# Security exposure / obligation ledger (DOCFIX-078)

Commercial posture: every credential exposure, rotation obligation, and
security TODO gets a ROW here with an owner and status -- never only a comment
in a script header (where the libvirt item below lived for a week). Review this
ledger at every phase-00 (teardown) and before any handoff. Locations of key
material are deliberately NOT recorded here -- custody detail lives off-repo
per D-069.

| id | date | item | source / evidence | owner | status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEC-001 | 2026-06-26 | libvirt SSH credential printed in plaintext by `maas machine power-parameters` during reenroll work | scripts/reenroll-hosts.sh header note | operator | OPEN -- rotate at v1 close (operator ruling 2026-07-06; was "after rebuild") |
| SEC-002 | 2026-06-17 | juju action params persist in the operation log -- charm authorization must use short-lived child tokens | DOCFIX-011 | operator | STANDING RULE (verify each vault authorize) |
| SEC-003 | 2026-07-03 | Vault unseal-key custody is single-operator (bus factor) | D-069 | operator | OPEN -- assign custodians + rehearse second-person unseal (DEFERRED 2026-07-06 by operator; note: keeps d011-06 MANUAL, gates D-011 full close) |
| SEC-004 | 2026-05-27 | repo temporarily PUBLIC for v1 web_fetch workflow | project completion list | operator | OPEN -- flip to private at v1 close (deferral reaffirmed 2026-07-06) |
| SEC-005 | 2026-07-13 | long-lived GitBucket PAT stored in PLAINTEXT on the jumphost (`credential.helper store`, mode 600) so the agent can push unattended; GitBucket PATs are account-wide -- no per-repo scoping exists | docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260713-git-credential-store.md | operator | OPEN -- dedicated token (not a reused personal one); revoke + rotate at v1 close, or immediately if the jumphost is shared/rebuilt. Revoke: GitBucket -> Account Settings -> Applications |
| SEC-006 | 2026-07-12 | NetBox API token PASTED INTO AGENT CHAT CONTEXT during D-111 IPv6 reconciliation -- the token is BURNED (it exists in a transcript that is not under our control) and must be revoked + reissued, not merely rotated on schedule | docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260712-office1-opnsense-edge-build.md; flagged again at 2026-07-12 session close | operator | OPEN -- **DEFERRED by operator ruling 2026-07-13: revoke at completion of this deployment.** Until then the token is live and exposed. Revoke: NetBox -> Admin -> API Tokens |
| SEC-007 | 2026-07-12 | `~/vr1-office1-creds/` on the jumphost holds the Office1 edge root password + its bcrypt hash + the `office1_svc` SSH PRIVATE key + (added 2026-07-13) the OPNsense **API key/secret** (`opnsense-api.txt`, 0600), all in plaintext (dir 0700, files 0600) | 2026-07-12 edge build; custody detail deliberately not recorded here per D-069 | operator | OPEN -- required for edge management (D-112(c) makes SSH the only management path), so this is a ROTATION obligation, not a delete-me. Rotate at v1 close / if the jumphost is rebuilt or shared |
| SEC-008 | 2026-07-13 | `~/vr1-office1-creds/tailscale-authkey.txt` (vcloud, 0600) -- the operator's 48-char Tailscale auth key for the SELF-HOSTED control plane `tailscale.baldurkeep.com`. Used to enrol `office1-tailscale`. Consumed BY PATH and never printed into a session; the copy shipped to the node was SHREDDED after `tailscale up` (tailscaled holds its own node key now). | 2026-07-13 Office1 Tailscale enrolment; docs/vr1-office1-as-built.md | operator | OPEN -- ROTATION obligation, not a delete-me: the key is still on vcloud for re-enrolment. Revoke/reissue on the control server at v1 close, or immediately if vcloud is rebuilt or shared. |
