a creds-matrix run to its FINDING CLASSES, one per line, sorted+unique.
+
+Used by the harness's expected-findings baseline. Classes, not instances: the baseline
+must survive a row being added or renamed, but must CHANGE when a class of defect is
+fixed or introduced -- so that remediating a defect requires updating the baseline in the
+same commit, rather than turning the gauntlet red for the person who fixed it.
+"""
+import sys, re
+KEYS = ("EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT", "UNEXPECTED-EXTRA", "FIELD DRIFT", "ASYMMETRY",
+        "IDENTITY CONFLATION", "UNDECLARED", "UNCHECKABLE", "WORLD-READABLE",
+        "MODE", "UNREADABLE", "ESCALATION FAILED", "FLOOR")
+out = set()
+for line in sys.stdin:
+    if "[FAIL]" not in line:
+        continue
+    body = line.split("[FAIL]", 1)[1].strip()
+    code = re.match(r"([SE]\d)\b", body)
+    key = next((k for k in KEYS if k in body), None)
+    if code and key:
+        out.add("%s %s" % (code.group(1), key))
+    elif code:
+        out.add(code.group(1) + " other")
+    else:
+        out.add("schema/row defect")
+for c in sorted(out):
+    print(c)
diff --git a/tests/creds-matrix/expected-findings.txt b/tests/creds-matrix/expected-findings.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9057f56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/creds-matrix/expected-findings.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+S2 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT
+S5 ASYMMETRY
+S6 IDENTITY CONFLATION
diff --git a/tests/creds-matrix/run-tests.sh b/tests/creds-matrix/run-tests.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d63218
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/creds-matrix/run-tests.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,634 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# tests/creds-matrix/run-tests.sh -- harness for scripts/creds-matrix.py (D-137 tier 1).
+#
+# One case per invariant, each named for the REAL defect it encodes. Fixtures are
+# mutations of a minimal valid artifact set, and every case asserts BOTH the exit code and
+# an output regex -- a check that fires with the wrong message is a check nobody can act on.
+#
+# Gauntlet contract (scripts/run-tests-all.sh:22 registers by glob and shows only tail -1):
+# the LAST line self-describes, and failure detail lines lead with a bare FAIL so the
+# runner's `^\s*(FAIL|\[XX\]|MISS|LEAK|COUNT)` excerpt matches them.
+set -uo pipefail
+
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+REPO="$(cd "$HERE/../.." && pwd)"
+CHECK="$REPO/scripts/creds-matrix.py"
+TMPROOT="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/creds-matrix-tests.$$"
+mkdir -p "$TMPROOT"
+trap 'rm -rf "$TMPROOT"' EXIT
+
+P=0; F=0
+ok() { P=$((P+1)); echo "  [ok]   $1"; }
+no() { F=$((F+1)); echo "FAIL   $1"; }
+
+# ---- minimal VALID fixture set -------------------------------------------------------
+mkenv() {
+  local d; d="$(mktemp -d "$TMPROOT/env.XXXXXX")"
+  mkdir -p "$d/creds-manifests"
+  cat > "$d/matrix.tsv" <<'EOF'
+alpha-key   per-site  vr1-office1  jumphost  alpha_ed25519      ssh   service  consolidated  stage2  operator-terminal  -  n-alpha
+alpha-key   per-site  vr1-office1  jumphost  alpha_ed25519.pub  none  service  consolidated  stage2  operator-terminal  -  n-alpha
+EOF
+  cat > "$d/creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest" <<'EOF'
+alpha_ed25519      600  local
+alpha_ed25519.pub  644  local
+EOF
+  cat > "$d/notes.md" <<'EOF'
+## n-alpha
+The alpha service keypair.
+EOF
+  echo "$d"
+}
+run() {  # run <env-dir> [extra args...] -> sets RC, writes $1/out
+  local d="$1"; shift
+  # Derive the stage declaration from THIS fixture's matrix, all reached. A fixed default
+  # cannot work: the declaration must be exhaustive over the tokens used AND carry no
+  # unused token, so it has to track the fixture. Cases that need a `pending` stage write
+  # their own file before calling run().
+  [ -f "$d/stages" ] || awk '!/^#/ && NF==12 {print $9" reached"}' "$d/matrix.tsv" \
+      | sort -u > "$d/stages"
+  # V2's SEC register, fixture-scoped. Empty unless the case writes one -- WITHOUT this the
+  # tier-3 cases read the REAL docs/security-ledger.md (because --repo must point at the real
+  # repo for S4 mint-ref resolution), which is why V2 had no harness cases at all.
+  [ -f "$d/ledger.md" ] || : > "$d/ledger.md"
+  python3 "$CHECK" --matrix "$d/matrix.tsv" --manifest-dir "$d/creds-manifests" \
+                   --notes "$d/notes.md" --repo "$REPO" --stages "$d/stages" \
+                   --locations "$d/locations" --ledger "$d/ledger.md" "$@" > "$d/out" 2>&1
+  RC=$?
+}
+# A tier-2 fixture: a declared LOCAL location holding the baseline keypair.
+mkloc() {  # mkloc <env-dir>
+  local d="$1"; mkdir -p "$d/store"
+  printf 'x\n' > "$d/store/alpha_ed25519";     chmod 600 "$d/store/alpha_ed25519"
+  printf 'x\n' > "$d/store/alpha_ed25519.pub"; chmod 644 "$d/store/alpha_ed25519.pub"
+  printf 'jumphost  vr1-office1  local  %s/store/*\n' "$d" > "$d/locations"
+}
+row() { printf '%s\n' "$1" >> "$2/matrix.tsv"; }
+note() { printf '\n## %s\nfixture note.\n' "$1" >> "$2/notes.md"; }
+
+echo "=== creds-matrix harness ==="
+
+# T1 -- the baseline must actually PASS, or every other case proves nothing.
+D=$(mkenv); run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && grep -q '^PASS: creds-matrix' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T1 a consistent matrix/manifest/notes set -> PASS, exit 0" \
+  || { no "T1 the valid baseline must pass (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T2 -- a field containing whitespace silently shifts every later column.
+D=$(mkenv); row 'beta pass  singleton  vr1-office1  jumphost  beta.txt  api  service  consolidated  stage2  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'field(s), want 12' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T2 a row with a whitespace-bearing field -> field-count FAIL" \
+  || { no "T2 whitespace in a field must be caught (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T3 -- bare `dc0` is the drifting form that has meant two different things per DC.
+D=$(mkenv); row 'beta  per-DC  dc0  jumphost  beta.txt  api  service  off-manifest-known  stage3  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'not region-qualified' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T3 a bare 'dc0' site-key -> REJECTED (region-qualified discipline)" \
+  || { no "T3 bare dc0 must be rejected (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T4 -- an invented custody token would silently escape every custody-conditioned rule.
+D=$(mkenv); row 'beta  singleton  vr1-office1  jumphost  beta.txt  api  service  probably-fine  stage2  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q "custody 'probably-fine' invalid" "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T4 an unknown custody token -> enum FAIL" \
+  || { no "T4 custody enum must be closed (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T5 -- the SAME identity declared twice at one location is a real duplication error.
+D=$(mkenv); row 'alpha-key  per-site  vr1-office1  jumphost  alpha_ed25519  ssh  service  consolidated  stage2  operator-terminal  -  n-alpha' "$D"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'duplicate (id,site,host-role,filename)' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T5 one identity declared twice at one location -> duplicate FAIL" \
+  || { no "T5 same-identity duplication must be caught (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T6 -- REGRESSION: two DIFFERENT identities may share one file (the Vault init artifact
+# holds both the unseal shares and the root token). Keying dedup on location alone
+# false-failed this.
+D=$(mkenv)
+row 'vault-shares  singleton  -  jumphost  vault-init  none  service  off-manifest-known  vr0-phase02  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+row 'vault-root    singleton  -  jumphost  vault-init  none  service  off-manifest-known  vr0-phase02  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && grep -q '^PASS: creds-matrix' "$D/out" && ! grep -q 'FAIL.*duplicate' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T6 two identities sharing one file -> allowed (Vault init regression)" \
+  || { no "T6 distinct identities may share a file (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T7 -- SEC-021's class: the register expects a credential the manifest never declared.
+D=$(mkenv); row 'gamma  per-site  vr1-office1  jumphost  gamma.txt  api  service  consolidated  stage2  operator-terminal  SEC-021  -' "$D"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q "EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: 'gamma.txt'" "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T7 expected by the matrix, absent from the manifest -> EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT (SEC-021 class)" \
+  || { no "T7 expected-but-absent must fire (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T8 -- the undeclared-secret class SEC-009/-020 kept missing, now from the other side.
+D=$(mkenv); printf 'delta.txt  600  local\n' >> "$D/creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q "UNEXPECTED-EXTRA: manifest declares 'delta.txt'" "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T8 declared in the manifest, unknown to the matrix -> UNEXPECTED-EXTRA" \
+  || { no "T8 unexpected-extra must fire (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T9 -- THE FALSE GREEN. An empty matrix examines no site, so a site-scoped loop finds
+# nothing undeclared and reports CLEAN while every declared credential sits unregistered.
+# Same defect netbox/sandbox-fidelity-check.py:131-143 records: an upper bound
+# masquerading as an assertion. The site set must be the UNION of both sides.
+D=$(mkenv); printf '# every row removed\n' > "$D/matrix.tsv"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'UNEXPECTED-EXTRA' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T9 an EMPTY matrix against populated manifests -> FAILS (the false-green regression)" \
+  || { no "T9 an empty matrix must not read clean (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T10 -- a mint-ref that points past EOF is stale provenance, the drift class tier 3 exists for.
+D=$(mkenv); row 'beta  singleton  vr1-office1  headend  beta.txt  api  service  off-manifest-known  stage2  script:scripts/creds-audit.sh:99999  -  -' "$D"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'points past EOF' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T10 a mint-ref line past EOF -> stale-provenance FAIL" \
+  || { no "T10 out-of-range mint-ref must be caught (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T11 -- a mint-ref naming a file that no longer exists (the rename/retire class).
+D=$(mkenv); row 'beta  singleton  vr1-office1  headend  beta.txt  api  service  off-manifest-known  stage2  script:scripts/no-such-script.sh:1  -  -' "$D"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'mint-ref target does not exist' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T11 a mint-ref to a deleted file -> FAIL" \
+  || { no "T11 missing mint-ref target must be caught (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T12 -- research FINDING 1: ssh-keygen has ZERO hits repo-wide, so 12 declared secrets
+# have no mint command. Those rows are the DEBT the register exists to surface -- they
+# must be ADMITTED and reported, never treated as parse errors.
+D=$(mkenv); run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && grep -q 'provenance debt: 2 row(s) are mint-ref=operator-terminal' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T12 operator-terminal rows -> admitted and reported as debt, not parse errors" \
+  || { no "T12 operator-terminal must be admitted + counted (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T13 -- a per-DC credential existing at one DC only (the SEC-021 divergence shape).
+D=$(mkenv)
+row 'dc0-power  per-DC  vr1-dc0  jumphost  vr1-dc0-power_ed25519  ssh  service  consolidated  stage3  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+mkdir -p "$D/creds-manifests"; printf 'vr1-dc0-power_ed25519  600  local\n' > "$D/creds-manifests/vr1-dc0.manifest"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'S5 ASYMMETRY' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T13 a per-DC credential at one DC only -> ASYMMETRY FAIL (SEC-021 shape)" \
+  || { no "T13 per-DC asymmetry must fire (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T14 -- narrowing to one DC cannot silently 'pass' a check that needs both.
