| 2026-07-13 |
D-114: voffice1 is LIVE. cloudinit-vm gains nested virt -- it was silently broken for the model
...
APPLIED, operator-approved: 5 added, 0 changed, 0 destroyed. The running OPNsense edge was NOT
touched (confirmed by plan BEFORE apply -- no in-place update, so no repeat of the 2026-07-13
guest bounce).
THE MODULE WAS SILENTLY BROKEN FOR D-114'S ENTIRE MODEL. modules/cloudinit-vm's libvirt_domain
had NO `cpu` block. With none, libvirt renders a GENERIC EMULATED CPU exposing no `svm` -- and
LXD *virtual machines* are qemu/KVM guests, so NO service VM could ever have been composed into
voffice1. D-114 would have failed at its first step with a confusing "KVM not available" that
pointed nowhere near OpenTofu. Measured proof of the masking: host is an AMD EPYC 9965; a
default-CPU guest was handed an "Opteron_G3".
Fix: `cpu { mode = "host-passthrough" }` always, plus a new `expose_nested_virt` variable with NO
default -- a real per-VM decision. true = pass `svm` through (required for D-114's containment
VMs); false = disable it, matching modules/opnsense-edge. The operator asked whether the edge's
`svm` disable was a leftover of the failed OPNsense deploy: it is NOT. It was tried as a
triple-fault fix on 2026-07-12, did NOT resolve it (the real cause was the memory unit), and was
retained on hardening grounds. A router has no business seeing nested virt. It stays disabled there.
voffice1 as built (MEASURED): Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS, 16 vCPU / 32 GiB / 600 GiB, single NIC on
office1-local, reports the real EPYC CPU with svm on all 16 cores and /dev/kvm PRESENT, egress to
1.1.1.1 at 4.6ms THROUGH the edge. Cloud-init deliberately MINIMAL (identity + key + guest agent);
MAAS and LXD go in as separate GATED steps rather than buried in a first-boot script that either
silently works or silently does not. The SSH pubkey is read via file(var...) at plan time -- key
material never enters a command line, the repo, or an agent's context; the tfvars holding the path
stays gitignored. network_config matches the NIC by GLOB, not a guessed kernel name (an inferred
value); it came up enp1s0.
TWO GATES CLEARED:
1. KEA HAS SERVED ITS FIRST REAL DHCP LEASE. Standing open item: the daemon was proven, the
SERVICE never was (office1-local had no client). voffice1 -- the first client ever on that LAN
-- took 10.10.0.100, hwaddr 52:54:00:6a:87:e5 (matches its NIC), hostname voffice1, state
active, read back through the D-113(a2) REST API. DHCP now works end to end.
2. D-114's NESTING PROBE PASSES AT L3. Stated honestly: this proves nested KVM is AVAILABLE. The
DEFINITIVE proof is a guest actually booting inside voffice1 -- that lands with the first
composed LXD VM. Not recording L3 as fully proven until then.
FINDING, logged NOT actioned (DC1 is gated behind Office1 per D-114): modules/node-vm has the SAME
missing-cpu-block defect. DC nodes run nova-compute, which needs working KVM -- without the fix
they will come up unable to run a single instance. MUST be fixed before Stage 3.
opentofu-validate PASS, repo-lint 0 fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
Fold the AppArmor/libvirt rule into scripts/prereqs -- it gated every VR1 VM boot
...
`/var/lib/libvirt/vr1/** rwk,` in /etc/apparmor.d/local/abstractions/libvirt-qemu had
been applied BY HAND on vcloud and existed ONLY as host state. Nothing in the repo
carried it, so a rebuild or a second host walked straight back into the same wall.
Why it matters: libvirt's stock abstractions/libvirt-qemu grants qemu only the DEFAULT
pool path (/var/lib/libvirt/images). VR1 uses a custom pool parent, which is not in that
abstraction, so AppArmor blocks qemu even with perfect POSIX permissions. The domain
DEFINES fine, then fails to start with a bare qemu "Permission denied" -- and NOTHING in
the libvirt error names AppArmor. It cost a session on 2026-07-12 (DOCFIX-186), was
logged as a PREREQ candidate, and was never actioned until the ledger collapse resurfaced it.
New: scripts/prereqs/install-apparmor-libvirt.sh, wired into install-all.sh (after
install-virtualization -- it edits libvirt's own profile dir) and reported by
check-prereqs.sh.
- Idempotent and deliberately QUIET on a good host: if the rule is present it exits 0
having touched nothing -- it does NOT reload apparmor or bounce libvirtd. Those happen
only on the run that actually adds the rule.
- Writes to local/, the vendor-sanctioned override include, so it survives package upgrades.
- Pool parent is a variable (VR1_POOL_PARENT, default /var/lib/libvirt/vr1), not a literal.
- Non-AppArmor hosts report N/A and SUCCEED -- no manufactured failure on a host it
does not apply to.
Verification: tests/prereqs 32/32 PASS (was 24/24) -- the new cases drive DETECTION off a
pool parent guaranteed absent from the profile, so the negative path is deterministic on
any host: a false OK from --check IS the bug, --dry-run must plan and mutate nothing, and
the planned rule must be exactly `<parent>/** rwk,`. Full gauntlet ALL GREEN (52 harnesses),
repo-lint 0 fail. Run live on vcloud: --check reports OK and leaves the profile byte-identical,
confirming the already-satisfied path is a true no-op.
No host state was mutated by this change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
Ledger collapse: close the coverage gap in the carry-forward
...
The collapse commit's guards (lint, ASCII, ledger-scan, size) validated FORM, not
COVERAGE. Two ledger regions had only been keyword-grepped, not read. Read them.
Three items surfaced; each was VERIFIED against the repo rather than trusted:
- run-tests-all.sh dirtying the tree with 37 spurious mode-change diffs: NOW FIXED
(the fakebin stubs are committed 100755 -- 36 of them, measured). Not carried.
- `scripts/opnsense-apply-config.sh` (once "wanted"): SUPERSEDED, and dangerous to
build -- its snapshot/scp/install/reboot flow IS the config.xml path D-113(a2)
deleted. Recorded as "do not build this", so nobody resurrects it from the history.
- The tcsh trap it taught is REAL and carried forward: root's shell on the OPNsense
edge is tcsh, so `$(...)` in a quoted remote command dies with "Illegal variable
name" -- QUIETLY. It already cost a silently no-op'd pre-install snapshot. Always
feed remote commands to `sh -s`.
Also carried (this one matters and was nowhere in the open lists): DHCP HAS NEVER
SERVED A REAL LEASE. kea-dhcp4 is bound to udp/67 with the subnet+pool intact, but
office1-local has no client host, so the DAEMON is proven and the SERVICE is not.
The first VM on office1-local (the Stage 2 headend VMs) is the real test -- logged
as that stage's gate rather than an assumption.
Plus a measured doc-accuracy finding: SEC-007 says "D-112(c) makes SSH the only
management path", but the edge's web GUI IS listening on the LAN (10.10.0.1:443,
HTTPS 200) and is correctly firewalled off on the WAN. Not an exposure -- OPNsense
default, and D-113 kept OPNsense *because* the GUI is an operator requirement -- but
the wording is imprecise. Logged, not actioned (hard rule 1).
Guards: repo-lint 0 fail (1 documented legacy warn), 0 non-ASCII. No live system
touched; the edge probes were read-only TCP/HTTP reachability checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
Collapse the three ledger streams into one; reconcile against repo ground truth
...
The ledger carried three separately-owned parallel stream sections (main-chat,
jumphost, shared) plus ~30 append-only session narratives -- 2189 lines, several
of them contradicting each other and the repo. Collapsed to ONE stream, 222 lines,
carrying only what is still OPEN plus the facts that live nowhere else.
The narrative is NOT lost: it is in this commit's parent (f81177a) and, durably,
in the 65 docs/changelog-*.md files, design-decisions.md, and the incident reports.
