# vr1-office1 creds manifest -- what MUST be consolidated in ~/vr1-office1-creds/ (SEC-009). # scripts/creds-audit.sh verifies this list against the live folder: presence, mode, # non-empty. No secret VALUES are read -- only existence, mode, and declared provenance. # # fields: # source = "local" -- generated/held on the jumphost (vcloud) # = ":" -- MINTED ON A SITE VM; a working copy MUST be pulled into # the folder at mint time (this is the class SEC-009 missed: # office1-netbox:/root/netbox-secrets/api.token went # un-consolidated until it was needed). # # MAAS region GUI/superuser passwords (SEC-020, 2026-07-25). # maas-admin-password -- the `admin` superuser's password, MINTED ON THE REGION VM # by scripts/site-headend-install.sh:452 (newpass -> 28 chars, alphanumeric, NO # trailing newline) and left root-only at /root/maas-secrets/admin.pass until this # consolidation. This is the SEC-009 miss class the NetBox token established: a # VM-minted secret with no forcing function to reach the folder. Byte-identical # copy (sha256-verified); the VM copy remains source-of-record, this is the working # copy. `admin` doubles as the automation identity (the `maas admin` CLI profile, # 19 call sites), which is WHY nobody ever needed its password -- see SEC-020. # maas-operator-password -- the `operator` superuser, minted 2026-07-25 for HUMAN GUI # login so a person no longer has to authenticate as the service identity. 32-char # base64, generated on vcloud, set via stdin (never argv, per SEC-018 discipline). # STILL UN-CONSOLIDATED on voffice1 (logged finding, NOT actioned -- hard rule 1): # /root/maas-secrets/{admin.apikey,db.pass,lxd-trust.pass}. admin.apikey is trivially # regenerable (`maas apikey --username=admin`) so it is deliberately NOT copied here; # db.pass + lxd-trust.pass are region infrastructure, out of scope of this task. maas-admin-password 600 voffice1:/root/maas-secrets/admin.pass maas-operator-password 600 local # NetBox web-GUI `admin` password (SEC-025). CONSOLIDATED 2026-07-27: it was minted # on the NetBox VM at stage 2 and had NEVER been pulled to the jumphost -- the SAME # miss class as the api.token below (the founding SEC-009 defect) and as SEC-020's # admin.pass, i.e. a VM-minted HUMAN GUI login with no forcing function to reach the # folder. Found by the 2026-07-27 consolidation audit, which asked which accounts # actually exist rather than which the register already knew about. Byte-identical # copy, sha256-verified at both ends, 28 bytes; the VM copy REMAINS source-of-record, # so any future rotation must update BOTH copies or this one becomes a stale trap # (the caveat SEC-020 records for maas-admin-password applies identically here). netbox-admin-password 600 office1-netbox:/root/netbox-secrets/admin.pass office1_svc_ed25519 600 local office1_svc_ed25519.pub 644 local opnsense-api.txt 600 local opnsense-root-hash 600 local opnsense-root-password 600 local README 600 local tailscale-authkey.txt 600 local vr1-netbox.env 600 local vr1-netbox-sandbox.env 600 office1-netbox:/root/netbox-secrets/api.token vr1-office1.env 600 local vr1-stage1.env 600 local