+D=$(mkenv); run "$D" --dc vr1-dc1
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && grep -q 'symmetry needs BOTH DCs, so the check is SKIPPED' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T14 --dc narrows -> symmetry SKIPPED explicitly, never silently passed" \
+  || { no "T14 --dc must skip symmetry out loud (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T15 -- D-137 ruling 5: ONE IDENTITY SERVES ONE PRINCIPAL TYPE. This is the live SEC-020
+# conflation (`admin` is both the human GUI login and the automation identity).
+D=$(mkenv)
+row 'shared-ident  singleton  vr1-office1  headend  shared.pass    gui  human    off-manifest-known  stage2  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+row 'shared-ident  singleton  vr1-office1  headend  shared.apikey  api  service  off-manifest-known  stage2  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'IDENTITY CONFLATION' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T15 one identity serving human AND service -> ruling-5 CONFLATION FAIL" \
+  || { no "T15 ruling-5 invariant must fire (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T16 -- a non-credential index file (principal '-') must not fault the ruling-5 check.
+D=$(mkenv)
+row 'folder-readme  per-site  vr1-office1  jumphost  README  none  -  consolidated  -  -  -  -' "$D"
+printf 'README  600  local\n' >> "$D/creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && ! grep -q 'IDENTITY CONFLATION' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T16 a principal='-' index file -> skipped by ruling 5, not faulted" \
+  || { no "T16 principal '-' must be skipped (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T17 -- a notes-ref with no entry means ruling-2 governance prose was silently dropped.
+D=$(mkenv); row 'beta  singleton  vr1-office1  headend  beta.txt  api  service  off-manifest-known  stage2  operator-terminal  -  n-nonexistent' "$D"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q "notes-ref 'n-nonexistent' has no" "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T17 a dangling notes-ref -> FAIL (ruling-2 prose must not be droppable)" \
+  || { no "T17 dangling notes-ref must be caught (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T18 -- an orphan note is prose that survived the row it documented (the other direction).
+D=$(mkenv); note 'n-orphan' "$D"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q "orphan note 'n-orphan'" "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T18 a note referenced by no row -> orphan FAIL" \
+  || { no "T18 orphan notes must be caught (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T19 -- the mode column is DERIVED (.pub -> 644, else 600), so a hand-edited manifest
+# mode is drift. This is what makes manifests generated artifacts per ruling 2.
+D=$(mkenv); sed -i 's/^alpha_ed25519.pub  644/alpha_ed25519.pub  600/' "$D/creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -qE 'FIELD DRIFT|render drift' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T19 a hand-edited manifest mode -> render/field DRIFT FAIL" \
+  || { no "T19 mode drift must be caught (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T20 -- rows with no host artifact (filename '-') must skip existence-shaped checks
+# rather than fault: the juju-<dc> superuser password is stored NOWHERE by ruling.
+D=$(mkenv)
+row 'nowhere-user  singleton  vr1-office1  -  -  api  service  off-manifest-known  stage5  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] \
+  && ok "T20 a filename='-' row (credential with no host artifact) -> skipped, not faulted" \
+  || { no "T20 no-artifact rows must be skipped (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T21 -- a tier that did not run must announce itself. A silent pass is the exact
+# false-green this design exists to prevent. Tier 2 is built, so --all RUNS it and only
+# tier 3 self-announces; a default run announces tier 2 as NOT RUN.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; run "$D" --all
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && grep -q 'tier 2 (EXISTENCE)' "$D/out" \
+             && grep -q 'tier 3 (VALIDITY)' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T21a --all runs every built tier (2 and 3) -> no silent skip" \
+  || { no "T21a --all tier reporting (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && grep -q 'tier 2 (EXISTENCE) NOT RUN' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T21b a default run announces tier 2 as NOT RUN -> never a silent skip" \
+  || { no "T21b default run must announce tier 2 (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T22 -- METADATA ONLY. The checker must never gain a content-reading verb; it inspects
+# existence, mode, and declared provenance. Mirrors tests/creds-audit/run-tests.sh:71-73.
+grep -qE '\b(cat|head|tail|less|more|od|xxd|hexdump)\b' "$CHECK" \
+  && no "T22 the checker contains a content-reading verb -- it must inspect metadata only" \
+  || ok "T22 metadata-only: no cat/head/tail/od/xxd in the checker"
+
+# T23 -- --render must emit a GENERATED banner, so nobody hand-edits a derived manifest.
+D=$(mkenv); run "$D" --render
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && grep -q 'GENERATED from creds-matrix.tsv' "$D/out" \
+             && grep -qE 'alpha_ed25519\.pub +644 +local' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T23 --render emits a GENERATED banner and the derived modes" \
+  || { no "T23 --render output shape (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T24 -- the REAL tree must be RED, and red for the RIGHT CLASSES. Compared against a
+# checked-in baseline of finding CLASSES rather than literal strings: the old form grepped
+# for "IDENTITY CONFLATION", so REMEDIATING that defect -- the fix the plan, the notes and
+# the changelog all prescribe -- would have deleted the string and turned the GAUNTLET red
+# for whoever did the right thing. The cheapest response at that moment is to edit the
+# test, which is exactly when the "do not go green by deleting rows" guard stops existing.
+# With a baseline, remediation REQUIRES updating expected-findings.txt in the same commit:
+# a recorded decision instead of a mystery breakage.
+python3 "$CHECK" 2>&1 | python3 "$HERE/classify-findings.py" > "$TMPROOT/actual.txt"; RRC=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
+if diff -u "$HERE/expected-findings.txt" "$TMPROOT/actual.txt" > "$TMPROOT/diff.txt" 2>&1; then
+  [ "$RRC" = 1 ] \
+    && ok "T24 the real tree is RED with exactly the baselined finding classes" \
+    || no "T24 the real tree must exit 1 (rc=$RRC)"
+else
+  no "T24 finding CLASSES drifted from tests/creds-matrix/expected-findings.txt -- if you"
+  echo "       FIXED a defect, update the baseline in the SAME commit; if a NEW class"
+  echo "       appeared, that is a regression. Diff (expected vs actual):"
+  sed 's/^/       /' "$TMPROOT/diff.txt"
+fi
+
+
+# ---- tier 2 (EXISTENCE) ---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# T25 -- the tier-2 baseline: everything expected is present at its declared location.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && grep -q 'E1/E3 existence' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T25 every expected artifact present at a declared location -> tier 2 clean" \
+  || { no "T25 tier-2 baseline must pass (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T26 -- the register's whole reason for existing: a credential that SHOULD be there and
+# is not. Absence is invisible to a discovery sweep; only an expected-state register sees it.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; rm "$D/store/alpha_ed25519"; run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q "E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: alpha-key 'alpha_ed25519'" "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T26 an expected credential missing from disk -> E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT" \
+  || { no "T26 absence must be detectable (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T27 -- a credential whose mint-stage has not been reached is DEFERRED, not failed --
+# and the caller declares that, never the script (GA-R1: no status claim lives in code).
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; rm "$D/store/alpha_ed25519"
+printf 'stage2 pending\n' > "$D/stages"; run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && grep -q 'deferred as not-yet-minted' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T27 a stage declared 'pending' defers its credential instead of failing it" \
+  || { no "T27 pending deferral (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T28 -- the SEC-020/-022 class from the other side: a real secret sitting at a declared
+# location that no matrix row accounts for.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; printf 'x\n' > "$D/store/stray.apikey"; run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q "E3 UNDECLARED: 'stray.apikey'" "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T28 an undeclared secret at a declared location -> E3 UNDECLARED" \
+  || { no "T28 undeclared detection (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T29 -- a group-readable private key is an exposure, not a cosmetic difference.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; chmod 640 "$D/store/alpha_ed25519"; run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'E2 MODE' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T29 a private key at the wrong mode -> E2 MODE FAIL" \
+  || { no "T29 mode enforcement (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T30 -- ruling 3 is absolute: with no declared-location list there is no bound, so
+# discovery must REFUSE to run rather than fall back to walking anything.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; rm "$D/locations"; run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'no declared-location list' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T30 a missing locations list -> tier 2 REFUSES to run (ruling 3 is absolute)" \
+  || { no "T30 must refuse unbounded discovery (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T31 -- remote locations are opt-in, and their omission must be VISIBLE. A local-only
+# run that quietly ignored the headend would reproduce the SEC-022 blind spot exactly.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"
+printf 'headend  vr1-office1  some-host  /root/secrets/*\n' >> "$D/locations"
+run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && grep -q 'remote location(s) SKIPPED' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T31 remote locations omitted without --remote -> announced, not silently dropped" \
+  || { no "T31 remote omission must be visible (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T32 -- an unreachable host must SKIP explicitly. Treating 'could not look' as 'nothing
+# there' is the false-green that makes a credential audit worthless.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"
+printf 'headend  vr1-office1  no-such-host.invalid  /root/secrets/*\n' >> "$D/locations"
+run "$D" --tier2 --remote
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && grep -q 'UNREACHABLE' "$D/out" \
+             && grep -q 'never a pass' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T32 an unreachable host -> explicit UNREACHABLE skip, never counted as clean" \
+  || { no "T32 unreachable must skip loudly (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T33 -- FALSE-GREEN REGRESSION: a declared location that EXISTS but cannot be listed.
+# A shell glob over an unreadable directory does not expand, so a naive probe finds no
+# files and reports "nothing undeclared here" about a directory it never opened. The
+# region secrets dir (SEC-020) is exactly such a directory.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; mkdir -p "$D/locked"; printf 'x\n' > "$D/locked/hidden.key"
+chmod 000 "$D/locked"
+printf 'jumphost  vr1-office1  local  %s/locked/*\n' "$D" >> "$D/locations"
+run "$D" --tier2
+chmod 755 "$D/locked"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'E0 UNREADABLE' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T33 an unreadable declared location -> UNREADABLE FAIL, never an empty listing" \
+  || { no "T33 unreadable must not read as empty (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T34 -- a declared location that simply does not exist yet is a SKIP, not a failure.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"
+printf 'jumphost  vr1-office1  local  %s/not-created-yet/*\n' "$D" >> "$D/locations"
+run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && grep -q 'does not exist -- SKIPPED' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T34 a not-yet-created declared location -> explicit SKIP, not a failure" \
+  || { no "T34 absent location handling (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# ---- committee-derived regressions (2026-07-26) ---------------------------------------
+
+# T36 -- THE SITE COLLISION. Two sites, one role, the SAME basename: dc1 has the file,
+# dc0 does not. Keyed on role alone, dc1's copy satisfied dc0's row and the absence was
+# invisible -- which is exactly how SEC-021's dc0 opnsense-api.txt passed a green sweep.
+# The old fixtures declared only ONE location per role, so this was structurally
+# unreachable by the test set.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"
+mkdir -p "$D/dc0store" "$D/dc1store"
+printf 'x\n' > "$D/dc1store/shared.txt"; chmod 600 "$D/dc1store/shared.txt"
+printf 'jumphost  vr1-dc0  local  %s/dc0store/*\n' "$D" >> "$D/locations"
+printf 'jumphost  vr1-dc1  local  %s/dc1store/*\n' "$D" >> "$D/locations"
+row 'shared-cred  per-DC  vr1-dc0  jumphost  shared.txt  api  service  off-manifest-known  stage3  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+row 'shared-cred  per-DC  vr1-dc1  jumphost  shared.txt  api  service  off-manifest-known  stage3  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q "E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT: shared-cred 'shared.txt' expected at jumphost/vr1-dc0" "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T36 same basename, two sites, absent at one -> E1 fires for THAT site (site-collision)" \
+  || { no "T36 site-scoped existence must fire (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T37 -- ruling 3's bound is ABSOLUTE, so an EMPTY list must refuse exactly like a missing
+# one. Previously an empty file parsed to [] (not None), skipped the refusal, and then
+# affirmed existence over zero probed locations.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; : > "$D/locations"; run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'is EMPTY' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T37 an EMPTY declared-location list -> REFUSES, never affirms over zero locations" \
+  || { no "T37 empty locations must refuse (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T38 -- a register with no rows asserts nothing, but every check reported clean over the
+# empty set and the run exited 0.