RECONCILED (repo ground truth wins over any stream's self-claim; all verified):
- machine-derived block was STALE: said D=111/DOCFIX=162/BUNDLEFIX=012 and listed
only SEC-001/003/004. Re-seeded from today's scan: D=114/DOCFIX=195/BUNDLEFIX=013,
six open SEC rows (001/003/004/005/006/007).
- main-chat called backlog items 6/7/8 "not started". FALSE -- keystone-policy-drift.sh,
cloud-snapshot.sh and tests/tenant-acceptance/ all exist. Delivered by the jumphost
stream; this was the cross-stream reconcile the ledger itself had pending.
- item 3 remainder (fold vault-kv-health into cloud-assert): VERIFIED still open.
- item 5 (tenant-cluster-create.sh): VERIFIED still absent.
- R-3/D-063: ledger claimed CLOSED, handoff doc still says PROPOSED/OPEN. D-063 is
RESOLVED/CLOSED in design-decisions.md -- so the HANDOFF DOC is the stale one.
Carried forward as an open item rather than fixed here (hard rule 1).
- D-076: not this repo's to work. D-076..D-099 is a RESERVED source-project band
(D-110), so its "uncommitted worktree draft" was never here. No work lost.
- "beta cluster left at node_count=2" was STALE -- the 2026-07-08 audit found no beta
cluster and no foil1 tenant. Retired.
CARRIED FORWARD (would have been operationally lost -- the skill loads this file):
the API-managed-DHCP edge trap; "updated in-place" still BOUNCES the guest; do not
re-implement OPNsense's key crypto, call the interface; config ISO can never be read
on a nano image; guide<->skill coupling (repo-lint L8); controller model is
admin/controller; State facts; Project-completion.
NEW, measured this session: the apparmor rule /var/lib/libvirt/vr1/** GATES EVERY VR1
VM BOOT but exists only as host state -- it is NOT in scripts/prereqs/, so a rebuild
hits the identical foundational failure. Logged as an open item.
Guards: repo-lint 0 fail (1 documented legacy warn), 0 non-ASCII, ledger-scan
reconciles against the re-seeded machine block. No live system touched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
APPLIED + CORRECTION: "updated in-place" does NOT mean "no restart" -- the apply bounced the edge
...
The config_seed/cdrom removal is APPLIED to the live Office1 edge. Apply complete: 0 added,
1 changed, 1 destroyed. `tofu plan` now reports "No changes" -- repo and state are back in sync,
so Stage 3 cannot trip over the divergence.
CORRECTION, recorded because the prediction was WRONG and the mistake is reusable:
I predicted the apply would NOT interrupt the guest, on the grounds that the plan said
"libvirt_domain.vm will be updated IN-PLACE". THE APPLY RESTARTED THE GUEST. Measured: uptime went
from 8:36 to 6 secs across the apply. The dmacvicar/libvirt provider redefines the domain to apply
a disk-list change and BOUNCES it -- a ~30s outage during which the edge was neither routing nor
serving DHCP.
"updated in-place" means the RESOURCE is not replaced. It says NOTHING about whether the GUEST
keeps running. Do not read it as "no interruption" -- that is exactly what I did.
STAGE 3 CONSEQUENCE (the reason this is worth a commit of its own): any future tofu apply that
touches a libvirt_domain's devices -- on a DC edge, or on a node VM -- must be assumed to BOUNCE
THE GUEST, and scheduled/gated as an outage rather than a no-op config tidy-up.
Recovery was clean and needed no intervention. Post-boot, measured: kea-dhcp4 running and bound
udp4 10.10.0.1:67 with subnet 10.10.0.0/24 + pool .100-.199 intact; WAN 172.30.1.2, LAN 10.10.0.1,
default route 172.30.1.1; egress to 1.1.1.1 at 0.0% packet loss; 8 LAN pass rules in pf; serial
console + getty alive (DOCFIX-192 holds). The cdrom is gone from the persistent domain XML.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B6Fzre1CxCY8tzwFCudu57
|
D-113(a2) COMPLETE: DELETE the config.xml path (template, renderer, ISO builder)
...
Operator ruling ("I'll defer to your lean"): the OPNsense config.xml template is DELETED, not
reduced.
WHY DELETED RATHER THAN REDUCED: the (a2) plan was to shrink the template to a minimal bootstrap
(sshd + root key + console + a seeded API key). That proved UNNECESSARY -- every one of those is
covered without a config.xml at all:
sshd + root key -> the D-112(c) console bootstrap (proven on Office1)
an API key -> scripts/opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh (OPNsense's OWN model; no GUI
click, no re-implemented crypto)
DHCP/firewall/interfaces -> the REST API (proven read AND write)
So the provisioning chain has NO config.xml anywhere:
boot factory nano -> console bootstrap -> mint API key -> configure over REST
A config.xml renderer that nobody should ever run is not a safety net -- it is a loaded gun
pointed at a live router. The 2026-07-13 safety sweep is the evidence: the repo still contained
runbook steps telling an operator to render a config and push it to the edge, which by then would
have CLOBBERED live API-managed DHCP.
DELETED: opentofu/templates/opnsense-config.xml.tmpl; scripts/opnsense-render-config.sh +
tests/opnsense-render-config/; scripts/opnsense-build-config-iso.sh +
tests/opnsense-build-config-iso/; the opnsense-edge module's config_seed volume + cdrom disk and
its config_iso_path variable; the xorriso/genisoimage prereq (it existed ONLY for the ISO
builder). Gauntlet 54 -> 52 harnesses (the two deleted scripts took their harnesses with them --
expected arithmetic, not a regression). All files remain in git history.
opentofu/templates/README.md is now a TOMBSTONE explaining what happened and what to use instead.
THE LIVE CHANGE IS NOT APPLIED IN THIS COMMIT. Removing the module's ISO wiring touches an
INSTANTIATED resource (libvirt_volume.config_seed is in tfstate). Measured with `tofu plan` first:
module.office1_opnsense.libvirt_domain.vm will be updated IN-PLACE
module.office1_opnsense.libvirt_volume.config_seed will be destroyed
Plan: 0 to add, 1 to change, 1 to destroy.
NO replacement of the running domain -- confirmed explicitly. A replacement would have DESTROYED
the live, routing, DHCP-serving edge, and would have been grounds to stop.
A LINT GUARD DID ITS JOB: repo-lint's L3 (runbooks must not reference missing scripts) went RED on
the tombstone notes, because they named the deleted paths. The rule was RIGHT and it has no
opt-out (only L4 does). Rather than weaken a guard that exists to stop runbooks pointing at dead
scripts, the tombstones were reworded to name the bare filename instead of the scripts/ path. The
guard stays fully intact; the information is preserved.
Verification: repo-lint 0 fail; opentofu-validate PASS (root + 10/10 modules standalone);
gauntlet ALL GREEN (52).
Revert: git revert this commit (restores template/renderer/ISO builder/harnesses), then
`cd opentofu && tofu apply` to re-create the (inert) config_seed volume + cdrom.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B6Fzre1CxCY8tzwFCudu57
|
D-113(a2): API-key bootstrap -- no GUI click, no re-implemented crypto
...
The last unknown in D-113(a2) edge provisioning. The API path was proven (read AND write), but
every new edge still needed a MANUAL GUI CLICK to mint its key -- which would have put a human in
the middle of building DC1's and DC2's edges in Stage 3. Closed.
scripts/opnsense-mint-apikey.php runs ON the edge; calls OPNsense's OWN model
(Auth\User -> apikeys->add()) -- the exact code path
the GUI's ticket button invokes
scripts/opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh ships it over SSH, runs it, retrieves the key, wipes
the remote copies
tests/opnsense-bootstrap-apikey/ offline harness, 8 PASS (ssh/scp stubbed)
Gauntlet ALL GREEN (54 harnesses, was 53); repo-lint 0 fail.