| SEC-009 | 2026-07-15 | Credential/env SPRAWL + world-readable exposure on vcloud: three env files sat loose in `~` outside the consolidated `~/vr1-office1-creds/` -- `.vr1-netbox.env` (upstream NetBox token), `vr1-office1.env` (edge root-password hash + SSH key path), and `vr1-stage1.env` which held `TF_VAR_maas_api_key` (a MAAS API secret) at mode **0664 (group/world-readable)**; `tailscale-authkey.txt` in the creds dir was also 0664. | docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260715-creds-consolidation.md | operator | **REMEDIATED 2026-07-15** -- all three moved into `~/vr1-office1-creds/`, every sensitive file `chmod 600`. STANDING CONVENTION established (below). Note: this is a CLOSED in-house test; the rotation obligations of SEC-005/006/007 still apply at v1 close, this row only closes the SPRAWL + PERMS exposure. |
| SEC-010 | 2026-07-16 | **metal-admin DC-LOCAL invariant (D-052/D-100) is PRESERVED but NOT ENFORCED in the committed Stage-3 config.** The `vvr1_dc0` rack straddles metal-admin (10.12.8.0/22, DC-local) + the office1<->dc0 transit (crosses fiber). Its committed cloud-init pins static IPs only -- **no `net.ipv4.ip_forward=0` sysctl, no host firewall on the transit leg.** Cross-plane routing (metal-admin <-> the whole Office1 /22, bidirectional) is blocked ONLY by Ubuntu's distro default; the deferred MAAS-rack install could silently flip it. A MAAS rack proxies at the application layer and needs no kernel forwarding, so pinning is free. **MODEL B UPDATE (2026-07-16):** after the D-123 Model B reshape, the OUTER `vvr1-dc0` is single-leg (transit only); metal-admin + the other 5 planes are now INNER bridges on `vvr1-dc0`'s own libvirtd. The forwarding hardening is MORE critical (vvr1-dc0 now bridges ALL 6 inner planes + the transit) and belongs on the inner libvirt host, not just a 2-leg rack -- wire it in the C3 bootstrap (`site-headend-install.sh` node-host mode). | 2026-07-16 plane-segregation review + Model B reshape cross-check; `opentofu/main.tf` `module "vvr1_dc0"` | operator | **CLOSED 2026-07-20** (was: artifact COMMITTED Phase D 2026-07-16, gated on apply+verify -- both now done, see close note at end of this cell). Enforced via a FORWARD-drop across the transit leg, NOT a global `ip_forward=0`. `scripts/site-headend-install.sh --host-nodes` writes `/etc/nftables-sec010.nft` (drop FORWARD in+out the transit interface, default `mgmt`) + a boot-persistent `sec010-fw.service`; `--host-nodes --check` is the MECHANICAL pre-apply gate (fails if the rule is absent, AND -- hardened 2026-07-16 -- if the keyed transit interface does not EXIST, since an nftables oifname on an absent iface loads clean but matches nothing = fail-open). **D-125 UPDATE (2026-07-16):** the earlier rationale (a global `ip_forward=0` being unusable because the inner `vr1-dc0-wan` NAT forced `ip_forward=1`) NO LONGER applies -- under bridge-in the inner `vr1-dc0-wan` is a BRIDGE (no inner NAT). The scoped FORWARD-drop is RETAINED as-is (correct either way). **br_netfilter CONSTRAINT:** it MUST stay interface-scoped and NEVER be globalized -- with `br_netfilter` loaded, bridged WAN frames traverse the L3 FORWARD chain, so a global forward-drop would silently kill the `br-vr1-dc0-wan` WAN path. `--check` now also verifies the WAN bridge exists with its uplink enslaved (same fail-open class). Nothing routes across the fiber THROUGH vvr1-dc0; the rack proxies MAAS at the app layer (originated/terminated, not forwarded). Same pin follows onto `voffice1` when its transit leg is wired. Region route must target only the rack transit /30, never 10.12.8.0/22. **CLOSED 2026-07-20 (operator ruling, exact utterance: "Close SEC-010 (Recommended)"): applied + verified BOTH ends in the logged dc0-deploy step-B window.