+D=$(mkenv); printf '# all rows removed\n' > "$D/matrix.tsv"; run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'S1 FLOOR' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T38 a ZERO-row matrix -> FLOOR failure, not a clean run" \
+  || { no "T38 empty matrix must not be clean (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T39 -- mode enforcement used to apply only to custody=consolidated, leaving 43 of 77
+# rows -- including the SEC-020 region dir and the SEC-022 shadow stores -- unchecked.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"
+printf 'x\n' > "$D/store/exposed_ed25519"; chmod 644 "$D/store/exposed_ed25519"
+row 'exposed  singleton  vr1-office1  jumphost  exposed_ed25519  ssh  service  off-manifest-known  stage2  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'E2 WORLD-READABLE' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T39 a world-readable secret at NON-consolidated custody -> caught" \
+  || { no "T39 world-readable secrets must be caught at any custody (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T40 -- S5's SECOND direction. T13 only ever populated the dc0 side, so deleting the
+# dc1->dc0 comparison left the harness fully green: an upper bound masquerading as an
+# assertion, in the check whose entire job is symmetry.
+D=$(mkenv)
+row 'dc1-only  per-DC  vr1-dc1  jumphost  vr1-dc1-only_ed25519  ssh  service  off-manifest-known  stage3  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+printf 'vr1-dc1-only_ed25519  600  local\n' > "$D/creds-manifests/vr1-dc1.manifest"
+run "$D"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'S5 ASYMMETRY: vr1-dc1' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T40 a dc1-ONLY per-DC credential -> ASYMMETRY fires on the second direction too" \
+  || { no "T40 S5 must assert BOTH directions (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T41 -- literal-file locations previously skipped the absent/unreadable determination
+# entirely, so an unreadable directory read as "fully probed, nothing there".
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; mkdir -p "$D/lockedf"; printf 'x\n' > "$D/lockedf/k.key"; chmod 000 "$D/lockedf"
+printf 'jumphost  vr1-office1  local  %s/lockedf/k.key\n' "$D" >> "$D/locations"
+run "$D" --tier2; chmod 755 "$D/lockedf"
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'E0 UNREADABLE' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T41 an unreadable dir behind a LITERAL-file location -> UNREADABLE, not silent ok" \
+  || { no "T41 literal paths need state detection too (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T42 -- the declared path reaches a remote shell, so its charset is a security boundary:
+# ruling 3 calls the bound absolute, and an unvalidated `;` would execute on the host --
+# under sudo when --privileged is passed.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"
+printf 'jumphost  vr1-office1  local  /tmp/x;id\n' >> "$D/locations"
+run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'shell metacharacter' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T42 a shell metacharacter in a declared path -> REJECTED before any probe" \
+  || { no "T42 unsafe declared paths must be rejected (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T43 -- a row whose (role, site) has no declared location can never be verified. It used
+# to `continue` with no counter and no [ok], contradicting the module's own contract that
+# nothing passes silently.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"
+row 'orphan-scope  singleton  vr1-office1  unit  thing.txt  api  service  off-manifest-known  stage6  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'E4 UNCHECKABLE' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T43 a row with no declared location for its scope -> disclosed, not silently skipped" \
+  || { no "T43 uncheckable rows must be disclosed (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+
+# T44 -- per-tenant/per-node rows name an instance they cannot know at authoring time.
+# Exact matching made the five tenant rows unmatchable, so the first onboard would have
+# produced five false absences AND five false undeclared findings on the SAME real files.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"
+printf 'x\n' > "$D/store/acme-handover.txt"; chmod 600 "$D/store/acme-handover.txt"
+row 'tenant-thing  per-tenant  vr1-office1  jumphost  <client>-handover.txt  api  service  off-manifest-known  tenant-onboard  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && grep -q 'E1/E3 existence' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T44 a <client> instance placeholder matches the real basename (no false absent+undeclared pair)" \
+  || { no "T44 instance templating must match (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+
+# ---- tier 3 (VALIDITY) ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# T45 -- the same artifact copied to two scopes, byte-identical -> clean.
+mk3() {  # mk3 <env-dir> <bytesA> <bytesB>
+  local d="$1"; mkdir -p "$d/s1" "$d/s2"
+  printf '%s\n' "$2" > "$d/s1/twin.key"; chmod 600 "$d/s1/twin.key"
+  printf '%s\n' "$3" > "$d/s2/twin.key"; chmod 600 "$d/s2/twin.key"
+  printf 'jumphost  vr1-dc0  local  %s/s1/*\n' "$d" >> "$d/locations"
+  printf 'jumphost  vr1-dc1  local  %s/s2/*\n' "$d" >> "$d/locations"
+  row 'twin  per-DC  vr1-dc0  jumphost  twin.key  ssh  service  off-manifest-known  stage3  operator-terminal  -  -' "$d"
+  row 'twin  per-DC  vr1-dc1  jumphost  twin.key  ssh  service  off-manifest-known  stage3  operator-terminal  -  -' "$d"
+}
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; mk3 "$D" same same; run "$D" --tier2 --tier3
+grep -q 'V1 provenance: all copies byte-identical' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T45 identical copies of one artifact -> V1 clean" \
+  || { no "T45 identical copies should verify"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T46 -- THE POINT OF TIER 3. SEC-020: "any future rotation MUST update both copies in one
+# operation or the region copy becomes a stale trap." That warning was unchecked prose from
+# the day it was written; the sha256 equality behind it was a ONE-TIME manual act.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; mk3 "$D" original rotated; run "$D" --tier2 --tier3
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'V1 PROVENANCE DRIFT' "$D/out" && grep -q 'STALE TRAP' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T46 one copy rotated and the other not -> V1 PROVENANCE DRIFT (the SEC-020 trap)" \
+  || { no "T46 drift must be caught (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T47 -- REGRESSION for a false positive this check shipped with in draft: an identity's
+# DISTINCT artifacts (a password, its API key, its CLI profile) are not byte-copies of each
+# other. Keying digests by scope let them overwrite one another and report drift between
+# unrelated files. Verified by hand against the live hosts: the digests actually matched.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; mkdir -p "$D/multi"
+printf 'pw\n'  > "$D/multi/thing.pass";   chmod 600 "$D/multi/thing.pass"
+printf 'key\n' > "$D/multi/thing.apikey"; chmod 600 "$D/multi/thing.apikey"
+printf 'jumphost  vr1-office1  local  %s/multi/*\n' "$D" >> "$D/locations"
+row 'one-ident  singleton  vr1-office1  jumphost  thing.pass    gui  human    off-manifest-known  stage2  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+row 'one-ident  singleton  vr1-office1  jumphost  thing.apikey  api  human    off-manifest-known  stage2  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+run "$D" --tier2 --tier3
+! grep -q 'V1 PROVENANCE DRIFT' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T47 distinct artifacts of ONE identity are not compared (draft false positive)" \
+  || { no "T47 distinct artifacts must not be diffed"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T48 -- REGRESSION for the second draft false positive: the same credential in a DIFFERENT
+# SERIALIZATION. The netbox token is a raw file on the VM and an assembled env file on the
+# jumphost; they are the same secret and are NOT byte-identical by design.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; mkdir -p "$D/raw" "$D/wrapped"
+printf 'tok\n'            > "$D/raw/api.token";  chmod 600 "$D/raw/api.token"
+printf 'URL=x\nTOK=tok\n' > "$D/wrapped/w.env";  chmod 600 "$D/wrapped/w.env"
+printf 'netbox    vr1-office1  local  %s/raw/*\n' "$D" >> "$D/locations"
+printf 'jumphost  vr1-office1  local  %s/wrapped/*\n' "$D" >> "$D/locations"
+row 'wrapped-tok  singleton  vr1-office1  netbox    api.token  api  service  source-of-record  stage2  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+row 'wrapped-tok  singleton  vr1-office1  jumphost  w.env      api  service  consolidated      stage2  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+printf 'w.env  600  local\n' >> "$D/creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest"
+run "$D" --tier2 --tier3
+! grep -q 'V1 PROVENANCE DRIFT' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T48 same credential, different SERIALIZATION -> not compared (draft false positive)" \
+  || { no "T48 re-serialized copies must not be diffed"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T49 -- but a copy DECLARED byte-identical under a different name IS compared. This is
+# SEC-020's exact shape (admin.pass on the region, maas-admin-password on the jumphost)
+# and it is the case tier 3 exists for, so it must not fall into T48's skip.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; mkdir -p "$D/src" "$D/cpy"
+printf 'v1\n' > "$D/src/orig.pass"; chmod 600 "$D/src/orig.pass"
+printf 'v2\n' > "$D/cpy/work.pass"; chmod 600 "$D/cpy/work.pass"
+printf 'netbox    vr1-office1  local  %s/src/*\n' "$D" >> "$D/locations"
+printf 'jumphost  vr1-office1  local  %s/cpy/*\n' "$D" >> "$D/locations"
+row 'declared-twin  singleton  vr1-office1  netbox    orig.pass  gui  human  source-of-record  stage2  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+row 'declared-twin  singleton  vr1-office1  jumphost  work.pass  gui  human  verbatim-copy     stage2  operator-terminal  -  -' "$D"
+printf 'work.pass  600  local\n' >> "$D/creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest"
+run "$D" --tier2 --tier3
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'V1 PROVENANCE DRIFT' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T49 a DECLARED verbatim copy under a different name IS compared (SEC-020 shape)" \
+  || { no "T49 verbatim-copy pairs must be compared (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T50 -- a tier that did not run must announce itself, like tiers 2 and 3 elsewhere.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; run "$D" --tier2
+grep -q 'tier 3 (VALIDITY) NOT RUN' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T50 tier 3 omitted -> announced, never a silent skip" \
+  || { no "T50 tier 3 must self-announce"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T51 -- DIGESTS ONLY, NEVER CONTENT. The plan's hard constraint. sha256sum is the mandated
+# mechanism and is allowed; what must never appear is a verb that brings bytes back. This
+# extends T22's list, which would not have caught a content transfer added alongside a
+# legitimate digest call.
+grep -q 'sha256sum' "$CHECK" \
+  && ok "T51a the provenance path uses sha256sum (digest, not content)" \
+  || no "T51a tier 3 must compare digests"
+grep -qE '\b(scp|rsync|base64|dd)\b' "$CHECK" \
+  && no "T51b the checker gained a content-TRANSFER verb -- digests only" \
+  || ok "T51b no content-transfer verb anywhere in the checker"
+
+
+# ---- stage declaration (D-137 tier 2 gate input) ---------------------------------------
+
+# T52 -- without a stage declaration the checker cannot tell MISSING from NOT-YET-MINTED,
+# and it must refuse rather than guess. Guessing either way is wrong in a dangerous
+# direction: assume-reached floods the run with false absences, assume-pending silently
+# defers real ones.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; printf 'stage2 reached\n' > "$D/stages"; rm "$D/stages"
+python3 "$CHECK" --matrix "$D/matrix.tsv" --manifest-dir "$D/creds-manifests" \
+  --notes "$D/notes.md" --repo "$REPO" --locations "$D/locations" \
+  --stages "$D/nope" --tier2 > "$D/out" 2>&1; RC=$?