VERIFIED END TO END on the live Office1 edge: minted a SECOND key via the vendor model ->
GET core/firmware/status returned HTTP 200 (the vendor-minted key AUTHENTICATES) ->
POST auth/user/del_api_key/<id> -> {"result":"deleted"} -> search_api_key shows 1 row remaining
(the operator's original key, untouched throughout) -> the retired key is now REJECTED (a real
negative test, not just an absence of errors). Temp creds shredded from the jumphost. The edge is
back to its prior state.
THE DESIGN DECISION, and why the alternative was rejected: OPNsense stores API secrets as
crypt(secret,'$6$') -- SHA-512 with an EMPTY salt (verified on the live 26.1 box: the stored hash
is "$6$$" + 86 chars). We COULD mint keys offline and seed them into a bootstrap config.xml. We
deliberately DO NOT. That would couple our provisioning to a vendor hash format we would have to
keep byte-compatible forever, and a mismatch FAILS SILENTLY -- keys that simply never
authenticate, with no error at generation time. Calling the vendor's own generator has no format
to keep in sync. Same principle as D-113(a2) itself: call the interface, do not re-implement the
internals -- which is exactly what DOCFIX-191/192/193 cost us. (An offline-hash attempt was
blocked by the permission classifier mid-session; the block was correct and produced this better
design.)
GUARD CLAUSE WORTH KEEPING (harness T5): the script REFUSES to overwrite an existing creds file.
An existing file means a LIVE key on the edge; overwriting the local copy would strand it there
PERMANENTLY, because the secret is hashed on save and can never be read back. That is
unrecoverable credential loss. T5 asserts both the refusal and that the existing file is left
byte-intact. The secret is never printed -- creation is the only moment it exists in cleartext.
WHAT THIS UNBLOCKS: edge provisioning is now automatable with no human in the loop --
boot factory nano -> D-112(c) console bootstrap (SSH + key) -> opnsense-bootstrap-apikey.sh
-> opnsense-api.sh for DHCP/firewall/interfaces.
There is NO config.xml anywhere in that chain.
STILL OPEN: the template reduction itself. And the chain above raises the real question -- the
template may not need REDUCING so much as DELETING, since the console bootstrap plus the key
minter cover first contact. NOT ruled; not done unilaterally. (Note the opnsense-edge module's
config_seed volume is INSTANTIATED -- it is in tfstate -- so removing the ISO wiring is a LIVE
change, not a docs change.)
Revert: git rm the two scripts + tests/opnsense-bootstrap-apikey/ (nothing live depends on them --
the live edge's key was minted via the GUI and is unaffected).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B6Fzre1CxCY8tzwFCudu57
|
Correct the workflow doc's status: it was materially FALSE and would misdirect work
...
docs/dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md is the first thing a fresh session reads. Its status claims
dated from 2026-07-09 and had drifted into being wrong. Corrected against MEASURED state.
Docs only; no code, no live system touched.
gap #2 "UNVALIDATED -- no tofu binary" -> OpenTofu v1.12.3 IS installed; tree validates
(root + 10/10 modules) and is partly APPLIED
(11 resources in state). But 2 modules were
BROKEN and had never been parsed (DOCFIX-194).
gap #17 "no per-site ISP-uplink network -> CLOSED FOR OFFICE1: office1-wan is live
exists anywhere, for ANY site" (virbr11, NAT, 172.30.1.0/24); the edge's WAN
sits on it at 172.30.1.2, egress verified. The
gap's own proposed answer (a dedicated per-site
uplink, NOT a mesh leg) is what got built.
DC1/DC2 STILL have none.
opnsense-edge "BUILT, UNVALIDATED" -> BUILT, INSTANTIATED, RUNNING (routing, NAT,
egress, console, SSH, Kea DHCP on udp/67).
config.xml tmpl "BUILT, fully tested" -> SUPERSEDED by D-113(a2); a full push would now
CLOBBER live API-managed DHCP.
netem-link "BUILT, UNVALIDATED" -> WAS BROKEN; fixed 2026-07-13 (DOCFIX-194).
Stage 2 "NOT YET EXECUTED" -> PARTIALLY EXECUTED.
THE TRAP THIS REMOVES: Stage 2's gate lists "NetBox authoritative" and "GitBucket serving" -- and
NetBox and GitBucket DO answer, at baldurkeep.com. But those are PRE-EXISTING services, NOT
Office1 headend VMs. Measured: office1-opnsense is the ONLY VM on the vcloud host. It would be
very easy to tick that gate as met and walk into Stage 3 with no headend at all. The corrected
State section now says this explicitly.
What actually remains of Stage 2 (the real critical path): the three headend service VMs
(MAAS-region, NetBox, GitBucket) do not exist. Blocked on a genuine decision, not on typing:
Option A (modules/cloudinit-vm) needs user_data/meta_data/network_config designed and an image
source chosen; Option B is manual virt-install, logged as debt. Both cloudinit-vm and base-image
now at least VALIDATE (DOCFIX-194) -- they never had before.
Revert: git revert this commit (restores the stale, false status claims).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B6Fzre1CxCY8tzwFCudu57
|
DOCFIX-194: the OpenTofu gate was GREEN over two BROKEN modules
...
scripts/opentofu-validate.sh printed PASS on 2026-07-13 while node-vm and netem-link were flatly
broken -- neither could have applied, and one could not even init. Both are modules Stage 3 and
Stage 4 are built on.
ROOT CAUSE OF THE MISS: root-only validation. `tofu validate` against the ROOT module only parses
modules the root actually INSTANTIATES. A module that is not called -- or is called only from a
commented-out block -- is NEVER PARSED. Root calls dc-planes, dc-storage-pool, mesh-link,
office1-network, opnsense-edge. It does NOT call base-image, cloudinit-vm, maas-vm-host,
netem-link, node-vm -- exactly the set Stage 2 (cloudinit-vm, base-image) and Stage 3 (node-vm,
maas-vm-host, netem-link) depend on. They had never been parsed by any tool.
Only findable because a tofu binary now exists on the jumphost (OpenTofu v1.12.3). The tree was
authored in sessions with no binary to self-check -- exactly the risk opentofu/README.md flagged.
DEFECT 1 -- node-vm: libvirt_volume had a top-level `format = {...}`, which is not a real
attribute ("An argument named format is not expected here"). Schema-verified via
`tofu providers schema -json` (dmacvicar/libvirt v0.9.8): libvirt_volume has NO top-level
`format` -- it nests under `target`. modules/base-image had the correct nesting all along, which
is why it passed and node-vm did not. node-vm builds EVERY DC node (PXE-boot blanks); Stage 3/4
would have failed on first use. The module's own header said "VERIFY with tofu providers schema
-json before the first real apply" -- nobody could, until now.
DEFECT 2 -- netem-link: a destroy-time provisioner referenced var.*, which OpenTofu rejects AT
INIT ("Destroy-time provisioners ... may only reference attributes of the related resource, via
'self', 'count.index', or 'each.key'"). The module could not even initialize. It is the
DR/latency mechanism for Stage 3 and the Stage 6 failover drill. Fixed with the canonical
pattern: stash values in `input`, read back as self.input.*.
THE DURABLE FIX -- S3: the gate now validates EVERY module STANDALONE, in a temp copy (so it
never writes .terraform/ or a module-level lock file into the repo; only the ROOT lock file is
tracked, deliberately). The two bugs are one-line fixes; the real defect was the gate. A gate
that reports green over unparsed code is worse than no gate -- it manufactures confidence.
VERIFICATION: tests/opentofu-validate 9 PASS (T2 skipped -- cannot exercise the missing-binary
guard on a box that has the binary). T8 is the load-bearing case: a fixture whose ROOT IS VALID
and does NOT call a BROKEN module -- root-only validation reports PASS on it, so S3 must FAIL.
If T8 ever goes green, the blind spot is back. T9 proves T8 fails on the defect, not the fixture
shape. T10 covers all 10 real modules. Fixtures use terraform_data (a builtin), so no provider
download is needed.
Gate against the real tree: S1 PASS, S2 PASS, fmt clean, root validate clean, 10/10 modules PASS
standalone. Gauntlet ALL GREEN (53 harnesses); repo-lint 0 fail.