** vvr1-dc0: written by `site-headend-install.sh --role rack --host-nodes`, verified by the named `--check` EXIT 0 (`docs/audit/stepB-check-20260720-final.txt` -- rule present + `enp1s0` exists + `br-vr1-dc0-wan`/`enp2s0` enslaved; note the transit interface is `enp1s0`, not the script-default `mgmt` -- netplan set-name dropped, session changelog). voffice1 (the "same pin follows" clause -- its transit leg `enp2s0` was wired 2026-07-20): identical scoped artifact + `sec010-fw.service` enabled, `nft list table inet sec010` verified, proxy/region paths re-verified working post-pin. |
| SEC-012 | 2026-07-20 | **New SERVICE credential: a dedicated MAAS -> libvirt SSH keypair.** Minted during the DC0 deploy so MAAS can power-control the inner node VMs (`power_type=virsh`). It is a SERVICE credential held by a daemon, not an operator key: the private half is installed inside the MAAS snap on BOTH controllers (region + DC rack) because MAAS dials the power address from whichever controller it chooses -- MEASURED to be the REGION, not the rack that owns the hardware. The public half authorizes a user that is in the rack's `libvirt` group, so anyone holding this key can drive libvirt on `vvr1-dc0` -- i.e. power/define/destroy every inner node VM and the DC edge. Blast radius is deliberately narrowed by being per-purpose (operator-ruled 2026-07-20: "Dedicated MAAS->libvirt key" over reusing the dc0 service key). | 2026-07-20 step-D power wiring; `scripts/maas-node-power.sh` header; session changelog items 15-17 | operator | **OPEN -- rotation obligation + a scope question.** (1) ROTATE at v1 close, or immediately if either controller is rebuilt or shared. (2) SCOPE: the key authorizes a `libvirt`-group user, which is broader than the power verbs MAAS actually needs; a tighter grant (dedicated unix user + polkit rule limiting to domain start/stop/status) is the hardening candidate and is Roosevelt-relevant, since bare metal replaces this with IPMI credentials that have the same "power-only vs full-control" question. Custody detail off-repo per D-069. |
| SEC-013 | 2026-07-20 | **MAAS API key materialized to disk on the region.** An admin-scoped MAAS API key (`consumer:token:secret`) was placed by the operator in a 0600 file on `voffice1` so the `opentofu/vr1-dc0-maas` root could consume it via `TF_VAR_maas_api_key`. It grants FULL MAAS admin API access (machines, power, deploy, users). Two exposure surfaces beyond the file itself: (a) the OpenTofu **state file** of any root that uses the maas provider records it -- unavoidable with this provider, so that state inherits credential handling (0600, never committed); (b) a MAAS CLI profile was also created for the operator user from the same key. It was verified by FORMAT ONLY (71 bytes, 3 colon-separated parts) and never printed, echoed, or passed in argv. | 2026-07-20 step-D part 2; `opentofu/vr1-dc0-maas/main.tf` header; session changelog item 15 | operator | **OPEN -- rotation obligation.** Rotate at v1 close, or immediately if `voffice1` is rebuilt/shared or the tfstate leaves the host. NOTE: the pod route this key was placed for was subsequently REFUTED (see changelog item 16) and `opentofu/vr1-dc0-maas` is currently UNUSED -- if that root is retired at stage close, this key's on-disk copy and the tfstate should be removed with it, leaving only the CLI profile. Custody detail off-repo per D-069. |