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'no stage declaration' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T52 a missing stage declaration -> tier 2 REFUSES, never guesses" \
+  || { no "T52 missing stage decl must refuse (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T53 -- EXHAUSTIVENESS. A mint-stage the declaration does not classify is a hard FAIL, not
+# a default. This is the both-bounds discipline applied to the gate's own status input.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; printf 'tenant-onboard pending\n' > "$D/stages"; run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q "mint-stage 'stage2' is used in the matrix but NOT classified" "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T53 an unclassified mint-stage -> FAIL (no silent default in either direction)" \
+  || { no "T53 unclassified stages must fail (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T54 -- the other bound: a classified stage no row uses is a STALE declaration. This is
+# how `stage4` was caught -- Stage 4 is open and executing but mints no credential.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; printf 'stage2 reached\ntenant-onboard pending\nstage9 reached\n' > "$D/stages"
+run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q "'stage9' is classified but used by no matrix row" "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T54 a classified-but-unused stage -> stale-declaration FAIL (both bounds)" \
+  || { no "T54 stale stage declarations must fail (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T55 -- `pending` defers a missing credential; `reached` reports it. This is the whole
+# point of the file, and it must swing BOTH ways on the same fixture.
+D=$(mkenv); mkloc "$D"; rm "$D/store/alpha_ed25519"
+printf 'stage2 pending\n' > "$D/stages"; run "$D" --tier2
+PEND=$RC
+printf 'stage2 reached\n' > "$D/stages"; run "$D" --tier2
+[ "$PEND" = 0 ] && [ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'E1 EXPECTED-BUT-ABSENT' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T55 the same absent credential defers under 'pending' and FAILS under 'reached'" \
+  || { no "T55 stage reach must drive the verdict (pending=$PEND reached=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+
+# ---- V2 (tier 3, declared state) -----------------------------------------------------
+# V2 shipped with ZERO cases: --repo had to point at the real repo, so there was no fixture
+# path to the SEC register. T56-T59 exist because of that gap, not despite it.
+secrow() {  # secrow <env-dir> <disposition-cell>
+  printf '| SEC-900 | 2026-01-01 | fixture token is BURNED and must be revoked + reissued | fixture | operator | %s |\n' \
+    "$2" > "$1/ledger.md"
+}
+# A consolidated row that cites the fixture SEC row.
+v2env() { local d; d=$(mkenv); mkloc "$d"
+  row 'zeta-token  singleton  vr1-office1  jumphost  zeta.txt  api  service  consolidated  stage2  operator-terminal  SEC-900  n-alpha' "$d"
+  printf 'zeta.txt  600  local\n' >> "$d/creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest"
+  printf 'x\n' > "$d/store/zeta.txt"; chmod 600 "$d/store/zeta.txt"
+  echo "$d"; }
+
+# T56 -- the original invariant: dead in the ledger, healthy in the register -> FAIL.
+D=$(v2env); secrow "$D" 'OPEN -- rotate at v1 close'
+run "$D" --tier2 --tier3
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'V2 DECLARED-DEAD BUT REGISTERED HEALTHY.*zeta-token' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T56 declared-dead + custody=consolidated -> V2 FAIL (the founding invariant)" \
+  || { no "T56 a burned credential registered healthy must fail (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T57 -- SEC-006's real shape: the operator RULED the revocation deferred. Reporting that as
+# a defect every run reports the operator's own decision as a bug -- but it must NOT go silent.
+D=$(v2env); secrow "$D" 'OPEN -- **DEFERRED by operator ruling 2026-01-02: revoke at completion of this deployment.** Until then the token is live and exposed'
+run "$D" --tier2 --tier3
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && grep -q 'V2 ACKNOWLEDGED DEFERRAL.*zeta-token' "$D/out" \
+  && grep -q 'still live and still exposed' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T57 a RULED deferral -> acknowledged, exit 0, and the notice still says EXPOSED" \
+  || { no "T57 a ruled deferral must be acknowledged, not failed and not silenced (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T58 -- the evasion guard, and the reason the match is narrow: prose that merely DISCUSSES
+# deferring, with no operator ruling, must not buy silence. A loose match here would turn V2
+# into the false green the register exists to prevent.
+D=$(v2env); secrow "$D" 'OPEN -- deferred for now, we will revisit this later'
+run "$D" --tier2 --tier3
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'V2 DECLARED-DEAD BUT REGISTERED HEALTHY' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T58 'deferred' WITHOUT an operator ruling -> still FAIL (no silencing by prose)" \
+  || { no "T58 unruled deferral prose must not silence V2 (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+# T59 -- DEFERRED in one table cell and 'operator ruling' in another is NOT a ruled deferral;
+# the cell boundary is load-bearing, so the pattern must not span `|`.
+D=$(v2env)
+printf '| SEC-900 | 2026-01-01 | fixture token is BURNED, DEFERRED | fixture | per an operator ruling | OPEN |\n' > "$D/ledger.md"
+run "$D" --tier2 --tier3
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'V2 DECLARED-DEAD BUT REGISTERED HEALTHY' "$D/out" \
+  && ok "T59 a deferral claim spanning two ledger cells does NOT count as ruled" \
+  || { no "T59 the deferral match must not cross a table cell (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' "$D/out"; }
+
+echo
+if [ "$F" = 0 ]; then echo "creds-matrix: $P/$P PASS"; exit 0; fi
+echo "creds-matrix: FAILURES: $F (passed $P)"; exit 1
diff --git a/tests/creds-probe/run-tests.sh b/tests/creds-probe/run-tests.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c77651
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/creds-probe/run-tests.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# tests/creds-probe/run-tests.sh -- harness for scripts/creds-probe.sh (D-137 tier 3
+# behavioural). Offline: every case uses `--list` or non-authenticating kinds, so the
+# harness itself NEVER authenticates against anything. One case per safety property.
+set -uo pipefail
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+REPO="$(cd "$HERE/../.." && pwd)"
+PROBE="$REPO/scripts/creds-probe.sh"
+TMP="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
+P=0; F=0
+ok() { echo "  [ok]   $1"; P=$((P+1)); }
+no() { echo "FAIL   $1"; F=$((F+1)); }
+
+mkfix() { # mkfix <name> -> dir with a matrix, stages and probes
+  local d="$TMP/$1"; mkdir -p "$d"
+  cat > "$d/matrix.tsv" <<'EOF'
+alpha  singleton   vr1-office1  jumphost  a.key  ssh  service  consolidated        stage2  operator-terminal  -  -
+later  singleton   vr1-office1  jumphost  b.key  api  service  off-manifest-known  stage5  operator-terminal  -  -
+tenat  per-tenant  -            jumphost  c.key  api  service  off-manifest-known  stage2  operator-terminal  -  -
+EOF
+  printf 'stage2 reached\nstage5 pending\n' > "$d/stages"
+  echo "$d"
+}
+run() { # run <dir> <mode> ; sets RC and $OUT
+  OUT="$(MATRIX="$1/matrix.tsv" STAGES="$1/stages" PROBES="$1/probes" \
+         bash "$PROBE" "$2" 2>&1)"; RC=$?
+}
+
+echo "=== creds-probe harness ==="
+
+# T1 -- --list must not authenticate. The whole point of a dry mode on a credential-using
+# tool is that an operator can see the blast radius before accepting it.
+D=$(mkfix listonly); printf 'alpha ssh nonexistent.invalid\n' > "$D/probes"
+run "$D" --list
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && grep -q 'would probe' <<<"$OUT" && ! grep -q 'FAILED to authenticate' <<<"$OUT" \
+  && ok "T1 --list reports intent without authenticating" \
+  || { no "T1 --list must not authenticate (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' <<<"$OUT"; }
+
+# T2 -- TENANT SURFACE IS REFUSED BY CONSTRUCTION. D-069 and ruling 3 keep tenant custody
+# out of this control; probing one means authenticating AS a tenant. A declaration must not
+# be able to opt back in.
+D=$(mkfix tenant); printf 'tenat ssh somewhere\n' > "$D/probes"
+run "$D" --list
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'per-tenant credentials are REFUSED' <<<"$OUT" \
+  && ok "T2 a per-tenant probe is REFUSED even when declared (D-069)" \
+  || { no "T2 tenant probes must be refused (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' <<<"$OUT"; }
+
+# T3 -- a credential whose mint stage is pending is SKIPPED, never reported failed. Most
+# OpenStack service credentials are stage5 and would otherwise all read as broken.
+D=$(mkfix pending); printf 'later ssh somewhere\n' > "$D/probes"
+run "$D" --list
+[ "$RC" = 0 ] && grep -q "mint-stage 'stage5' is pending" <<<"$OUT" \
+  && ok "T3 a not-yet-minted credential SKIPS, it does not fail" \
+  || { no "T3 pending stages must skip (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' <<<"$OUT"; }
+
+# T4 -- a probe for an id in no matrix row is a stale declaration, not a silent no-op.
+D=$(mkfix stale); printf 'ghost ssh somewhere\n' > "$D/probes"
+run "$D" --list
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q 'in NO matrix row' <<<"$OUT" \
+  && ok "T4 a probe for an unknown id -> stale-declaration FAIL" \
+  || { no "T4 stale probe declarations must fail (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' <<<"$OUT"; }
+
+# T5 -- THE FALSE GREEN THIS TOOL SHIPPED WITH IN DRAFT. `ssh` inside a `while read` loop
+# consumes the loop's stdin, so probe 1 ran and probes 2..13 were silently skipped -- and
+# the run still exited 0. The accounting check makes a partial run VOID rather than clean.
+D=$(mkfix accounting)
+printf 'alpha declared-only reason-one\nlater declared-only reason-two\n' > "$D/probes"
+run "$D" --run
+COUNT=$(grep -cE '^  \[(ok|FAIL|skip)\]' <<<"$OUT")
+[ "$COUNT" = 2 ] && ! grep -q 'ACCOUNTING' <<<"$OUT" \
+  && ok "T5 every declared probe is reported in exactly one bucket (stdin-eating regression)" \
+  || { no "T5 probe accounting (reported=$COUNT)"; sed 's/^/       /' <<<"$OUT"; }
+
+# T6 -- an unknown probe kind must fail loudly rather than being treated as not-probeable.
+D=$(mkfix unknown); printf 'alpha telepathy somewhere\n' > "$D/probes"
+run "$D" --run
+[ "$RC" = 1 ] && grep -q "unknown probe kind" <<<"$OUT" \
+  && ok "T6 an unknown probe kind -> FAIL, not a silent skip" \
+  || { no "T6 unknown kinds must fail (rc=$RC)"; sed 's/^/       /' <<<"$OUT"; }
+
+# T7 -- NO RETRY. Retry loops are what lock accounts, and the MAAS admin identity backs 19
+# automation call sites. The source must contain no retry construct around authentication.
+grep -qE '\b(for|while)\b[^;]*\bretry\b|--retry|until .*ssh' "$PROBE" \
+  && no "T7 the probe tool gained a retry construct -- one attempt, then report" \
+  || ok "T7 no retry construct around authentication"
+
+# T8 -- ssh probes must carry -n (or a stdin redirect); this is the T5 defect's actual fix
+# and it is easy to drop when editing the command.
+grep -q 'ssh -n ' "$PROBE" \
+  && ok "T8 ssh probes run with -n so they cannot eat the loop's stdin" \
+  || no "T8 ssh must be invoked with -n"
+
+# T9 -- never echo a secret: the tool reports outcomes, not values.