Nothing was instantiated; no live system is affected by either the bug or the fix.
Revert: git revert this commit (restores the two broken modules and the root-only gate).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B6Fzre1CxCY8tzwFCudu57
|
SAFETY SWEEP: mark the config.xml push path as a LIVE HAZARD (no behaviour change)
...
After D-113(a2) was proven (Office1's config is now API-managed), every instruction in the repo
that still said "render a config.xml and push it to the edge" became ACTIVELY DANGEROUS: a full
config.xml push replaces /conf/config.xml wholesale and drops ~667 migration-populated elements
(measured), including the only 2 firewall pass rules on the box. Following the old runbook steps
against the live edge would clobber it.
Warnings and headers only. No behaviour changes, no live system touched.
Marked (5 files):
runbooks/dc-dc-phase1-office1-standup.md DANGER banner; the config.xml render + config-ISO
sub-steps removed as RUNNABLE instructions (they
would clobber the live edge). Image-prep retained;
history preserved in git + the build changelog.
runbooks/dc-dc-phase2-tofu-dc-substrate.md STOP banner on Step 4.
scripts/opnsense-render-config.sh DANGER header at point-of-use. NOT dead: under
D-113(a2) it is to be reduced to a MINIMAL bootstrap
render. Until then, safe only for a brand-new,
not-yet-booted edge.
scripts/opnsense-build-config-iso.sh RETIRED header quoting the upstream source proving
the importer can never fire on a nano image.
docs/dc-dc-deployment-workflow.md STALE-CONTENT warning atop the tooling gap register.
THE SWEEP ALSO CAUGHT A PRE-EXISTING LANDMINE, unrelated to today's work: dc-dc-phase2 Step 4
still instructs building a CONFIG ISO for DC1's edge -- but D-112 established that ISO can never
be read (opnsense-importer probes for a read-only root; on a pre-installed nano the root is
writable and a factory /conf/config.xml already exists, so it bootstrap_and_exit 0's without
enumerating a single device). That runbook has been telling anyone who follows it to build an
inert artifact and then wonder why the edge came up on factory defaults -- which is EXACTLY the
day lost on 2026-07-12. It was never corrected at the source. Now it is. Its WAN_IF/LAN_IF
"chicken-and-egg" discussion is moot for the same reason: that problem only exists if you try to
seed a full config before first boot, and D-112(c) measures vtnetN AFTER boot.
Changelogs deliberately NOT touched -- they are history, not instructions. Marking history is
noise; marking instructions is safety.
Verification: opnsense-render-config 24 PASS, opnsense-build-config-iso 2 PASS, opnsense-api
21 PASS; repo-lint 0 fail.
STILL OPEN (the actual D-113(a2) migration): reduce the template to a minimal bootstrap, retire
the config-ISO path and the opnsense-edge module's config_seed/cdrom wiring, and rewrite Stage 3's
edge steps around the API. This sweep makes the repo SAFE, not FINISHED.
Revert: git revert this commit (restores the previous, dangerous instructions verbatim).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B6Fzre1CxCY8tzwFCudu57
|
CHECKPOINT 2026-07-13: session close (edge routing + serving DHCP; D-113(a2) proven)
...
Session-ledger checkpoint so a fresh session can resume cold.
LIVE STATE (measured): office1-opnsense is UP -- routing, NAT, egress 0.0% loss, serial console,
SSH key management, and kea-dhcp4 serving DHCP on udp/67 (pool .100-.199). 8 LAN pass rules in
pf. Nothing broken, nothing mid-flight.
LANDED TODAY:
1. DOCFIX-193 APPLIED -- DHCP live (was built-but-unapplied at last close)
2. SEC-005 -- GitBucket credential stored; unattended git push now WORKS (the branch had sat
12 commits ahead of origin for two days -- a real data-loss exposure, now closed)
3. SEC-006/007 -- the two known credential exposures put ON the ledger (prose only before)
4. D-113 RULED (a2): stay on OPNsense, move config to the REST API
5. D-113(a2) PROVEN END TO END, read AND write: API -> OPNsense -> Kea -> daemon.
scripts/opnsense-api.sh + harness (21 PASS); gauntlet 53 ALL GREEN.
THE ONE TRAP: DHCP on Office1 is now API-MANAGED. A full rendered config.xml push WOULD CLOBBER
IT. Do NOT run the old scp/install/reboot path against this edge until the template is reduced.
NEXT: reduce opnsense-config.xml.tmpl to a minimal bootstrap (sshd + root key + console) and move
DHCP/firewall/interfaces to the API. Repo work; no live mutation needed to land it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B6Fzre1CxCY8tzwFCudu57
|
D-113(a2) write path PROVEN on the live edge: API -> OPNsense -> Kea -> daemon
...
The read half was proven earlier today; this closes the other half. Configuration written
through the REST API reaches the running daemon. (a2) is now demonstrated end to end.
Executed (live, operator-approved, deliberately IDEMPOTENT -- the payload was the exact values
read back from the API moments before, so the edge's behaviour should not change; the point was
to exercise the WRITE path):
POST kea/dhcpv4/set_subnet/93473635-... -> {"result":"saved"}
POST kea/service/reconfigure -> {"status":"ok"}
GROUND TRUTH after the write (the API's {"result":"saved"} is only the service's own verdict):
kea-dhcp4 pid 30027 (RESTARTED), bound udp4 10.10.0.1:67
Kea's OWN generated /usr/local/etc/kea/kea-dhcp4.conf:
interfaces ['vtnet0'], subnet 10.10.0.0/24, pools ['10.10.0.100-10.10.0.199'],
routers 10.10.0.1, domain-name-servers 10.10.0.1
Router unaffected: WAN 172.30.1.2, LAN 10.10.0.1, default route 172.30.1.1, 8 LAN pass rules in
pf, egress to 1.1.1.1 at 0.0% packet loss.
Payload gotcha, measured -- do NOT infer this: a GET response is not directly re-POSTable.
OPNsense GET returns select fields as {value: {selected: 0|1}}; SET expects the comma-joined
selected values, so the GET must be flattened first. And kea/service/reconfigure is the apply
verb -- without it the config saves but the daemon never reloads.
CONSEQUENCE: the config.xml push path is now RETIRED IN PRACTICE for Office1. DHCP is
API-managed, so pushing a full rendered config.xml WOULD CLOBBER IT. Do not run the old
scp/install/reboot path against this edge. Reducing the template to a minimal bootstrap
(sshd + root key + console) is the next step under D-113(a2) and is NOT yet done.
Revert: re-POST the previous values (unchanged, so nothing to undo), or edit in the GUI at
Services > Kea DHCP > DHCPv4 > Subnets. Pre-API config.xml backups remain in /conf/backup/.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B6Fzre1CxCY8tzwFCudu57
|
D-113(a2) PROVEN: the OPNsense REST API round-trips the edge config
...
The API path adopted in D-113 is now demonstrated working against the LIVE Office1 edge,
closing the question that gated the ruling.
Measured:
GET core/firmware/status -> HTTP 200, OPNsense 26.1 (auth works)
GET kea/dhcpv4/get -> dhcpv4.general.enabled=1, interfaces=lan
POST kea/dhcpv4/search_subnet -> 1 row: subnet 10.10.0.0/24, pools 10.10.0.100-10.10.0.199,
option_data.routers 10.10.0.1, dns 10.10.0.1,
domain office1.vr1.cloud.neumatrix.local, descr "LAN DHCP"
The API reads back EXACTLY what we pushed via config.xml yesterday, and exposes it as TYPED,
NAMED FIELDS -- not free-form XML. That is the (a2) argument made concrete: DOCFIX-191 (missing
sshd), DOCFIX-192 (silenced console) and DOCFIX-193 (an inert ISC <dhcpd> block against a Kea
backend) are NOT EXPRESSIBLE here. You cannot omit a typed field that has a default, and you
cannot address the wrong DHCP backend when the endpoint IS the backend.