| SEC-011 | 2026-07-16 | **Node least-connectivity gap (not an L2 breach).** Under D-121 Option C role separation, all nodes get a uniform 6-plane NIC set, so a ceph-osd STORAGE node has a leg on provider-public (external/FIP) + data-tenant (tenant geneve) -- planes it never binds per D-052. Planes stay isolated L2 (no crosstalk). | 2026-07-16 plane-segregation review; `opentofu/main.tf` `local.vr1_dc0_node_nics` | operator | **CLOSED 2026-07-16 (operator ruling -- keep uniform 6-NIC).** Review R3-F10: A2's cross-examination refuted the attack-surface concern -- in the isolated-L2 sim the unbound vNICs have no reachability out, and pruning would INCREASE Roosevelt-delta (baremetal trunks all VLANs to every node on bonded NICs, so all planes are present regardless of L3 binding). Uniform 6-NIC is the more Roosevelt-faithful model. Accepted non-issue; no code change. |

**STANDING CONVENTION (SEC-009, 2026-07-15): per-site credential/env consolidation.** ALL sensitive
files AND environment/config files for a site live in a single `~/<site>-creds/` folder on vcloud,
mode 0700, files 0600 (public keys 0644). No loose env files in `~`. Sites: `~/vr1-office1-creds/`
(exists); when DC deployment starts, `~/vr1-dc0-creds/` and `~/vr1-dc1-creds/` follow the SAME
pattern from day one -- do not accumulate loose `vr1-dc0*.env` in `~` and consolidate later. This is
a DATA-LOSS / continuity control as much as a security one: scattered creds get lost between
sessions and after compaction. Rationale is looser-security-but-strict-hygiene: this is a closed
in-house test, so real credential hardening (rotation, revocation, non-shared tokens) is deferred to
post-teardown redeploy cycles (test2/3/4+), but consolidation happens NOW so nothing is lost.

**ADDENDUM (2026-07-15): the sandbox NetBox token was MISSED by the original consolidation.** It lived
only at `/root/netbox-secrets/api.token` on `office1-netbox`, never in `~/vr1-office1-creds/` -- the
prior consolidation moved the three loose `~` env files but did not pull this VM-resident secret into
the folder, contrary to the standing convention ("ALL sensitive files for a site live in
`~/<site>-creds/`"). Found while starting C2 sub-task (i) (the fidelity re-check needed it). Now
consolidated to `~/vr1-office1-creds/vr1-netbox-sandbox.env` (mode 0600; `NETBOX_URL=http://10.10.1.10:8000`
+ the assembled `nbt_<key>.<plaintext>` token), copied off the VM without being printed into the
session. The `/root/netbox-secrets/` copy remains the source-of-record on the VM; this is a working
copy on the jumphost, mirroring how `vr1-netbox.env` holds the upstream token. See
`docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260715-fidelity-check-scope-correctness.md`.

**ENFORCEMENT (2026-07-15) -- so the miss cannot recur, esp. for DC0/DC1.** The convention was never
ENFORCED; a VM-minted secret had no forcing function to get consolidated and no check to catch a miss.
Now built (`docs/archive/changelogs/changelog-20260715-creds-audit.md`):
- **`creds-manifests/<site>.manifest`** -- declares EXACTLY the secrets a site must hold, each with its
  mode and PROVENANCE (`local`, or `<vm>:<path>` for VM-minted secrets -- the class that was missed).
  `creds-manifests/vr1-office1.manifest` seeded (11 entries) and the live folder audits CLEAN.
- **`scripts/creds-audit.sh <site>`** -- verifies the live `~/<site>-creds/` against the manifest
  (presence, 0700 folder / declared file modes, non-empty), flags UNDECLARED files in the folder, and
  scans the home root for SPRAWL (loose `*.env`/`*.token`/`*authkey*` outside any `*-creds/`). Reads NO
  secret values -- metadata only. Harness `tests/creds-audit/` (7/7).
- **Standing rule:** run `bash scripts/creds-audit.sh vr1-dcN` at the CLOSE of each DC standup, and
  consolidate+manifest every secret AT MINT TIME (not "later" -- later is when it is lost). Wired into
  the `dc-dc-phase3` runbook.