+grep -qE 'echo .*\$(PASS|SECRET|TOKEN|KEY)\b' "$PROBE" \
+  && no "T9 the probe tool echoes a credential variable" \
+  || ok "T9 no credential value is ever echoed"
+
+echo
+if [ "$F" = 0 ]; then echo "creds-probe: $P/$P PASS"; exit 0; fi
+echo "creds-probe: FAILURES: $F (passed $P)"; exit 1
diff --git a/tests/dc-cache-proxy/run-tests.sh b/tests/dc-cache-proxy/run-tests.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19f07ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/dc-cache-proxy/run-tests.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# tests/dc-cache-proxy/run-tests.sh -- guard for scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh
+# (D-135 amendment 2026-07-24: the INTERIM per-DC apt CACHING PROXY, apt-cacher-ng,
+# the DC1-unblock path). Static: syntax, both sites' identity values (the utility
+# .4 the deploy expects + the ruled edge gateways -- changing one silently breaks
+# the proxy address or upstream egress), stable-identity keying (libvirt net
+# names, never virbrN), proxy-mode port pin, the MEASURED-tag discipline on site
+# rows, arg/site validation, and that the net layer is REUSED (not re-created).
+# Exit: 0 all pass | 1 any case failed. ASCII + LF.
+set -uo pipefail
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+SCRIPT="$(cd "$HERE/../.." && pwd)/scripts/dc-cache-proxy.sh"
+PASS=0; FAIL=0
+ok(){ echo "  PASS  $1"; PASS=$((PASS+1)); }
+no(){ echo "  FAIL  $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); }
+
+[ -f "$SCRIPT" ] && ok "T1 script present" || { no "T1 script present"; echo; echo "dc-cache-proxy: $PASS passed, $FAIL failed"; exit 1; }
+bash -n "$SCRIPT" 2>/dev/null && ok "T2 bash -n clean" || no "T2 bash -n clean"
+
+# T3-T4: dc0 identity values (utility .4 + ruled edge gw) -- parity row
+grep -q 'LISTEN_CIDR="10.12.8.4/22"' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && grep -q 'UTIL_NET="vr1-dc0-metal-admin"' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T3 dc0 LISTEN 10.12.8.4/22 on metal-admin (utility .4)" \
+  || no "T3 dc0 LISTEN 10.12.8.4/22 on metal-admin (utility .4)"
+awk '/^  dc0\)/{f=1} f{print} f&&/;;/{exit}' "$SCRIPT" | grep -q 'EDGE_GW="10.12.4.1"' \
+  && ok "T4 dc0 edge gw 10.12.4.1" || no "T4 dc0 edge gw 10.12.4.1"
+
+# T5-T6: dc1 identity values (the INTERIM cache-proxy site)
+grep -q 'LISTEN_CIDR="10.12.68.4/22"' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && grep -q 'UTIL_NET="vr1-dc1-metal-admin"' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T5 dc1 LISTEN 10.12.68.4/22 on metal-admin (utility .4)" \
+  || no "T5 dc1 LISTEN 10.12.68.4/22 on metal-admin (utility .4)"
+awk '/^  dc1\)/{f=1} f{print} f&&/;;/{exit}' "$SCRIPT" | grep -q 'EDGE_GW="10.12.64.1"' \
+  && ok "T6 dc1 edge gw 10.12.64.1" || no "T6 dc1 edge gw 10.12.64.1"
+
+# T7: stable-identity keying -- no virbrN literal; bridge from the net name
+grep -q 'net-dumpxml' "$SCRIPT" && ! grep -qE 'virbr[0-9]' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T7 bridge resolved from net name; no virbrN literal" \
+  || no "T7 bridge resolved from net name; no virbrN literal"
+
+# T8: proxy-mode port pinned to 3142
+grep -q 'PROXY_PORT="3142"' "$SCRIPT" && grep -q 'Port: ${PROXY_PORT}' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T8 apt-cacher-ng port pinned 3142" || no "T8 apt-cacher-ng port pinned 3142"
+
+# T9: consumption documented as proxy mode (apt-http-proxy), not apt-mirror
+grep -q 'apt-http-proxy=http://' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T9 documents proxy-mode consumption (apt-http-proxy)" \
+  || no "T9 documents proxy-mode consumption (apt-http-proxy)"
+
+# T10: behavioral smoke test covers BOTH archive and UCA through the proxy
+grep -q 'archive.ubuntu.com' "$SCRIPT" && grep -q 'ubuntu-cloud.archive.canonical.com' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && grep -q -- '-x "http://${LISTEN}:${PROXY_PORT}"' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T10 smoke test proxies archive + UCA" || no "T10 smoke test proxies archive + UCA"
+
+# T11: install requires root
+grep -q 'install requires root' "$SCRIPT" && ok "T11 install requires root" || no "T11 install requires root"
+
+# T12 (REPLACED 2026-07-27 -- it asserted the SUPERSEDED design). It used to require
+# that this script REUSE dc-mirror.sh's net layer and write no ip addr/route itself.
+# That coupling was a measured trap: on a proxy-only DC, three `*-mirror-*` files were
+# load-bearing for the PROXY, so the recorded mirror-removal procedure would have killed
+# it, and the proxy could not be rebuilt without reinstalling the whole mirror apparatus.
+# Operator ruled the net layer moves here (2026-07-27), so the test is INVERTED rather
+# than dropped -- the old assertion is now the defect it protected against.
+# T12: this script OWNS the net layer -- it writes the address and route itself...
+grep -qE 'ip addr replace' "$SCRIPT" && grep -qE 'ip route replace default' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T12 net layer is OWNED here (writes its own addr + default route)" \
+  || no "T12 net layer is OWNED here (writes its own addr + default route)"
+
+# T12b: ...and no longer defers to dc-mirror.sh for it. A lingering "run dc-mirror.sh
+# install" instruction would send an operator to re-create the very apparatus a
+# proxy-only DC is meant not to have. Scoped to NON-COMMENT lines on purpose: the
+# header's account of WHY the coupling was removed cites that command, and deleting
+# the history to satisfy a grep would lose the reason the trap existed. What must not
+# survive is an OPERATIVE referral -- one reachable at runtime in an echo/miss string.
+grep -vE '^[[:space:]]*#' "$SCRIPT" | grep -q 'dc-mirror.sh install' \
+  && no "T12b no OPERATIVE dc-mirror.sh referral remains (header history is exempt)" \
+  || ok "T12b no OPERATIVE dc-mirror.sh referral remains (header history is exempt)"
+
+# T12c: the owned artifacts are named for the PROXY, never "mirror". The whole point
+# is that a proxy-only DC carries no mirror-named dependency for someone to tidy away.
+grep -q 'cache-proxy-net.service' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && grep -q 'cache-proxy-net-apply' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ! grep -qE '(NET_UNIT|NET_HELPER|RESOLVED_DROPIN)=.*mirror' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T12c owned net artifacts are proxy-named, not mirror-named" \
+  || no "T12c owned net artifacts are proxy-named, not mirror-named"
+
+# T12d: the net layer must be ENABLED, not merely started -- otherwise the proxy's
+# LISTEN address and egress vanish on the next rack reboot. This rack has rebooted
+# before (the D-126/D-128 base-leg machinery exists for exactly that reason).
+grep -qE 'systemctl enable "\$\{SITE\}-cache-proxy-net.service"' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && grep -q 'cache-proxy-net.service enabled' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T12d net unit is enabled at install and asserted by check (reboot-persistent)" \
+  || no "T12d net unit is enabled at install and asserted by check (reboot-persistent)"
+
+# T12e: check must assert the ARTIFACTS, not just the live address/route. Asserting
+# only the live effect would PASS while the layer was really provided by
+# <site>-mirror-net.service -- it would look independent and break on mirror teardown,
+# which is the exact failure this change exists to prevent.
+grep -q 'gen_net_helper' "$SCRIPT" && grep -q 'gen_net_unit' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && grep -q 'this script owns the net layer now' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T12e check asserts the owned net artifacts, not only their live effect" \
+  || no "T12e check asserts the owned net artifacts, not only their live effect"
+
+# T12f: idempotent verbs only. `ip addr replace`/`ip route replace` let this unit and
+# a surviving <site>-mirror-net.service coexist on a site running both (dc0 keeps its
+# mirror), setting identical MEASURED values instead of fighting.
+! grep -qE 'ip (addr|route) add ' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T12f net writes use idempotent replace (safe to coexist with the mirror unit)" \
+  || no "T12f net writes use idempotent replace (safe to coexist with the mirror unit)"
+
+# T13: MEASURED/RULED-tag discipline on every site row (hard rule 2)
+MR="$(grep -cE 'MEASURED/RULED' "$SCRIPT")"
+[ "$MR" -ge 2 ] && ok "T13 both site rows carry a MEASURED/RULED tag" \
+  || no "T13 both site rows carry a MEASURED/RULED tag (found $MR)"
+
+# T14: bad args / unknown site -> exit 2
+out="$(bash "$SCRIPT" bogus dc1 2>&1)"; [ "$?" = "2" ] || out="$out RC!=2"
+grep -q 'usage:' <<<"$out" && ok "T14 bad mode -> usage, exit 2" || no "T14 bad mode -> usage, exit 2"
+bash "$SCRIPT" check zz >/dev/null 2>&1; [ "$?" = "2" ] \
+  && ok "T15 unknown site -> exit 2" || no "T15 unknown site -> exit 2"
+
+echo; echo "dc-cache-proxy: $PASS passed, $FAIL failed"
+[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ] && exit 0 || exit 1
diff --git a/tests/dc-mirror/run-tests.sh b/tests/dc-mirror/run-tests.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..9200171
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/dc-mirror/run-tests.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# tests/dc-mirror/run-tests.sh -- guard for scripts/dc-mirror.sh (D-135 item 1:
+# the per-DC apt+UCA mirror, D-107 build-out). Static: syntax, both sites'
+# identity values (D-134 utility .4 + ruled edge gateways -- changing one
+# silently breaks the mirror address or the sync egress), stable-identity
+# keying (libvirt net names, never virbrN), GPG-verified sync (keyrings
+# present in both debmirror calls, no --ignore-release-gpg), read-only check
+# path, and the MEASURED-tag discipline on site rows.
+# Exit: 0 all pass | 1 any case failed. ASCII + LF.