GUI gotcha worth recording (26.1): API keys are NOT created in the user-edit dialog, and NOT in
the ApiKeys tab -- that tab wires only search_api_key + del_api_key, so it can list and delete
but CANNOT create. Creation is a ROW ACTION on the Users list: the fa-ticket icon, "Create and
download API key for this user" (source: mvc/app/views/OPNsense/Auth/user.volt). Any instruction
saying "edit user -> API keys -> +" describes the OLD UI and is wrong for 26.1. ApiKeyField::add()
mints key+secret as base64(random_bytes(60)) and stores key|crypt(secret,'$6$') -- the secret is
shown EXACTLY ONCE.
API gotchas: response root key is `dhcpv4`, NOT `dhcp4` (the config XML element name differs from
the API key name -- do not infer one from the other). camelCase actions map to snake_case URLs:
searchSubnetAction -> POST /api/kea/dhcpv4/search_subnet.
SEC-007 amended: ~/vr1-office1-creds/ now also holds the OPNsense API key/secret (0600).
NOT DONE: no WRITE through the API yet -- that is a live mutation and stays gated. And the
config.xml template is still in place: DO NOT push a full rendered config.xml now, it would
clobber API-managed state. Next step is reducing the template to a MINIMAL bootstrap (sshd +
root key + console) and moving DHCP/firewall/interfaces to the API.
Revert: read-only against the edge + docs; nothing to undo. To revoke the credential: GUI ->
System > Access > Users > root row > ApiKeys tab -> delete, then rm ~/vr1-office1-creds/opnsense-api.txt
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B6Fzre1CxCY8tzwFCudu57
|
D-113(a2) step 1: thin OPNsense REST API client + harness
...
First delivery under the D-113 ruling (stay on OPNsense, move config off hand-authored
config.xml and onto the documented REST API).
scripts/opnsense-api.sh -- [--dry-run] <GET|POST> <api-path> [json-body]
tests/opnsense-api/run-tests.sh -- offline harness, 21 PASS, no network, no real key
Gauntlet ALL GREEN (53 harnesses, was 52). repo-lint 0 fail.
Design decisions that the harness now enforces:
- THE SECRET NEVER REACHES ARGV. Credentials are read from a file and handed to curl via
--config on STDIN. `curl -u key:secret` would put the secret in argv, where any user on the
box can read it out of `ps`. Harness T9 stubs curl with an argv recorder and asserts the
secret is absent from argv and present on stdin -- so a future "simplification" to `curl -u`
turns the harness red. That case is the point of the file.
- The API host is NEVER inferred (hard rule 2): $OPNSENSE_API_HOST unset is a loud failure, not
a silent default of 10.10.0.1 (T3).
- --insecure is deliberate and scoped: the edge's self-signed cert is REGENERATED ON EVERY BOOT
(measured -- "Created web GUI TLS certificate" appears in the config revision trail after each
reboot), so pinning it is pointless. Acceptable ONLY on the private lab LAN leg; never to be
copied to a tenant-facing surface.
- Dry-run reads no credentials (T11), which is what lets the harness prove URL construction
offline.
NOT RUN against the edge yet, and blocked on one thing: the API is alive (lighttpd on 443
answers 401) but root has 0 API keys. Minting one is a GUI action (System > Access > Users >
root > API keys), deliberately NOT automated -- writing apikeys into config.xml by hand is the
exact anti-pattern D-113 just retired. Key lands in ~/vr1-office1-creds/opnsense-api.txt,
operator-only, never read into agent context (SEC-007 covers that directory).
Proof-of-path once the key exists: drive yesterday's DHCP subnet through the API and confirm it
round-trips. If it does, the template retires to a minimal bootstrap config (sshd + root key +
console + apikey) and DHCP/firewall/interfaces move to the API. If it cannot express it, that is
the signal to revisit D-113.
Revert: git rm scripts/opnsense-api.sh && git rm -r tests/opnsense-api/ (nothing live touched).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B6Fzre1CxCY8tzwFCudu57
|
D-113 ADOPTED: option (a2) -- stay on OPNsense, move config to the REST API
...
Operator ruling 2026-07-13. Two constraints surfaced during the discussion narrowed the field
decisively, and both are recorded so the reasoning is not re-run from the wrong premise:
1. GUI ACCESS IS A REQUIREMENT (operator). This eliminates VyOS and plain-Linux outright --
neither has a GUI -- and both had been the leading candidates until it was stated.
2. VyOS LTS binaries are subscription-gated (verified against vyos.net/get and the Software
Access Subscription page). Free VyOS means the ROLLING release, a moving target that fights
this repo's appendix-B version-pinning discipline. Real friction, independent of the GUI.
Field reduced to OPNsense / pfSense CE / OpenWrt / IPFire. pfSense rejected (same GUI-owned XML
lineage -- a migration that buys nothing). OpenWrt was the credible alternative: its UCI config
is text-first BY DESIGN, structurally unlike OPNsense's GUI-owned config.xml. It loses on cost:
a new image pipeline, a fresh bootstrap problem, and dnsmasq instead of Kea -- all to escape a
problem that is fixable in place.
The ruling rests on this: the bug class was never OPNsense. It was hand-authoring config.xml
when OPNsense ships a documented REST API with mature Ansible collections that model exactly
what we got wrong (dhcp_subnet, firewall rules, system settings as typed resources). NONE of
DOCFIX-191/192/193 is expressible through the API -- you cannot forget to enable sshd in a
format where sshd is a typed field with a default. (a2) keeps the GUI, keeps a working
routing+DHCP edge, keeps the libvirt fixes, and removes the defect source.
(a1) config.xml templating is now explicitly REJECTED: its cost compounds per feature and it
depends on an undocumented self-heal of an internal format (the 667-element finding).
Live-edge recon (read-only): lighttpd listening on 443/80, API answers 401 (alive), root has
0 API keys. Minting a key via the GUI is the bootstrap step -- hand-editing apikeys into
config.xml would be the exact anti-pattern being retired.
Revert: git revert this commit (docs only; nothing migrated, nothing built).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B6Fzre1CxCY8tzwFCudu57
|
D-113 (PROPOSED): is OPNsense the right edge platform? -- and a confound in D-112
...
Operator asked, after a five-bug day, whether something is better suited than OPNsense for
the simulated edges. Written up with alternatives; NOT RULED.
Honest cost accounting: of the five bugs, TWO (DOCFIX-188 memory_unit, DOCFIX-190 ACPI) were
libvirt module bugs that would have hit any guest and whose fixes now protect every VR1 VM --
not OPNsense's fault. The other three (DOCFIX-191 no sshd/key, DOCFIX-192 no console,
DOCFIX-193 no DHCP) share ONE root cause: hand-authoring the appliance's internal, GUI-owned
config.xml. 2026-07-13 adds a fourth of the same kind -- a full-config push drops ~667
migration-populated elements including the only two firewall pass rules, and works ONLY
because OPNsense regenerates them on boot. We depend on an undocumented self-heal of an
internal format. That, not the boot bugs, is the ongoing cost.
THE CONFOUND, and the reason this is worth ruling rather than waving through: D-112 adopted
option (c) with the explicit rationale "C since it is the way people automate opnsense" --
i.e. the REST API (opn-cli, the Ansible collection). What we actually BUILT is config.xml
templating delivered over scp. That satisfies (c)'s letter (provision over the network, post
boot) but NOT the rationale it was ruled on. Every OPNsense-specific bug we are charging
against the platform is an artifact of hand-authoring XML -- precisely what the API exists to
avoid. So the fair comparison is not OPNsense vs VyOS; it is:
(a1) OPNsense + config.xml templating -- status quo; cost COMPOUNDS per feature
(a2) OPNsense + REST API -- what D-112's rationale actually called for
(b) VyOS -- blank-sheet best; discards a working edge
(c) plain Linux (nftables/Kea/FRR + cloud-init) -- max fidelity to our own tooling
(d) pfSense -- REJECT, same config-format lineage
Recommendation (operator rules): stay on OPNsense, and the real choice is a1 vs a2 -- I lean
a2. The hard part is done and measured working, and edges 2/3 reuse the module, so the cost
paid was one-time. But (a1) compounds, and (a2) is the honest reading of D-112's own ruling.
