# vr1-office1 creds manifest -- what MUST be consolidated in ~/vr1-office1-creds/ (SEC-009).
# scripts/creds-audit.sh verifies this list against the live folder: presence, mode,
# non-empty. No secret VALUES are read -- only existence, mode, and declared provenance.
#
# fields: <filename> <octal-mode> <source>
# source = "local" -- generated/held on the jumphost (vcloud)
# = "<vm>:<path>" -- MINTED ON A SITE VM; a working copy MUST be pulled into
# the folder at mint time (this is the class SEC-009 missed:
# office1-netbox:/root/netbox-secrets/api.token went
# un-consolidated until it was needed).
#
# MAAS region GUI/superuser passwords (SEC-020, 2026-07-25).
# maas-admin-password -- the `admin` superuser's password, MINTED ON THE REGION VM
# by scripts/site-headend-install.sh:452 (newpass -> 28 chars, alphanumeric, NO
# trailing newline) and left root-only at /root/maas-secrets/admin.pass until this
# consolidation. This is the SEC-009 miss class the NetBox token established: a
# VM-minted secret with no forcing function to reach the folder. Byte-identical
# copy (sha256-verified); the VM copy remains source-of-record, this is the working
# copy. `admin` doubles as the automation identity (the `maas admin` CLI profile,
# 19 call sites), which is WHY nobody ever needed its password -- see SEC-020.
# maas-operator-password -- the `operator` superuser, minted 2026-07-25 for HUMAN GUI
# login so a person no longer has to authenticate as the service identity. 32-char
# base64, generated on vcloud, set via stdin (never argv, per SEC-018 discipline).
# STILL UN-CONSOLIDATED on voffice1 (logged finding, NOT actioned -- hard rule 1):
# /root/maas-secrets/{admin.apikey,db.pass,lxd-trust.pass}. admin.apikey is trivially
# regenerable (`maas apikey --username=admin`) so it is deliberately NOT copied here;
# db.pass + lxd-trust.pass are region infrastructure, out of scope of this task.
maas-admin-password 600 voffice1:/root/maas-secrets/admin.pass
maas-operator-password 600 local
# NetBox web-GUI `admin` password (SEC-025). CONSOLIDATED 2026-07-27: it was minted
# on the NetBox VM at stage 2 and had NEVER been pulled to the jumphost -- the SAME
# miss class as the api.token below (the founding SEC-009 defect) and as SEC-020's
# admin.pass, i.e. a VM-minted HUMAN GUI login with no forcing function to reach the
# folder. Found by the 2026-07-27 consolidation audit, which asked which accounts
# actually exist rather than which the register already knew about. Byte-identical
# copy, sha256-verified at both ends, 28 bytes; the VM copy REMAINS source-of-record,
# so any future rotation must update BOTH copies or this one becomes a stale trap
# (the caveat SEC-020 records for maas-admin-password applies identically here).
netbox-admin-password 600 office1-netbox:/root/netbox-secrets/admin.pass
office1_svc_ed25519 600 local
office1_svc_ed25519.pub 644 local
opnsense-api.txt 600 local
opnsense-root-hash 600 local
opnsense-root-password 600 local
README 600 local
tailscale-authkey.txt 600 local
vr1-netbox.env 600 local
vr1-netbox-sandbox.env 600 office1-netbox:/root/netbox-secrets/api.token
vr1-office1.env 600 local
vr1-stage1.env 600 local