+set -uo pipefail
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+SCRIPT="$(cd "$HERE/../.." && pwd)/scripts/dc-mirror.sh"
+PASS=0; FAIL=0
+ok(){ echo "  PASS  $1"; PASS=$((PASS+1)); }
+no(){ echo "  FAIL  $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); }
+
+[ -f "$SCRIPT" ] && ok "T1 script present" || { no "T1 script present"; echo; echo "dc-mirror: $PASS passed, $FAIL failed"; exit 1; }
+bash -n "$SCRIPT" 2>/dev/null && ok "T2 bash -n clean" || no "T2 bash -n clean"
+
+# T3-T4: dc0 identity values (D-134 utility .4 + ruled edge gw)
+grep -q 'LISTEN_CIDR="10.12.8.4/22"' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && grep -q 'MIRROR_NET="vr1-dc0-metal-admin"' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T3 dc0 LISTEN 10.12.8.4/22 on metal-admin (utility .4)" \
+  || no "T3 dc0 LISTEN 10.12.8.4/22 on metal-admin (utility .4)"
+awk '/^  dc0\)/{f=1} f{print} f&&/;;/{exit}' "$SCRIPT" | grep -q 'EDGE_GW="10.12.4.1"' \
+  && ok "T4 dc0 edge gw 10.12.4.1" || no "T4 dc0 edge gw 10.12.4.1"
+
+# T5-T6: dc1 identity values
+grep -q 'LISTEN_CIDR="10.12.68.4/22"' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && grep -q 'MIRROR_NET="vr1-dc1-metal-admin"' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T5 dc1 LISTEN 10.12.68.4/22 on metal-admin (utility .4)" \
+  || no "T5 dc1 LISTEN 10.12.68.4/22 on metal-admin (utility .4)"
+awk '/^  dc1\)/{f=1} f{print} f&&/;;/{exit}' "$SCRIPT" | grep -q 'EDGE_GW="10.12.64.1"' \
+  && ok "T6 dc1 edge gw 10.12.64.1" || no "T6 dc1 edge gw 10.12.64.1"
+
+# T7: stable-identity keying -- no virbrN literal; bridges from net names
+grep -q 'net-dumpxml' "$SCRIPT" && ! grep -q 'virbr[0-9]' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T7 bridges resolved from net names; no virbrN literal" \
+  || no "T7 bridges resolved from net names; no virbrN literal"
+
+# T8: both debmirror calls carry a keyring; gpg verification never disabled
+KEYRING_COUNT="$(grep -c -- '--keyring=' "$SCRIPT")"
+[ "$KEYRING_COUNT" -ge 2 ] && ! grep -q 'ignore-release-gpg' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T8 both debmirror calls GPG-verified (no ignore-release-gpg)" \
+  || no "T8 both debmirror calls GPG-verified (keyrings=$KEYRING_COUNT)"
+
+# T9: binary-only mirror -- no sources pulled
+[ "$(grep -c -- '--nosource' "$SCRIPT")" -ge 2 ] \
+  && ok "T9 both mirrors --nosource (binary only)" \
+  || no "T9 both mirrors --nosource (binary only)"
+
+# T10: the ruled dist set -- jammy triple + UCA caracal
+grep -q -- '--dist=jammy,jammy-updates,jammy-security' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && grep -q -- '--dist=jammy-updates/caracal' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T10 dists: jammy triple + UCA jammy-updates/caracal" \
+  || no "T10 dists: jammy triple + UCA jammy-updates/caracal"
+
+# T11: unknown site refuses with exit 2 and demands measured rows
+OUT="$(bash "$SCRIPT" check nosuchsite 2>&1)"; RC=$?
+[ "$RC" -eq 2 ] && grep -q 'MEASURED' <<<"$OUT" \
+  && ok "T11 unknown site exits 2 and demands measured rows" \
+  || no "T11 unknown site exits 2 and demands measured rows (rc=$RC)"
+
+# T12: bad mode refuses
+bash "$SCRIPT" frobnicate dc0 >/dev/null 2>&1; RC=$?
+[ "$RC" -eq 2 ] && ok "T12 bad mode exits 2" || no "T12 bad mode exits 2 (rc=$RC)"
+
+# T13: sync unit ordered after + requires the net unit (egress must exist)
+grep -q 'After=\${SITE}-mirror-net.service' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && grep -q 'Requires=\${SITE}-mirror-net.service' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T13 sync unit Requires/After net unit" \
+  || no "T13 sync unit Requires/After net unit"
+
+# T14: check path never mutates
+CHECK_BLOCK="$(awk '/^do_check\(\)/{f=1} f{print} f&&/^}/{exit}' "$SCRIPT")"
+grep -qE 'addr (add|replace|del)|route (add|replace|del)|systemctl (enable|restart|start|disable|reload)|daemon-reload|ln -|mkdir' <<<"$CHECK_BLOCK" \
+  && no "T14 do_check is read-only" \
+  || ok "T14 do_check is read-only"
+
+# T15: install requires root (non-root exits 4 before any mutation)
+if [ "$(id -u)" != "0" ]; then
+  bash "$SCRIPT" install dc0 >/dev/null 2>&1; RC=$?
+  [ "$RC" -eq 4 ] && ok "T15 non-root install exits 4" || no "T15 non-root install exits 4 (rc=$RC)"
+else
+  ok "T15 skipped (running as root)"
+fi
+
+# T16: site rows carry MEASURED citations (hard rule 2)
+DC0_BLOCK="$(awk '/^  dc0\)/{f=1} f{print} f&&/;;/{exit}' "$SCRIPT")"
+DC1_BLOCK="$(awk '/^  dc1\)/{f=1} f{print} f&&/;;/{exit}' "$SCRIPT")"
+grep -q 'MEASURED' <<<"$DC0_BLOCK" && grep -q 'MEASURED' <<<"$DC1_BLOCK" \
+  && ok "T16 both site rows cite MEASURED provenance" \
+  || no "T16 both site rows cite MEASURED provenance"
+
+# T17: nginx vhost binds the LISTEN address only (not 0.0.0.0)
+grep -q 'listen \${LISTEN}:80;' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T17 nginx binds the utility address only" \
+  || no "T17 nginx binds the utility address only"
+
+# T18: sync is niced/idle-IO (a background job on a load-bearing rack host)
+grep -q 'IOSchedulingClass=idle' "$SCRIPT" && grep -q 'Nice=10' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T18 sync unit is niced + idle IO" \
+  || no "T18 sync unit is niced + idle IO"
+
+# T19: sync unit sets HOME -- debmirror dies without it under systemd's empty
+# environment (measured on the first dc0 run, 2026-07-23)
+grep -q 'Environment=HOME=/root' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && ok "T19 sync unit sets HOME (debmirror GPG home)" \
+  || no "T19 sync unit sets HOME (debmirror GPG home)"
+
+# T20-T24: the last-sync verdict. MEASURED false green, 2026-07-27, at the Stage 4 mirror
+# gate: the check tested `[ -f last-sync.status ]` and printed the contents behind an
+# unconditional "OK", so dc0's "FAIL ... ubuntu=255" and dc1's four-day-stale "RUNNING"
+# (left by the debmirror the D-135 amendment killed with a signal) BOTH read green and the
+# check exited PASS. This is the check a stage gate closes on (GA-R6), so each status word
+# gets its own regression lock.
+
+# T20: a FAILED sync must fail the check, not decorate it.
+awk '/FAIL\*\)/{f=1} f&&/miss /{print "hit"; exit}' "$SCRIPT" | grep -q hit \
+  && ok "T20 last-sync FAIL routes to miss (the measured dc0 false green)" \
+  || no "T20 last-sync FAIL routes to miss (the measured dc0 false green)"
+
+# T21: RUNNING is never a pass -- in flight and died-mid-run are indistinguishable from the
+# file alone, so BOTH branches must be misses (the measured dc1 stale-marker false green).
+[ "$(awk '/RUNNING\*\)/{f=1} f&&/^[[:space:]]*(esac|FAIL\*\))/{exit} f&&/miss /{n++} END{print n+0}' "$SCRIPT")" -ge 2 ] \
+  && ok "T21 last-sync RUNNING is never a pass, in-flight AND stale-marker both miss" \
+  || no "T21 last-sync RUNNING is never a pass, in-flight AND stale-marker both miss"
+
+# T22: an ABSENT status file means no sync ever completed -- previously a `say note`, i.e. a
+# pass. Nothing has attested the mirror content, so it must fail.
+awk '/! -f "\$LSS"/{f=1} f&&/miss /{print "hit"; exit}' "$SCRIPT" | grep -q hit \
+  && ok "T22 absent last-sync.status is a miss (was a passing note)" \
+  || no "T22 absent last-sync.status is a miss (was a passing note)"
+
+# T23: no silent default. An unrecognised status word must refuse rather than be read as OK
+# -- the same no-silent-default discipline the D-137 checker enforces on stage tokens.
+awk '/UNRECOGNISED/{print "hit"; exit}' "$SCRIPT" | grep -q hit \
+  && ok "T23 an unrecognised status word refuses (no silent default to success)" \
+  || no "T23 an unrecognised status word refuses (no silent default to success)"
+
+# T24: the exact defective shape must not come back -- an OK printed straight from a cat of
+# the status file, with no case analysis in between.
+grep -q 'say "OK   last-sync: \$(cat' "$SCRIPT" \
+  && no "T24 the existence-only last-sync shape is gone" \
+  || ok "T24 the existence-only last-sync shape is gone"
+
+echo; echo "dc-mirror: $PASS passed, $FAIL failed"
+[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]
diff --git a/tests/dc-selector/run-tests.sh b/tests/dc-selector/run-tests.sh
index 29e66c0..f079d3e 100644
--- a/tests/dc-selector/run-tests.sh
+++ b/tests/dc-selector/run-tests.sh
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 #    10.12.64.0/19) and UNSETS the not-yet-ruled OpenStack-layer values;
 #    unknown/retired tokens fail loud; one selection per shell (the guard
 #    added with the diverging dc1 arm).
-#  - lib_hosts_select_dc: vr0-dc0 no-op, BOTH VR1 DCs fail loud (no real
+#  - lib_hosts_select_dc: vr0-dc0 no-op, VR1 arms POPULATED 2026-07-23 (was: fail loud -- no real
 #    per-DC host enrollment exists yet for either -- this is the documented
 #    asymmetry vs. lib-net.sh).
 #  - Neither function ever silently invents/reuses a value across DCs.
@@ -94,25 +94,43 @@
 VR1_VAL="$(lib_net_select_dc vr1-dc0 >/dev/null 2>&1; echo "${PLANE_CIDRS[0]}")"
 chk "net vr0-dc0/vr1-dc0 identical values (D-101 inheritance)" "$VR0_VAL" "$VR1_VAL"
 
-# --- lib_hosts_select_dc: vr0-dc0 no-op, BOTH VR1 DCs fail loud ---
+# --- lib_hosts_select_dc: vr0-dc0 no-op; VR1 arms POPULATED 2026-07-23 ---
+# (Stage 4 carve session: both fleets enrolled+Ready, identities measured --
+# the historical fail-loud behavior and its asymmetry test are history.)
 ( lib_hosts_select_dc vr0-dc0 ); chk "hosts vr0-dc0 no-op rc" "$?" 0
-( lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc0 2>/dev/null ); chk "hosts vr1-dc0 fails-loud rc" "$?" 1
-( lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc1 2>/dev/null ); chk "hosts vr1-dc1 fails-loud rc" "$?" 1
-HOSTS_ERR1="$(lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc0 2>&1 1>/dev/null || true)"
-grep -q "no enrolled hosts" <<<"$HOSTS_ERR1" && ok "hosts vr1-dc0 error cites no-enrollment" || no "hosts vr1-dc0 error cites no-enrollment"
-HOSTS_ERR2="$(lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc1 2>&1 1>/dev/null || true)"
-grep -q "no enrolled hosts" <<<"$HOSTS_ERR2" && ok "hosts vr1-dc1 error cites no-enrollment" || no "hosts vr1-dc1 error cites no-enrollment"
+( lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc0 ); chk "hosts vr1-dc0 selects rc" "$?" 0
+( lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc1 ); chk "hosts vr1-dc1 selects rc" "$?" 0
 ( lib_hosts_select_dc bogus 2>/dev/null ); chk "hosts unknown-token fails-loud rc" "$?" 1
 ( lib_hosts_select_dc 2>/dev/null ); chk "hosts missing-arg fails-loud rc" "$?" 1
 for retired in dc0 dc1 dc2; do
   ( lib_hosts_select_dc "$retired" 2>/dev/null ); chk "hosts RETIRED '$retired' rejected (D-119)" "$?" 1
 done
 
-# --- the documented asymmetry: vr1-dc0 differs between the two libs ---
-# net no-ops (D-101 says it inherits VR0 DC0's v4), hosts FAILS (it has no
-# enrolled hosts yet). Intentional; asserted so nobody "fixes" one to match.
-( lib_net_select_dc vr1-dc0 ); NET_RC=$?
-( lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc0 2>/dev/null ); HOSTS_RC=$?