Rule BEFORE Stage 3: it builds two more edges from this module, so ruling later means
migrating three edges instead of one.
Revert: git revert this commit (docs only; nothing built or migrated).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B6Fzre1CxCY8tzwFCudu57
|
SEC-005: store a GitBucket credential on the jumphost so pushes stop failing
...
The jumphost clone could not push (could not read Username for https://git.baldurkeep.com),
which left this branch 12 commits ahead of origin for two days -- all the D-112 / OPNsense
edge work existed only on this box. Now fixed: credential.helper store + a dedicated PAT at
~/.git-credentials (mode 600), written by the operator via a hidden prompt. The token was
never read into agent context; the credential is verified by USING it, never by printing it.
Two GitBucket behaviours measured and recorded, because both cost a cycle:
1. The git username is NOT the web-UI login. The operator signs in with an email; that is
rejected for git transport. Measured against info/refs?service=git-receive-pack:
jesse.austin@neumatrix.com -> 401, JANeumatrix (the git user.name) -> 401,
jesse.austin -> 200 CAN PUSH. Note GitBucket 401s PAT basic-auth on /api/v3/ across the
board while accepting it for git -- so validating a credential against the API gives a
FALSE NEGATIVE. Validate against the receive-pack endpoint.
2. credential.helper store DELETES the stored credential when the server rejects it (git
calls credential reject on a 401). The first bad-username push therefore emptied
~/.git-credentials to 0 bytes, and the follow-up diagnostics were authenticating with an
empty string -- which read as a corrupt file and misdirected the investigation. If the
file mysteriously empties: the credential was rejected, it did not fail to write.
Tooling consequence: validate BEFORE writing.
SEC-005 is OPEN by operator ruling: a long-lived, account-wide PAT now sits in plaintext on
the jumphost (GitBucket has no per-repo token scoping, so the control is rotation, not
scope). Revoke/rotate at v1 close, or immediately if the jumphost is shared or rebuilt.
Revert: git config --global --unset credential.helper && rm -f ~/.git-credentials,
then revoke the token in GitBucket -> Account Settings -> Applications.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B6Fzre1CxCY8tzwFCudu57
|
DOCFIX-193 APPLIED: the Office1 edge now serves DHCP (kea-dhcp4 on udp/67)
...
Executed the live apply that DOCFIX-193 deliberately left pending. Measured end state
on root@10.10.0.1 after reboot: kea-dhcp4 running, bound udp4 10.10.0.1:67, subnet
10.10.0.0/24, pool .100-.199, routers/DNS 10.10.0.1. Router unaffected -- WAN 172.30.1.2,
LAN 10.10.0.1, default route 172.30.1.1, NAT automatic, egress 1.1.1.1 at 0.0% loss,
serial console + getty alive (DOCFIX-192 holds).
Path: render -> scp -> SHA-256 verify on guest (matched) -> install /conf/config.xml ->
reboot. Edge back in ~30s.
The finding that nearly bit us: a full-config push drops ~667 migration-populated
elements, including the ONLY 2 pass rules on the box ("Default allow LAN to any" + IPv6 --
legacy /filter/rule count is 0 in 26.1) against a pf base policy of block-drop-all.
Dropping them = an edge that boots but does not route. Settled NOT by inference but from
the box's own /conf/backup/ trail: three prior pushes of a rule-less config each came back
with both rules regenerated by run_migrations. Post-apply re-confirms it -- 791 elements,
both LAN rules back, webgui TLS cert back, and our Kea subnet4 survived the migration.
The overwrite is self-healing; do not hand-merge to preserve them.
Defect logged, not fixed here: root's shell on OPNsense is tcsh, so the pre-install
snapshot step (a $(...) inside a quoted remote command) died with "Illegal variable name"
and silently no-op'd -- the install ran without its rollback point. Config was recoverable
via /conf/config.xml.prev + /conf/backup/, so no harm, but the guard was absent when
relied upon. Remote commands must be fed to sh -s. The apply path wants to become a
harnessed scripts/opnsense-apply-config.sh; LOGGED as an open gap, out of scope here.
Not verified end-to-end: no client has taken a lease (office1-local has no host yet).
Revert: ssh root@10.10.0.1 'sh -s' <<< 'cp /conf/config.xml.prev /conf/config.xml && reboot'
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B6Fzre1CxCY8tzwFCudu57
|
| 2026-07-12 |
D-112(c) EXECUTED: the Office1 OPNsense edge is UP and ROUTING
...
End state, measured over SSH: office1-opnsense, OPNsense 26.1, WAN 172.30.1.2/24 static,
LAN 10.10.0.1/24, default route via 172.30.1.1, NAT active, and egress to the internet
WORKS through the simulated ISP (ping 1.1.1.1, 0% loss). Serial console restored
(kern.console=ttyu0, getty running). Managed over SSH with the service key.
Bootstrap: console (pexpect + virsh console) -> factory login -> config streamed as
base64, SHA-256 verified byte-exact, factory config backed up -> reboot. The DOCFIX-192
fix was then pushed OVER SSH -- the D-112(c) steady-state path proving itself.
Gotchas recorded in the ledger because each cost real time:
- Console settings need TWO reboots. OPNsense regenerates /boot.config and
/boot/loader.conf FROM config.xml *during* boot, so they only take effect on the NEXT
boot. After reboot #1 the loader files were already correct while the running kernel
was still on video. Do not conclude "the fix failed" after one reboot.
- /etc/ttys uses `onifconsole`: getty starts on ttyu0 only if ttyu0 IS the kernel
console. `sysctl kern.console` is ground truth.
- The guest's root shell is CSH (both via console and ssh). It rejects $(...) with
"Illegal variable name." Pipe POSIX scripts to `sh -s`.
- `virsh console` REFUSES a unix-socket chardev. The serial must be a pty + log file.
LEDGER CORRECTION: the 2026-07-12 entry claimed the rendered config provided
"DHCP .100-.199". That is FALSE -- there is NO DHCP configuration in the template at all
(no <dhcpd>, no <Kea>), and nothing serves DHCP on office1-local (measured: no
kea/dhcpd/dnsmasq process, nothing on udp/67). Another optimistic claim from the
max-context session. The operator's goal was "router + DHCP": the ROUTER half is DONE,
the DHCP half was never built. OPNsense 26.1 uses Kea (ISC dhcpd is gone), so this needs
the Kea schema verified upstream -- do not invent it.
repo-lint 0 fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y117t1F525ba9r1vXSBETk
|
D-112 ADOPTED: option (c) post-boot network provisioning (operator ruling)
...
Operator ruled (c): "C since it is the way people automate opnsense" -- prefer the
mainstream automation path (the OPNsense REST API, as used by opn-cli and the
Ansible OPNsense collection) over image-baking or a media-import trick. The
rendered config (opnsense-config.xml.tmpl) is REUSED unchanged; only the DELIVERY
mechanism changes.
IMPLEMENTATION NOT STARTED -- deliberately. "Push the config over the API" is not
actually reachable from a factory-default OPNsense, and the bootstrap sub-choices
are unruled. Recorded in D-112 so the next session does not discover this the hard
way:
1. NO ROUTE. Factory-default LAN is 192.168.1.1/24 on office1-local, an ISOLATED
libvirt network with no host leg on virbr2 (measured). The WAN side is reachable
at 172.30.1.126 but OPNsense blocks all inbound on WAN by default, so it is not
a way in.
2. NO CREDENTIALED API. The REST API authenticates with an API key+secret (not the
root password), minted via the GUI. SSH is disabled in the factory default.
3. OUR SERIAL IS WRITE-ONLY. The module attaches <serial type='file'> -- a one-way
capture that cannot be typed into. An interactive console means type='pty' +
virsh console (module change + recreate).
Sub-choices B1 (how to reach it) and B2 (how to authenticate first) are left
UNRULED in D-112 rather than picked.
SELF-CORRECTION recorded: I had earlier described option (b) as making the ISO
mechanism "work as designed, unchanged". That was over-claimed -- even with a
read-only root the importer prompts with a 7s timeout and asks for a device name,
so (b) may have been (d) in disguise. Logged so nobody revives (b) on my bad
summary. Note a console LOGIN SHELL is not the rejected (d): (d) was rejected for
racing the importer's 7s timeout; a login shell has no timing race.
The config-ISO path (opnsense-build-config-iso.sh + harness, the module's
config_seed volume + cdrom disk) is RETIRED but left in place -- it is inert, not
harmful. Remove it in the same change that lands (c), not before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y117t1F525ba9r1vXSBETk
|
D-112 (PROPOSED): OPNsense Config Importer cannot fire on a nano image -- by design
...
Bug 3 of the Office1 edge boot. With memory (DOCFIX-188) and ACPI (DOCFIX-190)
fixed, OPNsense boots -- but on FACTORY DEFAULTS. The config ISO was never read.
Root cause is architectural, not a bug. rc.syshook.d/import/20-importer runs
`opnsense-importer -b`, whose first act is:
INSTALL="/.probe.for.readonly"
touch ${INSTALL} 2> /dev/null
if [ -f ${INSTALL} -a -f /conf/config.xml ]; then
bootstrap_and_exit 0
fi
That touch is a PROBE FOR A READ-ONLY ROOT. On installer media root is read-only,
the touch fails, the marker is absent, and the importer scans attached media
(cd9660 included). On a pre-installed nano the root is WRITABLE and a factory
/conf/config.xml already exists -- so both conditions hold and it exits
immediately, never enumerating a single device.
Our ISO was correct all along: verified ISO9660 'OPNSENSE_CFG' containing
CONF/CONFIG.XML with our 10.10.0.1, and the guest sees it as cd0 at exactly the
right byte size. Nothing was ever going to read it.
The README's research correctly established that the Importer's scan path supports
ISO9660 -- but never that the Importer RUNS on a nano image. It does not. The
module header has always flagged this mechanism UNVERIFIED; that flag is now
discharged NEGATIVE.
Recorded as D-112 PROPOSED with four options (bake config into the image / switch
to the installer image / post-boot API push / serial expect-scripting). NOT
implemented -- this replaces the config-delivery mechanism of a built surface and
also gates Stage 3, so it is the operator's ruling to make.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y117t1F525ba9r1vXSBETk
|
DOCFIX-190: second boot bug -- libvirt domains had ACPI disabled (FreeBSD kernel panic)
...
With DOCFIX-188's memory fix in place the guest finally got its 2 GiB, the kernel
reached interrupt initialisation, and hit a SECOND defect the first bug had masked:
panic: running without device atpic requires a local APIC
apic_init() ... mi_startup() ... db>
None of the three VM modules emitted a `features` block, so libvirt rendered
`-machine pc-i440fx-noble,...,acpi=off`. FreeBSD gets its local APIC from ACPI's
MADT table and the OPNsense kernel has no atpic fallback, so with ACPI off it has
no usable interrupt controller. The guest parks in the ddb debugger -- which is
the 100%-of-one-core spin, while virsh still reports the domain as "running".
Fix: features = { acpi = true, apic = {} } in opnsense-edge, cloudinit-vm and
node-vm. node-vm matters most long term: MAAS drives power via ACPI signalling,
so without it graceful shutdown / MAAS power-off would never have worked.
Guard S2 added. Like memory_unit, `tofu validate` cannot catch this -- the whole
features block is optional, so its absence is schema-valid. Flag renamed
--static-only (--check-memory-unit kept as a back-compat alias). Harness 4 -> 6
PASS; fixtures/s2-bad PASSES S1 and still FAILS S2, proving the guards catch
independent classes rather than one masking the other.
LIVE RESULT (measured): acpi=on; kernel boots to userland; CPU idle, no spin;
DHCP lease 172.30.1.126 hostname "OPNsense" on office1-wan. Both boot bugs closed.
STILL OPEN: the Configuration Importer did not apply -- OPNsense came up on
factory defaults. The ISO is verified well-formed (ISO9660 OPNSENSE_CFG containing
CONF/CONFIG.XML with our 10.10.0.1). This is the mechanism the module header has
always flagged UNVERIFIED. Do not guess the fix; read the Importer's console
output. The unanswered WAN ping is NOT a fault -- OPNsense blocks inbound on WAN.
Gauntlet-relevant suites green; repo-lint 0 fail; tofu fmt/validate clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y117t1F525ba9r1vXSBETk
|
DOCFIX-189: re-audit the max-context session's troubleshooting + docs
...
Operator-instructed re-evaluation. The 2026-07-12 session authored its docs and
module comments WHILE WORKING FROM A WRONG DIAGNOSIS, at a context limit, so its
reasoning was re-checked rather than just its one-line bug (DOCFIX-188).
Headline: the settings it changed are mostly fine and are RETAINED. The reasoning
it recorded was not -- it attributed the fault to whatever knob was being turned,
on no evidence, four separate times. It also left one silently-dead knob.
FALSE CAUSAL CLAIMS (corrected at the source, opnsense-edge/main.tf). The disk
shape, q35->i440fx, the serial console and svm-disable were EACH written up as a
contributing cause. None changed the symptom -- the fault sat at a deterministic
262 bytes through all of them. All four settings RETAINED (each defensible on its
own merits); only the false justifications are gone. The serial console earned its
keep, but it REVEALED the fault, it did not change it.
DEAD KNOB (real functional defect). `disk_size_bytes = 16 GiB` did nothing once
DOCFIX-187 made the disk a direct copy; unused variables are legal HCL so neither
validate nor plan complained. MEASURED: the live disk is 11.00 GiB, not 16.
Removed from main.tf + module variables; real sizing is opnsense-prep-image.sh's
GROW (+8G). Proof it was dead: tofu plan is byte-identical before/after removal.
STALE/UNSOURCED FACTS. "Opteron_G3" is a red herring -- the host is really an AMD
EPYC 9965 (Zen 5, family 26); libvirt's CPU-model DB doesn't know family 26 and
falls back to the oldest name, and the prior session partly built its nested-virt
theory on that artifact. "OPNsense's 3 GB min" is unsourced -- annotated, do not
propagate. DOCFIX-186's backing_store parenthetical is stale (same conclusion,
different mechanism). DOCFIX-187's changelog gains a SUPERSEDED-IN-PART header.
KEPT: DOCFIX-186's apparmor + config-iso-staging findings are real and measured.
DOCFIX-185 (operator transport ruling) untouched.
STANDING LESSON: when a change does not fix the symptom, do not write it up as
though it did. A fault that is deterministic and immune to every knob you turn
means you have not yet touched the cause.
Gauntlet ALL GREEN (52); repo-lint 0 fail; tofu fmt/validate/plan clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y117t1F525ba9r1vXSBETk
|
DOCFIX-188 followup: correct the pass criteria (anchor on virsh dominfo, not the QEMU -m string)
...
libvirt normalizes MiB to KiB in the QEMU cmdline, so '-m size=2097152k' would be
SUCCESS, not failure -- the original criterion would have read a correct boot as a
failed one. Anchor on 'virsh dominfo' Max memory, which is unambiguous. Also: re-run
plan AFTER the undefine (the captured in-place plan is not what executes), and
pre-stage the two fallbacks (provider ignores memory_unit -> *1024; boots but no
router -> sizing, not a regression).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y117t1F525ba9r1vXSBETk
|
DOCFIX-188: root-cause the OPNsense boot triple-fault -- libvirt memory_unit (guest had 2 MiB)
...
The 2026-07-12 triple-fault was never a CPU/nesting/machine/console problem.
dmacvicar/libvirt >=0.9 reinterprets `memory` as raw libvirt units (KiB), not
MiB (the 0.8-era meaning the modules were authored against). With no
`memory_unit`, `memory = 2048` rendered `<memory unit='KiB'>2048</memory>` ->
QEMU `-m size=2048k` = 2 MiB. boot2 fits in 2 MiB and echoes /boot.config;
/boot/loader does not -- hence the deterministic 262-byte fault, immune to every
knob the prior window turned.