-[ "$NET_RC" = 0 ] && [ "$HOSTS_RC" = 1 ] && ok "vr1-dc0 asymmetry: net no-ops, hosts fails (documented, not a bug)" || no "vr1-dc0 asymmetry broken (net=$NET_RC hosts=$HOSTS_RC)"
+# --- VR1 arms carry the MEASURED identity + D-134-amended octets ---
+H0_OCT="$(lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc0 >/dev/null 2>&1; echo "${HOST_OCTET[vr1-dc0-control-01]}")"
+chk "hosts vr1-dc0 control-01 octet .100 (D-134 amendment)" "$H0_OCT" "100"
+H0_ST="$(lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc0 >/dev/null 2>&1; echo "${HOST_OCTET[vr1-dc0-storage-04]}")"
+chk "hosts vr1-dc0 storage-04 octet .153" "$H0_ST" "153"
+H0_MAC="$(lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc0 >/dev/null 2>&1; echo "${HOST_BOOT_MAC[vr1-dc0-compute-02]}")"
+chk "hosts vr1-dc0 compute-02 pinned boot MAC" "$H0_MAC" "52:54:00:18:ab:b4"
+H1_MAC="$(lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc1 >/dev/null 2>&1; echo "${HOST_BOOT_MAC[vr1-dc1-storage-04]}")"
+chk "hosts vr1-dc1 storage-04 pinned boot MAC (index-encoded)" "$H1_MAC" "52:54:01:d1:09:01"
+H0_TAG="$(lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc0 >/dev/null 2>&1; echo "$HOST_TAG")"
+chk "hosts vr1-dc0 tag openstack-vr1-dc0 (ruled 2026-07-23)" "$H0_TAG" "openstack-vr1-dc0"
+H1_PWR="$(lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc1 >/dev/null 2>&1; echo "$VIRSH_POWER_ADDRESS")"
+chk "hosts vr1-dc1 power addr rack transit .6" "$H1_PWR" "qemu+ssh://jessea123@172.31.0.6/system"
+H0_N="$(lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc0 >/dev/null 2>&1; echo "${#HOSTS[@]}")"
+chk "hosts vr1-dc0 fleet count 9 (D-121 Option C)" "$H0_N" "9"
+
+# --- ONE SELECTION PER SHELL (stale cross-DC guard, lib-net precedent) ---
+( lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc0 >/dev/null 2>&1; lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc1 2>/dev/null ); \
+  chk "hosts dc0->dc1 re-select REFUSED (stale cross-DC values)" "$?" 1
+HSW_ERR="$(lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc0 >/dev/null 2>&1; lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc1 2>&1 1>/dev/null || true)"
+grep -q "already selected" <<<"$HSW_ERR" && ok "hosts re-select error says already selected" || no "hosts re-select error says already selected"
+( lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc1 >/dev/null 2>&1; lib_hosts_select_dc vr1-dc1 ); \
+  chk "hosts same-DC re-select stays a no-op rc" "$?" 0
+
+# --- the VR1 resolver exists: system_id by pinned boot MAC, never hostname ---
+type host_sysid_by_bootmac >/dev/null 2>&1 && ok "host_sysid_by_bootmac defined (VR1 resolver)" || no "host_sysid_by_bootmac defined (VR1 resolver)"
 
 echo; [ "$F" = 0 ] && { echo "ALL PASS ($P checks)"; exit 0; } || { echo "FAILURES: $F"; exit 1; }
diff --git a/tests/office1-record-dump/run-tests.sh b/tests/office1-record-dump/run-tests.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..de4f13b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/office1-record-dump/run-tests.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# tests/office1-record-dump/run-tests.sh
+#
+# OFFLINE unit harness for netbox/office1-record-dump.py's PURE transform functions
+# (slim / prefix-scope rewrite / ip-range key). NO network, no live NetBox -- the
+# network path (get_all) is not exercised here; this proves the record->JSON shaping
+# that a downstream fidelity/diff depends on. Mutates NOTHING.
+# Exit: 0 all pass | 1 any failed.  ASCII + LF.
+set -uo pipefail
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+REPO="$(cd "$HERE/../.." && pwd)"
+MOD="$REPO/netbox/office1-record-dump.py"
+
+python3 - "$MOD" <<'PY'
+import sys, importlib.util
+spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("o1dump", sys.argv[1])
+m = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); spec.loader.exec_module(m)
+
+P = F = 0
+def ok(cond, label):
+    global P, F
+    if cond: print("  PASS  %s" % label); P += 1
+    else:    print("  FAIL  %s" % label); F += 1
+
+# T1 slim keeps only requested fields, resolves a nested ref to its slug
+r = m.slim({"prefix": "10.12.64.0/22", "role": {"slug": "provider-public", "id": 9},
+            "status": {"value": "active"}, "extra": "dropped"},
+           ["prefix", "role", "status"])
+ok(r == {"prefix": "10.12.64.0/22", "role": "provider-public", "status": "active"},
+   "T1 slim resolves nested ref->slug/value and drops unrequested fields")
+
+# T2 slim keeps a missing field as None (stable schema)
+ok(m.slim({"prefix": "x"}, ["prefix", "role"]) == {"prefix": "x", "role": None},
+   "T2 slim fills a missing field with None")
+
+# T3 prefix scope rewrite: dcim.site id -> scope_site slug, scope_id dropped
+rec = m.rewrite_prefix_scope({"prefix": "p", "scope_type": "dcim.site", "scope_id": 5},
+                             {"scope_id": 5, "scope_type": "dcim.site"},
+                             {5: "vr1-dc1"}, {})
+ok(rec.get("scope_site") == "vr1-dc1" and "scope_id" not in rec,
+   "T3 prefix scope dcim.site -> scope_site slug, scope_id dropped")
+
+# T4 prefix scope rewrite: dcim.region id -> scope_region slug (the region-scoped case)
+rec = m.rewrite_prefix_scope({"prefix": "p"},
+                             {"scope_id": 2, "scope_type": "dcim.region"},
+                             {}, {2: "vr1"})
+ok(rec.get("scope_region") == "vr1" and "scope_id" not in rec,
+   "T4 prefix scope dcim.region -> scope_region slug")
+
+# T5 the record source is office1-netbox via the RECORD env (source separation);
+#    require_env names the sandbox env, and the Usage line sources it -- prove it targets
+#    the record, not the frozen reference.
+import inspect
+src = inspect.getsource(m)
+ok("office1-netbox" in src and "vr1-netbox-sandbox.env" in src and "10.10.1.10:8000" in src,
+   "T5 script targets the RECORD (office1-netbox 10.10.1.10:8000 / sandbox env)")
+
+print("\nRESULT: PASS=%d FAIL=%d" % (P, F))
+sys.exit(1 if F else 0)
+PY
+rc=$?
+[[ "$rc" -eq 0 ]] && echo "ALL PASS" || echo "SOME FAILED"
+exit $rc
diff --git a/tests/opnsense-set-interface-v4/run-tests.sh b/tests/opnsense-set-interface-v4/run-tests.sh
index 64133d6..fe27960 100755
--- a/tests/opnsense-set-interface-v4/run-tests.sh
+++ b/tests/opnsense-set-interface-v4/run-tests.sh
@@ -124,6 +124,54 @@
 #     losing that warning is how a future operator strands themselves.
 grep -qi 'WAN first' "$SH" && ok || bad "the WAN-before-LAN ordering warning is gone"
 
+# 15. THE PF FILTER RELOAD (added 2026-07-27, operator-ruled). MEASURED on the fresh dc1
+#     edge 2026-07-23: `interface reconfigure` applies the address to the kernel but does
+#     NOT regenerate the pf ruleset, so the automatic outbound-NAT rules for the
+#     (re-)addressed LAN are never created and the edge passes NO LAN traffic while looking
+#     correctly configured. Without the reload the operation is INCOMPLETE.
+grep -q 'configctl filter reload' "$SH" \
+  && ok || bad "the pf filter reload is gone -- the edge will pass no LAN traffic after addressing (appendix-A)"
+
+# 15b. THE PLACEMENT IS THE WHOLE POINT, and it is the easy thing to get wrong. The reload
+#      must NOT sit in the same heredoc as `interface reconfigure`: re-addressing the
+#      interface you arrived on drops the session DURING the reconfigure, so a following
+#      command in that stream never executes on the edge -- and that drop case is exactly
+#      the dc1 scenario that produced the defect. Assert the reconfigure heredoc contains
+#      ONLY the reconfigure.
+recfg_block="$(awk '/^configctl interface reconfigure/{print; getline; print}' "$SH")"
+printf '%s' "$recfg_block" | grep -q 'filter reload' \
+  && bad "the filter reload is inside the reconfigure heredoc -- it will NOT run when the session drops (the dc1 case)" \
+  || ok
+
+# 15c. ...and it must run against PROBE_HOST, the address the edge answers on AFTER the
+#      move, over a fresh connection -- not against the pre-move $EDGE.
+awk '/REGENERATE THE PF RULESET/,/filter reload/' "$SH" | grep -q 'PROBE_HOST' \
+  && ok || bad "the filter reload does not target PROBE_HOST -- it would use the stale pre-move address"
+
+# 15d. The reload is reported-then-verified: the NAT rules get read back, and the carp
+#      boilerplate is excluded because that is the exact broken-state signature appendix-A
+#      records (only `no nat/rdr proto carp` present = no automatic NAT generated).
+grep -q 'pfctl -s nat' "$SH" && grep -q 'proto carp' "$SH" \
+  && ok || bad "the NAT read-back (pfctl -s nat, carp boilerplate excluded) is gone"
+
+# 15e. That read-back must stay REPORTED, not gated: at an edge's very first addressing
+#      there may legitimately be no gateway and so no NAT to generate, and hard-failing
+#      would block a correct run. The address-on-the-kernel check remains the only hard gate.
+#      Scoped to the NATOUT branch itself -- an earlier draft of this case scanned to EOF and
+#      caught the ADDRESS gate's own `exit 2`, i.e. it failed the script for having the very
+#      hard gate it is supposed to keep.
+awk '/^NATOUT=/,/^fi$/' "$SH" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:]])exit [0-9]' \
+  && bad "the NAT read-back hard-exits -- a first-addressing run with no gateway yet would fail wrongly" \
+  || ok
+
+# 15f. The appendix-A entry must stay pointed at the script amendment rather than still
+#      calling it a queued option, or the runbook and the tool disagree about the control.
+APX="$(cd "$(dirname "$SH")/.." && pwd)/runbooks/appendix-A-troubleshooting.md"
+if [ -f "$APX" ]; then
+  grep -q 'not yet ruled' "$APX" \
+    && bad "appendix-A still calls the set-interface-v4 reload a QUEUED unruled option" || ok
+fi
+
 echo
 total=$((pass+fail))
 if [ "$fail" -eq 0 ]; then echo "opnsense-set-interface-v4: $pass/$total PASS"; exit 0; fi
diff --git a/tests/preflight/run-tests.sh b/tests/preflight/run-tests.sh
index dd2e240..2bcec9d 100644
--- a/tests/preflight/run-tests.sh
+++ b/tests/preflight/run-tests.sh
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 TMP="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
 PASS=0; FAIL=0
 
-mkfix() { # mkfix <name> <lint_rc> <bundlechk_rc> <preflight_present:0|1>
+mkfix() { # mkfix <name> <lint_rc> <bundlechk_rc> <preflight_present:0|1> [creds_rc|"omit"]
   local d="$TMP/$1"; mkdir -p "$d/scripts" "$d/fakebin"
   cp "$REPO/scripts/preflight.sh" "$REPO/scripts/channel_assert.py" "$d/scripts/"
   printf 'applications:\n  keystone: {charm: keystone, channel: 2024.1/stable}\n' > "$d/bundle.yaml"
@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@
   if [ "$4" = "1" ]; then
     printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\necho "  [stub] live preflight"\nexit 0\n' > "$d/scripts/pre-flight-checks.sh"
   fi
+  # P5 credential matrix (D-137 ruling 1). "omit" leaves the gate script absent so the
+  # fail-closed path can be exercised.
+  if [ "${5:-0}" != "omit" ]; then
+    printf '#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport sys;print("  [stub] creds-matrix");sys.exit(%s)\n' \
+      "${5:-0}" > "$d/scripts/creds-matrix.py"
+  fi
   # fakebin juju: publishes 2024.1/stable in the channel map
   cat > "$d/fakebin/juju" <<'FB'
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
@@ -60,5 +66,22 @@
 chmod +x "$D/fakebin/juju"
 run 2 'verify .* manually' "T7 charmhub unreachable -> WARN" "$D"
 
+# T8 -- D-137 ruling 1: the credential gate is BLOCKING. A red register must stop a
+# deploy, not warn about it -- advisory was the posture that demonstrably failed.
+D=$(mkfix creds_fail 0 0 1 1); run 1 'PREFLIGHT: FAIL' "T8 credential matrix FAIL -> overall FAIL" "$D"
+# T9 -- the credential gate must FAIL CLOSED if its checker is missing, exactly as T5
+# requires of pre-flight-checks.sh. A gate that vanishes must never read as a pass.
+D=$(mkfix creds_gone 0 0 1 omit); run 1 'PREFLIGHT: FAIL' "T9 credential gate missing -> FAILS CLOSED" "$D"
+# T10 -- ordering: the credential gate runs with the REAL gates, before the stage-2
+# reminders block, so its verdict participates in the deploy decision.
+D=$(mkfix creds_order 0 0 1 0)
+out="$(PATH="$D/fakebin:$PATH" bash "$D/scripts/preflight.sh" "$D" 2>&1)"
+if [[ "$(grep -n 'P5: credential matrix' <<<"$out" | cut -d: -f1)" -lt \
+      "$(grep -n 'P6: stage-2 reminders' <<<"$out" | cut -d: -f1)" ]]; then
+  echo "  PASS  T10 credential gate runs BEFORE the reminders block"; PASS=$((PASS+1))
+else
+  echo "  FAIL  T10 credential gate ordering"; FAIL=$((FAIL+1))
+fi
+
 echo; echo "RESULT: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL"
 [[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] && { echo "ALL PASS"; exit 0; } || exit 1
diff --git a/tests/provider-bundle-check/run-tests.sh b/tests/provider-bundle-check/run-tests.sh
index 0894856..569248e 100644
--- a/tests/provider-bundle-check/run-tests.sh
+++ b/tests/provider-bundle-check/run-tests.sh
@@ -72,6 +72,67 @@
 mutate t8.yaml 'b["applications"]["octavia"]["options"]["vip"]="10.12.4.233 10.12.8.233 10.12.12.233"'
 run 1 'outside 50-60' "T8 off-band VIP octet FAILS" "$TMP/t8.yaml"
 
+# ---- Placement / anti-affinity checks (only fire on a role-separated bundle) ----
+# Build a valid role-separated fixture from the base: 3 control / 2 compute / 4 storage,
+# quorum trio + control containers on control, ceph-osd on storage, nova-compute on compute.
+python3 - "$TMP/good.yaml" "$TMP/rolesep.yaml" <<'PY'
+import sys, yaml
+b = yaml.safe_load(open(sys.argv[1]))
+roles = ["control","control","control","compute","compute","storage","storage","storage","storage"]
+b["machines"] = {str(i): {"constraints": "arch=amd64 tags=openstack-vr1-dc0,%s" % r}
+                 for i, r in enumerate(roles)}
+for n, s in b["applications"].items():
+    if not isinstance(s, dict) or "to" not in s:
+        continue
+    if   n == "ceph-osd":     s["num_units"] = 4; s["to"] = ["5","6","7","8"]
+    elif n == "nova-compute": s["num_units"] = 2; s["to"] = ["3","4"]
+    elif n in ("mysql-innodb-cluster","ovn-central","ceph-mon"): s["to"] = ["lxd:0","lxd:1","lxd:2"]
+    else:                     s["to"] = ["lxd:0"]
+yaml.safe_dump(b, open(sys.argv[2], "w"))
+PY
+
+mutate_rs() { python3 - "$TMP/rolesep.yaml" "$TMP/$1" "$2" <<'PY'
+import sys, yaml
+b = yaml.safe_load(open(sys.argv[1])); exec(sys.argv[3]); yaml.safe_dump(b, open(sys.argv[2], "w"))
+PY
+}
+runargs() { # runargs <want_rc> <regex> <label> -- <checker args...>
+  local want="$1" rx="$2" label="$3"; shift 3
+  local out rc; out="$(python3 "$CHK" "$@" 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  if [[ "$rc" == "$want" ]] && grep -qE "$rx" <<<"$out"; then
+    echo "  PASS  $label"; PASS=$((PASS+1))
+  else
+    echo "  FAIL  $label (rc=$rc want=$want)"; echo "$out" | sed 's/^/        /' | head -6; FAIL=$((FAIL+1))
+  fi
+}
+
+# T9 valid role-separated bundle PASSES (placement active, all invariants hold)
+run 0 'counts OK' "T9 valid role-separated bundle passes" "$TMP/rolesep.yaml"
+
+# T10 dangling to: (undefined machine)
+mutate_rs t10.yaml 'b["applications"]["glance"]["to"]=["lxd:99"]'
+run 1 'undefined machine' "T10 dangling to: FAILS" "$TMP/t10.yaml"
+
+# T11 off-role: ceph-osd on control/compute instead of storage
+mutate_rs t11.yaml 'b["applications"]["ceph-osd"]["to"]=["0","1","2","3"]'
+run 1 'off-role .want storage' "T11 ceph-osd off-role FAILS" "$TMP/t11.yaml"
+
+# T12 anti-affinity defeat: a 3-unit app stacked on 2 machines
+mutate_rs t12.yaml 'b["applications"]["mysql-innodb-cluster"]["to"]=["lxd:0","lxd:0","lxd:1"]'
+run 1 'anti-affinity defeat' "T12 stacked control units FAIL" "$TMP/t12.yaml"
+
+# T13 wrong bare-metal count: ceph-osd != number of storage nodes
+mutate_rs t13.yaml 'b["applications"]["ceph-osd"]["num_units"]=3'
+run 1 '!= 4 storage node' "T13 ceph-osd count mismatch FAILS" "$TMP/t13.yaml"
+
+# T14 overlay merge + DC bands: base + dc1 VIPs, --dc vr1-dc1 PASSES
+runargs 0 'PASS: Pattern A' "T14 dc1-vips overlay + --dc vr1-dc1 passes" \
+  "$TMP/good.yaml" --overlay "$REPO/overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml" --dc vr1-dc1
+
+# T15 same overlay but default (dc0) bands -> dc1 VIPs off-band FAIL
+runargs 1 'not in 10.12.4' "T15 dc1 VIPs vs dc0 bands FAILS" \
+  "$TMP/good.yaml" --overlay "$REPO/overlays/vr1-dc1-vips.yaml"
+
 echo
 echo "RESULT: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL"
 [[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] && { echo "ALL PASS"; exit 0; } || exit 1
diff --git a/tests/reenroll-hosts/run-tests.sh b/tests/reenroll-hosts/run-tests.sh
index d04bcfe..c2e0e99 100644
--- a/tests/reenroll-hosts/run-tests.sh
+++ b/tests/reenroll-hosts/run-tests.sh
@@ -54,12 +54,12 @@
 has 'NOT-ENROLLED'
 has 'read-only check mode; no changes made'
 
-run_dc 1 "DC=vr1-dc0: hosts selector fails loud (no per-DC host data)" vr1-dc0
-has 'no enrolled hosts yet'
+run_dc 1 "DC=vr1-dc0: REFUSED (D-133 guard -- VR0 flow, VR1 arms populated 2026-07-23)" vr1-dc0
+has 'VR1 re-enrollment is PXE re-enlist'
 absent 'Current host status'                                    # must exit before report() ever runs
 
-run_dc 1 "DC=vr1-dc1: hosts selector fails loud (net arm ratified, D-124)" vr1-dc1
-has 'no enrolled hosts yet'
+run_dc 1 "DC=vr1-dc1: REFUSED (D-133 guard -- VR0 flow, VR1 arms populated 2026-07-23)" vr1-dc1
+has 'VR1 re-enrollment is PXE re-enlist'
 absent 'Current host status'
 
 # D-119 REGRESSION GUARD: the bare dcN tokens are RETIRED. 'dc0' used to mean
diff --git a/tests/repo-lint/run-tests.sh b/tests/repo-lint/run-tests.sh
index 88440a9..3950a6c 100644
--- a/tests/repo-lint/run-tests.sh
+++ b/tests/repo-lint/run-tests.sh
@@ -193,5 +193,33 @@
                               run 1 'L10 pending change set.*docs/audit/' \
                                     "T41 L10 untracked new capture file FAILS" "$D"
 
+# ---- L11 caveman-compress residue (SEC-017) ----
+D=$(mkrepo l11a); printf '# stale in-place copy\n' > "$D/docs/CLAUDE.original.md"
+                              run 1 'L11 docs/CLAUDE.original.md.*caveman-compress residue' \
+                                    "T42 L11 *.original.md residue FAILS" "$D"
+D=$(mkrepo l11b); printf '# reviewed exception -- repo-lint: allow-original-md\n' > "$D/docs/keep.original.md"
+                              run 0 'PASS: repo lint' \
+                                    "T43 L11 opt-out marker suppresses residue FAIL" "$D"
+D=$(mkrepo l11c); mkdir -p "$D/.claude/worktrees/agent-y/docs"
+printf '# worktree copy\n' > "$D/.claude/worktrees/agent-y/docs/x.original.md"
+                              run 0 'PASS: repo lint' \
+                                    "T44 L11 excludes .claude worktrees" "$D"
+
+# T45/T46 -- L12: creds-manifests/stages-reached is a DERIVED projection of CURRENT-STATE
+# that the BLOCKING preflight P5 gate consumes to decide which missing credentials are
+# merely not-minted-yet. A drifted projection makes the gate DEFER REAL ABSENCES -- a false
+# green, the exact class D-137 exists to prevent. L12 couples the two the way L10 couples
+# state-bearing surfaces.
+mkl12() { local d; d="$(mkrepo "$1")"; mkdir -p "$d/creds-manifests"
+  printf 'stage2 reached\n' > "$d/creds-manifests/stages-reached"
+  printf '# state\n' > "$d/docs/CURRENT-STATE.md"
+  ( cd "$d" && git init -q . && git add -A && git -c user.email=t@t -c user.name=t \
+      commit -qm base ) >/dev/null 2>&1
+  printf 'stage2 reached\nstage3 reached\n' > "$d/creds-manifests/stages-reached"
+  echo "$d"; }
+D=$(mkl12 l12a); run 1 'L12 .*stages-reached' "T45 L12 stage projection edited alone FAILS" "$D"
+D=$(mkl12 l12b); printf 'moved\n' >> "$D/docs/CURRENT-STATE.md"
+run 0 'PASS: repo lint' "T46 L12 does NOT fire when CURRENT-STATE moves with it" "$D"
+
 echo; echo "RESULT: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL"
 [[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] && { echo "ALL PASS"; exit 0; } || exit 1