Measured every hop: module input -> tofu state -> domain XML -> virsh dominfo
(Max memory: 2048 KiB) -> live QEMU cmdline.
FOUNDATIONAL: the identical defect was latent in all three VM modules --
opnsense-edge (live blocker), cloudinit-vm (MAAS/NetBox/GitBucket, the next
step), node-vm (Stage 3). Every VR1 VM would have gotten 1024x too little RAM.
- memory_unit = "MiB" on all three libvirt_domain resources (memory_mib = 2048
value untouched -- it now means the 2 GiB always intended).
- Corrected the disproven "svm is ROOT CAUSE" comment in opnsense-edge; the
setting is retained as legitimate hardening, the false claim is not.
- Guard: opentofu-validate.sh S1 + --check-memory-unit flag. `tofu validate`
cannot catch this (memory_unit is optional => omitting it is schema-valid,
which is exactly how it shipped). Harness T3 is a true negative test: the
fixture IS the shipped defect. Harness 1 -> 4 PASS.
- Incident report gains a READ-THIS-FIRST box so nobody re-chases the CPU theories.
Gauntlet ALL GREEN (52 harnesses); repo-lint 0 fail; tofu fmt/validate clean.
Live boot verification remains a separately-gated operator step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y117t1F525ba9r1vXSBETk
|
DOCFIX-187: opnsense-edge module boot fixes + boot-triple-fault incident report
...
Office1 OPNsense edge first-boot debugging. Several correct module fixes made;
the boot is NOT yet resolved (BTX-loader triple-fault under double-nested virt),
documented as an OPEN incident for the next session.
Module (opentofu/modules/opnsense-edge/main.tf), all kept (a working config
needs them, none resolved the fault):
- serial console (nano is serial-only; the module had none) + boot-log capture
- machine q35 -> i440fx (pc)
- disk COW-overlay -> direct per-VM copy (matches virt-install --import)
- CPU host-passthrough with AMD svm disabled (documented AMD nested-virt fix;
note the provider key is `features` plural, not `feature`)
Incident report docs/incident-20260712-opnsense-edge-boot-triplefault.md: full
symptom (boot2 echoes /boot.config then triple-faults loading /boot/loader, a
consistent 262-byte fault confirmed fresh each boot), environment (double-nested
AMD Opteron_G3), everything tried, and ranked next steps (full CPU flags
+kvm_pv_eoi/+kvm_pv_unhalt, add a video device for the -D dual console, mem 4G,
UEFI/OVMF, outer-hypervisor CPU). Ledger checkpoint added; session at context
limit.
repo-lint 0 fail; module tofu validate Success.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
Office1 OPNsense edge build: real-ISP-router config + first-boot fixes
...
Bringing the Office1 OPNsense edge online (router + DHCP for office1-local)
before the Office1 NetBox VM. First-ever OPNsense boot in this repo; several
first-execution findings fixed.
DOCFIX-184: opnsense-prep-image.sh decompresses the .img.bz2 via python3's
stdlib bz2 when bunzip2 is absent (no sudo install needed). Harness 3/3.
DOCFIX-185: the OPNsense edge is a normal simulated-ISP router, not an
egress-airgap. Operator clarified the transport model -- each site (DCs +
Office) has its own real ISP connection; dark fiber is East-West/replication
only; D-107 node-airgap is a separate DC concern. Stripped the WAN
egress-control rules (seq 20/21/99) + MIRROR_* tokens from the config template,
render script, and harness (8/8). Flagged a D-100/D-107 amendment note as
follow-up.
DOCFIX-186: instantiate module "office1_opnsense" in main.tf (first real
validation of modules/opnsense-edge). Two infra findings: (1) config_iso_path
must be OUTSIDE the pool dir (create.content.url collides with its own target
volume) -> stage the ISO; (2) apparmor blocks the custom /var/lib/libvirt/vr1/
pool path (foundational -- all VR1 VMs) -> needs a one-time local apparmor rule
(operator sudo). office1-wan NAT network created via virsh (D-103 debt).
repo-lint 0 fail; opnsense-prep-image 3/3; opnsense-render-config 8/8.
Boot blocked only on the apparmor fix (pending operator sudo).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
| 2026-07-11 |
D-111: align VR1 v6 subcarve to deployed NN mnemonic; fix ULA-gen doc bug
...
Basing VR1 NetBox on the real netbox.baldurkeep.com modeling (operator
directive). A read-only live export confirmed VR0-DC0/Willamette use an NN
net-byte mnemonic with /60-per-plane + /64-active; dc-dc-prefixes-import.py
did not match it (arbitrary contiguous indices, /64-only).
DOCFIX-182 / D-111: carve_v6 replaces carve_ula/carve_gua -- provider :10
(+API-VIP :11) GUA, metal /60 shared by admin :20 / internal :21, data :30,
storage :40, repl :50, all /60+/64 ULA; the ULA /56 is indexed to the GUA site
nibble so the 4th hextet reads DC.NN in both families. Direct-math _sub_at (no
subnet enumeration -- preserves the DOCFIX-181 no-hang property). Harness
40 -> 53 PASS. D-111 ADOPTED in design-decisions.md; scope-doc sub-decision #1
ratified.
DOCFIX-183: fix the invalid-IPv6 ULA-generation sed in the netem/ULA proposal
doc (4+6 -> 2+4+4 hextets, caught by actually running it); ratified VR1 ULA is
fd50:840e:74e2::/48.
repo-lint 0 fail; tests/dc-dc-prefixes-import 53/53.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
| 2026-07-10 |
DOCFIX-181: fix carve_gua subnet-enumeration hang (gauntlet was stalling)
...
netbox/dc-dc-prefixes-import.py::carve_gua() list()-ed every /64 subnet of the
GUA prefix (2**24 = ~16.7M for D-101's /40 example) only to use the first ->
hung/OOM. Real import runs would hang identically, not just the test. Fixed to
take the first /64 lazily via next() (O(1)).
Added a faulthandler watchdog to tests/dc-dc-prefixes-import/test_logic.py so a
future blocking regression self-aborts with a traceback after 30s instead of
silently stalling the whole run-tests-all.sh gauntlet -- the false-green that
let the ledger claim "40/40" for a test that never actually completed.
tests/dc-dc-prefixes-import: 40/40 in 0.05s (was: hung indefinitely).
Full gauntlet: ALL GREEN (52 harnesses). repo-lint 0 fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
DC-DC Stage 1 (dc-dc-phase0): first real execution + scaffold/tooling fixes
...
First end-to-end run of a DC-DC runbook against real infrastructure (vcloud host,
OpenTofu v1.12.3). Applied 13 libvirt objects (6 DC1 planes, dc1/office1/dc2
pools, office1-local, 3 mesh legs, all MTU 9000); prior VR0 nets torn down (wan
kept as a gap-#17 model); DC2 planes deferred (NetBox supernet), DC2 storage wired.
DOCFIX-178: scripts/prereqs/ idempotent workstation prereq installers + a
Prerequisites section in the runbook + tests/prereqs/ (25/25). Runbooks must
not assume prereq runtimes.
DOCFIX-179: OpenTofu scaffold first validation + apply. Per-module
required_providers (child modules do NOT inherit provider SOURCE -> OpenTofu
inferred nonexistent hashicorp/libvirt); tofu fmt -recursive; provider "maas"
deferred to Stage 3 (kept a sensitive key out of Stage-1 plan/state);
repo-lint now skips the .terraform/ provider cache; .terraform.lock.hcl added.
DOCFIX-180: dc-dc-phase0 runbook as-executed corrections folded in at phase
close (two MTU domains, non-pristine-host handling, Step-9 13-resource plan,
-input=false, Known-Gap resolved).
repo-lint 0 fail; prereqs harness 25/25; repo-lint harness 34/34.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
